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For those who were part of this 16-year research journey: the Egress 
sisterhood – Nan Theingi, Khin Moe Samm, Thei Su San, Phyo Thandar and 
my Myanmar family – Aung Htun, Nwe Nwe San and their daughter Mia.
Figure 0.1 Khin Moe Samm, Phyo Thandar, Nan Theingi and Nwe Nwe 
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IntroductIon 1
Introduction
A policy window for change
The landslide election victory of the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) in 2015 offered a window for change – a so called ‘policy window’ 
(Marshall, 2000) – to lead Myanmar’s reform process according to the 
original NLD values that included a left-leaning view of social justice and 
the empowerment of the poorest and most disadvantaged communities 
as a part of the political and economic transformation of Myanmar.1 
This book, written from mid-2019 to mid-2020, is a snapshot taken 
towards the end of the first five years of NLD rule, evaluating the progress 
made, nevertheless casting an eye on the future of Myanmar beyond the 
2020 elections.
The reality on the ground after almost ten years of reforms – five 
years under President Thein Sein and almost five years under Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi – does not point to a social justice agenda. The most 
marginalised remain at the fringes. A recent report by the Myanmar 
Information Management Unit (MIMU) on vulnerability bears out how 
the reforms are failing the wider Myanmar population and exacerbating 
inequalities (MIMU, 2018). This multi-sectoral review holds that 
Myanmar’s success in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) largely depends on how well the government targets the poorest 
and most marginalised in society. In its summary findings, the report 
points to the urban–rural differences as follows (MIMU, 2018: 2):
Stark disparities were found in living conditions and economic 
freedoms between the residents of urban and rural areas: 72% of 
rural villages are not electrified and persons in rural areas have 
markedly lower access to safe drinking water and sanitation; 
educational outcomes vary significantly and secondary school 
attendance in rural areas is half of that in urban areas.
Figure 0.2 Map of Myanmar. Source: CartoGIS Services, College of 
Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.
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With regard to health, the report again shows the stark disparities that 
are not being alleviated by the reforms (MIMU, 2018: 3):
There are wide geographic, ethnic and socio-economic disparities; 
infant mortality rates are highest in the districts of Labutta in 
Ayeyarwady and Mindat in Chin, whereas Magway, Sagaing and 
Tanintharyi have particularly high early years mortality rates. 
Children in rural areas are more likely to be chronically under-
nourished (32% stunting) than those in urban areas (20%).
With regard to education the report finds (MIMU, 2018: 3):
Literacy is particularly low in Shan State which accounts for 18 of 
the 19 townships countrywide where more than half of children 
have never attended school; Mongkhet township is especially 
prominent with 85% of children never having attended school. 
Other townships with particularly high numbers of persons with 
no education are in Kayin, Magway and Rakhine. Children from 
rural families, poor or otherwise disadvantaged groups are less 
likely to transition from primary to secondary education, or to 
complete their secondary education.
Much of this is of course the legacy of decades of junta rule, yet the 
decade of reforms could have made a significant difference if development 
priorities had targeted the most vulnerable – the poor and conflict-
affected communities.
In part, the types of development being prioritised is due to the inter-
national aid and development community, whose philosophy comes from 
a neo-liberal tradition, and who are driving the reform process. This has 
resulted in too much being changed at once, with tight targets exceeding 
the capacities of local departments and organisations. It has also resulted 
in large development contracts being awarded to Western firms who have 
little knowledge of Myanmar2 rather than supporting bottom-up grassroots 
civil society and local NGOs who understand the local context.3 The kind 
of development taking place is nevertheless also due to the gap between 
NLD policy and priorities, between what was promised and what this 
first NLD Government is actually delivering. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has 
changed the tune of the government, asking local people to look to each 
other for help and support rather than to the state (McCarthy, 2019).
While the reforms have not yet resulted in Myanmar adopting an 
overall market approach to public services, including education, the 
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Myanmar Government ministries are adopting other aspects of neo-
liberalism – including the vocabulary of efficiency and effectiveness. The 
‘market’ is being looked at to offer choice to the urban middle classes. 
Some reforms are being rolled out to improve the lives of the majority 
rural and poor population by improving the quality of the government 
services, but Myanmar’s first democratic decade has seen a dramatic 
increase in the inequalities between urban and rural, middle classes 
and poorer sections of society. This is disappointing to many Myanmar 
citizens4 who had put all their hopes into Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and 
her NLD Government. They had not expected much from the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) Government led by President 
Thein Sein that ruled from 2011 to 2015 that was largely viewed as no 
more than a political vehicle for the military. There was a clear expectation 
that once the NLD obtained power, the country would be governed in a 
manner that would strive to bring equality and justice to all. People 
did not use the term ‘social justice’, but in effect that is what they were 
referring to when speaking about access to education and health and 
public services, no matter where they lived and from what ethnic group 
they originated.
Today, the NLD has been in power for almost five years and people 
across the country complain about having been let down. Some look for 
excuses, for example, that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has not had a free hand 
in governing the country, but must constantly appease the military. Yet 
many know that the military contingent in parliament5 is not preventing 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from delivering on their hopes. In fact, there was 
more than hope, rather the many promises in the 2015 NLD election 
manifesto that all reflect the issues that one would group under ‘social 
justice’, even if this exact term was not used.6
One of the overall promises in the NLD election manifesto (priority 
3 of 4) was: ‘To change the lives of our people, the NLD will strive for 
a system of government that will fairly and justly defend the people’ 
(NLD, 2015: 4). With regard to ethnic affairs and peace the NLD 
promises ‘solidarity with all ethnic groups’ and ‘principles of freedom, 
equal rights and self-determination’ (NLD, 2015: 5). This is also reflected 
in the section in the Constitution (NLD, 2015: 6) where the NLD 
promises: ‘to guarantee ethnic rights’ and ‘to defend and protect the 
equal rights of citizens’. In particular, the NLD mentions agricultural 
workers (NLD, 2015: 11) and states that ‘farmers’ rights and economic 
well-being must be secure’. Workers (NLD, 2015: 14) are being promised 
the following:
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• ‘We will establish opportunities for workers to develop their skills 
and expertise.
• We will implement policies aimed at ensuring that workplaces are 
safe and fair for all, and that workers receive an appropriate salary.
• No worker should be discriminated against, and every worker 
should receive equal compensation for equivalent work.
• Every worker shall have the right to freely establish and be part of 
workers’ organisations that protect their rights and benefits.
• We will end all forms of forced labour.’
In order to secure these opportunities for workers and agricultural 
workers, the NLD promises to: ‘strive to establish access to electricity 
in all areas, both urban and rural’ (NLD, 2015: 19) and the urban 
poor, many of whom are migrants from conflict and disaster areas are 
promised to be rehoused: ‘We will establish, as quickly as possible, a 
programme for the rehousing of homeless migrants, who have moved to 
the cities as a result of natural disasters, economic opportunities, and 
land confiscation’ (NLD, 2015: 25). Women are also promised equality 
(NLD, 2015: 22):
• ‘We will strive to ensure that existing laws are implemented 
effectively so that women in all sectors – whether government, 
business, or social – have equal rights with men.
• We will take action as necessary to end the persecution, insecurity, 
violence, and other forms of harassment and bullying suffered by 
women.
• We will work to ensure that female workers receive the same 
compensation as their male counterparts for equivalent work, and 
that there is no gender discrimination with regard to workplace 
promotions.’
And most importantly for this book, with regard to education (NLD, 
2015: 15), the NLD promises the following:
• ‘We will prioritise the needs of schools in less-developed areas 
where schools currently lack necessary facilities and equipment, in 
order to make middle school and high school education more 
accessible to all.
• For the improvement of the quality of life of people with limited 
educational qualifications, we will establish opportunities for 
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further education through programmes for continuing basic middle 
and high school study, and in-school and out-of-school vocational 
training opportunities of equivalent standard.
• We will establish effective education services that do not place a 
burden on parents and communities.’
As can be seen from the above, the 2015 election manifesto did indeed 
promise social justice, despite the absence of this term.7 The social justice 
framework cuts across the various chapters, as education is a key element 
if one is to build a just and equal society, and it is crucial for other reforms 
to succeed. The fact that the promises made by the NLD go well beyond 
the education sector strengthens the case this book is making.
After the manifesto, the election: November 2015 – 
Myanmar’s first free and fair election since 19908
On Sunday 8 November 2015, Myanmar went to the polls with more 
than 90 parties contesting seats for the two houses of parliament as 
well as the 14 state and regional assemblies. Despite the large number 
of parties, all eyes were on the opposition NLD and the regime USDP. 
The NLD swept the polls. In order to control the government, the NLD 
needed 67 per cent of the seats (or 329 seats), as 25 per cent were 
allocated to unelected appointees of the military; but the NLD did far 
better than this, winning almost 80 per cent of elected seats. Crossing 
this threshold meant that Myanmar could become a very different 
country – it offered a policy window to transform Myanmar. The losing 
military-based USDP was bitterly disappointed with the result, yet 
despite this, neither the military nor the USDP tried to hinder the transfer 
of power in any way.
The elections were followed by an almost three-month transition 
period during which time the old government was still in power. The 
new parliament convened only after the old parliament dissolved on 
30 January 2016. The NLD’s first task was to select a new President, 
as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD, was barred by the 
constitution from the position due to her having sons with British 
citizenship. To circumvent this restriction, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
declared that she would be ‘above the president’ in all the decisions – a 
promise she has kept. In any event, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s close 
childhood friend Htein Kyaw9 was appointed to the presidency and the 
post of ‘State Councillor’ was created for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.10
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The challenges faced by the National League 
for Democracy (NLD)
After winning the election, the NLD’s first challenge was to develop 
cordial relations with the military. Myanmar has mainland Southeast 
Asia’s largest standing army, and the constitution guarantees their place 
in parliament, and together with their control over key ministries they 
remain significant stakeholders in the political system. The NLD had 
to find a way to cooperate with the Chief of Staff as well as the military 
members of parliament (MPs). The NLD’s campaign pledge to alter the 
Constitution, and in particular change Article 436 which ensured a 
veto by the military for any constitutional change, was likely to bring 
the party into conflict with the military leadership, and as such it was 
quickly shelved.
The second major challenge was to rule and administer the country. 
The NLD did not do much in this regard between 2012 and 2015 as 
they had only 43 MPs. With the exception of wanting to change the 
constitution, the NLD campaign was devoid of clear and detailed policy 
priorities, keeping things rather general and focusing on promising major 
changes. As seen above, the NLD manifesto did, however, promise to 
govern the country on the lines of social justice, promising to represent 
the poorest and most disadvantaged in society.
The main challenge facing the new Myanmar Government at the 
time of the transfer of power was addressing the country’s ethnic and 
religious tensions. An ultra-nationalist Buddhist movement led by monks 
– called Ma Ba Tha (‘Society for the Protection of Race and Religion’) 
had gained traction since 2012 and had been fuelling anti-Muslim 
sentiment across the country. Ma Ba Tha’s influence not only resulted 
in four ‘race and religion protection laws’ being passed in 2014 (which 
clearly discriminate against Muslims), it also resulted in Muslim electoral 
candidates not being able to contest seats in the election, and not one 
of the 1,051 NLD candidates was a Muslim. The result has been a 
parliament without a single Muslim MP, despite about 4 per cent of 
Myanmar’s population identifying as Muslim. At the time of the elections 
in November 2015 (and in the subsequent four years), the NLD did not 
speak up for the disenfranchised Rohingya for fear of being branded a 
‘foreigner friendly’ party.
Another challenge to unity and fairness included the representation 
of ethnic people, as around 38 per cent of Myanmar’s population are 
ethnic minorities and there are a large number of ethnic political parties.11 
In 2010, the ethnic MPs formed the first legal opposition to the USDP 
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dominated parliament. Despite local ethnic leaders’ misgivings (Lall 
et al., 2015) the NLD fielded candidates in all ethnic majority areas. 
Consequently, many locals feared the vote would be split, leading to an 
end of the vibrant ethnic politics that had been an unforeseen result 
of the 2010 elections. After the ballots had been counted, it was clear that 
the NLD had displaced most of the ethnic parties.12 The main reason 
for this result appears to be that a large number of ethnic parties had 
been created to contest the 2015 elections, but subsequently, the ethnic 
electorate seems to have decided that if the country was to change, a 
united vote for the NLD was going to be more powerful than many small 
ethnic parties with little mandate. The lack of a clearly defined ethnic 
voice in parliament was, however, to have grave consequences for equal 
representation. The NLD has always maintained that democracy is their 
first priority and ethnic grievances can be addressed later. Given the 
protracted peace process with the ethnic armed groups, a sizeable ethnic 
representation would have been essential so as to represent the ethnic 
civilian voice.
At the time of the electoral win in November 2015, euphoria 
across Myanmar’s electorate was high. The results that they had been 
denied in 1990 came through 25 years later. People expected the NLD to 
transform the country. However, in the past five years there have been 
increasing voices of discontent, and at the time of writing – as the NLD is 
completing its fifth year in power – the overall mood across Myanmar has 
changed from hope to resignation. The list of challenges confronting the 
government seem almost unchanged from when the NLD took power, 
with the country’s progress seemingly stalled, stuck in quagmires for 
which there are no easy solutions.
The key issue remains the stagnant peace process, and more 
specifically how to link the wider reforms and the peace process. The 
lack of decentralisation means that ethnic states still do not have the 
required mandate to engage with issues specific to their state or their 
ethnic groups, which is underpinned by the lack of ethnic voices in 
parliament and in wider politics, as mentioned above. Whilst the NLD 
does have ethnic MPs in certain areas, they have not been able to speak 
up specifically for local and ethnic issues as ethnic parties had done in 
the past.13
Other problems include the lack of freedom of expression for the 
press,14 the lack of decentralisation of power (even within ministries), 
and stagnating economic growth that rather than delivering inclusive 
development is widening the gap between urban and rural, rich and 
poor.15 Ministries are working towards change according to strategic 
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plans that they have co-developed with development partners, however, 
many have reached a point where they cannot take any more capacity 
building, nor spend the aid money that has been allocated to drive 
change. While ministries are supposed to drive change in all sectors, the 
lack of agency they are allowed at different levels means the direction of 
instructions remains top-down, begging the question of how Myanmar 
will ever move to a more participatory administration. The lack of agency 
is also due to the deep mistrust the NLD holds of the civil service: ‘due to 
the military background and loyalties of many bureaucrats’ (Stokke 
et al., 2018: 12). The role of the international community is not blameless 
in these developments, as the lack of coordination between development 
partners means that ministries are pushed and pulled in different 
directions, and those most senior (such as director generals) have to cope 
with unbearable workloads to try to keep all the funders happy.
A defining feature of Myanmar’s reform journey has been the 
contestations over narratives and understandings of citizenship and 
national identity. There has been a growing sense that Buddhism as part 
of the national identity has served to discriminate and divide rather 
than unite. An increasingly large number of citizens within the Buddhist 
ethnic groups (i.e. not only the Bamar) equate citizenship with religion, 
or seem to think that in order to be a Myanmar citizen one must also 
be Buddhist (Lall et al., 2014). This religious nationalism that reared 
its head earlier this decade has not been dealt with carefully, and has 
alienated other groups with different religious identities. Debates in the 
press and social media have been galvanised by the crisis in Rakhine that 
has pitted Buddhists and Muslims against each other, however, the issue 
is central across ethnic states as well. It has of course also deeply affected 
Myanmar’s image abroad as countries that have supported Myanmar’s 
transition have turned to castigating the government for not doing 
enough for the Muslims in northern Rakhine. At the heart of this issue is 
Myanmar’s decades of unequal treatment of ethnic groups, a clear social 
justice issue.
At this point in 2020, just before the next elections, it is therefore 
pertinent to ask about the NLD’s vision for the reform process. It is unclear 
what is driving the choice of priorities.16 Coming from a left wing political 
tradition that espouses the state’s responsibility towards its citizens 
through the provision of public services underpinned by social equality, 
the NLD’s key promise was to deliver reforms and social justice if it came 
to power. Some change is indeed evident, but the country is not united in 
these changes, and a relatively small urban elite is benefitting far more 
from the reform process than is the wider population. In fact, Daw Aung 
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San Suu Kyi has asked citizens to rely on themselves rather than look to 
the state (McCarthy, 2019).
As seen above, there is a widening gap between rural and urban 
Myanmar, at social, economic and political levels. Inflation has made 
the income divide between the urban middle classes and rural poor 
much starker. Land is now at a premium, so the agricultural poor are 
losing their livelihoods to development schemes, not least due to the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that are being created 
to bring more foreign investment to Myanmar. Social justice has not 
been sufficiently part of the reform agenda, despite it being promised 
as a pillar by President Thein Sein in his inaugural speech in 2011, 
reiterated in his 2015 New Year message and then taken up as an NLD 
campaign pledge. The only difference with ‘before’ is that now those 
who have been wronged can protest, so there are loud and visible 
protests about land ownership and other social justice concerns. This 
widening gap and the trajectory Myanmar is on raises questions about 
the commitment to social justice that the NLD chose as a basis for its 
political mandate.
Social justice in a neo-liberal era
Myanmar is of course not alone and the global context shows that 
inequality has been on the rise. Brown and Lauder pointed out that since 
the 1970s, the income share of the richest 20 per cent of the world’s 
population as compared to the poorest 20 per cent of the world’s 
population increased from 30:1 to 61:1 (Brown and Lauder, 2003). 
Alvaredo et al. in ‘The World Inequality Report’ (Alvaredo et al., 2018) 
note that inequality has increased everywhere in the world despite 
substantial geographical differences, with the richest 1 per cent twice 
as wealthy as the poorest 50 per cent. This widening gap, both within 
countries and between countries, raises global questions around equality 
and social justice. There are broadly two opposing policy views regarding 
social justice – one emanating from social democracy based on social 
relationships and the needs of people within a community, and another, 
neo-liberal view that believes that social justice can be achieved through 
market individualism where people get what they deserve, rejecting 
any redistributive notions. The two positions represent very different, 
contrasting views of the world and Rizvi and Lingard in their epic 
book on globalisation remind us that (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 158) 
‘… market individualism and social democracy rest on very different 
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understandings of the nature of the relationship between justice and the 
market.’ Hatcher puts it bluntly (Hatcher, 2001: 58):
… the starting point has to be the recognition that there are two 
distinct logics at work. One is a logic of education, based on social 
and individual need, and notions of equity and democracy. The 
other is a logic of business, whose bottom line is profit. Not 
everything business wants to do is incompatible with education 
interests. But the logic of business is incompatible with the logic 
of education.
The path of social democracy and redistribution marked the post-World 
War II (mostly Western) world.17 At the core was the state’s responsibility 
to provide equal public services – including education – to all its citizens, 
although more recently the neo-liberal vision of market-based social 
justice has dominated. It is argued that the marketisation of society 
has influenced all spheres of life, including education, and this has led 
to profound changes in the nature of social relations, in particular, 
the narrowing of the notion of ‘student’ into that of consumer, and 
a concomitant commodification of the learning experience (Giroux, 
2004). The emphasis on competition and increased performance means 
increased surveillance and evaluation, which has led to the development 
of national curricula, national testing regimes and managerialist systems 
of performance evaluation which have eroded teacher’s professional 
autonomy (Apple, 2004).18
At the heart of a neo-liberal system is the changing nature of the 
state from a provider to a regulator (Olssen and Peters, 2005; Wrigley, 
2007). Consequently, neo-liberalism is not about lessening state control, 
but rather represents a new form of state involvement. As the market 
logic is extended to the public sector, the state becomes a regulator rather 
than a provider of such services, with the state being instrumental in 
facilitating the market to take on these responsibilities. As such, the state 
uses the market as a new control mechanism. Whilst there is a general 
withdrawal of the state, it is not in the arena of control, but rather in its 
position as the entity responsible for safeguarding all citizens, especially 
the weaker sections of society, a key socio-democratic function of the 
state. Globalisation has ensured that these notions have influenced the 
development and aid agenda, with aid agencies exporting these notions 
to the Global South (Lall and Rao, 2011).
Reforms pushing public services to adapt to markets have been 
particularly supported by the growing middle classes in middle income 
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and poorer countries, as they tend to benefit most from policies of choice 
and have the ability to buy themselves out of the public system to the 
detriment of the poorer and weaker sections of society (Hill and Rosskam, 
2009: xvii). Globally, the middle classes have been seen to access the 
lion’s share of opportunities that have come with the new economy, using 
education as a key cultural resource.
The new economic realities across the developing world have led 
to increased disaggregation, deregulation, commodification, emphasis 
on measurable outputs, managerialism and accountability. Neo-liberal 
market-orientated reforms have affected education at all levels in 
developed and developing countries. In many countries, primary and 
secondary education have opened up to the market allowing new 
private providers to offer educational services, competing with public 
education provided by the state. This has brought with it a new education 
discourse which changes the aim of education and is developing a society 
which is adapted to the new knowledge economy both at domestic and 
international levels. As Gamarnikow notes:
In the social democratic era, education was constructed as a public 
good and a collective form of welfare provision, a key element of 
Marshall’s social citizenship (Marshall, 1950). In the current neo- 
liberal era, by contrast, policy discourses construct education as a 
positional good for individuals, and as the site for human capital 
formation for the globalised economy. What has not changed is the 
importance ascribed to education. (Gamarnikow, 2009: 158)
There have been similar effects in the higher education (HE) sector: mar-
ketisation across the sector has made performance and accountability 
cornerstones of HE policies today. The pressure to increase the number of 
students, account for how time is spent and the general concern with 
national and international rankings are all effects of the changing under-
standing of the aims of HE. The role of the university is no longer that 
of a public interest institution, but that of a site of ‘knowledge production’ 
in light of the economic imperatives of the ‘knowledge economy’. As 
academics are ranked according to the number of their publications, 
their universities compete internationally for those students who will 
bring in the highest fees.
The central question in all this concerns the role of the state, and 
what role it has to play in ensuring a socially just society. Those concerned 
with equality and social justice in education have voiced concern about the 
changing discourse on social justice with the ascendance of the neo-liberal 
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paradigm in education, pointing to widening disparities between social 
groups while emphasising emerging and deepening inequalities as a 
result of new state policies and programmes. There has been a significant 
volume of research (as well as official statistics) that show that groups that 
experience discrimination and disadvantage because of identities of race, 
caste and ethnic identity show lower participation and achievement rates 
in schools and HE (Lall and Rao, 2011).
Regimes of competition that include standardised testing of high 
skills (within and across nations) are becoming widespread as nations 
strive to make their school systems more efficient in order to gain a 
competitive edge in the global market for education and labour. The 
growing preoccupation with testing and competition and the resulting 
narrowing and fragmenting of the larger objectives of education leads to 
the neglect of inclusive cultures and practices.
The purpose of education reforms
Education reforms in developing countries are often ‘pushed through’ 
as part of a wider reform process, one underpinned by an international 
development agenda spearheaded by international agencies such as 
the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
Washington consensus ensured for decades that inefficient public systems 
that were attempting to serve poor communities across developing 
countries had to change their funding models to achieve ‘fiscal reforms’. 
The dominant Western economic perspective on education reform (Wolf, 
2002) focuses on its role in producing future benefits, largely drawing 
on human capital theory (Hanushek, 2013; Sweetland, 1996). Whilst 
research has begun to highlight the limitations of the human capital 
theory approach (Brown, 2001; Marginson, 2019), many fundamental 
questions about the role of, and alternatives to, human capital theory 
remain unanswered (Kapur and Crowley, 2008). What is increasingly 
clear is that the perspective of human capital theory and its role in driving 
the comparative advantage in the global economy as part of many a 
national education policy does not allow for all groups to benefit equally. 
Often these neo-liberal reforms pay lip-service to social justice, mainly in 
terms of expanding provision for hitherto excluded groups. However, the 
increasingly differentiated systems of education, the spread of for-profit 
schooling and tight controls and accountability structures, along with the 
standardised assessment practices that schools are being drawn into have 
grave consequences for the purposes of education and social justice.
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Why ‘social justice’ as a basis to review education 
reforms in Myanmar?
As noted above, despite important improvements across the globe that 
include better living standards both in the Western and the developing 
world, there are enduring problems including a rising gap between 
the poor and the middle classes; social class and ethnicity still largely 
determine life chances and political influence is polarised according to 
wealth and class. Education has been heralded as a panacea to resolve 
inequalities and deliver more socially just societies across the globe. 
It is thought that education will empower any individual to rise to his or 
her full potential and to break free from poverty and inequality. However, 
in order for education to deliver such outcomes, the education system 
itself needs to offer not only equality of access and opportunity (quality) 
but also equality of outcome and condition. Education delivered in 
public schools by poorly trained teachers in rural or remote areas cannot 
compete with education delivered by high-end urban private schools 
because the conditions are vastly different.
Education reforms in developing countries therefore need to go 
beyond the access agenda propagated by the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and beyond the quality agenda propagated subsequently 
by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in order to consider 
how those most disadvantaged can attain equal outcomes to the more 
privileged with regard to future opportunities and equality of conditions. 
Policies for distribution and redistribution are necessary but not 
sufficient. Recognition is also important. Taylor et al. reminds us that any 
policies for educational justice have to deal with a complex web of issues 
that go beyond access and equity (Taylor et al., 1997: 151):
… but also [include] issues of identity, difference, culture and 
schooling. That is, the way things are named and represented, the 
manner in which difference is treated and the way in which the 
values and norms which govern life in schools are negotiated 
and established. These are all matters central to the concerns both 
of social justice and education.
The MDG proposal of a way forward to deliver a more socially just world 
was based on the distributive paradigm that focuses on resources – 
essentially on ‘who gets what?’ It can be argued that this model drew 
undue attention to the allocation of education. Education was seen 
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as a social good and it was access to that social good and the resources 
given to it that were important. Social justice was therefore furthered 
by more equitable access. This paradigm, however, was never sufficient 
to capture the complexities of injustice. Content and quality were 
overlooked. Realising that just getting more children into classrooms 
and ‘giving everyone their due’ did not actually raise their achievement 
levels brought about the debate of quality that underpins the SDGs. 
An argument emerged that: ‘the how much cannot be separated from 
the what’ (Connell, 1993: 18). The 17 SDGs and in particular goal four, 
‘quality education’, place quality and content at the heart of the agenda, 
while the SDG agenda also promises to address ‘intersecting inequalities’ 
as the goals are interrelated.
For social justice to truly underpin the governance of education 
and public services, relational justice is a better model. This refers to the 
power structures within society both in terms of how people interact 
with each other at a micro level, how individuals connect with wider 
society, as well as the macro socio-economic relations that: ‘are mediated 
by institutions such as the state and the market’ (Gewirtz, 1997: 471). 
Particular policies that target particular groups are known as ‘politics 
of identity’ and risk becoming deterministic. On the pathway to social 
justice we should not and cannot ignore differences within groups. What 
needs to be developed is a system that stresses: ‘balancing the rights 
and freedoms of individuals to pursue their own interests with an equal 
interest in the rights and interests of the community’ (Olssen et al., 2004: 
235). The first step in this direction is to understand how the education 
reforms promote (or not) social justice through a theoretical model. 
One such model19 is Iris Young’s ‘five faces of oppression’ that includes 
consideration of exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism and violence (Young, 2005).20 When examining education 
reforms these factors identified by Young can be used to assess how the 
education policies support, interrupt or subvert:
• exploitative relationships within and beyond educational institutions
• the processes of marginalisation and inclusion within and beyond 
the education system
• the promotion of relationships based on recognition, respect, care 
and mutuality or produce powerlessness for education workers and 
students
• practices of cultural imperialism – and which cultural differences 
should be affirmed, which should be universalised and which 
rejected?
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These questions will form the basis for the analysis of the various 
education reforms that have been undertaken by the Myanmar 
Government since 2011, but in particular since the NLD took power in 
2016. The lens of social justice (Taylor et al., 1997; Gerwitz, 1997; 
Connell 1993) is used throughout these chapters to engage with a 
critique of the reforms undertaken over the past decade and the outcomes 
as they are visible today, just a few months before Myanmar is due to go 
to the polls again. The basis for the critique is what Marshall terms a 
‘policy window’, a space that opens because of a change in the political 
stream (a change in administration, a shift in parliament or national 
mood); or it opens because a new problem captures the attention of 
policy-makers (Marshall, 2000; 127).
Taking a comprehensive view over 16 years, this book argues that 
the 2015 elections represented a policy window for the NLD that could 
have set Myanmar on a social justice trajectory, but that this policy window 
has been missed. It argues in particular that despite the education reform 
priorities espoused by the NLD Ministry of Education (MoE) explicitly 
advocating greater equality and equity,21 Myanmar has missed an historic 
opportunity to use the education reform process to engage with deep- 
seated social justice issues, both in terms of granting more equitable 
long-term outcomes to poorer sections of society as well as rectifying 
existing inequalities between the majority Bamars and ethnic nationality 
communities.22
The book’s aim is to review the education reform process as an 
example of policy reform and draw out the lessons learnt for Myanmar’s 
Government and citizens, as well as for the aid and development 
community who have underpinned the reforms. Although locating 
itself in the education reform process, this book addresses interests 
beyond education, as education links in with many of the other reforms 
such as the peace process and economic and labour reforms. In doing 
so, the book aims to give voice to those most implicated in and affected 
by the changing landscape of Myanmar’s education and wider reform 
process. This is important because these voices of students and their 
parents of all ethnic backgrounds, as well as those of teachers, student 
teachers and university staff engaged in education are rarely heard. Yet 
if readers (some of whom might be policy makers) are to understand 
what has been successful (or not) and why, it is important to look at 
the effects of the reforms on the ground and how ordinary lives have 
changed – or not. The book also engages with the voice of key policy 




Education is at the heart of Myanmar’s transformation. The education 
story does not start with the Comprehensive Education Sector Review 
(CESR) in 2012. It starts in 2005–6 when different civil society groups 
saw education as the principal way in which to bring about change to the 
country’s military dictatorship from within. Lall charts how Myanmar 
came to start a domestically-led transition from military dictatorship 
to a more participatory system between 2005 and 2010, resulting in 
an NLD Government between 2015 and 2020 (Lall, 2016a). It is clear 
that education was a catalyst for the movement of new civil society 
organisations that emerged and pushed for change.
After the 1988 and 1990 student protests, the universities had 
largely been closed. Undergraduate provision had been moved outside 
of the cities into remote areas and distance university education was 
encouraged, officially to enable the poorer students to study at home, 
but mostly to avoid students from getting together and becoming 
politically active. A whole generation was not able to access education 
beyond the metric examination and the quality of government education 
overall, and the quality of tertiary education particularly, had fallen 
dramatically over the decades of isolation due to under-investment and 
a lack of contact with the outside world.23 The generation that was the 
last to complete their university education before 1988 realised that they 
had been the lucky ones, and that those who came after them would not 
have access to a comprehensive form of HE. Now in their 40s or older, 
some started to think about how the country could and would be able 
to change, and how a growing number of uneducated young adults in 
the population would make change ever more difficult. Some joined 
together to form civil society organisations (CSOs) to develop education 
programmes for the middle classes to compensate for the decade long 
closure of key universities prior to the 2010 elections (Lall, 2016a). In the 
mid-2000s, these organisations were supported by mostly German 
political foundations, and together with Myanmar Egress (ME), the most 
significant civil society organisation to emerge in 2006 to support the 
change process, have been pivotal in the country’s reforms. ME was 
made up of a group of friends who had managed to complete their studies 
prior to 1988 and understood the transformative power of education. 
Their view was that if change was going to come to Myanmar, it was only 
going to occur by expanding the space from within, and not through 
either a revolution (as had been attempted in 1988) or through pressure 
from the outside (as the sanctions had been attempting since the 1990s). 
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The idea of an institution that would serve as a training institute, a think 
tank, a liaison office for reform-minded military government officials 
and as a catalyst for change can be credited to Dr Nay Win Maung, a 
medical doctor who had left medicine first for business, and then left 
business for journalism.24
The main aim of ME was first and foremost the training and 
education of young adults – the generation that had not had the chance 
to go to university, and those who could be catalysts for change. A series 
of courses was developed by ME ranging from a few days to six months 
to educate the youth about basic economic and political concepts and 
prepare them to vote in the 2010 elections.25 Education was at the core 
of Myanmar’s local move to engender change and it was these types of 
classes conducted by civil society that brought young people together, 
not on the streets in protest as in 1988, but binding them together with 
the aim of jointly transforming their country. ME was also used to create 
political space and develop a political and social identity amongst the 
young middle class Myanmar citizens who had missed out on ‘proper’ 
education. The idea was to recruit those who were enthusiastic, even if 
they had limited skills and few qualifications, and develop them into 
change agents. There were mostly three types of students – those who 
wanted to continue with their studies, those who wanted a career change, 
and those who were already working as NGO workers or activists. 
Recruitment happened through the networks of students who had 
completed the course, snowballing the number of applications. In the 
end, the number of students wanting to enrol far exceeded the number of 
places and all candidates had to be interviewed for the final selection. 
Some of the graduates of early courses then joined ME as staff for research 
and training.
Education – as can be seen from the above – is much more than 
what happens in schools and universities. It is at the heart of the political 
process in Myanmar. It is what has been at the origins of all the student 
protests that brought the country to a standstill in 1988 and 1990, and 
what pulled the country out of its stasis before the 2010 elections. It is 
therefore right that the country’s transformation, especially since 2015, 
is reviewed in light of the education reforms that happened across 
the various education sectors – formal and informal – and by using 
education as a platform to give voice to the Myanmar people across the 
country who are living the change process. To successfully undertake 
this, a lot of primary data is required. The section below reviews the 
primary qualitative and quantitative data sets that have been collected 
through fieldwork across the whole of Myanmar.
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Introducing the data that underpins this book
Based on 16 years of engagement, and over 10 years of (education) data 
collected in Myanmar across the whole country, this book gives a holistic 
view of both government and non-government education sectors, the 
reform process and how the transition has played out across schools, 
universities and wider society. This book refers to secondary sources, 
however, at the heart of the narrative are 13 large education studies that 
were conducted between 2010 and 2019. This book also draws on 
information gathered across three other very large studies, one on young 
people’s views on citizenship, another on the peace process, and a third 
on ethnic political parties.
Data for Chapter 1 on the background of education before the 
reforms started was collected as part of a 2012 study entitled ‘Teachers’ 
Voice’ (Lall et al., 2013). Data was collected in 19 schools (most were 
government schools, but there were a few monastic and two private 
schools) in the Yangon Region.26 Of these, four were primary level, seven 
were middle, and eight were high schools. Surveys were conducted with 
308 teachers (out of 443 working in these schools). Follow-on in-depth 
focus groups with 84 teachers and interviews with 16 head teachers were 
conducted so as to get a comprehensive view on issues including the 
curriculum, the examination system, teacher salaries, teacher training 
and teaching methods. Schools were deliberately chosen so as to reflect 
the diversity of education institutions. Schools that agreed to take part 
were urban and suburban, and based in both middle class and poor 
areas. The aim of the project was to inform the incoming government of 
the on-the-ground needs and challenges faced by teachers in light of the 
expected reforms. The research was the first project of three conducted 
as part of the research training of research staff whilst supporting the 
establishment of a research centre at ME. Both the research centre and 
the research were funded by the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Foundation 
from Germany and the EU as part of a large capacity building project.
Data on the education reforms in basic education and other 
education sectors, including the Comprehensive Education Sector Review 
(CESR) and the Education Promotion Implementation Committee (EPIC), 
were collected by the author whilst holding the position of Education 
Advisor for Fragile States for AUSAID (now Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade – DFAT) between 2012 and 2014, and being part of a 
team supporting the CESR that was led by the Myanmar MoE. This also 
included work on education in ethnic and conflict-affected areas that 
involved the organising and leading of two ground breaking ethnic 
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education workshops in Yangon with representatives of all Ethnic Armed 
Organisation (EAO) education departments, workshops that have fed into 
the chapters on ethnic education.
More data on how the reforms were being carried out in the field 
were collected in 2013 as part of the United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) funded and American University-
led ‘Mon State Situation Analysis (SITAN)’ (Mehta et al., 2014), that 
examined decentralisation issues in the service delivery of education. 
This project included detailed discussion with MoE officers at State 
and Township levels. There was further engagement with the Union 
MoE through a series of two-day workshops and seminars between 
2018–9 for the director generals and their deputies supporting reforms 
(funded by the Danish International Development Agency – DANIDA and 
delivered through the UCL Institute of Education).
The primary data for Chapter 3 on monastic education emanate 
from two large studies conducted in 2011 and 2016. Both studies were 
funded by the Pyoe Pin programme, a British Council (BC) supported 
programme that became an independent entity in 2018. The first was 
research conducted on child-centred teaching and learning methods in 
monastic schools across Myanmar. This involved fieldwork in 11 schools 
in three divisions – Ayeyarwady, Yangon and Mandalay (as regions were 
then called) in 2010, as well as conducting a workshop for stakeholders. 
The second focused on non-state education across Myanmar (not only 
monastic schools) leading to an advocacy policy paper in 2016. This 
involved fieldwork in Yangon, Northern Shan and Karen States.
Data for Chapter 4 on HE is taken from the BC funded project 
‘Supporting the Transformation of Higher Education in Myanmar’ in 2018. 
Though not based on research, this allowed engagement with 11 Myanmar 
universities from across the country in developing leadership capacity 
through a series of four one-week-long intense training modules, workshops 
and two conferences. The project also involved supporting the development 
of a new government institution for HE (National Institute for Higher 
Education Development) that is to take on the future training of senior 
university staff in light of the reforms.
Chapter 5 on teacher education draws on three BC funded projects; 
a review of leadership needs for head teachers across Yangon in 2013–4; 
the baseline research for the Connecting Classrooms pilot project 
involving 15 schools across Yangon, Mandalay Region and Mon State; 
and a project surveying 2,000 teacher trainees over two consecutive 
years (2014–6) regarding the attributes and motivations of those who 
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become teachers. Data were collected in all Myanmar education colleges 
(20 at the time) around the country and two batches studying in two 
different year groups that were compared with each other.
The data for ethnic education were collected during fieldwork 
undertaken between 2011 and 2019, primarily in Karen, Mon, Kachin, 
Shan and Rakhine-populated areas. The first round of data collection 
(together with Ashley South) was in 2011–2, funded by the Open Society 
Institute, focusing in particular on mapping ethnic minority education 
systems in Mon and Karen States, where interviews and focus groups 
were conducted with 93 people across 8 locations, including in jungle 
and conflict-affected areas. Communities were accessed through local 
colleagues who have been instrumental in delivering education services 
in hard-to-reach places. Most meetings were held in schools, but in some 
cases respondents preferred to meet at sites where they felt less exposed 
to scrutiny. All interviews were conducted in the local language with 
a trained translator. Further data collection (funded by USAID as part 
of their transition support programme, together with Ashley South) 
happened between 2014 and 2016 across 10 locations in Mon, Karen 
and Kachin States, and neighbouring China and Thailand, in both 
government and EAO-controlled areas. This included interviews with 
150 people and 30 focus groups conducted with 8–10 participants each, as 
well as larger meetings with stakeholders from EAOs, ethnic education 
departments, political parties and local civil society actors who were 
contacted through the EAO education departments and education 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs). In addition, teachers, parents 
and students at ethnic schools were either interviewed or took part in 
focus groups. All meetings were conducted either in the local language 
or in Burmese with the help of a trained translator. Subsequently, the 
findings were validated through a series of five workshops in Mon and 
Kachin States conducted around four to six months after the original 
fieldwork had taken place. The workshops included state education 
officials so as to better understand how the Myanmar Government was 
developing education policy in ethnic areas. A further set of data comes 
from 28 interviews we conducted as a part of a Pyoe Pin-funded research 
project in 2016, which investigated the funding and teacher training 
challenges faced by non-state education institutions. This last round of 
data collection focused on ethnic education providers in very hard-to-
reach areas, including northern Shan State where conflict is ongoing. In 
that setting, it was too dangerous to meet parents, so only teachers and 
other official stakeholders were interviewed.27
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What the book covers
Chapter 1 reviews the state of education prior to the 2010 elections, 
including the period under military rule, including issues pertaining to 
textbooks. The chapter then looks at the limited changes that took place 
between 2000 and 2012, including the rise of a parallel system of private 
education as an alternative for the urban middle classes, which began 
to divide society into those who could afford to buy services and those 
dependent on what the state provided. Drawing on original interview 
and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) data in 19 Yangon schools in 2012 
just prior to the start of the education reform process, it reflects the 
voices of teachers who were asked what they felt were the priorities for 
education reform, revealing the tension between the weighty curriculum 
and the examination system with improving teaching methods in the 
classroom – particularly Child-Centred Approaches (CCA) to teaching 
and learning. The chapter then engages with the challenges faced by the 
teachers in the public education sector in terms of teacher salaries that 
are too low for daily living (and the related problem of tuition that is used 
by teachers to compensate for the difference); teacher-to-student ratios 
that are overly large (especially in primary schools, and even more so in 
rural and remote regions); the lack of classroom materials and teaching 
aids; and societal pressure for teachers not to marry so they can dedicate 
their life to society. These pressures have made teaching an increasingly 
unattractive profession. The chapter sets the scene for the social justice 
issues that the education reforms have promised to address, in order 
to understand how far the post-2012 changes have actually made a 
difference in the Myanmar government school classrooms.
Chapter 2 details the effects of the reforms in basic education 
by introducing the education reforms that started in the second half of 
2012 under the Thein Sein Government, including the CESR, and the 
role played by the aid agencies. The chapter engages with the tensions 
between the various stakeholders including the MoE (which remained 
quite detached between 2012 and 2015), the CESR, the Parliamentary 
Committee lead by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National Network for 
Education Reform (NNER), a civil society-led consortium campaigning 
for more radical education reforms. It explains why President Thein 
Sein brought in EPIC to side-line the influence of the international 
development agencies, and how all of this resulted in the National 
Education Sector Plan (NESP)28 and the New Education Law.29 The 
chapter also looks at the student protests of 2015, their demands based 
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on social justice, and their engagement with the government leading to 
limited changes in the New Education Law.
The second part of the chapter engages with the NLD Government’s 
development of the education reform process, including the continuity of 
policy by largely accepting the NESP unchanged. Priorities for education 
remain access, quality, curricular reforms and teacher training reforms, 
thus addressing a few issues faced by Myanmar’s poor, yet not engaging 
with the issues associated with ethnic and linguistic diversity that have 
resulted in a largely inequitable education system. As of this point, all 
chapters will contrast education policy and the education experience on 
the ground. The chapter draws on original data collected during training 
sessions and meetings with the MoE between 2012 and 2019.
Chapter 3 considers monastic education. Myanmar’s education 
system has historically been closely linked with Buddhism, and Myanmar 
traditional values reflect Buddhist values of service to the community. 
Society supports monks and monasteries through donations as part of 
their religious duty, and monasteries have been the main vehicle for 
inclusion in education by offering schooling to poor and disadvantaged 
children. This chapter engages with the role of monasteries in bringing 
about change in the classroom, even before the government reforms 
began. Whilst monastic schools have always catered to the poorest and 
the most disadvantaged of society, their relative independence and status 
outside of the purview of the MoE allowed them to pioneer the CCA in 
their classrooms. Phaung Daw Oo, the largest monastic school in the 
country, based in Mandalay, is led by Sayadaw U Nayaka who can be 
credited with bringing large-scale change to teaching methods across 
all monastic schools by founding a centre for monastic teacher training 
that was supported by local donors as well as international aid money. 
Drawing on original interviews and FGD data of monastic teachers 
collected in 2010 and 2016, the chapter looks at how CCA spread across 
monastic networks and the role of both local and international teacher 
training agents across the country. In the end, it was monastic schools 
that led the way in reforms that affected teaching methods beyond 
monastic schools, especially CCA in the classroom, with the state sector 
following suit a few years later. The chapter discusses how children from 
the most disadvantaged backgrounds were ultimately subject to better 
teaching practice than those at government schools because of the work 
pioneered in Phaung Daw Oo. The chapter draws on original FGD data 
with parents whose children attended these schools, and their views on 
the role of monasteries in educating Myanmar society. Lastly, the chapter 
describes the role of monasteries in maintaining ethnic nationality 
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languages and culture, especially in Mon, Karen, Shan and Pa-O societies 
through summer school language and literature programmes; a theme 
that will be considered again in Chapter 6 on ethnic languages.
Chapter 4 reviews the state of HE. The quality of HE has deterio-
rated sharply in Myanmar since independence, prior to which Rangoon 
University was seen as a leading higher education institution (HEI) in 
the region. The chapter gives a snapshot of Yangon and Mandalay 
Universities in 2005 and 2006, when the author was teaching there 
during the summer months, before moving on to the main HE reform 
agenda, including the development of the National Institute of Higher 
Education Development (NIHID)30 that is due to start training senior 
academic staff across the HE sector. The chapter engages with the vexed 
issue of decentralisation including the rotation of staff appointments, the 
changing role of research and how universities are starting to engage 
with issues of access and quality, and designing their own curriculum. 
The chapter contrasts the views of leading academics31 on the purpose of 
HE and its reforms, contrasting neo-liberal views that have emerged 
through the engagement with Western aid and development agencies 
with more traditional Myanmar views based on Buddhist values.
At the time of writing, access to HE, although almost free and 
despite the presence of over 150 institutions across Myanmar, is only 
accessible to a small number of mostly middle class students, with the 
poorer students enrolling in one of the world’s largest (and possibly the 
worst) distance HE system. The chapter discusses the issues of limited 
access of ethnic minority young people due to severe language disadvan-
tage32 that emanates from their lack of access to basic education, and 
how this is something with which most Myanmar universities, including 
those based in ethnic states, do not have the capacity to engage.
Chapter 5 reviews the issues faced by student teachers and teacher 
educators across the 20 education colleges in Myanmar, drawing on 
original survey data collected in the midst of the reform process. It 
engages with the views, hopes, challenges and fears faced by those who 
want to become teachers. It explains the special challenges faced by the 
very few ethnic nationality teacher trainees who manage to get into 
the education colleges. The chapter also looks at the reforms of teacher 
education that started with the BC funded ‘English for Education College 
Trainers’ (EfECT) project that focused on upgrading teacher educators’ 
English and teaching methodology. At the time of writing, the curriculum 
for teacher education is being reformed, yet this is not in sync with 
the curricular reforms of basic education, as these are supported by 
different aid agencies with little, if any, communication or coordination. 
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The chapter discusses the tensions that arise from these uncoordinated 
efforts to improve education across Myanmar.
Chapter 6 discusses Myanmar’s struggle with ethnic and linguistic 
diversity. Despite the reforms, education has remained highly centralised, 
with only Burmese being allowed as a means of instruction. Policy under 
the NLD Government has not changed much. While ethnic minority 
languages are now allowed as ‘classroom language’ to help explain 
concepts when necessary, mother tongue-based multi-lingual education 
(MTB-MLE) is not presently Myanmar education policy, marginalising 
ethnic hopes and concerns.33 The only concession from the government 
has been the introduction of a ‘local curriculum’ (LC) of one period a 
day in Kindergarten (KG), Grade 1 and Grade 2 that is locally developed 
and can be taught in an ethnic language. The development of this LC and 
its roll-out is haphazard and uneven, privileging larger, more organised 
ethnic groups. This chapter engages with the often overlooked voices 
of minorities within minorities regarding their views on language, 
education and Language of Instruction (LoI), and how this shapes their 
relationship with both the more dominant ethnic groups as well as the 
ruling Burman majority. It argues that whilst all minorities within 
minorities consulted as part of fieldwork research in 2018, work hard to 
preserve their ethnic language and culture, they all argue that they want 
Burmese to remain the main LoI. Many emphasised that Burmese was 
the essential language for their children to be able to get good jobs and 
bring their families and communities out of poverty. The communities 
therefore do not support an MTB-MLE system and prefer multilingual 
local teachers who can explain the Burmese textbooks to their children.
The chapter also engages with a potential solution to the need for 
more ethnic nationality teachers in government schools. It looks at 
the alternative teacher education college established by the Pa-O to 
specifically train those ethnic nationality candidates that failed to get 
into the education colleges. The lack of ethnic teachers is a serious issue 
for ethnic nationality children who cannot understand Burmese, so the 
training of such teachers by an ethnic organisation is an interesting 
alternative solution to the problem. Based on original data collected at 
this college in Shan State, the chapter explains how despite its recognition 
by the government authorities, this college is not able to fulfil its mission 
as its teachers are sent to work in ethnic areas where they do not speak 
the local language, defeating the original purpose of its creation.
Chapter 7 discusses the structural challenges in alternative systems 
run by EAOs and uses the education systems under the authority of 
four major EAOs to discuss the relationship between ethnic nationality 
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS26
communities and the state. Drawing on data collected (between 2011 
and 2018) in schools under the New Mon State Party’s (NMSP)34 Mon 
National Education Committee, the Kachin Independence Organisation’s 
(KIO) Education Department,35 the Karen National Union’s (KNU) 
Education Department, and the Revolutionary Council of Shan State’s 
(RCSS)36 Education Department as well as their administrations, the 
chapter discusses the issue of recognition of alternative and separate 
education systems that have in effect been filling the gap for education 
provision in remote and conflict-affected areas for the Myanmar 
Government. Whilst addressing the language issue (also discussed in 
Chapter 6) is a key part to finding a sustainable resolution to armed 
conflict, the chapter engages with the key problems of recognition 
of EAO authority in education in areas under their control, and how 
the issues of the peace process, language policy and federalism are 
inextricably intertwined with each other.
The book is essentially about the Myanmar education reform 
process and how this is affecting key stakeholders and the wider 
population. Therefore, the conclusion returns first to the NESP Mid Term 
Review and its assessment on what has been achieved with regard to 
equity. It is clear that the MoE and the wider government understand 
that there are wider issues of social justice at play that are not being 
resolved through the education and wider reform processes. In light 
of the 2020 elections and the path Myanmar has chosen through the 
lenses of education and ethnicity, the conclusion asks – ‘What future for 
Myanmar’s youth?’
Areas that are not covered by the book include disability and 
inclusive education, vocational education and education for out-of-
school children, and recent developments in private education. Disabled 
people are largely invisible in Myanmar society, and disabled students 
are not often seen in schools. While this is a key issue of social justice 
and equality, the invisibility of the less able means that there was not 
enough available data, and writing anything substantial on this problem 
would be virtually impossible. Vocational education and the education 
of out-of-school children, although now part of the education reform 
process through its inclusion in the NESP, was until recently quite 
separate from the formal education sector. This again has meant a lack 
of substantial data, making its inclusion in the book impossible.37 The 
focus being on the effects of the government reforms, the book also 
does not cover Chinese schools (some of which exist in Shan State 
close to the border, for example, in the Wa Autonomous Region) as well 
as in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay, nor other religious schools 
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and HEIs – such as those run by the Baptist or Adventist churches, nor 
any religious education institutions catering to the Muslim population, 
that remain largely unaffected by the government reforms. Lastly, a 
separate book could be written on the rise of the private parallel system 
that has increased so dramatically over the past decade. The early 
development of this sector is covered in Chapter 1. However, the book’s 
focus means that the more recent rise of the private education sector, still 
a largely urban phenomenon serving the middle classes and the rich, is 
less relevant. Given that much of the private education sector is not 
recognised by the government, it is also not included in the reform 
processes and remains a separate, parallel, largely business orientated 
development.
Notes
 1 Although she is no longer on the website, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was a honorary President of 
Socialist International, a worldwide organisation of social democratic, socialist and labour 
parties. The NLD’s first election manifesto of 1989 focuses on democracy, but has strong 
sections on farmer, student and labour unions as well. The NLD might have reinvented itself, 
but its roots lie on the left side of the political spectrum. 
 2 The Norwegian Government’s commissioned Political Economy Analysis states: ‘Myanmar is a 
new place for many donors that have entered the country since 2011. Many of them have little 
experience and poor understanding of how to address the opportunities and challenges that 
have emerged from Myanmar’s democratic opening. Insufficient country knowledge on the part 
of development actors is a risk that can potentially do harm.’ (Stokke et al., 2018: XX). 
 3 It has to be said that the NLD is not supportive of CSOs and local Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) receiving aid funds to undertake development work, and prefer inter- 
national funds to be received by the government so that the programmes can be controlled. 
This is in stark contrast to the government under President Thein Sein (2010–5) who 
allowed CSOs and local NGOs to receive donor funds and to run programmes as they saw 
fit (Lall, 2016a).
 4 Over the 15 years that the author has been speaking with ordinary Myanmar people across the 
whole country – most of whom she met (parents and teachers) through her education 
research, as well as many young people through her work on citizenship and many ethnic 
respondents/members of armed groups through her work on conflict and the peace process.
 5 The 25 per cent military seats in parliament are there to stop the constitution from being 
changed. They make sure the Tatmadaw leadership has a free hand in dealing with ethnic 
conflict and border affairs the way it sees fit. To date, they have not stopped any policy that 
focused on issues of health, education and access to public services.
 6 The 2015 NLD Manifesto was also very much in tune both with the anti-colonial cries for 
economic justice espoused in the pre-independence period that were taken up by the post-
independence governments, as well as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s accusations that the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government had made economic inequalities worse 
during their rule, due to their socio-economic mismanagement.
 7 This chapter will not try to engage with the semantics of the terminology in Burmese and how 
the terms were used, as this will detract from the core aim of the book, which is to engage 
with the education reforms. The issue at heart is that the NLD as a political party promised a 
Myanmar version of social justice and the wider electorate understood this promise. 
 8 It has been argued that the 2015 elections cannot be considered fair and free as 25 per cent of 
seats in all legislative assemblies were reserved for the military. See Tonkin for more on the 
1990 election (Tonkin, 2007). 
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 9 He was replaced by President Win Myint on the 30 March 2018, after President Htein Kyaw 
resigned ‘to take a rest’. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/president-u-htin-kyaw-resigns-u-win- 
myint-tipped-as-replacement.
10 Despite their constitutional mandate neither of the two presidents seem to have had much say 
in any of the government’s policy making, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has kept control of the 
government. The post of ‘State Councillor’ was specially created for her – it does not exist in the 
Constitution. The creation of this post shows the power of the NLD, whose majority in 
Parliament meant that they were able to override the 25 per cent military vote who were 
opposed to the creation of such an official position. 
11 It is estimated that non-Burman communities make up around 30–40 per cent of the 
population including Shan 9 per cent, Karen 7 per cent, Rakhine 4 per cent, Chinese 3 per cent, 
Indian 2 per cent, Mon 2 per cent, and other 5 per cent. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.
12 With the exception of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan 
National Party (ANP).
13 Informal discussions with ethnic nationality NLD MPs in NPT in 2017, 2018 and 2019. 
14 The most famous cases being the two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who 
were detained in Myanmar on 12 December 2017 for reporting on the killings of Rohingya 
men. They were freed as part of an amnesty in May 2019. 
15 Economic growth – but not inclusive and sustainable development. Myanmar has seen an 
economic liberalisation and opening that has been followed by increased investment in key 
sectors, above all in natural resource extraction. The lack of redistributive mechanisms and the 
continuing cronyism hinder inclusive growth and sustainable development. (Stokke et al., 
2018: xviii).
16 An example of this is the peace process versus reforming the constitution. The NLD decided to 
give constitutional change another push despite the peace process being stuck. It proved to be 
a fruitless battle with the military MPs, not unlike what occurred at the end of 2015.
17 The social democratic framework as the foundation for governance was also the basis for 
India’s development, as well as a number of other post-colonial developing countries.
18 Quite a lot has been written about how teachers have been affected by neo-liberal education 
reforms. However, the Mike Apple reference of 2004 shows that this is nothing new.
19 There are of course other models and theoretical frameworks for social justice, but this one 
focuses on structures rather than individuals, encapsulating much of the social justice issues in 
Myanmar. In the last two chapters that focus on ethnic education issues, another social justice 
model – Novelli et al.’s ‘4 R framework’ of redistribution, recognition, representation and 
reconciliation (Novelli et al., 2015) – is used in addition to Young’s ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ 
model (1990 and 2005), since Novelli et al.’s model links in with peace and reconciliation 
issues, that are particularly relevant in light of Myanmar’s peace process. 
20 Young’s ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ is a model cited in much recent literature pertaining to 
oppression, and first appeared in Iris Young, 1990, ‘Justice and the politics of difference’: 
Exploitation (the transfer of the fruits of labour from one group to another, as, for example, 
in the cases of workers giving up surplus value to capitalists or women in the domestic 
sphere transferring the fruits of their labour to men); Marginalisation (the expulsion of 
people from useful participation in social life so that they are ‘potentially subjected to severe 
material deprivation and even extermination’); Powerlessness (the lack of that ‘authority, 
status and sense of self’ which would permit a person to be listened to with respect); 
Cultural imperialism (stereotyping in behaviours as well as in various forms of cultural 
expression such that the oppressed group’s own experience and interpretation of social 
life finds little expression that touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes 
on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social life). Violence (the fear and 
actuality of random, unprovoked attacks which have ‘no motive except to damage, humiliate 
or destroy the person’).
21 As the MoE’s NESP 2016–2021 notes in its Executive Summary (7): ‘Quality, equitable and 
relevant education is essential if we are to provide our children with new knowledge and 
competencies, creativity and critical thinking skills and cultural and ethical values that will 
enable them to excel in their chosen careers and contribute to Myanmar’s socio-economic 
development in the 21st century.’ 
22 In Myanmar, ethnic minorities prefer to be referred to as ‘ethnic nationality communities’ or 
simply ‘ethnic’. They reject being labelled as minorities.
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23 More on the student protests in Chapter 4.
24 More on Dr Nay Win Maung, his life and work in Lall (2016a).
25 As detailed in Lall (2016a), the military regime had announced elections as part of their 
‘roadmap to democracy’ in 2004. However, no one knew when these elections would be held 
and it was clear that the process would be tightly controlled.
26 There was not enough funding for the research team to collect data outside of Yangon.
27 In 2018, the author was the Lead Consultant at Covenant Consult for the World Bank and the 
Myanmar Education Consortium (MEC) working across all ethnic states and leading a team 
of 12 international and Myanmar specialist consultants. Data from this project (Informing 
Partnerships between Government and Ethnic Basic Education Providers – MEPP) has not been 
directly used in this book, however, the views from respondents in that project are reflected 
in Chapters 6 and 7. In 2019 and 2020, the author was an advisor to the Department for 
International Development (DFID) funded Myanmar–UK Partnership for Education (MUPE) 
project that involved data collection across the various departments of Myanmar’s MoE. Data 
from this project has not been directly used for this book, however, the views from policy makers 
and development partners in that project are reflected across the volume.
28 Renamed ‘National Education Strategic Plan’ (thus still ‘NESP’) by the NLD government after 
2016.
29 The author was special education advisor to AUSAID in Myanmar at the time, therefore 
accessing both the MoE and CESR staff as well as the international agencies. 
30 Author was part of a small team training the NIHED senior trainers, and supporting NIHED 
in its first HE training of 11 universities.
31 Who took part in a training programme co-led by the author.
32 This is a double disadvantage as HE is supposed to be in English, and the books are in English, 
even if the actual teaching is in Burmese. Many ethnic nationality students are unable to 
matriculate because of their poor levels of Burmese, making it impossible for them to access HE. 
Those who do make it then find that course materials in English present a double challenge.
33 Using any ethnic language in the classroom effectively would require recruiting local teachers, 
or teachers who have learnt an ethnic language. According to UNICEF, 70 per cent of teachers 
working in ethnic areas do not speak local languages (Joliffe and Speers, 2016: 37).
34 Maintained a ceasefire with the government since 1995.
35 Which saw its 17-year ceasefire collapse in 2011.
36 Both EAOs agreed to sign the 2015 ‘Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement’ (NCA), following 
decades of armed conflict.
37 There is a substantial MoE report on education of out-of-school children, but internal MoE 
politics in 2018–9 means that there is now not so much focus on the issue, as (allegedly) 
the MoE does not wish to acknowledge the fact that this problem exists. (From personal 
interviews with a number of development partners in the summer of 2019.)
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1
The state of education, pre-reform
Introduction
This chapter reviews the state of education in the decades preceding the 
2010 elections, during which the country was primarily under military 
rule. It starts with a brief history of education in Myanmar and discusses 
it in the context of the post-independence military governments’ attempts 
to instil nationalism under the banner of a Bamar identity. The chapter 
considers the limited changes that took place between 2000 and 2012, 
including the rise of a parallel system of private education that provided 
an alternative for the urban middle classes, thus dividing society into 
those who could afford private offerings, and those dependent on what 
the state provided. The information here draws from interview and 
focus group data obtained from 19 Yangon schools in 2012, just prior 
to the start of the education reform process. It reflects the voices of 
teachers who were asked what they believed should be the priorities 
for education reform, and reveals the tension between the weighty 
curriculum and examination system in relation to the aim of improving 
teaching methods in the classroom – particularly the use of CCA to 
teaching and learning. The chapter then identifies some key challenges 
faced by teachers in the public education sector: very low teacher salaries; 
the related problem of tuition as a means for teachers to enhance their 
incomes; overly large teacher-to-student ratios, especially in primary 
schools, and even more so in rural and remote regions; the lack of 
classroom materials and teaching aids; and societal pressure on teachers 
not to marry so they can dedicate their life to their work. These challenges 
have made teaching an increasingly un-attractive profession. Thus, this 
chapter sets the scene for the social justice issues that the education 
reforms have promised to address, in order to understand how far the 
post-2012 changes have actually made a difference in the Myanmar 
government school classrooms.
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History of education
The best known history of Myanmar’s traditional education before and 
during the colonial era is that of U Kaung’s detailed dissertation submitted 
to the University of London in 1920, and later published in the Journal 
of Burma Research (U Kaung, 1963). In it he describes how traditional 
Myanmar education functioned under the ancient monarchies, with 
mainly monastic settings serving boys, and a parallel system of lay 
schools developed to educate girls.1 U Kaung identifies the influence of 
European missionaries who came to Myanmar over the centuries, and 
whose fortunes rose and waned, depending on which dynasty was in 
power and where in the country they were based. Missionaries shaped 
education in a lasting way in certain ethnic areas, more so than in the 
Bamar heartlands where monastic education held sway.
‘Modern’ education in Myanmar began with the British colonising 
Burma from 1824. In 1885, after the third Anglo–Burmese war when 
Burma was made part of British India, the state became responsible 
for education and a larger number of students, both girls and boys, were 
able to access some form of government education. Monastic education, 
perceived as traditional and backward by the colonisers, declined. 
According to Thein Lwin, the three types of school in pre-World War II 
Burma were as follows (Thein Lwin, 2000: 4–5):
• Vernacular schools, administered by local education authorities 
in which the medium of instruction was Burmese or one of the 
recognised local languages. These were the schools serving the 
majority of the country’s children.
• Anglo–vernacular schools in which English was taught as a second 
language and instruction was in both English and Burmese.
• English schools, in which the medium of instruction was English, 
with Burmese as the second language. These schools served the 
elites and were geared for students who aspired to government 
employment. 
Because English was the language of the colonial powers, vernacular 
schools were seen as second class. A domestic reaction to the dominance 
of the colonial language took shape with the creation of national 
schools in the 1920s, where the language of instruction was Burmese 
and Buddhist holidays were observed as opposed to the British ones. 
These schools did not survive beyond the 1930s, however, nationalism 
in the form of anti-colonialism continued to grow across educational 
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institutions. In the early twentieth century, colleges and universities 
became centres of social and political activism, playing their part in the 
anti-colonial movement. By the 1920s, university students had begun 
to strike against the University Act Bill that established English as the 
medium of instruction and which set fees for instruction that placed 
universities out of reach of most Burmese (Zobrist and McCormick, 
2017).
While the Japanese occupation was short lived (1942–5), the end 
of the colonial control of Burma resulted for the first time in a single 
schooling system with a unified curriculum and Burmese as the medium 
of instruction, making it accessible to all Burmese. It did not, however, 
result in a revival of the monastic education system. According to Salem-
Gervais and Metro, ‘In spite of some government documents deeming 
religion essential to a “sound educational tradition”, and some policies 
leaning towards an increased role for the Sangha in schooling, a specific 
policy of religious teaching in schools was conspicuous by its absence.’ 
(Salem-Gervais and Metro, 2012: 61). Thein Lwin reports that in 1947, 
the Education Reconstruction Committee, chaired by the Honourable 
Sir Htoon Aung Gyaw, reviewed Burma’s education system and proposed 
the concept of a homogenous system of schools provided and controlled 
by the state (Thein Lwin, 2000). On 1 June 1950, a new policy came 
into force promising free education for all pupils in state schools from 
primary to university level. Private schools were allowed in their own 
school buildings under the registration of the 1951 Private Schools Act. 
Shortly thereafter in 1952, a modern school curriculum was introduced 
nationwide, followed by textbooks in Burmese in all subjects. The 
curriculum for the state schools introduced vocational subjects according 
to local needs rather than a unified qualification system, resulting in an 
academic–vocational divide, an urban–rural divide, and inequality of 
opportunity between girls and boys (Thein Lwin, 2000: 9). In 1958, the 
Ministry of Education (MoE) announced that the medium of instruction 
was to be Burmese in schools and English was to be taught only from the 
Fifth Standard onwards (Union of Myanmar, 1992 cited in Thein Lwin, 
2000). No consideration was given to the use of ethnic languages for 
pupils whose mother tongue was not Burmese. However, there were still 
private, Christian and Buddhist monastic schools functioning legally 
around the country, and private and Christian schools taught English 
from the beginning of primary education. In ethnic majority areas, 
community schools used ethnic languages. At university, Burmese also 
became the medium of instruction for all undergraduate subjects, with 
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English becoming the medium of instruction in postgraduate Honours 
and Masters classes (Thein Lwin, 2000: 8–9).
After the April 1962 coup led by General Ne Win, the Revolutionary 
Council proclaimed ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’ as its political 
programme. The new government’s view of education was inspired 
by its socialist aims. ‘The Revolutionary Council believes the existing 
educational system un-equated with livelihood will have to be 
transformed. An educational system equated with livelihood and based 
on socialist moral values will be brought about; science will be given 
precedence in education’ (Thein Lwin, 2000: 9). The syllabus put more 
emphasis on vocational education to support the socialist cause. 
Universities also changed, with the new 1964 University Act decreasing 
the size of Rangoon and Mandalay Universities by splitting off specialist 
subject areas such as technology and medicine. Since the arts and 
humanities were seen as lower ranking courses, children with high 
matriculation results tended to study medicine regardless of whether 
they wanted to become doctors or not. In 1965, all schools were nation-
alised, including mission schools and schools operated for the Chinese 
and Indian communities (Zobrist and McCormick, 2017). In 1974, 
the military rule changed to a constitutional dictatorship (Silverstein, 
1977) with Article 152 of the new 1974 Constitution stating that, ‘every 
citizen shall have the right to education’ and that ‘basic education’ would 
be compulsory, while Article 10 stated, ‘the State shall cultivate and 
promote the all-round physical, intellectual and moral development of 
youth’. However, very little changed across educational institutions. 
In 1988, as a result of nationwide protests in which students took a 
leading role, the 1974 Constitution was abolished and replaced by 
absolute military rule under the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC). General Saw Maung, the Head of State at the time, said that 
education was not the military regime’s responsibility, but would be 
that of the next elected government. Elections were held in 1990, but 
the military refused to recognise the NLD win, ultimately entrenching 
military rule for another two decades.2 The quality of education across 
schools and universities continued its slow and steady decline. Control 
by SLORC – renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 
in 1997 – came to an end through the development of a new constitution 
in 2008, and subsequent 2010 elections that brought a partly civilian 
government into power in 2011. The new constitution that was enacted 
in 2008 made some changes to education. These are discussed in the 
next chapter.
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Education and nationalism: Cementing military rule
The roots of 20th century Burmese nationalism lay in growing 
Burmese perceptions that they were second-class citizens in their 
own country, in British ‘divide and rule’ policies and the loss of 
traditional authority structures and in the exploitation by the 
British and other foreigners of Burma’s rich natural resources. 
(Herbert, 1991 cited in Thein Lwin, 2000: 1).
Education had been one means of developing and cementing nationalism 
from as far back as the colonial period, where the national schools and 
HEIs promoted anti-colonial patriotism. National schools had worked 
towards a return to pre-colonial education – as led historically by 
monasteries – coupled with new demands for civil liberties, prioritising 
Burmese language, literature and history. The National Education 
Committee that led this movement aimed for both progress and renewal: 
‘Patriotism is the new religion of the new generation, and it is best 
propagated through National Schools’ (Cheesman, 2002: 53). According 
to Cheesman, students at national schools recited the Five Buddhist 
Precepts in place of ‘The Prayer for the King–Emperor’, were permitted to 
wear Burmese traditional clothes, and were free to read any publications 
(Cheesman, 2002). The national schools also reintroduced six letters 
of the Burmese alphabet that had been dropped from government 
schools. Unfortunately, problems with funding and factionalism led to 
their decline and eventual demise in the late 1930s.
From independence in 1948 onwards, the school curriculum was 
standardised and centrally determined by the government without 
regional or other special allowances. However, as seen earlier, private 
and ethnic alternatives were tolerated until the 1960s, just not as part of 
the state education narrative. After the 1962 coup, these alternatives 
were closed down and outlawed. Nationalism in Myanmar’s education 
system, no longer serving an anti-colonial purpose, had two main 
functions: to cement the Burman culture and language as central to the 
nation’s unity – a process referred to as ‘Burmanisation’– and to help 
justify military rule.
education and Burmanisation: post-1962 focus
Burmanisation is the hallmark of post-1962 education. This was based 
on a belief that the country needed a unifying national identity based on 
one culture, one language and one religion. Since independence, there 
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had been conflict with separatist ethnic movements on the Thai and 
Chinese borders, with the Karen National Union (KNU) in particular 
calling for an independent Karen homeland. Further north, located in 
ethnic areas, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) was fighting the 
Burmese central government.3 These conflicts provided the reasons both 
for the 1962 military coup (‘to prevent the disintegration of the nation’) 
as well as for the process of enforcing Burmanisation on all non-Bamar 
ethnic groups across the country.
It is important to note that Bamar-centred nationalism did not 
suddenly appear after 1962. Nationalism had been historically linked 
with the majority Bamar, both under the Bamar kings in pre-colonial and 
later during the anti-colonial pre-independence periods. Thant Myint-U 
and Michael Charney have described the formation of a ‘myanma’ 
identity centred around Buddhism, Burmese language and Burman 
ethnicity during the Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885) (Thant Myint-U, 
2001; Charney, 2006). Thant Myint-U argues that the concept of myanma 
lu-myò was consolidated around Burmese language, Buddhism and the 
political and legal institutions based in the Konbaung dynasty court at 
Ava during the late eighteenth century (Thant Myint-U, 2001: 88). This 
identity was spread by itinerant monks in what was later described as a 
process of ‘Burmanisation’, in which non-myanma people were given 
incentives or pressured to adopt myanma customs (Houtman, 1999). 
Because lu-myò was more flexible than twentieth-century conceptions of 
ethnicity, people could ‘become’ myanma by changing their political 
allegiance or behaviour – the category myanma was capable of retaining 
its purity while incorporating other groups (Charney, 2006: 41). As Thant 
Myint-U argues, ‘the strength and political dominance of a Burmese/
Myanma identity based on older Ava-based memories has never allowed 
the development of a newer identity which would incorporate the 
diverse peoples inhabiting the modern state’ (Thant Myint-U, 2001: 
254). The 1930s nationalist Dobáma (‘We-báma’) organisation took as its 
slogan a series of phrases that can be translated as ‘Báma country, our 
country; báma literature, our literature; báma language, our language’ 
(Khin Yi, 1988: 5). Although this ‘Burmanisation’, as it was called, was 
primarily an attempt to combat the dominance of ‘foreign’ English and 
Hindi languages (Khin Yi, 1988: 6), it also served to exclude non-Burmese 
speaking ethnic groups from nationalists’ conception of báma/myanma 
(Metro, 2011: 47).
As shall be seen in later chapters, the conflict between ethnic armed 
groups and the Burmese military (‘Tatmadaw’) arose largely because of 
unequal rights as well as the forced assimilation process of ‘Burmanisation’, 
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best exemplified by the requirement that only the Bamar language was 
allowed as the language of instruction in schools and for official 
transactions. This excluded the culture and languages of over 100 ethnic 
groups that comprise modern Burma. In essence, though this was nothing 
new – the history of the Mon, Shan and Arakanese kingdoms were not 
part of the monastic curricula that dominated education for hundreds 
of years (Salem-Gervais and Metro, 2012), nor do they appear in post-
independence textbooks. As noted above, the tension between Bamar 
and other ethnic groups is undoubtedly ancient, and was deepened 
during the period immediately pre-independence when the Karen, 
Kachin and some other ethnic groups fought with the British against the 
Japanese–Burman alliance. In the post-independence era, the majority 
Bamar again instituted measures to control other ethnic groups. In fact, 
the primacy of one ethnicity (Bamar) over the others became a tactic the 
Tatmadaw used to attempt to legitimise itself through primary school 
textbooks. Cheesman found that according to the textbooks’ normative 
model, the ideal citizen had distinct ethnic (Bamar), religious (Buddhist) 
and gender (male) characteristics, and worked to benefit the state 
(Cheesman, 2002: iii). ‘Part of the aim of the textbooks was to instil an 
understanding of “the Union” that conflates the state, nation, territory 
and people’ (Cheesman, 2002: 1). After 1962, schools had to serve as an 
aid for the realisation of the revolutionary government’s socialist goal. 
This is when schools were nationalised, Burmese was made the official 
language of instruction, Buddhism the national religion and minority 
languages were removed from state schools.4 The aim seems to have 
been to force a unitary Bamar-dominated national identity across all 
ethnicities. The first Basic Education Law (1966), enacted under General 
Ne Win, tightened the supervision of schools, including monastic schools 
(Cheesman, 2002: 64).
promoting the martial kings and forgetting aung san: 
post-1988 focus
Under the SLORC/SPDC regime, the core aims of basic education 
remained unchanged from the preceding socialist period. Students were 
still expected to become citizens who served the state, with the aims 
being as follows (UNESCO–IBE, 2006/7):
• to enable every citizen of the Union of Myanmar to become a 
physical and mental worker well equipped with basic education, 
good health and moral character
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• to lay foundations for vocational education for the benefit of the 
Union of Myanmar
• to give precedence to the teaching of science capable of strengthen-
ing and developing productive forces
• to give precedence to the teaching of arts capable of preservation 
and development of culture, fine arts and literature of the state
• to lay a firm and sound educational foundation for the further 
pursuance of university education.
Buddhism, interestingly, was not included in the syllabus, rather it was 
part of co-curricular activities and teachers were encouraged by the 
state to develop their students’ spiritual character outside of school 
hours (Cheesman, 2002: 75). Cheesman recounts how Secretary One 
of the SPDC (Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt) personally travelled 
throughout the country in order to give instructions on how education 
should support the state and promote nationalism (Cheesman, 2002: 
72–3). Addressing students of monastic schools, Khin Nyunt urged the 
trainee teachers to study:
… with the aim of being able to organize and lead the youths in 
safeguarding the nation against the danger of some foreign super 
powers who are disrupting national consolidation, peace and 
stability of the State and development, and to study with the aim of 
keeping national unity ever alive and flourishing of the Union Spirit, 
which are the true strengths to prevent the infiltration in political, 
economic and cultural sectors with the use of e-technologies, and to 
counterattack the fabrications of the neo-colonialists and their 
follower expatriates group. (New Light of Myanmar, 2001: 16)
Cheesman notes how such speeches exemplify the contradictions of 
the regime’s simultaneous focus on the ‘modern nation’ and ‘traditional 
values’ (Cheesman, 2002: 90–1). Part of a wider endeavour of promoting 
nationalism and restoring the glory of the dynastic era, the SPDC changed 
the official name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 
(Houtman, 1999: 48). Nationalism post-1988 changed focus in that the 
‘Myanmar identity’ was now meant to include the other ethnic groups 
so that Myanmar means the Bamar plus other ethnic groups (although 
not ethnic Chinese or Indian). Houtman describes this process as 
‘myanmafication’, the creation of a unitary myanma identity, which 
parallels the processes of Burmanisation carried out in earlier eras 
(Houtman, 1999). Callahan points out that myanmafication entails both 
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a simultaneous homogenisation and differentiation of ethnic identity: 
ethnic people are ‘infantilised’, mostly represented by traditional costumes 
and dance styles, with no mention of their cultures or history (Callahan, 
2004).5 When looking at this process in the textbooks, Cheesman finds 
that Bamar people appear ‘natural’, whereas those of non-Bamar groups 
‘are contrived and often comical’ (Cheesman, 2002: 157).6
In line with Khin Nyunt’s sample speech above, the SPDC used 
school textbooks to reinforce links between the military regime and 
Myanmar’s past, creating the myth that the Bamar kings defeated ethnic 
minorities and ruled supreme. Metro shows that what she calls a ‘trinity 
of activities – national unification, economic development, and religious 
patronage’ are carried out by the SPDC and by all kings who are ‘hero-ised’ 
in the textbooks (Metro, 2011: 56). The result of this was to relegate 
anti-colonial nationalists to the second rung of heroes, behind the Great 
Kings. The prioritisation of the Great Kings7 meant that almost all of the 
history sections of history and geography textbooks were dedicated to 
Kings Anawratha, Kyansittha, Bayinnaung, Alaungpaya and Mindon. In 
textbooks, the actions of these Kings mirrored the actions of the SPDC, 
lending a spurious legitimacy to the military regime, a point developed 
by Metro (Metro, 2011). However, the kings and heroes of the other 
ethnic groups are only mentioned in relation to the Burman kings, so 
that the Mon, whose history is more closely related to the Burmans than 
other ethnic groups, received more textbook space than other ethnic 
historical figures.
In promoting the military as part of Myanmar’s history, the SPDC 
reduced the focus on the period of independence, in which General Aung 
San, seen by many as the founder of the Union, played a leading role.8 
According to Salem-Gervais and Metro, it is a popular misconception that 
the SPDC erased Aung San from the textbooks (Salem-Gervais and 
Metro, 2012). Rather, his role was reduced in light of the longer and 
wider history of historical kings, so that while in textbooks from the late 
1970s he was often referred to as the ‘Architect of Independence’, and he 
appeared in numerous lessons, by the 1990s the process of downplaying 
Aung San’s role had occurred. According to the Democratic Voice of Burma 
(Naw Say Phaw, 2008), some extracts of his speeches were removed 
in 2008.
Though the focus on the kings was paramount, the role of the 
kings nevertheless changed according to what the regime in power was 
aiming to achieve. In the first chapter of her PhD dissertation ‘Myanma 
identity and the shifting value of the classical past: A case study of King 
Kyansittha in Burmese history textbooks, 1829–2010’, Metro argues that 
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Burmese history textbook discourse from the dynastic era to the present 
illustrates the ‘ethnification’ of Burmese (myanma) identity9 and shows 
that the SPDC was using the past to underpin its policies, which was 
not new, rather it continued a tradition that has been in use for two 
centuries (Metro, 2011). She argues, however, that the SPDC fails in 
constructing an all-inclusive Myanmar identity that includes other ethnic 
groups, rather the term Myanmar most often refers only to the Bamar 
majority, in effect erasing the other ethnic groups.
This argument is also underlined by Cheesman who explains that 
the Union of Myanmar – also called Pyidaunzu Myanmar Naingandaw – is 
essentially ‘Bamar’ (Cheesman, 2002: 226):
From start to finish, the textbooks link national identity with the 
dominant ethnic group. State rhetoric speaks to ‘Myanmar’ identity 
in terms of ‘national races’; in the textbooks this narrative is 
marginalised and subverted by a stream of text indicating the 
contrary. […] Culture, tradition, history, civility and normalcy are 
all associated with being Bamar. But all of these things are also 
‘Myanmar’. The lines are blurred: overtly, ‘Myanmar’ is ‘national 
races’, covertly it is Bamar. No better illustration for this exists 
than the fact that the language in which the readers are written, 
Burmese – with all its concomitant cultural and historical baggage 
– is signified as ‘Myanmar language, our language’.
Beyond promoting nationalism and the Union, the SPDC still had to 
ensure literacy and numeracy of the Myanmar citizens. As the quality of 
education declined, and unfavourable comparisons with Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started to emerge, the government 
began to develop a plan for the education sector.
Signing up to ‘Education for All’
In 2001, the MoE set up a 30-year-long Basic Education Plan that was to 
be implemented in six five-year phases. In addition, it formulated a 
special 4-year Education Development Plan from 2000–1 to 2003–4 to 
develop the education sector, specifically to improve enrolment rates, 
review the curriculum, revise the assessment system, establish 
multi-media classrooms and upgrade teacher training institutions 
(Government of Myanmar, 2004). The 30-year Education Plan contained 
10 programmes for basic education with the purpose of promoting 
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greater access to, and quality of, basic education, and 36 programmes for 
the HE sector (Min Zaw Soe et al., 2017).
The Myanmar Government signed up to the objectives of the World 
Declaration on Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), nevertheless education remained woefully underfunded, 
receiving only 0.5 per cent of the gross national product compared to an 
average of 2.7 per cent in other Southeast Asian Countries (Thein Lwin, 
2000). In order to meet its EFA responsibilities, the government organised 
an EFA Forum in May 2002 and established the EFA National Plan for 
Action (NPA), adopting six national goals for EFA under the EFA NPA 
2003–2015.10 The NPA was linked to the 30-year Long-Term Education 
Plan, and developed activity plans for access to and quality of basic 
education, Early Childhood Centres for Education (ECCE), non-formal and 
continuing education, and Education Management Information Systems 
(EMIS). The government set the following goals that were to be achieved 
through the implementation of the NPA with various government and non-
government organisations (NGOs) working together:11
• ensuring that significant progress is achieved so that basic education 
of good quality is compulsory and completely free for all school-age 
children by 2015
• improving all aspects of the quality of basic education: teachers, 
education personnel and curriculum
• achieving significant improvement in the levels of functional 
literacy and continuing education by 2015
• ensuring that the learning needs of young people and adults are 
met through non-formal education, life-skills training and preventive 
education
• expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and 
education and
• strengthening EMIS.
One of the flagship projects was ‘Child-Friendly Schools’, supported by 
the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). 
For the wider community in meeting literacy goals, the focus was on 
Community Learning Centres (CLCs), and other non-formal education 
examples such as inclusive education initiatives. At the seventh EFA 
coordinators meeting in Bangkok in Thailand in October 2005, Myanmar 
presented slides that showed programmes for disabled children, over-aged 
students and the building of CLCs, as well as the introduction of human 
rights to the Myanmar School Curriculum.12 With regard to targeting 
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disadvantaged groups through non-formal education, unpublished MoE 
documents detailed how the CLCs that focused on literacy acquisition 
as of 1994, expanded from 7 centres established with United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) assistance 
to over 70 centres in 11 townships. The CLCs rolled out a 3R (reading, 
writing and arithmetic) programme in rural and disadvantaged urban 
areas to support adults and help meet EFA literacy targets. The CLCs also 
served as community information and resource centres, building capacity 
with short-term courses and skills-based training. In addition, there was 
a special 3R programme developed for the border areas and implemented 
by the Ministry of the Progress of Border Areas and National Races 
(MPBND), Department of Basic Education (DBE) and Department of 
Educational Planning and Training (DEPT), with technical assistance from 
Department of Myanmar Education Research (DMER) that increased 
from 7 townships in Kokant, Wa, Eastern Kyaingtong and Rakhine in 1996 
to 68 townships by 2007.13 Another measure was a special primary-level 
curriculum and syllabus for over-aged school children developed by DEPT 
in June 2003. The accelerated programme was intended to help children 
over 7 or 8 years old to complete primary education in two years.14
It is unclear if the signing-up to the EFA goals shaped part of the 
30-year policy or if what was prioritised in the 30-year policy was 
identified before the EFA framework. However, the policy plan of 2004 
describes the details of the 30-year plan and they seem to show that the 
Government of Myanmar was aware of some severe shortcomings of 
its education system, particularly of issues related to social justice and 
equality. Long before the formulation of the National Education Strategic 
Plan (NESP) in 2016, and eight years before the start of the reforms, the 
policy document engages with access to schools, mentioning in particular 
the border and conflict affected areas, gender disparity in schools, the 
lack of post-primary schools and the promotion of access to over- 
aged children. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and 
assessment that does not rely on rote learning and teacher education 
(both pre- and in-service) are also mentioned as priority areas for reform. 
In addition, the document provides details on changes that are required 
in HE, such as improving access, quality and delivering modern ICT. 
For example, Section 7.2 summarises priorities under the heading of 
‘Developing Learner Maturity, Creativity, Analytical Skills and Ability to 
utilise Modern Technology’.15 The section on HE even suggests that HEIs 
should cater to the needs of the local communities and help develop the 
regions in which they are located. Although not as detailed as the NESP, 
this policy document is a valuable precursor. It seems that the issue the 
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MoE faced was more with the implementation of change rather than 
with the realisation that change was needed.
Myanmar’s progress was reviewed in 2010. In an unpublished 
advisory document to the MoE,16 a Myanmar consultant and education 
expert for the government states:
Net enrolment ratio in primary education in Myanmar was 65.7% 
in 1990. Though it rose sharply to 73.6% in 1995, it rose gradually 
to 77% in 2000. In 2005, 82.2% (about 1% per year) has been 
gained. In 2009, it was 84.1%. Hence, in order to accomplish the 
MDG target (95%) in 2015, it needs to increase, at least, by about 
2% growth rate per year. In other words, more concerted efforts 
and investment are, indeed, required to achieve this target. (…) 
The proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5, in 
1990, was 24.5%. In 1995, it was improved by about 12% to 37.1%. 
Likewise, it was progressed by about 12% to 48.5% in 2000. While 
the increase rate of this proportion (12%) was doubled to gain 
73.4% in 2005, it was only 74.4% in 2009. In other words, it had 
only increased by 1% over the period from 2005 to 2009. Therefore, 
this indicator is too slow to reach its target and Myanmar must 
invest all possible effort to achieve its target 90% by 2015 (pp. 2–3). 
[…] The dropout rate in primary education is still existing 
in all the Grades. […] The highest number of dropout rates is in 
Grade 1, indicating 17.52% in 2001–02, 18.44% in 2000–01, 
20.13% in 1999–00 and 23.17% in 1998–99 academic year.
It is clear from the above that the MoE was made aware of the shortcom-
ings of its programmes well before the 2012 Comprehensive Education 
Sector Review (CESR) and that they were aware of the challenges in 
catching up with other nations in the region.
Child-Centred Approaches, international donors and 
the failure of a new method
Part and parcel of the first round of education ‘reforms’ that followed the 
Myanmar government’s commitment to work towards EFA outcomes, 
was the introduction of a new teaching and learning method called Child- 
Centred Approaches (CCA).17 This was first introduced in cooperation 
with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2004–5 
to promote the development of children’s creativity, analytical skills, 
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critical thinking and problem-solving skills (JICA, 2013: 61). However, 
as shall be seen below, since the curriculum was developed before 
the CCA method was introduced, the two did not integrate well. Part 
of the problem was that the MoE published a syllabus rather than a 
comprehensive curriculum.
The Monthly Curriculum (MC) developed by the Regional Education 
Office (REO) and authorized by DBE is the well-known school 
syllabus despite being called ‘curriculum’. In addition to that, modifi-
cations relating to school curricula are made during an annual 
conference in April – the ‘Seminar on National Education Promotion’ 
– without updating the current curriculum documents. DBE merely 
notifies schools about decisions and modifications through Regional 
Education Offices (REO), District Education Offices (DEO) and 
Township Education Offices (TEO). (JICA, 2013: 61)
The problems of practicing CCA go beyond the mismatch between 
curriculum, syllabus, method and lack of communication noted by JICA. 
In a study in 2009–10 on teaching methods, most teachers who had 
received some form of CCA training had no difficulty explaining what 
they saw as the main elements of CCA or the benefits they experienced 
when using CCA. The teachers, however, struggled to apply this approach 
due to logistical problems such as high teacher-to-student ratios, lack of 
space, lack of teaching aids and lack of time. Teachers all agreed that 
CCA required a lot more work overall (Lall, 2010: 1–2).
A further issue with this change has been cultural; CCA has been 
perceived as a ‘foreign’ or ‘Western’ way to teach. Teachers were not 
always used to the self-reflection and collaborative procedures which 
underlie such teaching and were worried that they might be asked 
questions they would not be able to answer (Lall, 2010: 27). The issue of 
respect and how the students view teachers and parents or other elders 
remains central, as many see the main difficulty in balancing this new 
approach – seen as the ‘modern’ and ‘Western’ way – with traditional 
Myanmar culture. Parents were especially worried that children would 
become too disrespectful and reject the traditional hierarchies at home 
(Lall, 2010: 27).
Lall et al.’s study, conducted prior to the start of the reforms 
in 2012, focused on what teachers18 themselves had to say about the 
current education system in Myanmar and what education reforms they 
felt were needed. Some quotes from the teachers who took part are listed 
below (Lall et al., 2013: 18–19):
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• ‘We don’t have time. Let me say. For biology we need 18 periods for 
teaching, 4 periods for practicals, so it is altogether 22 periods. But 
in practice I have only 21 periods for this month. […] We are in 
haste every month, we feel like changing it.’
• ‘To finish the course in time set by the MoE, CCA is used less than 
Teacher Centred Approach (TCA).’
• ‘But in our opinion we don’t think the current syllabus is fit for 
CCA. Not only children but also teachers prefer CCA but in the 
meanwhile a limit of time, lots of lessons to teach, examinations 
and the number of children more than we can manage are things 
hindering CCA to be successful in current Myanmar schools. […] 
With CCA we cannot assess each and every child thoroughly. We 
don’t have time. Current exam system does not go well with CCA. If 
we are to use CCA, we are obliged to reduce the curriculum.’
One of the main reasons that CCA could not be applied was incompati- 
bility with the exam system, also referred to as the ‘Pass System’, used 
from Grade 1 to Grade 8. The intention of this system has been to make 
sure that the whole class passes the final exams with a basic understand-
ing of each and every lesson. However, there were some constraints to 
exercising this principle. In the primary and high schools, teachers had 
to finish the given curriculum within a limited timeframe, and exams 
had to be held on target dates. Because of this time limitation, teachers 
chose some lessons out of the overall curriculum and taught the students 
through rote learning so that they would finish teaching the lessons on 
time and the students could then sit the exams.
The exam system included monthly exams, with questions designed 
in a manner that students only needed to memorise what had been 
taught in the classroom and to write down the exact answer. After the 
exams, the students’ pass rate was used as an indicator for both teacher 
and school evaluations. If students failed the exams, the teachers had to 
prepare reports to their respective Township Education Office/Officer 
(TEOs), and they had to teach the students again in the summer so that 
they could attempt the exam again and move on to the next grade. 
Most of the schools skipped this process and just allowed all students 
to pass in the first stage, otherwise the process consumed too much 
time and money – and some said they felt that students would not learn 
better anyway.
Other reasons for not applying CCA included insufficient teaching 
aids, inappropriate class sizes and large teacher-to-student ratios, small 
class spaces and out-dated curriculum in some subjects, especially science 
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subjects. There were also issues with regard to inequities between teachers’ 
qualifications and teachers’ salaries. Since older teachers had not received 
regular in-service training after entering into service, their understanding 
of teaching methodology and child psychology was not up to date; they 
were nevertheless the ‘senior’ teachers who had to be listened to.
Another issue that teachers complained about was their salary, the 
salary scheme for public servants pre-2012 being unrealistic. The need 
to subsidise teaching salaries meant that tuition became a popular 
business for teachers, especially in urban areas, to meet the costs of 
living. Unfortunately, the need to make money outside the classroom 
reduces teaching capacity in schools as well as creating conditions 
conducive to corruption. Students come to rely on tuition and only 
students who can afford tuition get high marks and high grades in exams. 
A deputy director from a TEO interviewed in 2012 added:
Most of the teachers do not want to change CCA. They think CCA 
is good, but there are some problems such as parents’ economic 
and education status, student-teacher ratio imbalance, time, 
curriculum, exam system, and teachers’ salaries. They think these 
factors make problems for CCA. In the current situation, they want 
to use TCA, not only CCA.
The fact that parents expect students to pass exams means that teachers 
also feel they have to teach to the test rather than for learning:
We have to spoon-feed here in our country. They have to learn by 
heart. We don’t have self-study, though children from international 
schools have self-study.
[…] We have to teach for exams, not to teach them so that 
they really learn! (Lall et al, 2013: 20).
It takes time, for CCA system is related with the intelligence of the 
children. There will be problems for this system because of our 
‘all pass’ system. […] We are weak in every sector in comparison 
with foreign countries. There should be music halls and sports 
halls for the children to cope with every aspect. The spacious 
classrooms and teaching aids should also be well installed. (Lall 
et al, 2013: 20)
In effect, teachers agreed that the whole system needed to be adapted to 
the teaching method. Just changing the method without changing the 
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exam system and without addressing issues of time and space would not 
lead to a successful adaptation of CCA. As one head teacher explained: 
‘It is important to be provided with material resources together with 
system change. For example, to change into CCA we need enough 
teachers’ (Lall et al., 2013: 20).
The main findings of the research showed deep incompatibility 
between CCA and the exam system. The pass system meant that teachers 
were under time pressure to get through the curriculum, and the lack of 
space and time reduced their ability to use the CCA method. Capacity 
constraints both infrastructural and curriculum-related were the second 
issue, with oversized classes leading to inattention and rote learning 
methods, and a profession in need of greater professional pride and 
modernisation. Teachers did, however, speak of the pressure from head 
teachers to change the teaching method to accord with Myanmar’s 
education policy. The lack of parental involvement and the proliferation 
of tuition in the state sector resulted in profoundly inequitable outcomes 
for children, as children left school with different foundations depending 
on which school they attended. This then affected their ability to enter 
HE. In the end, those studying for the teaching profession were not the 
top achievers from the school system, in turn affecting teaching quality 
(Lall et al., 2013: 27).
The findings above, though based on research only across Yangon, 
are reflected in another, much larger UNICEF and University of York 
Institute for Effective Education Study (Hardman et al., 2012) that used 
a stratified sample of 800 schools from 20 townships covering a range of 
urban/rural, multi-grade/mono-grade settings and schools of different 
sizes. The schools had many of the traditional impediments noted in the 
earlier research (Hardman et al., 2012: 9).
Many of the teachers observed were working in an environment 
of genuine constraints caused by lack of adequate investment 
in school buildings: schools lacked electricity, learning resources 
and other facilities. Nearly 80% of the schools observed were multi- 
grade without walls or partitions between classes. Classrooms were 
often overcrowded, hot and noisy, with insufficient desks and chairs 
available and buildings were in a poor state of repair, particularly in 
rural areas.
The study used a pre-/post-test, quasi-experimental design to investigate 
the impact of an in-service and teacher education (INSET) programme 
on classroom processes and learning outcomes. The findings were 
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basically the same as noted in the Yangon study, in that teachers were 
unable to use the CCA method (Hardman et al., 2012: 9).
The majority of lessons observed used a transmission model of 
teaching in which the teacher often used a chalk board and/or 
textbook to transmit recipe knowledge for recall. There appeared 
to be very little difference in the underlying pedagogic approach 
used by teachers in the teaching of mathematics and Myanmar 
language at Grades 3 and 5. […] Teacher feedback on responses 
did not occur in nearly 80 per cent of the questioning sequences as 
they were usually answered by a choral response with little 
opportunity for follow-up.
Private schools: The middle class looks for alternatives
Government schools and public education provision were increasingly 
seen as poor and inadequate, especially by the middle classes. Yet legally 
there were no alternatives. As had been mentioned earlier, in the post-
independence period from 1948 to 1962 private education was accepted, 
but during the socialist era of 1962–1988 all private institutions were 
closed down. The Myanmar government website consulted in 2007 stated:
… though the private sector has not yet formally been granted a 
status of setting up Universities with privileges to confer degrees, it 
has increasingly played an important role in the education market 
in consonance with the adoption of market mechanisms in the 
country’s economy. The Private Tuition Law of 1964 permits setting 
up of private schools to teach single subjects per se. Permission is 
not granted to set up private schools to teach the full curriculum.
Dorothy Guyot describes how when the government shut down all 
universities in 1996 in reaction to the student boycott, families started to 
look for alternatives. This gap led to an opening for the private sector 
to start providing education services as a business, and even a school 
directory, the ‘Education Directory and Guide for Everyone’ (EDGE) 
which was published by U Myo Kyaw in 2000. Guyot19 wrote to U Myo 
Kyaw’s assistant Daw Tahnee Wade, who recollected:
Students would go from course to course at private tuition 
companies while they waited for universities to open. The problem 
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was that the education establishments were not allowed to 
advertise, so the students did not know what was out there for 
them. Many of the schools were legally illegal. They were not 
allowed to open by law, but the government of the time ignored 
them. I still do not know how we managed to get permission for the 
Education Directory, but I do remember going to the Censor office 
with a sample and getting permission. We were able to include 
adverts from the tuition centres and schools, and even had an ad 
from the British Council.
Many schools did not advertise themselves, and those that did used 
headings such as ‘tutors, foreign language schools/centres, or education 
services’. Preschools were the only private Myanmar schools that the 
government officially allowed, since education before kindergarten (KG) 
was under the authority of the Ministry of Social Welfare, not the MoE. 
The only schools that announced their presence in EDGE in 2000 were 
10 international schools and 75 preschools. Slowly, the sector started to 
grow and by 2006–7, private schools had sprung up at pre-elementary, 
elementary, secondary and HE levels to cater for popular demand for 
English language, computing, accounting and business-related training.20 
Some schools offered a wider curriculum, some focused only on a 
few subjects. Most operated as supplementary schools, where children 
came after their day at the government schools, others were full-time 
schools operating under the radar.21 Officially in 2006–7, private schools 
were still not allowed to operate as an alternative to the state system 
(although there were a few that had special status, such as the Yangon 
International School and the Diplomatic School in Yangon). The state 
tried to regulate these new schools by limiting the number of subjects 
they were allowed to teach, but schools managed to teach mathematics 
and science subjects under the guise of ‘Information Technology’ and 
other arts and language subjects under the title of ‘English’.22 Some private 
organisations, sometimes calling themselves schools and sometimes 
education centres, were also engaged in preparing students for examina-
tions held by overseas universities and professional institutes.
Despite the regulations, some larger consortiums managed to set 
up large private education centres around the country. The International 
Language and Business Centre (ILBC) was such a venture and catered to 
a wide age group of learners of English and other subjects.23 The Khit 
Myanmar Weekly (2006) reports that there were also summer schools 
that ran as businesses, such as the Summit International Learning Centre 
in Yangon that focused on English skills as well as maths and sciences.
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In the 2002 Education Directory section entitled ‘General 
Education’, the sub-headings were: Day Care (61), KG (17), Preschool 
(89), Primary (18), International Schools (11), GCE ‘O’ levels (20), 
Libraries (4), plus Basic Education Schools as well as Universities and 
Colleges (these last three categories were government institutions). It is 
clear from the listings that most private institutions catered to the 
pre-primary age (which includes both preschool and KG), nevertheless 
offering a variety of subjects such as Myanmar, English, Maths and 
general knowledge as well as singing, playing and drawing. In certain 
cases, other languages such as Mandarin Chinese were also on offer. The 
day-care centres/KGs catered to those aged 3–5, but some offered their 
services from the age of one. The prices for 2002 ranged from around 
500 MMK per month to 30,000 MMK per month. The older the children, 
the more variety of subjects (including IT, Geography, History, Science, 
Arts and Physical Education) and the more expensive. The Montessori 
Children’s house seemed at the time to be the most expensive pre-primary 
option at 45,000 MMK per month. Guyot et al. remember this as well 
(Guyoy et al., 2016):
The visible growth area was outside the purview of the Ministry 
of Education – preschools. The heads of preschools often quietly 
accommodated parents’ pleading to let their English language 
school grow with their children. An example of the quiet growth 
is ES4E (English Skills for Everyone), housed in a simple single 
story building on Kaba Aye Road. When Dorothy first visited the 
preschool in 2003 looking for a service placement site for Pre-
Collegiate students, it had been teaching 3–5 year olds since 1998. 
When she dropped in a few years later its signboard and façade 
were unchanged, but in the back there were five new classrooms for 
five new grades.
Parents were keen to send their children to formal institutions, although 
the quality of tuition was not verified or regulated. An article from a local 
Burmese weekly (cited in Lall, 2009: 141), explains:24
Private Schools ending with ‘School’ are chosen over those that end 
with ‘Centre’.
If the name ends with ‘school’, private schools are more likely to be 
chosen than if it ends with ‘centre’ said a principal of the private 
international school which opens in Yangon, Myanmar. The parents 
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choose this as it is related to the international private school field. 
In this field, more credible names end with ‘school’ rather than 
having a name ending with ‘centre’. According to the same principal 
over ninety per cent of parents did not check the credibility of the 
school. These parents send their children to what was perceived as 
popular schools.
What is clear from the above is that while the government schools were 
failing, urban middle class parents were looking for alternatives, and in 
light of the political changes expected after the 2008 Constitution had 
been enacted, the scene was set for a major overhaul of the education 
system.
Tuition
It is good to remember that all parents – not only middle class parents in 
urban areas – are key stakeholders in any education system. In Myanmar’s 
poorer households, parental involvement in education has been histori-
cally low, not because parents were not interested in education, but 
because traditional hierarchies accorded teachers considerable esteem 
and respect along with a belief that teachers know best and will do their 
best for the children. Parents of all classes and across all states and 
regions25 place a high value on education, which they connect with 
character development and socio-emotional skills, such as self-control, 
discipline, manners and ethics. At the same time, poorer households do 
not support schooling beyond the minimum amount thought necessary 
for their children, unless they perceive that the quality of education will 
allow their children to have a better future. The poorest households 
always have to appraise the school versus work choice for their children.
Parents at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century in 
Myanmar knew that the system was failing them and their families. 
Education was not a conduit out of poverty for the more disadvantaged, 
and it rarely offered a brighter future to those in remote and conflict- 
affected areas. Despite this, and possibly because there were no alter- 
natives, parents and communities subsidised government education to 
about 70 per cent of total expenditure (Mehta et al., 2014). Historically, 
there have been two main forms of community-based funding of 
education: parental contributions and community-based donors.26 In 
the government schools, parents and children are regularly solicited to 
cover various common expenses of the school, including festivals, award 
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ceremonies and repairs. These contributions could be in cash, kind and 
labour, with individual households funding not just direct education 
expenses for their children attending the school, but also contributing 
frequently to fund the general expenses of the school. While officially 
‘voluntary’, these contributions create equity issues between families, and 
in some cases create situations where the schools discriminate against 
families that cannot pay, potentially leading to student drop outs. It also 
means that already overburdened teachers have to focus on raising funds 
rather than focusing on teaching. The government had at one point 
imposed a blanket ban on parental donations, which in light of continuing 
funding gaps at the school proved unsustainable.
As parents realise that their children will not pass exams only by 
going to school, they pay for after-school tuition.27 This practice has 
mostly been illegal and for many years the government has tried to crack 
down on it.28 However, tuition remains in high demand because of 
the overcrowded curriculum that cannot be covered in class, an exam 
system that encourages memorisation, and large class sizes which make 
it impossible for teachers to provide individual attention to students. 
Parents also see tuition as an ‘investment’, making sure that their children 
get the best possible chance in life. One father in Mon State explained: 
‘Some parents who are poor, and whose children are weak in studies, 
have to take loans in order to send their children for private tuition. It is 
a kind of investment for them.’ Also some parents reported that at times 
exam questions are revealed by the teachers to children taking tuition, 
giving those children an unfair advantage. In rural settings, parents 
sometimes find that they cannot help their children themselves. This is 
especially true for households where parents are either insufficiently 
educated or are unable to spare their work-day time to help the child 
after school with homework and lessons: ‘When our child is in a grade 
that is higher than I have studied, then I have to send them to a tutor who 
is more educated than me.’29
Teachers of course also provide tuition to supplement their meagre 
incomes. 
The nation’s more than 226,000 teachers, like other civil servants, 
are poorly paid. Public service salaries were drastically increased 
in January 2010; nevertheless, according to MOE data, a primary 
school teacher’s pay still averages only 47,000 kyat ($58) per 
month, a secondary school teacher’s pay averages 53,000 kyat 
($66) per month and a high school teacher’s pay (upper secondary) 
averages 59,000 kyat ($73) per month. […] According to 
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interviews carried out in some of Myanmar’s border areas, the 
attrition rate of trained teachers is at times as high as 90 per cent. 
(Mehta et al., 2014: 85)
UNICEF’s Mon Situational Analysis (SITAN) study (Mehta et al., 2014) 
found that the use of after-school tutoring services has been the most 
significant form of non-formal education accessed by households. It 
has been used by families from all walks of life, rich and poor, urban 
and rural, students in all grades from grade one through primary and 
secondary school, for all subjects, no matter if these students go to ‘high’ 
or ‘low’ quality schools. The MoE has tried to ban public school teachers 
from providing private tuition,30 however, the ban seems to have simply 
driven the practice into a shadow market, where parents confirmed that 
they were still paying for the service, whilst teachers would not confirm 
they were providing tuition.
Most households worry about the future of their children, so 
knowing that it is the matriculation grade that will determine a child’s 
entrance to university and the subject that their child can study, parents 
invest in these supplementary classes, no matter what the government 
says. However, tuition in the end might compensate a little for those who 
can afford it, but ultimately it substitutes for rather than complements 
what happens in the classroom.31
Conclusion
It has been seen in this chapter that the quality of education in Myanmar 
has declined over the decades. Despite the government committing 
to the MDGs, EFA and publishing education development plans, these 
have remained theoretical documents, not resulting in much change on 
the ground. The presence of systemic bottlenecks at both the macro 
and micro level have created severe resource, capacity, information and 
incentive problems that in turn have weakened the ability of the education 
system in Myanmar to address the various deprivations and inequities 
experienced by children and school communities.32 There has been 
a large variation in the extent and mix of deprivations experienced 
across the different states, townships, schools, even across basic education 
grades. Overall, the presence of widespread poverty and a stagnant 
economy were key factors affecting education services and the experience 
of children within schools. The UNICEF funded SITAN study (Mehta 
et al., 2014) conducted and written before the reforms started, and 
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looking at the situation for children across Myanmar, summarises the 
issues as follows.
The immediate causal factors hampering children in Myanmar 
from realizing their right to education are the limited quality of 
education services and the high actual and opportunity costs 
of education. Quality is impaired by insufficient infrastructure, 
insufficient teachers, outdated teaching methodologies and large 
teacher-pupil ratios. Although no fees are levied in primary 
education, there are multiple charges that families must pay in 
order for their children to access it. This burden is heaviest for 
the poorest families. Tuition fees are charged for both middle 
and higher secondary schools. Nearly 30 per cent of school-aged 
children not attending school in 2009 did not do so because of the 
cost burden. Parents also have to consider the opportunity cost of 
keeping their children in education, both for themselves and their 
children; many feel work is a better option for them than education. 
Parents’ appreciation of the value of education and their willingness 
to support it for their children is strongly linked to their own 
educational experience (or lack of it). But even where children do 
attend school, parental involvement in their education is limited.
Underlying causes for the failure of children in Myanmar to realize 
their right to education include structural factors undermining 
service delivery, a lack of options in non-formal basic education 
and language barriers. The former includes lack of funding for the 
education sector as well as limited policy development and planning, 
limited quality of teacher training, sector-level management failings 
and inadequate monitoring and assessment. The current provision 
of non-formal or alternative primary education for children who 
have dropped out of school is very limited in coverage. Despite the 
country’s very complex linguistic diversity, Myanmar language is 
the sole language of government, public affairs and public education. 
The ‘language barrier’ is a significant factor for children from 
non-Myanmar ethnic groups dropping out of school. Three focus 
areas of education reform in Myanmar are quality, equity and sector 
capacity.33




 1 It is interesting to note that even eminent western historians of Burma, such as John Furnivall, 
did not mention these lay schools. The reason for this was arguably because they focused on 
the education of girls and were not considered worthy of much notice. 
 2 The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed its name to the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. See Tonkin for more on the 1990 elections, 
(Tonkin, 2007). 
 3 In the late 1980s and early 1990s as China withdrew its financial support, the BCP splintered 
into various ethno-nationalist EAOs. 
 4 More on this in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 5 More on this in Rose Metro’s thesis: ‘The rhetorical aspect of myanmafication was heralded 
by the “Adaptation of Expressions” law of 1989, which altered the name of the country in 
non-Burmese languages from “Burma” to “Myanmar,” ostensibly in order to correct the 
misapprehension of colonists who had labelled the country by its spoken name rather than 
by the more formal term by which it had been known since the dynastic era – myanma 
naing-ngan. The law also claimed that báma – what the British had rendered as “Burma” – was 
not and had never been a nation, but was instead one of the ethnic groups that made up 
myanma lu-myò (previous usages of myanma lu-myò to describe the majority ethnic group 
went unexplained)’ (Metro, 2011: 54). 
 6 In school textbooks, Nick Cheesman found, ‘People dressed as Bamar are seen as individuals 
or in family units, engaged in community celebrations or household tasks. Non-Bamar are 
usually lumped together in contrived groups displaying standardised national costumes, 
rather than simple day-to-day scenes’ (Cheesman, 2002: 157). 
 7 Anawarahta (1044–77 CE), Bayinnaung (1551–81 CE), Alaungpaya (1752–60 CE). 
 8 Any mention of Aung San would remind people of his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi, held by the 
SPDC under house arrest at the time. 
 9 Metro traces the process of ‘ethnification’ of Burmese/myanma identity over the past two 
centuries by examining the continuities and changes in the way schoolbooks portray one king, 
Kyansittha (Metro, 2011). By investigating Kyansittha’s appearances in dynastic, colonial, 
nationalist and socialist era textbooks, she accounts for his transformation from a universal 
monarch in his own court inscriptions into a myanma king in current textbooks, in line with 
the military regime’s post-1988 project of ‘myanmafication’ (Houtman, 1999: 26–27) of 
Burmese identity. 
10 See, for example, the Government of Myanmar’s (2014a) National EFA Review. 
11 This includes a range of government organisations: The MoE leads the literacy programme 
along with the Myanmar Education Research Bureau (MERB), in 2004 re-named the 
Department of Myanmar Education Research (DMER); The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief 
and Resettlement; and the Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races and 
Development Affairs (MPBND). The Ministry of Information has established township libraries 
that are used as Community Learning Centres for Literacy and Continuing Education. 
NGOs: Myanmar Literacy Resource Centre (MLRC), Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation 
(MWAF), Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA), and Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA). All are providing libraries, CLCs and reading circles for literacy 
and continuing education.
International agencies: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF 
both support literacy programmes and World Vision and Save the Children have assisted 
programmes that include literacy development. 
12 One slide states: Human Rights Education was first introduced in school curriculum Grades 
6–10. 
13 Myanmar NFE records, DMER publication (2006) cited in unpublished advisory document to 
the MoE 2010. 
14 Cited in unpublished advisory document to the MoE (2010: 33). 
15 Cited in unpublished advisory document to the MoE (2010: 40). 
16 This has to remain anonymous as this document was shared in confidence. 
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17 Anecdotal interview evidence over a decade shows that respondents do not necessarily know 
that CCA stands for child-centred approaches to teaching and learning. They do know, 
however, that it is the opposite of teachers lecturing to a class. 
18 These were mostly government schoolteachers, although two monastic schools and one 
private school also took part in the study.
19 Tahnee Wade, personal email to Dorothy Guyot, 22 August 2016. 
20 In January 2005, the author met a businessman who had set up a school which was teaching 
in English. The school was at primary level only and meant as a supplement to regular state 
school teaching after official classes had ended. The school was located in the businessman’s 
house in a residential area in central Yangon. It emerged over the next few meetings with other 
education specialists that such schools were common, but that there was no official data as 
to how many there were and what they taught. Interviews revealed that many taught only 
English, but an increasing number of schools offered broader curricula, some even employing 
English-speaking foreigners on an unofficial basis. A visit around 6 months later revealed 
that there had been a ‘crackdown’ on such schools and that they were now only allowed to 
teach English and computers/ IT. The government was also trying to regulate this new market 
by dictating what fees the providers could charge. It emerged from interviews that especially 
in secondary supplementary schools, under the heading ‘English’, a number of social sciences 
such as history were being taught, and that IT often meant maths and science. In this way, a 
fuller curriculum could be maintained. Official fees, of course, could be supplemented through 
black market cash payments (Lall, 2009).
21 This was common knowledge across the education community at the time but not spoken 
about. The proof came out much later in what Guyot et al. (2016) call the ‘President Thein Sein 
effect’. 
2011 2013
International Schools  10  57
Kindergarten, Primary, Secondary  25  13
Preschools 219 188
Total Private Schools 254 258
‘In just 2 years how could anyone transform small schools serving 3–5 year olds into 
full, multi-grade international schools? Look at the total number of schools. It increased by 
only four. Thus, the net disappearance of 31 preschools and the disappearance of 12 other 
schools may make up the bulk of the international school growth. We believe that many 
preschool owners had been quietly growing their schools for years, just the way ES4S had. […] 
Excitement was in the air about the forthcoming private school law. We suspect that 
the vast majority of owners of the 47 new international schools announced their school’s 
existence because they trusted that President Thein Sein’s government would welcome their 
efforts.’
22 Interview with Ko Tar, owner of one of the new private schools in 2005 and again in 2006.
23 ‘International Language and Business Centre (ILBC) has classes in Taunggyi and Lashio (Shan 
States). According to the Managing Director, the ILBC, which has the most branches 
of private schools across the country and is based in Yangon, opened new branches in two 
cities, Taunggyi and Lashio in the Shan States. They will accept preschool students up to GCE 
‘O’ for summer course and for regular classes. ILBC is the first among the private schools in 
Yangon and has three branches in Yangon (Bahan, Tarmawe and Thingangyun) with a total of 
450 students (Khit Myanmar Weekly, 2006: 3). 
24 For most of the 2000 institutions could not call themselves schools – however, some institutions 
did manage to circumvent government rules. (The Voice Weekly. (2007) Vol. 3, No. 30, 7 May 
2007, 8). This article is not available online. 
25 Over the past decade and a half, I have met with several thousand parents across the whole 
country. 
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS56
26 Schools also solicit contributions from donors and ‘well-wishers’ whereby schools receive 
funding from better-off members within the local community through the institution of the 
School Board of Trustees. 
27 See Bray et al. for more information on tuitions and the education shadow market 
(Bray et al., 2019). 
28 Private subject tuition was investigated in the 2006–7 school year. This was announced on 
9 May 2006 by No. 3 Basic Education Department under MoE. The township chief education 
officer was to instruct those providing tuition to apply to get permission to open the tuition 
class. The township chief education officer had to report the tuition classes which were 
eligible within the rules and regulations of the above department. If some problems occurred 
and if he did not report them, he had to take responsibility for all problems. The teachers 
from these tuition classes would be investigated too. If a school runs without permission, 
it would be terminated in accordance with the law of 1984 Rules and Regulation of 
Private Subject Tuition. (Living Color Magazine. 2006 ‘Private subject tuition investigated’, 
132 (July), 18).
29 Author’s notes, interview with Rural Mothers, Mawlamyine, 2013. 
30 ‘Order banning private tuition is “not fair”’. Eleven Media, 14 October 2013 reported that 
the: ‘Ministry of Education has issued an order to teachers not to give private tutoring but 
the directive doesn’t seem to have much effect as the practice continues unabated.’ https://
www.nationthailand.com/noname/30217080. 
31 Concerns that this system creates incentives for teachers to shirk their primary teaching 
responsibilities within school hours have led MoE to ban the supply of tuition by public 
school teachers. The ban, however, proved to be both unsustainable and counter-productive – 
driving the practice into the shadowmarket and making it even more difficult for poorer 
children to access after-school support.
32 Conclusion drawn by Mehta et al.’s 2014 UNICEF-funded Mon SITAN study. This conclusion 
can be drawn for the whole country at the time.
33 Mehta et al.’s 2014 study conducted for UNICEF also points to the following disparities that 
will be explored in more depth in the next chapter. Primary schooling Disparities exist: in 
terms of regions […] Tanintharyi (98 per cent) had the highest rate of primary education 
participation and Rakhine (75.8 per cent) the lowest; there was a slight bias towards urban 
schooling – 93 per cent compared with 89.2 per cent in rural schools; it was much higher for 
children from the richest quintile (94.9 per cent) than those from the poorest (81.4 per cent).
 
Enrolment of disabled children is particularly low. Ministry of National Planning and 
Economic Development, Ministry of Health and UNICEF (2011) 80: ‘[…] Despite official 
whole township enrolment drives undertaken since 1999–2000, the MICS 2009–10 data show 
that only 77.3 per cent of 5 year olds attended school. This increased to 95 per cent for 7and 
8 year olds. Given the 117 per cent gross enrolment rate in primary education in 2008
 
and 
that 11.9 per cent of children aged 10–15 in 2009–10 were attending primary school, these 
figures indicate that many over-aged children are enrolled in primary education. Again, 
there are significant disparities. As much as 19 per cent of 10–15-year-old children from the 
poorest households were still in primary school, but only 5 per cent from the richest. The rich–
poor contrast is more marked when the status of 9 year olds is assessed: only 31.2 per cent of 
9 year olds from the poorest households were in the last year of primary school, compared 
with 78.7 per cent of those from the richest. Regional disparities are prominent: just 31.7 per 
cent of 9 year olds were in the last year of primary school in Rakhine State, compared with 
72.3 per cent in Tanintharyi, and UNICEF (Ministry of National Planning and Economic 
Development, Ministry of Health and UNICEF, 2011: 80–1) ‘[…] The net completion rate for 
primary school was only 54.2 per cent (children of primary school completion age attending 
the last year of primary school) in 2009–10.
 
The same significant disparities are seen based on 
socio-economic status (78.7 per cent richest quintile, compared with 31.2 per cent poorest 
quintile), rural–urban division (49.6 per cent, compared with 66.6 per cent)…’ (Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Health and UNICEF, 2011: 81). 
Secondary schooling Participation rates in secondary education are increasing but still low 
and inequitable. The gross enrolment rate for secondary education was estimated to be 53 per 
cent in 2008, a significant increase from 34 per cent in 1999.
 
(Global Education and Monitoring 
Report Team, 2011: 82–3.) ‘[…] The recent MICS also found that the rural–urban difference 
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in secondary school attendance (76 per cent versus 52 per cent) was far more pronounced 
than for primary school attendance. So too were the disparities based on socio-economic 
status: only 28.2 per cent of children from the poorest households were in secondary school, 
compared with 85.5 per cent from the richest households. Regional disparities were also 
greater (figure 29): the secondary school attendance rate was 74.7 per cent in Yangon but only 
30.9 per cent in Rakhine, low rates were also found in Shan State’.
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2
Education reform and effects on 
basic education
Introduction
This chapter starts with a description of the state of education prior to 
2012, and introduces the education reforms that were engendered in 
the second half of 2012 under President Thein Sein’s government with 
the CESR, and the role played by the aid agencies. The chapter engages 
with the tensions between the various stakeholders including the MoE, 
the CESR team, the Parliamentary Committee lead by Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the NNER, a civil society-led consortium campaigning for more 
radical education reforms. It explores the competing reform initiatives 
and explains why President Thein Sein brought in EPIC to side-line the 
influence of the international development partners, and how all of this 
resulted in the NESP1 and the New Education Law.2 The chapter also 
looks at the student protests of 2015, their demands based on social 
justice and their engagement with the government leading to limited 
changes in the New Education Law (2014, amended 2015).
The second part of the chapter discusses the challenges faced 
by the NLD government after taking over in 2015 in trying to meet 
Myanmar’s international commitment to EFA. Education has been a 
key priority of the NLD government, and the education sector needed 
further reform after the initial changes that had been initiated by the 
Thein Sein government. This section engages with the NLD government’s 
development of the education reform process, including the continuity 
of policy by largely accepting the NESP unchanged. Priorities remain 
access, quality, curricular reforms and teacher training reforms, thus 
addressing a few issues in education faced by Myanmar’s poor, yet still 
not addressing the issues of ethnic and linguistic diversity that have 
resulted in a largely inequitable education system. The chapter engages 
with the role of the development partners, the structural changes at the 
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MoE and the curricular reforms of the primary level, including changes 
that make the content of that curriculum marginally more inclusive. 
The chapter ends with the mid-term review (MTR) of the NESP that was 
conducted in the summer of 2019 and made public in the spring of 2020.
Background
At the time of writing in 2020, the Myanmar government educates 
9 million children in 45,600 schools with 320,000 teachers. It is the 
largest education provider across the country, although it is estimated 
that around 300,000 students study in monastic schools and another 
300,000 are provided for by ethnic systems (MIMU, 2017), which are 
covered in subsequent chapters. Within the government system, there 
are four types of schools: approved schools where teachers are appointed 
by the government, branch schools established near an approved school, 
affiliated schools and self-help schools. The government appoints the 
teachers once a particular threshold of students is registered at a particular 
school. Affiliated schools and self-help schools, each of which is adminis-
tratively attached to a main school, have to prepare and manage all school 
facilities and teacher arrangements by themselves, while students in these 
affiliated and self-help schools are reported as students of the main 
schools, where they also take their exams. In these schools, most of the 
expenses, including the cost of teachers’ salaries, is borne by the entity 
that established the school – mostly communities or monasteries (JICA, 
2013: 25). This, in effect, means that in many places in Myanmar, it is 
the parents, not the state, who bear the brunt of education expenses. 
According to the UNICEF Mon Situational Analysis (SITAN) mentioned in 
Chapter 1 of this volume, community funding of education is estimated 
at 70 per cent of total education expenditure (Mehta et al., 2014).
Although the Myanmar Government has started to increase 
government expenditure on education, public education expenditure 
as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has traditionally been 
lower than the ASEAN average. According to official data, government 
investment in education was 2.1 per cent of GDP in 2013–4 and 
2.2 per cent in 2018, a substantial increase from the 0.7 per cent in 
2010–1, but still low compared to the region. For example, Malaysia and 
Vietnam spent 6.3 per cent in 2013 and 2012 respectively; Laos PDR 
4.2 per cent in 2014 and Indonesia 3.4 per cent in 2013.3
Government data shows that expenditure on education in fiscal 
year 2015–6 was four times that of fiscal year 2011–2. This rapid rise in 
government expenditure can also be seen in a comparison between fiscal 
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year 2011–2 and fiscal year 2012–3, during which it more than doubled.4 
In 2015–6, spending on education was around 7 per cent of the 
government budget (Min Zaw Soe et al., 2017: 11) and in 2018, the latest 
official figures available, it had risen to 7.75 per cent. The largest 
expenditure of the government budget is salary payments, estimated 
at around 90 per cent, leaving little for maintenance and goods and 
services that schools need to function. There is a separate capital 
expenditure budget where construction expenditures account for over 
90 per cent, leaving little for equipment. Since school budgets are centrally 
determined based on uniform formulas, they do not meet actual school 
needs. Although some of this is now slowly changing, TEOs and head 
teachers have traditionally had little or no discretion over school budgets, 
making them reliant on community funds to deal with any emergency 
and even standard expenses. Schools have been given some limited 
autonomy through the school grants programme that is covered later 
in this chapter. At the time of writing, the teacher hiring system was 
being reviewed to allow TEOs some say in what was, until now, a highly 
centralised system of teacher placement conducted by the MoE in Nay Pyi 
Taw (NPT), something which will have longer-term effects on budgets. 
The centralised system has resulted in teacher shortages in rural and 
primary schools, disadvantaging schools that are already serving the 
poorer sections of Myanmar society.
The status of education before the reforms started
Chapter 1 of this volume has already offered a snapshot on the education 
issues Myanmar faced before the reforms began in 2012, while 2010, 
the year of the elections, is the year against which the success of the 
reforms will eventually be compared. Using the Integrated Household 
Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar (IHLCS) (2009–10) that had been 
conducted by the UN and the Ministry of National Planning and Economic 
Development based on data from the 2009–10 school year, JICA 
published a report (JICA, 2013) that established somewhat of a baseline 
for the subsequent education reforms with regard to access and retention. 
The JICA report concluded that in 2010, the gap of the Net Enrolment 
Ratio (NER) between children from poor and non-poor households 
was around 10 per cent at primary level, widening to around 24 per cent 
at secondary level. They estimated that this was due to the financial 
constraints on poor families as secondary education was not free.5 
Interestingly, there was only a slight difference between urban and rural 
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areas for the primary level enrolment rates (3 per cent), whereas the 
difference became more pronounced at the secondary level (around 
30 per cent). More than 90 per cent of pupils at the primary level resided 
within an hour’s walk to school (i.e. within 1.23 miles) but at the 
secondary level (Grade 6 and above) only 60 per cent of students who 
lived in urban areas and 24 per cent of students who lived in rural 
areas were within this distance, suggesting a lack of schools. This is 
compounded by transport being harder to arrange in rural areas, 
especially in the rainy season (JICA, 2013: 29). In 2010, almost a quarter 
(23 per cent) of students dropped out in the last year of primary school – 
i.e. Grade 5. The drop-out rate reached more than 18 per cent in Grades 
8 and 9. More worrying was the high drop-out rates in Grade 1, which 
was identified as resulting from difficult access to primary schools in 
rural areas, as well as a ‘lack of readiness’6 of Grade 1 entrants to study 
in primary education, along with the cost to parents of uniforms, books, 
exercise books and other expenses.7 Parents also need to pay a Parent 
Teacher Association fee and athletic, stationary and library fees from 
middle school onwards, resulting in more drop outs of poorer children.
The results of the JICA report (JICA, 2013) are confirmed by 
an analysis of the same data set aggregated with the MoE’s EMIS in 
addition to data collected by a survey of 786 schools (all different 
types) offering secondary grades, and distributed nationwide during 
the CESR process with the help of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
(which supported the CESR Team in conducting broader statistical 
analysis).8 The analysis of this data concluded that in the school year 
2009–10 at higher-grade level and age groups, gross and net enrolment 
ratios (GER and NER) dropped, the share of out-of-school youth rose, 
and the gap between GER and NER suggested many children were 
over-age. The disaggregated analysis showed that overall there is gender 
equity, but there are large gaps across urban–rural, states–regions, and 
access to preschool was limited to mostly urban areas. These disparities 
in access are sizeable in primary education, yet these become much 
more marked at the secondary level. The data also confirmed low 
drop-out rates through to Grade 4 – about five-sixths of youth finish 
primary level; however, nearly a quarter of primary completers never 
entered middle school, and less than half finished middle school. The 
drop-off at the transition from primary to middle school is likely to 
exacerbate inequality, as prospects for entry into middle school appear 
to be weakest for disadvantaged groups (for example, ethnic group 
students from remote rural areas) who may also have weaker academic 
preparedness, increasing their risk of drop-out if they do enter secondary 
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education (CESR, 2014). The EMIS cohort analysis concluded that there 
are at least 1.1 million new entrants to Grade 1 each year but only around 
300,000 reach Grade 11, and two-thirds fail matriculation every year, 
leaving only around 110,000 finishers out of 1.1 million starters, leading 
to high levels of repetition in Grade 11 as well. These estimates are fairly 
consistent with Census tables released in 2014, where the disaggregated 
analysis showed sizeable gaps between urban–rich and rural–poor. As 
Figure 2.1 shows, rural schools have few facilities and are much poorer 
than their urban counterparts. For example, four-fifths of urban children 
finish middle school, versus less than one-third of poor children; poor 
girls are worst off: among poor households, the gender gap is widest at 
Grade 6, meaning that poor girls are least likely to enter middle school. It 
is well known that the disparities across states and regions and between 
affluent and poor areas are stark. The ADB data indicate the following 
(Sy, 2013: 59):
An NER in Yangon of roughly 74.7 per cent versus only 30.9 per 
cent in Rakhine: more than four-fifths of children age 10–15 in 
Yangon are in school (at least in primary), while more than half 
(52.9 per cent) in Rakhine are already out-of-school. In terms of 
gender, while a marginally larger share of girls (58.6 per cent versus 
58.3 per cent of boys) age 10–15 are in secondary school, the share 
of girls out-of-school is also slightly larger (30.5 per cent, versus 
29.8 per cent for boys).
The ADB data (Sy, 2013: 58–9) also show the following:
The relationship between wealth quintile and share of 10–15 year 
olds who are out-of-school youth (OSY) is dramatic and strikingly 
linear, confirming that enrolment and dropout are strongly 
affected by socioeconomic status. Moreover, poverty appears to 
more strongly affect female dropouts: with the exception of the 
richest quintile, the gender gap in shares of OSY is roughly inversely 
related to wealth quintile, and for the poorest quintile, the share of 
OSY girls is 7 percentage points higher than for boys. The share 
of girls who are OSY is also slightly higher in rural areas and 
marginally lower in urban areas. These gender dynamics are much 
sharper for children of secondary school age (10–15 years old) 
than those of primary school age (5–9 years old).
For non-entry and drop-out during primary level,9 the IHLCS responses 
suggest direct cost is the main factor, but among students exiting 
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during the secondary level, the number one reason is reported as lack of 
interest10 and the opportunity cost that parents have as they need the 
children to work, especially in agricultural communities. The analysis 
of IHCLS dataset shows that the largest share (about 42.5 per cent) of 
household expenditures on education go to private tutoring, which is 
higher in urban areas, but still large (i.e. more than a quarter of education 
spending) among poor households. The ADB data (Sy, 2013) maintain 
that regression analysis suggests high school (not university) is the most 
costly level per enrolee.
This is the picture two years before the reforms began and against 
which Myanmar needs to measure its progress. It shows that there are 
structural issues that perpetuate cycles of inequality and injustice that 
the reforms needed to address. At the time of writing – 10 years later – 
access has improved, however, drop-out rates remain high, particularly 
in Grade 5 for children from poorer households and overall around 
2.7 million children remain out of school.11
The role of the 2008 Constitution
The 2008 Constitution describes the obligations and duties of the Union 
with regard to education, and the right of all Myanmar citizens to 
Figure 2.1 Rural government school, 2014. Source: Author.
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education. In Chapter 8, Article 366: ‘Citizens, Fundamental Rights and 
Duties of Citizens’ describes its obligation to citizens regarding their right 
to education, and stipulates the following:
Every citizen shall, in accordance with the educational policy laid 
down by the Union: (a) have the right to education; (b) be given 
basic education which the Union prescribes by law as compulsory; 
and (c) have the right to conduct scientific research, explore science, 
work with creativity and write, to develop the arts, and conduct 
research freely with other branches of culture.12
In Chapter 1, Article 28, the 2008 Constitution13 also describes the 
obligations of the Union in respect to the provision of education and 
health as follows:
The Union shall: (a) earnestly strive to improve the education and 
health of the people; (b) enact the necessary law to enable the 
Nation’s people to participate in matters of their education and 
health; (c) implement a free compulsory primary education system; 
and (d) implement a modern education system that will promote 
all-around correct thinking and a good moral character, contributing 
towards the building of the Nation.
The aim of the Constitution seems at least in theory to promote and 
support aspects of social justice with both the right to education and basic 
education being compulsory. The state here is responsible for providing 
this service, with a duty to improve the lives of its citizens. There is, 
however, also the note that education is to promote ‘correct’ thinking 
and that this will lead to citizens contributing to nation building – in a way 
closing the circle of the reciprocal social contract, albeit still reflecting 
some of the themes of nationalism discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume. 
Meeting these provisions after decades of military rule meant that the 
whole education system needed to be overhauled. It is, therefore, in light 
of this constitution that the education reforms finally began after the 
2010 elections had put Myanmar’s first civilianised government into office 
since 1962 (Lall, 2016a).
The start of Myanmar’s education reforms and the 
engagement of the development partners
When power was handed over by the SPDC to the new government 
in 2011, President Thein Sein’s14 Government developed a 10-point 
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education policy and a 20-year plan called the Basic Education Sector 
National Education Promotion 20-year Long-term Plan 2011–2031. 
The new plan was in line with the previous 30-year Basic Education 
Plan, but was more specific on policy measures that would improve 
access to education, for example, a stipend programme for students 
from disadvantaged families. In addition, the first ever schools grant 
programme was proposed. The 10 points would form the basis of 
what was to come over President Thein Sein’s following four years 
in office.
Education reform was President Thein Sein’s fourth priority after 
national reconciliation with the NLD, peace with the Ethnic Armed 
Organisations (EAOs) and economic reforms (Lall, 2016a). In February 
2012, a Conference on Development Policy Options with Special 
Reference to Health and Education Sectors was organised by the 
government and development partners. As a result of this conference, 
the CESR was launched in July 2012.15 UNICEF led the education 
consortium, working together with the Multi-Donor Education Fund 
(MDEF). The MoE invited all interested development partners to take 
part, and many, in particular the Australian government (AusAID – now 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)), the EU and the WB, 
took the opportunity to engage with the MoE for the first time. The 
CESR’s responsibilities encompassed all sectors of teaching and learning, 
from early childhood education to HE and involved a wide range of 
ministries and departments that had a stake in education. The focus 
of the CESR was on reviewing the formal state education sector around 
the country in four stages. After the first phase of work (entitled ‘Rapid 
Assessment’), proposals under consideration by the CESR included 
increasing basic education from 11 to 12 years, and changing the teacher 
career structure – two major structural changes that would mean all 
other areas within education would have to adapt. The former aimed to 
resolve the time pressure that teachers faced in covering the curriculum, 
the latter to make sure there were enough teachers for primary level 
education. The latter is particularly important as teachers who wanted 
promotion moved to the secondary schools, resulting in large teacher- 
to-student ratios in primary schools with the least experienced teachers 
teaching these classes. The CESR also reviewed language policies 
(including the teaching of English) and recommended the translation 
of textbooks into ethnic languages.16 Phase 1 of CESR’s review was 
completed in early 2013, followed by CESR Phase 2 (entitled ‘In-Depth 
Analysis’), where more detailed work was conducted resulting in detailed 
reports for each of the education sectors. Phase 2 of CESR’s review 
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promised to put equity at the heart of its mandate. Its website stated the 
following:17
All the Phase 2 components will look at options for increasing access 
to education for all groups in society, as well as improving the quality 
and relevance of education at every level. Recommendations for 
improving management, planning and monitoring will also be a key 
feature. As a guiding principle, all the studies will look closely at 
issues of equity. This will involve:
• analysing how policies, programmes, practices, organisational 
processes and institutional structures impact on different 
groups and individuals
• making recommendations for policies and actions to improve 
positive impacts so that all groups can benefit equitably




• Geographic location (e.g. urban, rural, remote), by State/
Region/Township;
• Disability;
• Other vulnerabilities, for example, post conflict and migrant 
communities, impact of HIV/AIDS etc.
Phases 1 and 2 of CESR provided a much clearer understanding of the 
status of the education sector, including recent achievements and 
priorities for continued reforms and investments. Phase 3 focused on 
the costings covering fiscal years 2016–20 of what would be required 
to make the changes across the sector, and this was later followed by 
Phase 4, the writing of the National Education Sector Plan – later renamed 
the ‘National Education Strategic Plan’.
The role of donors and development partners
The development partners welcomed the CESR and took the opportunity 
to engage in Myanmar’s education sector – many for the first time. Rather 
than focusing on issues of social justice (which the CESR emphasised), 
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their views were based on human capital theory – that Myanmar needed 
to reform education in order to modernise its economy, create graduates 
that could find jobs and subsequently join the more developed and 
developing nations. Their views are best summarised by the ADB in one 
of their final reports on supporting the CESR (ADB, 2016):
Recognizing the need for an educated population and workforce is 
essential for sustained economic growth and poverty reduction, 
in 2011, the Government of Myanmar redoubled efforts to 
strengthen the education sector, reflected in a doubling of the 
education budget between fiscal year FY 2011–2 and FY 2012–3. 
However, a dearth of data posed a key obstacle to education 
sector reforms, perhaps particularly in the Post-Primary Education 
(PPE) subsectors – the Secondary Education Subsector (SES), 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), and 
the Higher Education Subsector (HES) – which involve multiple 
ministries and linkages to the labour market, and had received little 
DP organization support.
In order to support education, development partners had come together 
previously – pooling some of their funds – as the MDEF. Between 2006 
and 2011, they had funded the Quality Basic Education Programme 
(QBEP), led by UNICEF, the only international agency apart from JICA 
able to work directly with the MoE. UNICEF’s work had been limited 
by government controls, although this was set to change with the 
announcement of the CESR. After 2012, the MDEF increased its support 
with UNICEF, EU, AusAID, DFID, Denmark and Norway, being joined by 
the ADB and the WB (JICA, 2013). The 2012–5 funding was aimed 
at rolling out QBEP Phase 2, which quickly became linked to the CESR 
(more on QBEP 2 below). Many others that were not part of MDEF 
nonetheless committed to supporting education in Myanmar, including 
bilateral agencies such as the German Corporation for International 
Cooperation (GIZ) and JICA, multilateral agencies such as UNESCO, 
and International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) such as the 
Nippon Foundation, the Open Society Foundation, Save the Children, 
and the BC. In order to coordinate funds and programmes across the 
development partners, the Development Partner Coordination Group 
(DPCG) organised regular coordination meetings and established com-
munication and coordination among development partners through a 
mailing list. In order for development partners to communicate with the 
government, the Joint Education Sector Working Group (JESWG) was 
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officially formed as a policy dialogue mechanism (JICA, 2013: 3). It was 
through these mechanisms that the development partners became 
increasingly involved in the CESR and the wider reform processes. 
However, as shall be seen below, this was not necessarily welcomed 
by all.
The battle over education: President, parliament, 
civil society and students
The CESR had a significant mandate, but at first little political support. 
Not knowing where the reforms were going to lead and how stable the 
Thein Sein Government would be in the long run, even Dr Mya Aye, 
the Minister of Education18 remained uninvolved, ostensibly leaving the 
running of the CESR to more junior staff. Daw Tin Tin Shu, head of the 
CESR, was left to coordinate with the development partners and to 
fend off criticism that came from all quarters, including from inside the 
government and the opposition parties. The opposition NLD was at first 
categorically opposed to the CESR. Shortly after the start of the CESR, 
the NLD and associated civil society and activist groups started to 
undertake a national education review of their own led by the NNER and 
Dr Thein Lwin.19 Their argument was that the MoE did not have the moral 
authority to lead the education reform process, that everyone knew what 
was wrong with the education system (and, therefore, no review was 
needed), and that a bid to reform needed to be inclusive of all groups, 
including ethnic education providers.20 Although the NNER was more 
inclusive in its approach, allowing for voices from ethnic education 
systems to be heard, ethnic education groups also found that the NNER 
had a particular agenda and that inclusiveness did not necessarily mean 
that other viewpoints were taken on board.21 The NNER proposal focused 
mainly on free education, decentralisation and freedom of institutional 
decision making. Many of their very progressive ideas were impossible 
to implement given the state of education infrastructure, the lack of 
teachers and the cost of fixing basic faults within the system, along with 
the available funding.
Initially, the CESR process and the NNER operated in parallel and 
without much contact, but after a few months there was some limited 
collaboration as each review team invited the other to attend events and 
share (limited) information. This was largely due to the great diplomatic 
skills of Daw Tin Tin Shu, who was open to suggestions and ideas from all 
quarters. However, in the end the NNER officially declared that it had lost 
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faith in the government and in the MoE’s reform process. The relationship 
between the NNER and the NLD soured and Dr Thein Lwin, who had led 
the NNER since its inception, was removed from the NLD in February 
2015. The NLD released a statement saying that neither he nor the NNER 
were speaking for the party and threatened legal action against him as he 
had violated party rules by not seeking permission from the committee to 
become involved in a separate organisation.22
Subsequently, other matters further complicated the working 
of the CESR. Given that the CESR was the main window through which 
the development partners were able to exert influence on the thinking 
around education reform, the process quickly became dominated by the 
various aid agencies sending in experts for areas close to their hearts. 
The BC, for example, paid for a specialist to advise on English language 
teaching in schools, and others such as AusAid (now DFAT) and the EU 
also sent in their own people, specialists in various education sectors, to 
help with issues ranging from early childhood development to HE. Whilst 
the help and good intentions were appreciated, the CESR was largely 
over-run by foreign experts. There was only limited time available for the 
actual review and to construct a coherent education plan, so the MoE 
officials were rather overwhelmed. This also led to criticisms from inside 
the government. The development partners were seen as too influential 
in setting the course of education reforms. The situation was not helped 
by the fact that the two resident experts in the posts coordinated by 
UNICEF to help run the CESR (technical adviser and coordinator) 
kept changing. None of these experts had any prior experience of 
Myanmar and whilst they had worked on education reviews and reforms 
in other countries previously, each new appointment took a certain 
time to catch up and understand the workings of the CESR and the 
complicated political context in which it was evolving. While this was 
certainly a strain on the CESR team,23 they continued functioning and 
produced a second set of reports to conclude Phase 2, largely on time in 
early 2014.24
Finding that the CESR process was taking too long to feed into the 
legislative process, and wanting to secure a set of education laws well in 
time for the 2015 elections, the President’s Office constituted EPIC. To 
the surprise of all the development partners who were called at short 
notice to NPT on 7 October 2013, the Office of the President convened a 
National Seminar on Pragmatic Reforms for Education announcing 
that this new body would take the lead on education. The development 
partners were assured that this was not to replace the CESR, nor to do 
similar work twice, but that EPIC and the CESR were complementary to 
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each other. In reality, however, this was a move to retake control of the 
process without having to shut down the CESR or make the development 
partners’ prior work redundant (Lall, 2017). The EPIC team took up 
residence only a few hundred metres away from the CESR in the Diamond 
Jubilee Hall on the Yangon University Campus. The three components 
included a task force of deputy ministers from the 13 ministries directly 
involved in education, supported by their director generals, an advisory 
group consisting of retired MoE officials, academics and other national 
experts, and 18 working groups covering specific areas of education 
reform, with two co-leads – one from government and one from the 
group of experts totalling over 200 people. Its 18 thematic working 
groups were tasked with formulating policies and plans for pragmatic 
education reforms. The EPIC team had limited contact with the CESR 
teams and the involvement of development partners was severely 
reduced, not least because all meetings were held in Burmese. Whilst the 
main task of the CESR was to develop recommendations for the reform 
of the education system, the main purpose of EPIC was to draft policies 
for the implementation of educational reform, with both organisations 
coming together in Phase 3 when costings had to be developed (Min Zaw 
Soe et al., 2017). The EPIC reports were submitted by the end of January 
2014. They were clearly supported by the President’s Office and were the 
answer not only to what was seen as an inefficiently led MoE process 
subject to too much international interference, but also as a riposte to 
the Parliamentary Education Promotion Committee (PEPC) that had 
been promoted by the speaker of the parliament, Thura U Shwe Mann 
and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The PEPC was comprised of 10 Union 
Solidarity Development Party (USDP) members, three NLD members 
and two MPs from the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party and had 
been tasked with developing an overarching education ‘mother law’ to 
provide a framework for education reforms. The powerful speaker of 
Parliament, Thura U Shwe Mann, had teamed up with Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi to push the legislative process in Parliament (held quite separate 
from the CESR work). Parliament had started to challenge government 
ministries, and parliamentary committees quickly learnt to use their new 
authority to summon officials and hold ministries to account. Thura U 
Shwe Mann and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi started by calling the acting 
Minister of Education and other officials in November 2013 to criticise 
the pace of the education reforms and demand a greater involvement of 
the Parliament in the process. The Parliamentary Guarantees, Pledges 
and Undertakings Vetting Committee then also criticised the MoE for 
failing to deliver on 220 of its commitments (Pyoe Pin, 2014). As a result, 
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Thura U Shwe Mann and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi decided to take the lead 
in the Parliament with regard to the education reform process and a 
power struggle erupted between the processes led by Parliament and 
those affiliated with the President’s office.
In the meantime, the President’s office also tried to remain in control 
of the legislative process by removing ‘hardliners’, and putting presidential 
allies in place. Key actors of the executive branch in education included 
the Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham (who allegedly was close to EPIC and 
attended many of the policy planning sessions, and the Ministers of the 
President’s office – also known as the ‘super cabinet’ – mainly U Tin Naing 
Thein, who was responsible for social affairs). Other advisors included 
Dr Aung Tun Thet, a former lecturer at the Yangon Institute of Economics 
and former Director General in the Ministry of Health and Dr Yin Yin Nwe, 
a former Country Representative for UNICEF and a former geology lecturer 
at the University of Yangon.
The education law and student protests
The process inside EPIC went on largely unperturbed by the power play 
on the outside, and in March 2014, EPIC drafted the National Education 
Bill that was then submitted to Parliament in July 2014. It needed 
presidential approval, and President Thein Sein sent the Bill back to 
Parliament with 25 suggested changes. On 30 September 2014, the law 
was enacted, accepting 19 of the proposed changes.
During the whole process, momentum for protest increased; 
civil society organisations and student and teacher unions accused the 
Government of excluding them and not taking into account the advice 
from the relevant stakeholders. The NNER held meetings that decried 
the law as cementing the centralisation of Myanmar’s education system. 
The meetings resulted in a set of detailed suggestions that were submitted 
to Parliament.25 The main issues that sparked unhappiness included the 
lack of teaching of ethnic languages and cultures at universities, 
the lack of independence of universities, and the legality of students 
taking part in political activities.26 The Action Committee for Democratic 
Education (ACDE) – comprising members of the All Burma Federation of 
Students’ Unions (ABFSU), the Confederation of University Student 
Unions and University Student Union – began to campaign for the 
amendment or redrafting of the National Education Law. Demanding 
a quadripartite meeting between ACDE, NNER, the Government and 
Parliament, they held a demonstration between 14 and 17 November 
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2014 at various locations in Yangon and other parts of the country, and 
threatened nationwide demonstrations if the government did not respond 
within 60 days. Once the 60 days expired, more than 100 people started 
to march from Mandalay to Yangon, commencing on 20 January 2016. 
Other protesters joined the march from across the country, including 
from Pakokku, the Delta, Dawei and Mawlamyine. The 11 points issued 
by the ACDE on 24 January demanded a meeting with the Government 
and for the law to be amended. The Government agreed to meet with 
the students in February to discuss their demands. Three quadripartite 
meetings took place during which time the student protests continued. 
As Dr Thein Lwin had been expelled from the NLD, the NLD was not seen 
to be on the side of the NNER and the students. Students maintained 
that their protests would only stop after the new or amended law had 
been passed by the Parliament. At the last meeting, an agreement 
was struck, with the Government promising to take into account the 
11 demands. The Government repeatedly asked the students to suspend 
their protests, and even a head monk endorsed this position requesting 
the students ‘to go back to their studies’. However, the tensions grew and 
as police tried to prevent the protesters from marching onto Yangon from 
Latpadan, the protests became violent. Solidarity protests by students 
and civil society organisations near Sule Pya in Yangon were violently 
broken up by the police in March 2015. Figure 2.2 shows protesters 
running away from the police. The Government not only used police to 
control the protesters and manhandle them, but civilian thugs, who were 
recruited from poor areas, or who had recently been released from jail. 
Figure 2.2 Education protests, 2015. Source: Author.
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The riots resulted in the arrest of 127 students and students being beaten 
in the streets.
On 26 March 2014, the Upper House voted to accept amendments 
to the National Education Law, however, it did not agree to all of the 
changes that the students had demanded.27 For example, whilst the 
students had insisted that 20 per cent of national spending should go 
to education, the law vowed to increase spending year on year, yet 
without the 20 per cent explicitly guaranteed. Part of the problem in 
agreeing the amendments of the law were the various competing drafts 
of the law that had been sent to Parliament. The students accused the 
Government of dishonesty as a draft that had allegedly been discarded 
at one of the quadripartite meetings was presented to the legislature. 
In June 2015, just 5 months before the elections, the revised Bill was 
voted into law, leaving many disillusioned and disappointed as they felt 
the Government had broken its promise.28
Key problems that were left for the NLD Government: 
Decentralisation
The CESR and the education law writing process did start to address 
some of Myanmar’s main education issues, however, the Thein Sein 
Government was not able to deal with all problems, leaving some key 
issues unfinished and to be dealt with by the incoming NLD Government. 
One of the most important issues was decentralisation.
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution indicates that some level of decen-
tralisation was to be expected, however, the legislative side of decentral-
isation in the education sector remained ambiguous, even after the 
reform process had started. During the Thein Sein Government, there 
had been some announcements about re-distributing decision-making 
authority to the local, state and township levels, but these were ad hoc, 
incomplete and tentative. In education, there were some policy directives 
relating to decision-making capacity being placed at the local level: local 
setting of curriculum, hiring of primary school teachers, role of the newly 
appointed district education officers and responsibility for school con-
struction contracts. A new administrative layer of District Offices was 
created, yet without clear directives as to how they would contribute to 
decentralisation. Conversations in 2014–5 with local officials across the 
country showed that no one at the local level seemed to be confident as to 
what these transfers of power actually meant and preferred not to ‘rock 
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the boat’ lest they be punished by someone higher up for being overly 
ambitious. This was a key problem which was handed to the NLD.
The Framework for Social and Economic Reforms (FESR), the first 
document that gave some indication of a possible decentralisation 
framework, had indicated that the Government of Myanmar planned 
to work with a distributed (or de-concentrated) model of education 
management, albeit retaining: ‘the budgetary controls over health and 
education expenditure for transitional adjustments, which may be a 
future subject of decision for fiscal decentralisation’ (MoE, 2012: 34). 
At the time it was also unclear how far the de-concentrated education 
management model envisaged a role for non-state actors and stakehold-
ers in achieving the government’s key goals in basic education, despite 
the actual reality that non-state education was in effect already delivering 
education services in remote and conflict-affected areas (MoE, 2012: 29 
– see also Chapter 7 of this volume):
While the Government of Myanmar strengthens regulatory policies 
to streamline various private and community-run educational 
programs, it is also moving ahead with the decentralization of 
education management in line with the requirements of the 
Constitution by integrating locally-designed teaching curriculum 
as well as non-formal programs in basic education system. This 
reform policy and strategy will focus on the need to expand the 
system of basic education from eleven to twelve years, on child- 
centred teaching methodologies, upgrading teacher training and 
other curriculum reforms necessary to enhance the quality of 
basic education, on teacher remuneration and broader issues 
of education financing, on establishing a rigorous system for 
education quality assessment and performance, and on further 
reforms in the management of basic education including the 
importance of active engagement in the process by the parents 
themselves. In addition, the Government of Myanmar will also pay 
attention to other supportive measures that can address high 
drop-out rates and out of pocket cost burdens on families.
During the Thein Sein administration, the budgetary process proved to 
be an impediment to decentralisation as the funding made available 
to each school, and the control of expenditure, continued to be decided 
at ministerial level, regardless of local circumstances or needs. This 
tradition had led to a unique and strange situation where schools had to 
rely on local communities to provide the bulk of resources for financing 
expenditure within a centralised public school system.
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Schools grants and stipends programme: The first 
step to autonomy for schools
One way forward towards limited decentralisation or ‘de-concentration’ 
was the establishment of two Union Government-funded direct-grant 
programmes to schools: the Student Stipends and School Grants, 
initiated in the 2012–3 school year. The key feature of this programme 
was that money was allocated to schools on the basis of a simple but 
transparent formula. The grants were required to be administered locally, 
and TEOs and head teachers were expected to take local decisions. The 
School Grants Programme aimed to improve the education quality, to 
reduce the amount of resources needed to be raised from communities, 
and to create a better teaching and learning environment for schools. 
This was to be done by creating a reliable and transparent flow of 
resources to schools, building capacity in schools to prepare budgets 
and develop school improvement plans, and to strengthen community 
participation in schools.
The first set of school grants, however, were provided to schools 
with defined expenditure categories, and the TEOs’ responsibility was to 
audit these, potentially restricting the development of local decision-
making capacity. Research in 2014 showed that schools could not 
necessarily meet their actual needs with the new money, although 
many hoped that in time things would become more flexible. Given that 
these direct grant programmes were the first foray of the Government 
of Myanmar into decentralisation, the WB decided to get involved in 
supporting, expanding and deepening the programme.29
The second programme for stipends was small both in terms of 
financing and the number of beneficiaries, although it was rolled out 
across the country. The aims of the stipends were to increase the rates of 
completion by levels of basic education, transition from primary level 
to middle school level and transition from middle school level to high 
school, and to reduce drop-out rates by offering stipends to students 
who found it difficult to continue their schooling. The beneficiary 
population was about 11,000 students nationally, only 2–6 students 
per township.30 At the start, the stipend amounted to only USD 5 per 
month over 10 months for primary students, USD 6 per month for 
lower secondary students and USD 8 per month for upper secondary 
students. Schools were asked to select one or two of the poorest or most 
disadvantaged students in their school and submit these to the township 
education office for final selection. Priority was given to orphans or 
children who only had one parent who was not able to work. Conversations 
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with head teachers in the first year of the project revealed how frustrating 
some of them found the process as it was a lot of paperwork for a very 
low chance of their students actually receiving the money. They felt there 
were many deserving students that should qualify and that the money 
on offer was simply inadequate. In fact, the Year 2, Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Qualitative Assessment of the Myanmar School Grants and Stipends 
Programme showed how the roll-out of the programme had raised new 
issues at schools, many of which were related to equality and social 
justice. For example, in one area there were questions at the stipend 
training regarding whether the younger students of parents and older 
students who were White Card holders31 were entitled to receive a 
stipend. Stipends were only allowed for Myanmar nationals, but given 
the ambiguous status of White Cards, the TEOs were uncertain and could 
not provide a definitive answer as to whether White Card holders were 
eligible or not. In one township, the TEO team decided all poor students 
should receive a stipend and did not exclude White Card holders. In other 
townships, the TEO teams asked the State Education Office (SEO) for 
further guidance, but received no reply. Subsequently, these TEO teams 
decided not to provide the stipend to the students whose parents were 
White Card holders. There were similar issues with regard to religion. In 
a township where approximately 30 per cent of the people residing in a 
particular ward identified as Muslim, and with approximately the same 
ratio of Muslim children in school, no student was selected to receive a 
stipend. Teachers attempted to explain that they were not eligible since 
most of them did not have a National Registration Card,32 and those who 
did were not perceived as poor. Despite explanations of the rationale 
behind the selection process, most of the families felt dissatisfied with 
the whole process and thought it was simply a case of discrimination 
(Myint Zaw Soe et al., 2017: 13). The review of the programme also 
linked the inadequate staffing levels of TEOs to some of the issues faced 
by the programme, as staff did not feel they had enough time to work 
on the programmes due to this having been added to their already 
heavy regular workload (Myint Zaw Soe et al., 2017: 15). In addition, 
instructions from the central level to the township were often unclear 
or delayed (Myint Zaw Soe et al., 2017: 22): ‘The lack of clarity was 
instrumental for confusing and/or delaying many aspects of the programs 
(e.g. participation in training, reimbursement of allowances, school 
grant transfers to monastic schools, delay in stipend fund transfers etc.)’
Despite all the issues noted above, it was the very first time that 
schools, head teachers and TEOs were able to take some limited decisions 
without ministerial approval, and this in itself felt like some (limited) 
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empowerment. It should be remembered that both the school grants and 
the stipend programmes had come out of President Thein Sein’s 10 points 
for education, with a view to improving matters related to disparity, 
poverty and social injustice. In actual fact, rather than doing much for 
the most disadvantaged and their schools, the programmes became the 
first vehicle for some form of decentralisation.
The WB has continued to support both direct grant programmes 
by channelling the funding through government coffers. In 2017, the 
Government invested USD 100 million in the school grants and stipend 
programme. School grants rose to a minimum of 800,000 MMK, equal 
to nearly USD 700 per school, and student stipends also increased. 
There was also an extension to the scholarship programmes, and to the 
scouts and girl guides programmes (Myint Zaw Soe et al., 2017). Today 
both the school grants33 and the stipend programmes have expanded 
exponentially and the WB claims that some of the inequity issues seem to 
have been resolved.34
The NLD’s ‘new’ education policy: How the NESP 
remained the NESP
Education policy under the NLD Government has really not changed 
much from that of the previous government, and is reflected in the 
National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) of 2016, launched by the 
NLD Government in February 2017, that is based on the previous 
government’s draft National Education Sector Plan (NESP), that in turn 
had come out of the CESR. The main focus of the NESP remains on access, 
completion, quality and transparency and the main aims are ‘equity, 
quality and relevance’. In order to achieve this, the plan proposes nine 
transformational shifts that are to be driven by the MoE (MoE, 2016).
Even the ‘new’ NESP has not been without its local critics. In a 
widely circulated letter entitled ‘Comments on the National Education 
Strategic Plan (2016–21) of the Ministry of Education, Myanmar’, 
Dr Thein Lwin, head of the NNER, lamented the fact that his organisation 
had not been invited to participate in the process of drafting the NESP 
2016–2021, despite being part of the four-party meeting with the 
government in 2015 (Thein Lwin, 2017).35 In fact, he reminded the 
Government that the original amendment of the education law had been 
achieved as part of this four-party meeting between the Government, 
Parliament, the Boycott Committee for Democratic Education and the 
NNER. The four-party group meeting had happened because of the 
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students’ protests for the amendment to the law. Dr Thein Lwin argued 
that: ‘Since these events mark the historic movements in the history 
of Myanmar education system, the Ministry of Education should not 
ignore or overlook these historical events whether it likes or not.’36 
The NNER claims that it had no knowledge of the NESP 2016 until a 
consultant37 to the Global Partnership for Education38 met with the 
NNER in January 2017. Dr Thein Lwin’s detailed analysis of the NESP 
focuses on how the planned reforms are unlikely to result in greater 
social justice for the broader Myanmar population and provides an 
excellent running commentary to main issues presented by the policy 
document. The NNER priorities remain the aims of the SDG 4 and the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Education. Dr Thein Lwin argues39 that 
the peace process and the education reform process need to be linked so 
that ethnic nationality communities (or indigenous people as he calls 
them) have a right to self-determination and their education systems – 
mainly organised by the EAOs – should be recognised:
Myanmar has been one of the signatories to the United Nations 
Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples since 2007. As 
per the Declaration, it is a prerogative to recognize the schools 
established by the Indigenous Peoples, their local school 
curriculums, teachers and students. Since there is no recognition 
from the government, the students of the indigenous schools face 
difficulty in studying in the government’s schools and national 
universities. (Thein Lwin, 2017: 2)
A third critique regards the need to develop a local curriculum rather 
than that solely developed by the central government, arguing that the 
cultural diversity of Myanmar can only be served if local curricula are 
included at school so as to reflect the local context:40
Since the curriculum used in all the regions of Myanmar is made 
and produced by the central government alone, the curriculum is 
inordinately influenced by the culture and values of the curriculum 
developers. As a result of this curriculum, many students in the 
ethnic regions are not happy in the schools and leave before they 
complete the primary levels. (Thein Lwin, 2017: 2–3)
As before, the NNER also argues for MTB-MLE to improve achievement 
and attendance of ethnic children, as well as asking the government to 
teach ethnic languages during the school hours for equity reasons and so 
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that families see that the government takes ethnic languages as seriously 
as other subjects. The commentary argues that leaving ethnic languages 
as after-school subjects results in poorer children, who have to help their 
parents, missing these classes.
For those that fear ‘which language to choose out of 135’, there are 
ways and means to overcome this. In rural areas and hill regions, 
people of the same language mostly live together in the village. The 
language most familiar with children and used in the village can 
be used as the Mother Tongue, thereby Mother Tongue, Myanmar 
and English may be used as the medium of teaching in the school. 
Since children in the cities are familiar with Myanmar language, 
they may be taught in Myanmar language as Mother Tongue. For 
instance, if there are Karen and Burmese in one of the wards of 
Insein Township, children in their primary school can be taught in 
a tri-lingual education system in which Myanmar as Mother 
Tongue, Karen as second language and English as third language 
may be used (Thein Lwin, 2017: 3–4).
In addition, the NNER commentary complains that the examination 
remains summative, and that the curriculum method of teaching and 
examination all need to be changed. The document also reviews issues 
with teacher autonomy, the fact that students’ unions are not yet allowed, 
and that children with disabilities do not yet have an equal right to 
education, as even with special provisions planned in certain areas this 
will not allow disabled children to study anywhere they want. Dr Thein 
Lwin concludes that whilst quality of education is the driving force of the 
NESP: ‘the quality set by the Center (sic) is not in line with the needs of 
local context, people and individuals’ (Thein Lwin, 2017: 6).
The chapter now turns to the changes made by the NLD Government 
in education based on the NESP, exploring if Dr Thein Lwin’s assessment 
is correct.
New and revised structures to support the MoE in 
the reform process
In February 2016, the NLD Government set up two new parliamentary 
committees to support Education. The Pyithu Hluttaw Education 
Promotion Committee (Lower House) was set up to provide support for 
the following:
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… to develop the education promotion function; to support to 
improve public education and to support to implement modernized 
education with right concept, good behavior and critical thinking 
to contribute in the state building process.41
The Amyotha Hluttaw Education Promotion Committee (Upper House) 
had the same responsibilities but additionally included the following:
… supporting every child to complete basic education and lifelong–
learning process, supporting reforming pedagogy system of teacher, 
supporting reforming curriculum and examination systems, 
supporting to make sure sufficient school infrastructure, teaching 
aids and deployment of teachers and supporting teachers to access 
sufficient social welfare.42
It is unclear why the Upper House Committee has responsibilities that 
have some bearing on social justice, such as supporting all children to 
complete their education and supporting teachers to access social 
welfare, when the Lower House of Parliament has a more limited brief.43
Part of taking over the government meant that the NLD had the 
freedom to revise ministerial structures. In education, they did this by 
merging the MoE and Ministry of Science and Technology in August 2016. 
This resulted in the establishment of a new Department of Alternative 
Education; merging other departments to create a new Department of 
Education Research, Planning and Training (DERPT) and abolishing the 
Department of Teacher Education and Training – the responsibilities of 
which will be split between the DERPT and the Department of Higher 
Education. According to a recent report, the MoE has an estimated 670,000 
positions with up to 55 per cent of total allotted staff member positions 
remaining unfilled (MoE and Quality Basic Education Programme, 2016). 
The report also showed a disparity between male and female employees: 
‘While females make up 61 per cent of the sampled workforce, they 
currently occupy 25 per cent of filled executive level positions’ (GoM and 
DFAT, 2017: 11).
The MoE was also able to create new structures and institutions 
as had been laid out in the National Education Law 2014 and the 
2015 Amendments. The National Education Policy Commission (NEPC) 
was established first in September 2016 as a statutory body to provide 
education policies for ‘the promotion of national development’. The 
NEPC has 21 academic and educationist members from various education 
sectors to provide practical education policies for the attainment of the 
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national education objectives, to advise on how to achieve quality 
education accessible to all, and to provide policy recommendations so 
that Myanmar can achieve ‘international standards and develop human 
resources for a knowledge based economy and society’. The NEPC was 
designed to have an executive role in advising and coordinating HE policy 
and legislation in the form of Myanmar’s 30-year Long-term Education 
Development Plan as well as coordinating with development partners 
(Channon, 2017). The NEPC also oversees the National Curriculum 
Committee (NCC), the National Accreditation and Quality Assurance 
Committee (NAQAC) and the Rectors’ Committee (RC).
The NCC was formed in November 2016 with 15 members to 
develop and review curricula so that they met international standards. 
The NAQAC, formed in January 2017, is composed of 20 members 
focusing on developing and implementing a comprehensive quality 
assurance system as well as assessing and providing accreditation to 
educational institutions and programmes. Finally, the RC, formed just 
over a year later in April 2018, has as members all rectors and principals 
of public HEIs. It also has a Central Committee of 44 members and a 
Central Executive Committee of 15 members elected from among its 
members. It is meant to coordinate the affairs of HEIs, help to enhance 
the quality of teaching, research and management in HEIs, give guidance 
to HEIs in the transition to autonomy and provide advice to HEIs for 
increasing revenues to support their development.
These four institutions are meant to support the MoE in delivering 
the reforms by bringing in non-ministerial experienced staff, but the 
MoE remains the main government institution that is responsible for 
delivering the nine transformational shifts on which the NESP is based.
Role of the development partners and aid money 
post-2015
With the NLD government in power after 2015, the role of the development 
partners was to change. Under the Thein Sein Government, the primary 
guidance for the development partners’ aid had been the FESR, which 
framed the government’s priorities across the whole economy. The new 
government, however, did not adopt an overarching framework for the 
country’s development, and focused instead on defining strategy at the 
sectoral level. The NLD started to reorganise donor structures to provide 
more effective support to the reform processes. In the first instance, the 
Education Sector Coordination Committee (ESCC) developed Terms of 
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Reference (ToR) to clarify memberships of the various working groups 
and their roles and responsibilities, in order to better align with 
government policies. The ToR specified that it was for the government 
to lead on the reform agenda, and that the government owned the 
change process. The ToR also noted that there needed to be systematic 
measurement and accountability for results, inclusive partnerships with 
stakeholders at national, sub-national and school/community levels, 
greater transparency, knowledge sharing and learning, and sustained 
emphasis on capacity building at all levels of education service delivery. 
The ESCC started to meet in February 2017. Other development part-
ner-related structures included the JESWG, the Education Thematic 
Working Group (ETWG) and sub-national education coordination groups. 
The JESWG had been in existence since 2012 and remained responsible 
for high-level dialogue between government and development partners, 
and included government, INGO and representatives of development 
partners. The ETWG that had existed since 2009 was named as an 
inclusive and neutral forum for consultation and advocacy, providing 
technical and policy expertise with over 400 members from government, 
CSOs and NGOs. At the time of writing, the ETWG had eight sub-working 
groups. The sub-national education coordination groups that had been in 
place since 2015 were now there to promote coordination between the 
government, development partners and non-state actors at sub-national 
level (starting in Mon and Karen states).
This was also the time that UNICEF’s Quality Basic Education 
Programme – QBEP Phase 2 – started to come to an end, changing the 
relationship between development partners and the government as 
UNICEF was no longer to hold the monopoly on coordinating education 
reform programmes. Phase 2 of QBEP, mentioned at the start of this 
chapter, was a 4-year (2012–6), USD 76.6 million joint Myanmar MDEF44 
and MoE effort to strengthen the provision, quality and administration of 
government basic education. The QBEP programmes supported education 
reform before the NESP brought in the nine transformational shifts. 
This included capacity building and providing direct education services 
in 34 selected disadvantaged townships (UNICEF, 2017) including a 
programme for in-service teacher training based in schools (SITE) that is 
reviewed in Chapter 5 of this volume as well as Child Friendly Schools and 
the Language Enrichment Programme, discussed briefly below.
As the development partners remained involved, their role and 
their influence started to change. One of the new priorities has been the 
support of development partners to help transform the MoE. As has been 
seen above, the MoE’s ways of working have been defined by decades of 
Education REfoRm and EffEcts on Basic Education 83
centralisation, with officials not empowered to make their own decisions. 
In order to transform Myanmar’s education system, a change in working 
style and structure is needed. As part of supporting this aspect of the 
process, different development partners have offered targeted support to 
the MoE to try to change the ways in which the Ministry and its staff 
work. In October 2017, the MoE established a Capacity Development 
Fund (CDF), in partnership with DANIDA (the development arm of 
Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to strengthen MoE systems and 
build human resource capacity. The key challenge that was identified 
was the limited professional training programmes for new and existing 
staff that were needed to strengthen human resource development. In 
order to enhance capacity of senior managers to be able to support the 
NESP implementation, as well as strengthen the effectiveness of existing 
systems and procedures at national and sub-national levels, the CDF 
project put in place an ‘Education Management Training Programme’ 
that included critical thinking and management seminars, as well as the 
development of a Diploma in Education Management to be delivered by 
the Yangon University of Education (with the support of the University 
College London’s Institute of Education). Figure 2.3 shows some of this 
training in NPT. The idea behind this project was that senior staff of the 
Figure 2.3 Leadership and management seminars for informed 
decision making for the Ministry of Education, 2019. Source: Author.
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MoE, including Director Generals (DGs) and Deputy Director Generals 
(DDGs) would get the kind of training required that would not have been 
available previously from Myanmar’s un-reformed HE system. The CDF 
and others also arranged for ICT and English training for more junior 
staff as part of a general capacity building programme.
In May 2018, the Government joined the Global Partnership for 
Education (GPE), which supports countries in the drafting and imple-
mentation of quality sector plans, and has a particular focus on equity, 
learning and efficiency. In line with GPE requirements, the MoE and 
development partners commissioned an independent appraisal of the 
NESP. The appraisal identified a number of areas for improvement, 
including further work in developing and implementing the NESP 
monitoring and evaluation (GoM and DFAT, 2017: 10). The MoE has tra-
ditionally been focused on numbers rather than outcomes or standards, 
and monitoring and evaluation are relatively new concepts. Monitoring 
and evaluation has now been formalised at the MoE through a dedicated 
department, which has, however, struggled with its mandate.45 Australia’s 
DFAT-funded ‘My-Equip Quality Improvement Programme’46 is the 
programme that aims to support the MoE in developing systems to 
measure education quality and evidence-based planning. As a part of this, 
it supports the Monitoring and Evaluation Department to develop and 
implement an education quality improvement system that assesses 
performance of education services against indicators and quality 
standards, produces outputs to inform decision making, and enables 
learning and continuous improvement in the sector. The aim is to fill 
knowledge gaps – including quality assurance, monitoring, evaluation 
and research. The project’s focus according to DFAT is on building 
capacity, systems and a culture in which decision makers are empowered 
to make decisions within their level based on evidence (GoM and DFAT, 
2017). Linked with this is the UNESCO-supported MoE’s EMIS, including 
work on data collection and reporting systems. The UNESCO Cap-Ed 
programme47 also provides broader capacity development training and 
support on education sector planning and budgeting.
Other large development partner projects include UNESCO’s 
Strengthening Pre-service Teacher Education in Myanmar (STEM), 
discussed further in Chapter 5 of this volume. A new national Teacher 
Competency and Standards Framework had been written in 2016 as 
part of STEM. The Teacher Competency and Standards Framework 
has articulated for the first time what is expected of teachers in their pro-
fessional practice at various stages in their professional development. 
The work of STEM is continuing with a focus on teacher empowerment 
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through the UNESCO pre-service teacher education project by developing 
the curriculum for the new Early Childhood degree. This work has 
been on-going since 2015–6, starting with a review of the curriculum 
used in education colleges and the subsequent development of a 
curriculum framework for a competency-based curriculum for a four-year 
degree programme, with primary and middle school teacher specialisa-
tion tracks.48
In the summer of 2019, DFID began the five-year Myanmar–UK 
Partnership for Education (MUPE) programme that addresses some of the 
interrelated issues in the education reform process. The five components 
focus on strengthening English and teacher education, assessment and 
education reform support, education provided by monastic and ethnic 
education providers, and education in conflict-affected areas, including 
Rakhine. 
The development partners agree that the whole education system 
needs a quality shift and are pouring support directly into the MoE 
and developing large programmes that feed into the NESP priorities. 
However, at the time of writing, the various departments of the MoE no 
longer seem to have the capacity to absorb more funds and training, 
in part, because there are not enough staff, but also because too much is 
being done at the same time and everyone is attempting to work on 
everything simultaneously.49
Reforms to basic education
The reforms to basic education (from KG to Grade 11) are numerous and 
complex. They include access (including through alternative education 
for out-of-school children), formalising a KG year and moving to 12-year 
schooling. The new basic education structure of KG+12 (kindergarten 
plus 12 years) was introduced for the Academic Year (AY) 2016–7. The 
previous education structure (5–4–2) (Grades 1–5 for primary level, 
Grades 6–9 for lower secondary level and Grades 10–11 for upper 
secondary level) was transformed into the KG+ (5–4–3) structure with 
an extra year of schooling for upper secondary level. Under the Thein 
Sein Government, the number of schools and students had increased 
dramatically: rising from 39,398 basic education schools and 7,776,148 
students in the AY 2007–8, to 43,181 basic education schools and 
8,597,348 students in the AY 2013–4.50 As more schools have opened 
around the country, more teachers have been appointed to reduce the 
teacher-to-student ratio. In rural and remote areas, university graduates 
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who were residents of these regions were appointed as primary school 
teachers in 2013 and 2014: 53,975 more basic education teachers, 
2,233 more HE teachers and 534 more teacher trainers were appointed 
in the AY 2015–6 than in the AY 2011–2. Some teachers for government 
schools were also recruited from the monastic schools as they had 
classroom experience.
In 2016, a development partner meeting51 reviewed the results of 
the massive new hiring of teachers that had resulted in them making 
up around 40 per cent of all the primary school teachers. Most of the 
new teachers had been hired as Daily Wage Teachers (DWTs) but were 
then converted to permanent staff after a month’s training. The new 
teachers had strikingly different background characteristics compared 
to experienced teachers. The (unpublished) data reported at the meeting 
noted that only 32 per cent of new teachers had an education degree or 
higher, compared to 96 per cent of experienced teachers; 21 per cent of 
new teachers had DWT diplomas and 8 per cent had no teacher training 
qualifications which means that across the board they had limited 
pedagogical training. However, a large number of new teachers had the 
one-year Certificate of Education offered by the education colleges, 
which qualified them to teach at primary level. The new teachers tended 
to work in the most remote schools where they had limited access to 
support and other professional development.52 They were also much 
more likely to be obliged to teach multi-grade. This is a unique disadvan-
tage in terms of teaching workload and pedagogical difficulty, especially 
in challenging areas. A further study into the effects of DWTs entitled: 
‘Having at least 5 teachers at every school’ revealed that the hiring of 
DWTs at primary level had improved the teacher-to-student ratios. 
Traditionally teacher-to-student ratios were lower in urban areas and 
larger in remote and rural areas, and that the large number of new 
teachers did improve numbers around the country. However, the study 
alleges that the hiring of DWTs allowed more experienced senior teachers 
at primary schools to move to the centre of townships or allowed them to 
transfer to middle school and high schools where the numbers increased 
to 12,103 (17.4 per cent) and 4,741 (16.4 per cent) respectively (Muta, 
2015). So while the massive input of DWTs in 2014 diminished the 
regional disparity in the teacher-to-student ratio, the disparity in the 
teachers’ quality remained unresolved. Even though DWTs are supposed 
to have a bachelor’s degree or matriculation pass (depending on the 
state/region), they have not had adequate pedagogical training and in 
general they do not have experience as teachers. They are expected to be 
trained by senior teachers on the job, so if there are only a limited number 
Education REfoRm and EffEcts on Basic Education 87
of senior teachers in the school, such training is impossible and the only 
teaching method new DWTs can rely on is to repeat what they observed 
when they were primary school students.
The reforms also include overhauling the curriculum and the 
examinations system as well as training teachers in a new pedagogy 
to be able to deliver the new curriculum and prepare the students for the 
new examinations system in order to improve quality.53 This is bound to 
be complex – the QBEP 2 evaluation of the Child Friendly Schools and 
the Language Enrichment Programme reminds us that many elements 
need to fall into place for teachers to be able to change their practice. In 
the QBEP final evaluation, Emily Stenning (UNICEF, 2018) concludes 
that there are three main reasons teachers did not change their behaviour 
and these are as follows:
• The training is not long or frequent enough, with teachers not being 
able to practice to make behaviour change sustainable.
• External, environmental factors have not been taken into account 
and pose significant barriers. These can include infrastructural 
constraints such as partitioned rooms (noise), immovable furniture, 
crammed classrooms, insufficient teaching aids as well as socio-
economic constraints such as language barrier (multi-lingual 
classes), parental resistance and large teacher-to-student ratios.
• System constraints included teacher transfers and lack of time. 
The QBEP programme did not seem to have resulted in sustained 
change, and therefore the next phase of reforms would require some 
joined up thinking across the MoE and development partners.
Most at the MoE will agree that the quality shift expected by the 
NESP is substantial. The issue is that some of the changes have been 
hampered by the interrelated nature of the system; for example, to 
implement a more child-centred approach to education requires both 
different teacher training and a reformed examination system that does 
not rely on rote learning – as well as more teachers teaching smaller class 
sizes in better equipped classrooms.54 This is why the lessons learnt as 
part of the QBEP evaluation are so important.
One of the main reforms to basic education are the changes to 
the curriculum and textbook content, led by JICA under the ‘Project for 
Curriculum Reform at Primary Level of Basic Education (CREATE)’ that 
began in May 2014.55 This has been the first major curriculum revision in 
20 years and involved 40 Japanese and overseas curriculum experts as 
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well as over 60 Myanmar academics. The textbooks were reviewed and 
approved by the National Curriculum Committee. The new primary 
education curriculum now comprises nine subjects: Myanmar, English, 
mathematics, science, social studies, morality and civics, life skills, 
physical education and arts (performing arts and visual arts). In 2017, 
the new Grade 1 curriculum and its textbooks, developed jointly by the 
MoE and JICA, were introduced into schools. The announcement by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) stated that: ‘approximately 1.3 million 
new Grade 1 primary school students across the country will learn with 
the new textbooks. […] The textbooks are colorful with many pictures 
and designed in a way that learning is fun and linked with students’ life’ 
(JICA, 2017a). The project also developed a detailed teachers’ guide for 
each subject that helps teachers move away from using rote learning. In 
preparation for the introduction of the new Grade 1 curriculum, JICA 
supported a series of cascade training courses, which were conducted by 
the MoE for education officers from townships, districts and states/
regions, as well as ministerial officials from the concerned departments 
at the central level. Following this, nationwide in-service teacher training 
(INSET) was conducted to introduce the new curriculum to teachers 
and JICA claims that through the INSET, all primary teachers who teach 
Grade 1 from all schools, including monastic schools, private schools 
and other schools that use the government curriculum were trained 
(JICA, 2017a). The JICA CREATE MTR acknowledges the ‘hindering 
factors’ (Mizuno et al., 2019: 15) that included the role of teachers and 
the difficulties faced by them. It states that although head teachers were 
recognised as key in supporting teachers in rolling out the curriculum 
and materials, some head teachers did not attend the introduction 
training. This was particularly the case for head teachers of the high and 
middle schools with primary level sections, as the training clashed with 
the Grade 6 training for secondary schools. The JICA report also states 
that teachers complained of a number of barriers in using the new 
curriculum. These included insufficient time to prepare the lessons, 
teaching subjects they had no training in – such as performing arts, 
especially playing the flute and singing songs in front of their students, 
and visual arts ‘because teachers by themselves are sometimes poor in 
drawing and painting’.56 But the main issue seems to have been the 
cascade training (Mizuno et al., 2019: 16), where the lower the cascade, 
the thinner the transmission of the concepts required for the new 
curriculum, with teachers struggling to understand and use the new 
materials.57 Interviews conducted by JICA with teachers revealed that 
some head teachers were not supportive, specifically with regard to 
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preparing the new lessons and that teachers worried about less able 
students falling behind in the group work. They also felt the level of the 
Grade 1 maths textbook was too high for some students who were unable 
to read it. (Mizuno et al., 2019: 18–21) This presumably means more time 
is spent for the teacher to make sure all students keep up with the work.
In its review, JICA did not look at the effects of the new assessment 
system. The Oxford Policy Management (OPM) team conducted the only 
review of how the new formative and summative assessment system is 
affecting teachers (OPM, 2019). The head teachers and serving teachers 
were affected differently with head teachers questioning ‘the presence of 
a coherent strategic vision and plan’ and the lack of clarity with regard to 
the roll-out of the new examination system causing confusion (OPM, 
2019: i–iii). It seems that rapid changes have resulted in parallel systems 
in the same school, which means that some teachers are teaching both 
the old and the new curricula with both pedagogies depending on which 
class they were teaching. The head teachers confirmed that teachers 
did not have sufficient training to implement the new skills that were 
required both with regard to teaching and assessment and therefore rote 
learning prevailed.58 Large class sizes continued to impede the use of 
group discussions and other types of child-centred interactions. Other 
barriers included extra work for teachers to support students who failed 
Grade 5 exams (that also clashes with the requirement that all students 
should pass) and the changing of the grading system from percentage 
scores to grades (A, B, C, D) that do not allow for comparisons between 
students (and is unpopular with parents). The OPM field notes59 give an 
insight into how teachers feel about the new examination system. While 
many like the new system as it motivates the creativity of students, 
teachers are worried because they do not feel they have the pedagogical 
skills to use the new approach. Teachers complained that the training 
sessions were too short and did not really help them in teaching the new 
content or teaching in a more child-centred way, especially when they 
had a large class size. (OPM, 2019: 38). All teachers interviewed by OPM 
said they needed further training on how to teach the new curriculum 
courses. The teachers also felt that they were unable to conduct classroom 
assessment on individual students due to the lack of experience with 
the new system. ‘For Grade 3 and Grade 6 new curriculum teachers, 
trained skills and experiences are very limited to two-week assignment/
project work and so teachers are not able to apply it very effectively in 
classroom practices. In primary classes, a class teacher is responsible 
for all subjects and it highlights that a single teacher cannot perform 
classroom assessment on all subjects for individual students’ (OPM, 
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2019: 42). This points to the problem that teachers have not been trained 
in how to collect individual student information on achievement in 
very large classes across various subjects (OPM, 2019: 43). The lack of 
assessment training also means that teachers have a lack of knowledge 
on how to develop tests and how to use criteria and standards to evaluate 
students.
An official at the JICA Yangon office explained that at the base of 
JICA’s overall education strategy for Myanmar was employment,60 
and that foundational capacity development was very important. The 
overall aim for CREATE was better learning in the classroom along 
with supporting students to lead a happier life through holistic 
development. The official explained that it was unusual for JICA to 
engage with all subjects, as they usually only focus on maths and the 
sciences. The content development was influenced not only by the 
Japanese curriculum but also by various ASEAN curricula. The three 
impact surveys that were shared showed improvements in learning, 
especially in mathematics, but parents apparently are complaining that 
children no longer recite what they have learnt in school and so they are 
worried that they are not learning anything. This shows a move away 
from the scourge of rote learning – a positive improvement if this can be 
sustained, but it also means that parents need to be brought on board 
to support the changes and make them sustainable. The effects on 
parents, how they view the reforms and what barriers they might 
experience do not seem to have been examined systematically. Clearly, a 
longer school path of 12 years will increase expenses. Presumably, the 
new curriculum and assessment system will also mean a change in 
the parental role as parental involvement in education will become 
more important than previously (exacerbating urban, rural and class 
divides). Parents, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds 
and less educated, do not get involved in homework or in supporting 
their children’s learning. Parental involvement in Myanmar is primarily 
about parents supporting the school materially if something needs to 
be fixed. The OPM report 2019 explains: ‘Parents can help or hinder the 
transition. They express support for the aims of developing higher order 
skills, but are not engaged properly on issues of teaching methods and 
they can often be reluctant to risk poorer grades for their children by 
trying new things’ (OPM, 2019: ii). Parents do seem mostly positive 
as they reported that they hope the new curriculum will allow their 
children to choose a career path based on their interests but some 
were apprehensive that those children that did not master reading and 
writing in KG would face difficulties in all subsequent years. The OPM 
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research team also spoke to students who reported that teachers and 
parents still encouraged rote learning and teaching and assessment 
remained textbook based.
Rote learning, formative assessment and parental involvement 
are not Myanmar’s only problems with the new curriculum. Issues of 
discriminatory content vis-à-vis different ethnic groups was discussed 
in Chapter 1 of this volume and it would be interesting to see if the 
curricular reforms have altered the content with regard to identity, 
equality and citizenship. The first study on this was undertaken by Rose 
Metro who examined the KG–Grade 3 textbooks and compared them to 
the previous curriculum, and shared her findings at a conference in NPT 
in 2019.61 Metro argues that the reforms were an opportunity to rethink 
how national identity is defined in Myanmar: ‘who is at the center, who is 
on the periphery, and where the boundary falls between national races 
and foreigners’(Metro, 2019: 1). Whilst arguing that there is now a more 
inclusive focus on non-Burman and non-Buddhist groups in the new 
textbooks, the Burman Buddhist identities still remain at the centre of 
what is taught as Myanmar’s national identity. As before, all the heroes in 
the social studies books remain Burman Buddhist military men. Metro 
points out that they are referred to as ‘Myanmar’, which ‘is supposed 
to include all the Eight National Races, but in practice it is often used to 
mean Burman’(Metro, 2019: 7). Metro reports that there has been some 
progress in ‘Morality and Civics’ texts (Metro, 2019: 8–9):
Although light-skinned Burman Buddhist military leaders are 
centered in the curriculum, they are situated within a discourse 
that purports to be inclusive. First, offensive content – for instance, 
a poem insulting people of ‘mixed blood’ (Su Myat Mon, 2019) – 
is not present. Second, children are often instructed to tolerate 
each other’s differences. For instance, they are told to accept people 
of any ethnicity, religion, or place (‘lumyo batha neya’.) (Third 
Grade Morality and Civics, 38). One poem compares the national 
races to ‘blood relations’ (Third Grade Morality and Civics, 56). 
In a notable and welcome departure from previous textbooks, 
children are even asked open-ended questions that allow them to 
self-identify and identify the ethnicities of others: ‘Who are the 
ethnic groups in your area?’ (First Grade Morality and Civics, 59). 
Finally, science textbooks do mention that human skin tone and 
hair texture vary (First Grade Science, 23), and a poem cautions 
against discrimination based on skin color (Third Grade Morality 
and Civics, 3).
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Nevertheless, non-Burman ethnicities are never the protagonists and 
remain on the periphery as they are only mentioned when they support 
the Burmans. Metro points to a few instances of inclusivity where the 
Pwo Karen language is mentioned, or a church or a Kachin Manao pole 
is shown in a picture (Metro, 2019: 10). Individual ethnic groups are 
not mentioned, only the term Myanmar is used. This, however, also 
erases the independent histories of other groups and more importantly 
whitewashes ethnic conflict: ‘King Bayinnaung fights against nameless 
enemies (in fact, the Mon) at the Battle of Naungyo’ (Third Grade Social 
Studies, 57, as cited in Metro, 2019). ‘By leaving out ethnic identifiers, 
in what may be a well-intentioned attempt to downplay conflict, history 
is sanitized in a way that glosses over the contributions and histories of 
non-Burmans’ (Metro, 2019: 11). Outsiders, such as people of Indian or 
Chinese origin who have lived in Myanmar for generations are still not 
mentioned (Metro, 2019: 12).
Whilst the changes with regard to national identity are a positive 
step, they do not yet seem to go far enough. There is also a question of 
the role of the teachers and how far the changes in teacher training will 
address such issues – something which remains unclear (see Chapter 5 
of this volume). As Higgins et al. found, teachers sometimes view the 
exclusive and sectarian approach of identity as normal, as that is what 
they were taught: ‘Aligning with such viewpoints on the function of 
history, teachers implicitly present themselves as guardians of their 
culture’ (Higgins et al., 2016: 121). Civil society groups have also 
voiced concerns. In December 2018, more than 120 civil society groups 
sent an open letter to President U Win Myint to urge a review of the 
curriculum for primary school civics classes, claiming that it supported 
ethnic and religious discrimination (Su Myat Mon, 2019). The letter 
claimed that the civics education curriculum seemed to be an: ‘attempt 
to indoctrinate the innocent minds of children with discriminatory 
practices’ and contradicted Section 348 of the 2008 Constitution, that 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, birth, religion, official 
position, status, culture, sex and wealth. According to an interview 
conducted by the newspaper Frontier anti-hate speech campaigner Ma 
Zar Chi Oo, the discriminatory language she had heard was not in a 
student textbook but came from a guide for teachers which had been 
read to the class. She suggested that this was deliberate, to make it harder 
to prove what was being taught to the children was questionable. It is 
clear that curricular and textbook content reforms still have some way 
to go to be truly inclusive of all groups so as to underpin a more equal 
society.
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NESP mid-term review
The NESP, as has been established above, has been the guiding policy 
document of the education reform process. Reaching its half-way 
point in the summer of 2019, a MTR was undertaken to allow for a 
re-prioritisation and some streamlining of programmes within the MoE. 
A data gap analysis workshop was conducted by UNESCO to inform 
the MTR in April 2019 prior to its start, and officials from each MoE 
Department at the Union level and all State/Regional Departments 
contributed to this workshop. This gap analysis focused on all nine 
transformational shifts, identifying if data was available to establish how 
far the 93 outcome indicators outlined in the NESP were progressing. 
The MoE Data Gap Analysis report established that: ‘… in many cases, 
even where implementation has significantly progressed, information 
to measure outcome level indicators may not be available to provide 
evidence of achievement’(MoE, 2019a: 5). Part of the exercise was 
to shift the MoE from looking at what had been done to what had 
actually been achieved. However, the lack of baseline data meant that 
it was difficult for the MTR to show what progress had been made 
over time (MoE, 2019a: 54). Another issue raised at the workshop was 
that of responsibility and data format: ‘In many of the discussions 
with departments, it was not clear with whom the responsibility for 
monitoring activities lie. […] In some cases, monitoring does take place, 
but the data is often not in the correct format to review progress’ (MoE, 
2019a: 55).
An MTR reference group that included development partners 
(chaired by Dr Aye Myint), a MTR team and a ministerial MTR team were 
established. Independent consultants organised by DFAT reviewed the 
work of the various departments in light of the NESP, focusing on what 
had been achieved at the mid-way point. The process nevertheless 
remained led by the MoE. Interviews with the development partners and 
the MoE in September 2019 showed that a rift had started to emerge, 
with development partners getting increasingly frustrated at their lack of 
influence. One issue was the late submission of the inception report by 
the MoE that did not allow development partners to comment in time 
before the actual MTR process started.
Amongst the development partners’ respondents there was some 
concern as the MTR was not seen as a research-driven process and they 
expected it to be more anecdotal as opposed to data driven. One of the 
Australian consultants complained62 that she was given no access, not 
much information, and then told that the site visits she undertook could 
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS94
not be used in her report. She felt the MTR was a checklist of activities 
that had been undertaken rather than a report of what progress these 
activities had contributed to. It seems that the MTR went off track because 
it was initially not meant to be an evaluation, rather a way of establishing 
areas that the MoE needed to focus on, although in the inception 
workshop the issues of efficiency and effectiveness emerged. The MTR 
inception report (MoE, 2019b: 10) notes that: ‘the MTR will examine 
the NESP against the standard criteria associated with relevance, effec-
tiveness, and efficiency. It will validate and supplement the data collected 
from key informant interviews and focus group discussions, observa-
tions, literature review, and a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats (SWOT) analysis’. In that same report, the main purposes of the 
MTR were described as follows:
… management – to enable the MoE to make evidence-based 
decisions on priorities, resources, direction, and strategy going 
forward; accountability – to ensure alignment with relevant policies, 
procedures, programming decisions, expenditure, and to ensure 
these are clearly understood by funders and relevant stakeholders; 
and learning – to learn about what has worked well and less well and 
how to improve the implementation of the NESP. (MoE, 2019b: 10)
The MoE respondents interviewed in 2019 insisted the process had been 
data driven, not least through the submission of the Annual Progress 
Reviews (APRs) and other data that had been requested by the consultants 
that they say they provided. In fact, the increased use of data does need 
to be commended. The new department responsible for monitoring and 
evaluation led by Director General Dr Sai has produced two APRs for 
2016–7 and 2017–8, the first of their kind.63 According to the APR 2018 
text, the MoE has developed a new management system called the 
‘Annual Planning and Budget Estimate Cycle’ to provide senior ministry 
officials with more accurate and timely performance to inform decisions 
on priority activities for the next ministry annual budget (MoE, 2018: 8). 
In addition, departmental monitoring and evaluation plans, annual 
budgets and outputs, evaluation reports and performance reports all 
feed into this new annual publication. Dr Sai said in an interview64 that 
the APR reports allow the MoE to share education information widely 
across the various stakeholders at state and region level, making them a 
bigger part of the reform process. These two reports are indeed an 
impressive achievement, especially in a country where previously such 
data was not available.
Education REfoRm and EffEcts on Basic Education 95
The MTR inception report states that the MTR is also due to review 
issues of inclusion and equality to see if: ‘the MoE and its key stakehold-
ers are doing the right things and doing things right’ within the context 
of the SDGs’ (MoE, 2019b: 7). The section mentions both the economic 
disparities between communities as well as the effect of conflict on ethnic 
children as follows:
… the impressive conditions of the economy and improvements 
in living standards mask deep fissures in terms of inclusion, 
equity and vulnerabilities between urban and rural settings, across 
regions, and along ethnic lines. The Multidimensional Index of 
Disadvantage records stark spatial diversity of disadvantage, 
exemplified by nearly two thirds of households in Rakhine and 
Kayin being disadvantaged in at least five different aspects of 
disadvantageousness; intra-state variations in disadvantage at 
Township levels; rural populations being more than twice as likely 
to experience multiple disadvantages as compared to urban 
populations; and 84 per cent of the population experiencing disad-
vantage in at least one indicator. […] Ongoing conflicts and ethnic 
tensions have led to displacement of the ethnic populations and 
economic disenfranchisement, and have severely impacted the 
peacebuilding processes ushered in with the National Ceasefire 
Agreement (NCA), signed between the government and the Ethnic 
Armed Organisations. Significantly, the persistence of conflict 
has disrupted education opportunities for children in these areas. 
(MoE, 2019b: 6)
The report goes on to acknowledge the real progress that has been made 
across the country with primary enrolment rates at over 90 per cent, but 
notes the following three challenges (MoE, 2019b: 7):
• Most children are under-prepared for school, with only 20 per cent 
having access to early childhood education prior to enrolment in 
primary school, and this under-preparedness has an early impact 
on learning and an early educational divide.
• Low quality of primary provision with under-resourced schools and 
low-paid teachers utilising outdated teaching methods.
• Extremely low transition rates from primary to secondary school, 
with only 10 per cent of children who commenced primary school 
successfully completing upper secondary education.
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The MoE recognises that the low transition rates result in children not in 
school needing different pathways to complete their education, and has 
made this a priority as part of the equitable educational access for all 
(MoE, 2019b: 8). Other aspects showing an awareness of inclusion in 
the MTR process was the addition of gender65 as a category beyond the 
adopted Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) evaluation framework,66 and an adequate coverage of rural 
areas across the two data collection phases including district and 
township level stakeholders in Sittwe, Mandalay, Lashio, Myitkyina and 
Mawlamyine (MoE, 2019b: 14).
The MTR final report that was circulated in February 2020, covers 
all the main chapter headings of the NESP.67 It explains that the reforms 
to basic education are complex and ambitious, because they involve many 
large-scale activities occurring simultaneously including infrastructure 
projects and the development and roll-out of the new curriculum, as 
well as changes to pedagogy and assessment, underpinned by reform 
in teacher capacity building. ‘At the time of this review, it is difficult to 
gauge the overall effectiveness of these profound changes to embed and 
systemise new educational practice and improve student learning. Each 
intervention is interrelated requiring sustained investment and time 
before systematic gains in student learning are evident’ (MoE, 2020: ix). 
The new curriculum moves Myanmar teaching away from rote learning 
and hopes to increase student engagement and performance, but requires 
teachers to have the capabilities to deliver this. ‘The new curriculum 
also reflects society’s need for citizens capable of learning how to learn, 
applying critical thinking, communication and creativity and possess a 
core of knowledge and skills in technical and academic areas’ (MoE, 2020: 
ix). It was expected that the MTR would allow the MoE to focus on priority 
areas rather than trying to change everything at once; and at the same 
time allowing the MoE to reflect on which departments need what kind 
of support and perhaps engage with the development partners in a 
more strategic way. The MTR final report’s list of priority recommenda-
tions for basic education in the NESP 2019–21 does not really do this, 
but recognises that more time is needed for the transformational 
shifts to embed. ‘The combined reform across all the Basic Education 
Transformational Shifts is planned to be implemented over a period of at 
least 10 years in order to become fully established in schools across the 
country’ (MoE, 2020: xii).
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Conclusion
Returning to Iris Young’s framework of social justice discussed in the 
Introduction, and reviewing how far the education reforms at the MoE 
and within basic education are allowing the Myanmar government to 
deliver on its manifesto promises, it is crucial to mention that the policy 
documents all engage with issues of marginalisation and inclusion. 
This includes the NEP MTR final report that acknowledges: ‘There is a 
lack of awareness about inclusivity combined with limited capacity to 
implement inclusive practices at the school level’ and ‘Limited quality 
data to understand and address equity and inclusion issues’ (MoE, 2020: 
viii). The MTR includes a full chapter on disparities and specifically 
mentions rural poor populations, children living in conflict affected 
areas, children with disabilities and children whose mother tongue is not 
Burmese as particularly disadvantaged, especially with regard to access 
to education. The MTR acknowledges that Gender Equality and Social 
Inclusion (GESI) has not been integrated across all nine Transformational 
Shifts of the NESP. To remedy the disparities and shift attitudes, the 
MTR suggests collaborations across ministries and with civil society 
organisations to develop targeted interventions and awareness campaigns 
at school and community levels. However, it is unclear how the MoE is to 
take these suggestions forward.
The emerging problem is not a lack of understanding of Myanmar’s 
social justice issues, rather it seems to lie in the policy–practice gap, 
raising questions as to why what is acknowledged in policy fails to 
translate into planned changes on the ground. This is particularly the 
case with regard to the reforms of the curriculum content where there 
is improvement, but as of yet cultural differences are erased rather 
than supported, and where equality between the national races is 
not yet part of the education discourse, certain forms of ‘cultural 
imperialism’ remain. Structures are a key part of the problem; the lack of 
decentralisation means that schools, teachers and other education 
workers remain powerless, and dependent on the MoE decisions in NPT. 
It seems that part of the problem are the hierarchical structures, cultural 
traditions and the top-down nature of the reforms that do not allow 
the stakeholders to question or shape the changes, in effect, reinforcing 
rather than resolving inequalities. The relationship between the MoE and 
the development partners is also increasingly problematic, and it is 
unclear in how far rolling out the reforms promote mutuality, recognition 
and respect between stakeholders.
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS98
Notes
 1 Renamed ‘National Education Strategic Plan’ (still ‘NESP’ by the NLD government after 2016. 
Under the President Thein Sein Government until 2015 it was the ‘Sector Plan’ and under the 
NLD after 2016 it became the ‘Strategic Plan’. But the acronym remains NESP.
 2 The author was special education advisor to AusAID in Myanmar at the time, therefore 
accessing both the MoE–CESR staff as well as the international agencies. 
 3 See: World Bank, 2018a. Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP) – 
Myanmar 2017. According to the WB (2018a: 2): ‘Public funding for education significantly 
increased in recent years, going from MMK 310 billion (about USD 200 million equivalent) 
in 2011–2 to more than MMK 2,177 million (about USD 1.4 billion equivalent) in 2018–9, 
but remains considerably lower than in neighbouring and comparator countries […] as a 
percentage of GDP (at around 2.2 per cent)’. 
 4 Under President Thein Sein (i.e. between 2012 and 2015), teachers received a pay rise and 
more teachers were recruited from the monastic sector to make up for teacher shortages, 
accounting for much of this expenditure increase.
 5 The poverty line was defined as 376,151 MMK/year (1,030 MMK/day) in 2010 (IHLCA Project 
Technical Unit 2011: 6).
 6 This probably includes language issues for ethnic children who do not speak Burmese.
 7 IHLCA Survey responses (2011) suggest at least 12 per cent repetition in Grade 1. 
 8 All figures are from a MoE document by U Ko Lay Win and Chris Spohr (no date). Myanmar’s 
Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR): Statistics for Evidence-Based Policy and 
Planning. Unpublished. 
 9 Data provided by UNICEF at a meeting the author attended on 10 September 2015, showed: 
35.72 per cent of children aged 5–17 do not attend school. This is the equivalent of 4.5 million 
children nationally.
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The alternative: Monastic education
Introduction
Myanmar’s education system has historically been closely linked with 
Buddhism and Myanmar culture incorporates the traditional Buddhist 
value of service to the community. Society supports monks and 
monasteries through donations as part of their religious duty, and 
monasteries have been the main vehicle for inclusion in education by 
offering schooling to poor and disadvantaged children. This chapter 
considers the role of monasteries in bringing about change in the 
classroom, a change which occurred before state education reforms 
had begun. Whilst monastic schools have always catered to the poorest 
and the most disadvantaged members of society, their relative independ-
ence and status outside of the direct purview of the MoE allowed them 
to pioneer CCA in the classroom. Phaung Daw Oo, the largest monastic 
school in the country, based in Mandalay, is led by Sayadaw U Nayaka 
who can be credited with bringing large-scale change to teaching 
methods across all monastic schools through founding a centre for 
monastic teacher training that was supported by local donors as well as 
international aid funding. Drawing on original interview and focus group 
data from monastic teachers collected in 2010 and 2014, the chapter 
examines how CCA spread across monastic networks, and the role of 
both local and international teacher training agents across the country 
in this. In the end, it was monastic schools that led the way in reforms 
that affected teaching methods, especially the introduction of CCA 
in the classroom, which the state sector emulated a few years later. 
The chapter discusses how children from the most disadvantaged 
background ultimately had access to better teaching practices than those 
at government schools as a result of the work pioneered in Phaung Daw 
Oo. The chapter also draws on original focus group data with parents 
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whose children attended these schools, so as to portray their views on 
the role of monasteries in education in Myanmar. Finally, the chapter 
describes the role of monasteries in maintaining ethnic nationality 
languages and culture, especially in Mon, Karen, Shan and Pa-O societies 
through their summer school language and literature programmes, a 
theme that will be further examined in Chapter 6 on ethnic languages.
Background: Buddhism and education, monastic 
schools in history
The history of monastic education dates back over 1,000 years to the Bagan 
era (1044–1287) when King Anawrahta first established Theravada 
Buddhism in what is today lower Myanmar. Evidence suggests that the 
origins of monastic schools go even further back to a Mon-dominated 
kingdom in the south some centuries earlier (Kaung, 1963). Monasteries 
were the only education providers during the rule of the Burmese 
kings,1 and, therefore, educational control rested with the Sangha.2 The 
focus was on learning Buddhist texts, and boys started their education 
at the age of eight (Cheesman, 2003: 48). This free monastery-based 
education was possible as monasteries were supported by the local 
community in the villages where they were located, and other, more 
wealthy donors undertook the responsibility to feed the monks, as 
well as funding the construction and maintenance of schools (Aung-
Thwin, 1985: 175). The monks themselves were generally from the same 
background as the community in which they were situated (Kaung, 
1963: 20).
When the British arrived in Burma they encountered a society that 
already had an education system, however, most colonial administrators 
dismissed monastic schooling as inadequate, believing that this type of 
religion-based education was unsuitable for the modern era (Cheesman, 
2003). The introduction of a British secular education system in the 
colonial days led to a decline of the monastic system; by removing the 
King and changing the Burmese social structure, the Sangha no longer 
had its traditional support base (Cheesman, 2003). The more ‘modern’ 
alternative education system was at first not readily adopted. As Furnivall 
points out, although: ‘the people acquiesced perforce in the desertion of 
the monasteries and the degradation of their own system of education’, 
they were relatively uninterested in the new schools (Furnivall, 1938: 
81–2, cited in Cheesman, 2003: 50–1). In the end, those Burmans who 
wanted to advance socially embraced British education (Cheesman, 
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2003), relegating monastic education to the poor, thus resulting in a 
two-tier education system where monastic schools were seen to cater 
to the poor and disadvantaged, a view which persists to this day. During 
colonial times, the British administration viewed the monks and their 
monasteries as antiquated, not in line with British colonial objectives, 
and thus were not supportive of the parallel education that the 
monasteries provided (Cheesman, 2003). Zoellner describes how the 
widespread demand of a distinctively Buddhist education as opposed 
to the British secular system became a significant part of the nationalist 
movement and the anti-colonial struggle (Zoellner, 2007).
After independence in 1948, Burma’s socialist government 
centralised schooling and made it dependent on state funding (MoE, 
1953). The new education policy recognised a role for religious 
instruction: ‘The five elements essential to a sound educational tradition 
were identified as religion, discipline, culture, athletics and service’ 
(Cheesman, 2003: 54). As Burma’s post-independence years were 
characterised by instability and civil war, society increasingly attributed 
rising anti-social activities and crime to the perceived inadequacies 
of secular schools.3 According to Smith, a powerful association of monks 
in 1959 demanded a reversion to monastic instruction at primary 
school level in order to prevent a nationwide breakdown (Smith, 1965: 
178–9). In 1962, after the military coup and the advent of the ‘Burmese 
way to Socialism’, schools were: ‘subject to unambiguous directives that 
emphasised military-style “socialist” prerogatives’ (Burma Administrative 
and Social Affairs, 1963, cited in Cheesman, 2003: 55). Despite the 
central control held by the military, the monastic system did nevertheless 
experience a limited revival under Burmese socialist party rule. Although 
all schools had been nationalised, the government system could not reach 
across the whole country and monastic schools began to fill the gaps. The 
state, nonetheless, made sure that the Sangha was controlled through 
a system of registration and supervision that tightened over the mid- 
1960s through to the late 1970s. Cheesman explains that the introduc-
tion of the first Basic Education Law in 1966 continued the trend towards 
tighter supervision of schools, including monastic schools (Cheesman, 
2003). The monastic schools were overseen first by the Ministry for 
Social Welfare (MSW), later by the MoE, and after 1988, the responsibil-
ity moved to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). Cheesman writes 
that after the uprisings in 1988 and 1990, the relationship between state 
and Sangha was remodelled to resemble the earlier regal system of 
patronage, albeit with the state firmly in control and the Sangha having 
no means to undermine the government (Cheesman, 2003).4 It was also 
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at this time, possibly because the under-funded state education system 
could not meet the needs of all families, that more monastic schools were 
encouraged to open and allowed to register so as to gain a certain legal 
status, which consequently allowed some of the bigger monastic networks 
to establish themselves.
Since 1992, all registered monastic schools have used the national 
curriculum as prescribed by the MoE. Up until the turn of the twenty-first 
century, monastic education was largely perceived as ‘non-formal’ 
education until the government realised that in order to meet its responsi-
bilities under the ‘Education For All’ declaration that it had signed, the 
children in monastic schools needed to be counted and included.5 
Monastic schools were suddenly seen as part of the solution to provide 
education across all sections of society and across the country (Lall, 
2011). Consequently, monastic schools today are in a more prominent 
position than at any time since independence. Any monastic school can 
register with the MoRA, and there is now a formal structure in place with 
monastic school committees at township, state/region and national levels.
Zobrist describes the institutional framework for monastic education 
as being tripartite, including two government ministries (the MoRA and 
the MoE) and the state Saṅgha Mahā Nāyaka Committee where the 
MoRA takes the administrative lead, defining rules and regulations, and 
is responsible for school registrations (Zobrist, 2015). Within MoRA, 
monastic education is the responsibility of Domestic Religious Affairs 
under the Department of Promotion and Propagation of Sasana.6 The 
MoE is not responsible for monastic schools but prescribes the curriculum 
and assessment. The state Saṅgha Mahā Nāyaka Committee is the 
supervisory body for monastic education and there are Monastic Education 
Supervisory Committees (MESC) at central, state/region and township 
levels.7 There are now regular monastic education conferences bringing 
the heads of monastic schools together. The first was held in 2014 and they 
are funded through donations and managed by a group of head monks 
who are engaged with MoRA and MoE.8 The conferences are hosted in a 
large monastic school called Naung Taung Monastic School in Ho Pone, 
Shan State. One of the key outputs of the second conference in 2015 was a 
series of eight resolutions9 for the monastic education system which are 
now the basis of a monastic school policy.
Over the last 80 years, the number of monastic schools has 
fluctuated significantly. In 1932, there were 928 schools. By 1958, this 
had risen substantially to 5,545. Then after the 1962 military coup, most 
were officially disbanded. After monastic schools officially reopened in 
1992, the number of schools rose and by 1996 there were 1,507. The 
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number of students enrolled, however, was only 30 per cent of today’s 
enrolment figures (Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, 2015: 11–12). In 2005, it 
was estimated that the same number of 1,500 monastic schools catered 
for 93,000 children (Achilles, 2005). According to data collected by 
MoRA, in 2010 there were 196,458 children enrolled in registered 
monastic schools across the country (Lall, 2011).10 There could be more 
with those in non-registered but affiliated monastic schools, as there was 
no accurate data concerning how many monastic schools registered, so 
that the only official data available is from registered schools. The major 
incentive to register today is to receive government subsidies (Zobrist, 
2015; 15–6). This has become increasingly more important as monastic 
schools traditionally rely on donations. Since 2013–4, the government 
has started providing some financial support to registered monastic 
schools, specifically subsidising teacher salaries based on the number 
of enrolled students. According to Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, the 
government subsidises the cost of one teacher for the first 20 students, 
then subsidises further salaries for every additional 40 students 
(Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, 2015: 22). As of 2015–6, the government 
also included registered monastic schools in their school grants 
programme. Despite this recent support from the government, the issue 
of funding continues to be problematic, especially with regard to teacher 
salaries, which are significantly lower than government schoolteachers, 
and some monastic schools have no other option but to ask parents 
to contribute towards fees. Some monastic schools have now started to 
explore how they can initiate effective ‘Income Generating Activities’ 
(IGAs) in order to provide greater job security for their teachers.11
According to analysis by MIMU of the five-year period between 
2012 and 2013 and between 2016 and 2017, 303,061 students attended 
registered monastic schools across Myanmar in 2016 (MIMU, 2017). 
Of these, 12 per cent were young novices and nuns and 88 per cent were 
ordinary boys and girls, with marginally more boys than girls (51:49), 
and many more novices than nuns (65:35). Officially, monastic schools 
can only provide primary (Grades 1–5) and post-primary education 
(Grades 6–8), although there are a small number of middle schools and 
an even smaller number of high schools.12 Other secondary monastic 
schools have found a way around this by affiliating with a government 
school (Zobrist, 2015: 17). In monastic education, 72 per cent of children 
are at primary school levels between Grades 1–4, and there has been a 
22 per cent increase (53,823 more children) in the number of children 
enrolled in monastic education between 2012 and 2017 (MIMU, 2017). 
Children from monastic schools who want to remain in education are 
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expected to transfer to government middle schools – the monastic system 
is not intended as a parallel education pathway. Transfers are simple as 
the head monk only has to issue a transfer certificate in Grade 5 that 
is then endorsed by the local TEO and then given to the middle school 
head teacher.13
Monastic schools today: A social justice agenda
The two-tier system mentioned above means that those who cannot afford 
to go to state schools go to monastic schools or forego their education 
altogether. Monastic schools clearly cater for the poor and disadvantaged. 
At the time of writing, monastic schools are the most important civil society 
institutions that bridge the accessibility gap to the government education 
system. While public schooling is not available in many rural, remote or 
conflict affected areas, there is a monastery in nearly every village.
A study by the Burnet Institute Myanmar (BIM) and the Monastic 
Education Development Group (MEDG), that reviewed 127 monastic 
schools, provides a snapshot of the state of monastic schools, including 
structural issues such as water supply, sanitation and hygiene (BIM and 
MEDG, 2014). According to this study, most monastic schools are managed 
by monks, sometimes supported by school committees. However, only 
49 per cent of schools had a staff member trained in school administration. 
Although school committees or PTAs were present at 67 per cent of these 
monastic schools (usually made up of the principal, teachers, monks, 
parents and other community members), they did not meet very often. 
Their main functions were to support the monastery with fundraising, 
school maintenance, coordinating parental involvement, supporting the 
building of new infrastructure, encouraging out-of-school children to go to 
school, and hiring new teachers. All in all, the monastic school is very 
much a community responsibility.
The classroom environment is often problematic, with 75 per cent 
of schools in the BIM and MEDG study conducting multiple classes in one 
large room. Teaching space is a major issue and monasteries often cannot 
offer more than one large hall. In some cases, however, the building has 
been provided by the government but the monastery (and by extension, 
donations from the community) has to pay for a teacher. This is especially 
the case in more remote areas (Lorch, 2007). The hygiene condition of 
many schools is also a problem: only 37 per cent of schools in the BIM–
MEDG 2014 study had a good waste disposal system, not all schools had 
access to clean water (58 per cent of schools had tube wells), the majority 
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of schools (59 per cent) had poor water drainage systems and a few 
schools (6 per cent) did not have any toilets, while girls had separate 
toilets in only 47 per cent of schools. Hand-washing facilities were only 
noted in 67 per cent of the schools and most had no soap. The environment 
is a result of what the local community can afford and what the head 
monk manages to raise in donations.
It is clear that those attending monastic schools are usually those 
who would otherwise not attend school at all, making monastic schools 
a critical piece for inclusion in Myanmar’s education system. The cost 
of education to families is the main issue. In all studies conducted on 
Myanmar’s monastic schools (Lall, 2011 and 2016b; Zobrist, 2015; BIM 
and MEDG, 2014; Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, 2015) parents say that they 
simply cannot afford the hidden fees of the government system. Most 
parents are agricultural workers, migrant workers or small-scale vendors 
with very low, often daily wage, incomes. There are nevertheless other 
reasons for choosing a monastic school including safety and distance, in 
some cases preference for values-based education, familiarity with the 
abbot and teachers, and the school’s flexible schedule that allows children 
to work to support their families. In some cases, disability or disease 
means that students are barred from government schools but accepted in 
monastic education centres.14 With regards to students with disabilities, 
interestingly, UNESCO (cited in Zobrist, 2015) reports that 45 per cent of 
all students with disabilities attend monastic institutions. Since monastic 
students represent only 3 per cent of the total student population, it is 
significant that these schools absorb such a high percentage of students 
with disabilities despite no direct investment from any ministry for the 
provision of services, and no capacity to offer specialised help for disabled 
children. In certain cases, monastic heads show flexibility when children 
do not have the required official documents (birth certificates, citizenship 
registration cards, etc.)15 In other cases, school heads allowed over-aged 
students to enrol or held special evening classes for older children who 
had to work, something which is impossible at a government school. 
Often monastic schools will also cater for ethnic minority students 
(Zobrist, 2015; Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, 2015), albeit teachers teach 
in Burmese and have no training in multilingual education.
Teachers and training
Across both state and monastic schools, the quality varies tremendously. 
Monastic teachers do not come from the same pool as those who teach 
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in the state system. Head monks usually prefer to employ university 
graduates16 as teachers but often have to compromise and accept the 
most qualified local staff. Most are female, live locally and many are very 
young. In Phaung Daw Oo, there is a preference to employ their own 
graduates after they have finished Year 11. There is no formal pre-service 
training and many, especially in the rural areas, have no more than the 
11 years of basic schooling. Some schools have benefitted from in-service 
teacher training funded by international organisations such as JICA or 
UNICEF. There is also a MoE annual two-week in-service teacher training 
course that many monastic teachers are allowed to attend, although 
some have reported that it is difficult to access the training location. In 
some very rare cases, schools or particular teachers (often head monks) 
have had access to an Open Society-developed programme entitled 
‘Reading, Writing and Critical Thinking’ (RWCT), a programme funded 
out of Thailand.17 But many monastic schools have had nothing at all and 
teachers teach as they were taught when they were children.
Some larger schools such as Phaung Daw Oo have started to use 
teaching assistants, especially in very large classes where space allows. 
Classroom observations showed that the coordination between the main 
teacher and the teaching assistant is still something that needs to be 
learnt, as the mechanisms did not seem to have been fully worked out in 
some classrooms. However, teaching assistants are crucial in settings 
with over 80 or 100 students in a class if the teaching method is to go 
beyond simple rote learning.
Phaung Daw Oo is often represented as the country’s model 
monastic school. Teachers there have received more training than in 
most other monastic school settings, starting in 2005 with specialist 
CCA training provided in Thailand (Lall, 2010). Teachers there have 
also received mathematics, English and subject-specific training as 
well as RWCT training. The Head Teacher of Phaung Daw Oo explained 
(Lall et al., 2016):
In 2006, there was one month self-awareness training from Thailand. 
Teachers could not go home during that training. The middle school 
teachers have received gender training. The government also 
organizes life skill trainings. The new teachers receive TOT18 training 
from the teachers at this school. 
Since Phaung Daw Oo’s Grades 9 and 10 are linked to a government 
school, each subject dean also receives subject-specific training from the 
government that includes lesson planning, curriculum development and 
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management. It should be remembered that most monastic schools are 
not like Phaung Daw Oo, yet all have an important contribution to make, 
as is described by the parents below.
Parent views on monastic education and social justice
Studies conducted by the author across monastic schools in 2010, 2015 
and in 2016 reflect much of what other research also discussed. Students 
were from poor and very poor families living in the local areas, and in 
some cases were orphans or ethnic minority students living as boarders 
in the monastery (Lall, 2011; Lall, 2016b; Lall et al., 2016). One monastery 
had built a special shelter for the children who had fled from cyclone 
Nargis in 2010 and who either had no family left, or whose families could 
no longer feed them. Generally, there were 80–100 students in each class 
and the benches and rooms were overcrowded. In most schools, multiple 
classes were held in one hall. Figure 3.1 shows a typical monastic hall. 
Both in urban and rural areas, classes had varying age groups with some 
students having started education late. In general, boys and girls learnt 
together but in some schools they were seated separately. Apart from one 
very large school located in the Delta which was perfectly disciplined, 
Figure 3.1 Monastic school, 2010. Source: Author.
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order and adherence to rules was better in smaller schools and in the 
larger schools there seemed to be utter chaos most of the time.
The choice of school for most parents was based on the fact that the 
school was free and that they were poor. Many parents explained that 
their daily wage was not enough to pay for the extra costs of the local 
government school. Many parents, especially in the rural areas, also said 
that the school was close and that their children could easily and safely 
walk to school alone. There was an implicit trust in the teachers and 
the head monk that the children would be treated well and protected. 
‘The teachers treat our children like their own’ was a refrain often heard. 
Beyond free education, the monasteries also often supported the families 
by other means, such as meals or snacks for the children, and this was 
mentioned as an important factor.
The parents interviewed were all very interested in their children’s 
education but many said they were unable to help or felt incapable of 
taking part in the education process either due to time constraints (most 
families live hand to mouth and have a hard time putting one daily meal 
on the table) or because they were not educated themselves. All parents 
also said that they wanted their children to become ‘civilised’ and that 
the school was the best way for this. Discipline and order was something 
the teachers could impart and this would make the children good adults, 
with Buddhist values and respect for their elders and wider society. 
In the discussions, there was no critique of the schools whatsoever. In 
fact, many parents said they felt the schools were ‘perfect’ and there 
was a wide sense of gratitude towards the head monk and the teachers. 
Only when prompted markedly did they have some suggestions for 
improvement. Mostly, these consisted in wanting the school to expand 
(to have more space) or the school becoming a middle or high school. 
The parents know that they will not be able to send their children to the 
government middle or high schools due to the costs of uniforms and 
books. They also feel that it would be nicer for their children to remain in 
the same environment until Grade 11.19 Many parents also appreciated 
the vocational classes or the courses in sustainable development, and 
although not asked about them made it a point to mention how helpful 
these were. Invariably, parents hoped that their children would take on 
work in which they were interested, and without exception the parents 
wanted the children to have better employment than themselves and saw 
education as the only means forward. Monastic schools are, therefore, 
a key part of Myanmar’s Buddhism social justice fabric, offering an 
educational path to the most disadvantaged. This path is by no means 
perfect, not least because it mostly offers education only to the end of 
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primary school, but it does allow some to escape from the grinding 
poverty of their parents, and improves literacy levels across the country.
Phaung Daw Oo is exceptional and its parents know how lucky they 
are to get their children admitted. It is not only a monastic school that 
offers 11 years of schooling up to the metric exam, but it is also a school 
that has pioneered new teaching methods of CCA (see next section) and 
even offered fast-track classes where the curriculum is taught to smaller 
groups of students in English.20 The head monk, U Nayaka, explained 
that these classes were for any gifted child at his school. However, upon 
closer examination, it turned out that the children in the fast-track 
section had parents largely emanating from the middle and lower middle 
classes. These parents praised the system for not requiring extra tuition 
they felt they would have had to provide to their children in government 
schools. It meant that some poorer students were able to mix with middle 
class peers, but it also shows that middle class parents will send their 
children to a monastic school if that school provides better quality 
education than the local government alternative.21
Phaung Daw Oo is also the only monastic school with a reasonable 
number of computers. They use technology regularly and find that the 
students who board are more familiar with IT than those who go back 
home in the evening, as they do not have access to computers at home. 
One teacher, however, mentioned that there were potential issues with 
online resources (Lall, 2011):
Although there are good things about Facebook, there is too much 
hate speech which is disappointing so I don’t use it much anymore. 
I use the computer more for presentations, downloads and 
scholarship information.
Given the issues that have developed across the country with regard 
to growing Buddhist nationalism and discrimination towards certain 
religious minorities, it was heartening to hear this from the leading 
monastic school in the country.
Developing child-centred approaches in education in 
monastic schools
Child-centred approaches in education arrived in Myanmar through 
INGOs such as UNICEF and JICA in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
was later adopted by local NGOs. Child-centred approaches are government 
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endorsed, and both UNICEF and JICA, which had the first Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) with the MoE, worked with the teachers’ colleges to 
train state sector teachers in CCA methods. However, evidence suggests 
that the methodology was rarely, if ever, applied in government schools, 
largely because of the examination system being based on the chapter-end 
test, which required children to regurgitate what had been rote learnt in 
the preceding weeks.22
Around 2003–4, Pestalozzi Children’s Foundation, an INGO, 
started to offer training to teachers in the monastic sector, including 
those from Phaung Daw Oo monastery. Since 2005, there have been a 
number of CCA training providers who have worked with monastic 
schools, including Hantha educators, Yinthway Foundation, the Asia 
Peace and Education Foundation (APEF), Shalom (Nyein Foundation) 
and Save the Children, amongst others. Some of these are local NGOs 
(with and without international support) and some are international 
charities (such as Save the Children). The international response to 
Cyclone Nargis in 2010 increased funding in the education sector and 
brought with it an expansion of teacher training provision and funding 
for further training, which in turn allowed for this new ‘sector’ to 
develop.23 The training provided in the monastic schools that were 
visited in 2010 and 2016 has often been a mix of diverse approaches – 
some teachers have had one set of training by one provider, others have 
been on multiple courses run by external providers, and some have been 
trained by in-house trainers as well as attending training sessions outside. 
The length of the training sessions also varied considerably from a 
few days to several weeks. Not all training provided follow-up sessions 
and the cascade model used by many assured large numbers of trained 
teachers, but with no quality assurance as to how much of the method 
was actually being retained, passed on and utilised. Discussions with 
teacher trainers revealed that there was a wide disparity in quality and 
the understanding of training methodologies. The lack of coordination 
between the training providers is one of the main issues as schools 
literally accept any training offered, but this approach lacks the possibility 
of building on what has been previously learnt. There has also been an 
issue with certain teachers believing that since they received training 
as trainers in a cascade model, they were in effect qualified to train 
the teachers of their school. Not only did this create new hierarchies 
and associated intercollegiate problems, those assigned to train other 
teachers could not clearly explain their own efforts at training. The 
issue of quality assurance of the various training methods is thus quite 
central. Additionally, training often occurred outside the school away 
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from the teachers’ home schools, so presented difficulties in ensuring 
the application of the newly learnt techniques once teachers returned 
home. Only one training provider made it a point to train teachers within 
their own classrooms.
The main training providers are linked to each other and to a 
number of nodal monastic schools with whom they collaborate through 
a complex network web (see Figure 3.2).24 It is interesting how some 
organisations and names seemed to be at the centre of the web and at the 
base of the often used cascading model – through which trainers were 
trained and then went on to train more trainers as well as teachers.
Overall, the objectives of all the programmes are the same as they 
aim to train teachers or teacher trainers to develop a child centred 
approach in the monastic school classrooms. Their definition of child-
centeredness is also essentially the same. There were differences in 
that some providers focused more on lesson planning and classroom 
management, while others focused on teaching techniques and the types 
of teaching exercises that can be done with students. However, the 
manuals reviewed25 had different approaches in securing the objectives, 
and training techniques varied. One training manual in particular was 
extremely theoretical and did not bear much connection to the local 
context. Some training providers were more technical than others; some 
had simpler and shorter approaches; some, especially those developed 
locally, were also more adapted to local circumstance.
Teachers had no difficulties explaining what they saw as the main 
elements of CCA and what they believed the benefits were. In focus 
groups (Figure 3.3), many explained through examples what methods 
they used in the classroom, and classroom observations showed that 
CCA practices were indeed being used in many (not all) classrooms, 
especially for the younger children and in schools where some teachers 
had received training in focus group discussions. The most commonly 
used approaches included group and pair work, student presentations 
in front of the class, getting more able students to teach others in 
small groups, the use of teaching aids such as flash cards and pictures 
(especially in mathematics, Myanmar and English), role-play, singing 
songs and reciting poetry (sometimes together as a whole class), drawing 
pictures, using pictures to illustrate body parts, plants or other objects 
and using jigsaw puzzles and storytelling. Since classrooms often did 
not have walls (at times only one big hall with small partitions), students’ 
work was displayed only occasionally. Furthermore, given the cramped 
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aquarium as one American educationist suggested). Despite the 
limitations, teachers spoke of taking the children outside and showing 
them plants and objects so they could learn through observation. Some 
teachers brought in common household items such as jars and bottles 
and used these as teaching aids. Assessment practices had also changed 
quite radically for those who applied CCA. Unlike their colleagues, who 
Figure 3.3 Phaung Daw Oo Monastic School, 2010 teachers’ focus 
group discussion. Source: Author.
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mainly used written tests, more CCA teachers used a form of oral 
assessment by asking questions.
The teachers themselves spoke of the benefits they experienced 
when using CCA. They felt that they learnt as well – and had more fun 
with the students; some felt that CCA also gave them a closer relationship 
with the students. They would immediately know if one student was 
not following the topic, or had difficulties understanding. They also felt 
that it improved relations between the students as group work ensured 
the stronger students helped the weaker ones. It should be noted that 
not all teachers were equally enthusiastic, and in general CCA was 
more easily adopted by the younger women. Based both on classroom 
observations and interviews, it seemed that some male teachers seemed 
resistant to changing their ways stating that: ‘some subjects are suitable 
for CCA teaching and some are not’ (Lall, 2010). There were more female 
teachers overall, and they were mostly responsible for the younger 
classes, making the adoption of CCA methods not only gender dependent 
but also related to the age of the students and the level of the class. 
Younger women spoke frequently about how they had fewer problems 
in the changing hierarchies where students feel free to ask questions 
and where the traditional silent respect for teachers is eroded. They 
understood that the method would improve their teaching but were 
outside their comfort zone in using it. As one of the head monks said, ‘If 
they cannot understand the new method they do not dare let go of the 
old method’ (Lall, 2010).
In all monastic schools visited, the rote method of learning was 
still applied, especially with older students, by teachers who had had 
no training and in those classes where due to the cramped conditions 
moving about between benches was impossible. One of the head monks 
said that he felt times are changing and teaching methods also have 
to change accordingly (Lall, 2010). This was echoed by teachers and 
trainers who emphasised that Myanmar had to dispense with the strategy 
of rote learning in order to raise standards across the country. Since 
government schools were unlikely to take the lead in this, it was left, 
ironically, to the age-old monastic school tradition to lead the way. All 
were aware that this would meet with resistance, not least from parents 
who were wondering what was happening in classrooms if the children 
did not bring home something written in their notebooks, or if they 
could not recite the phrases learnt at school back at home. Resistance 
also came from the monasteries themselves as monks, used to silence 
and respect, suddenly had to deal with noisy children in and outside the 
classrooms. The issue of respect and how the students view teachers and 
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parents or other elders remains central as many see a major difficulty in 
how to balance the new ‘modern’ and ‘Western’ approach with traditional 
Myanmar culture. Parents who took part in focus group discussions (as 
seen in Figure 3.4) were especially worried that children would become 
too disrespectful and reject traditional hierarchies at home.
However, there was a general understanding by all stakeholders – 
including the parents – that the children taught with the new methods 
could apply what they learnt in the classroom to the outside world and to 
everyday life. Teachers also felt they had to learn more themselves to 
adapt lessons to the real world, and this in turn had benefits for their own 
understanding of the world.
Despite all their misgivings, parents and teachers interviewed 
spoke about how the teaching methodology had changed children’s 
attitudes. Children were seen to be more engaged and happy to come 
to school. Parents in particular mentioned how children were excited 
by the prospect of going to class in the morning. Teachers mentioned 
fewer absences and drop-outs as proof that children were more engaged. 
In the classroom, the teachers said that the children’s confidence was 
up and many were no longer afraid to ask questions: ‘they feel they [the 
children] can say what they want to do and feel more able to do things by 
Figure 3.4 Monastic school Yangon Region, 2010 parents’ focus group 
discussion. Source: Author.
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themselves’ was a commonly echoed refrain (Lall, 2010). Children were 
also more curious, interested and keen to explore. Many female teachers 
also spoke at length about the new ‘bond’ they felt children were 
developing and that generally this meant they had a closer relationship 
and that classroom relations were no longer based on fear. The absence 
of corporal punishment in all classes visited contributed to that bonding 
process. Some (predominantly male) teachers, however, felt that this 
closer bond also eroded the traditional respect children had for teachers, 
and some parents also expressed worries to that effect. ‘Children become 
noisy’ was seen as a discipline problem at home and at school as well 
as by other monks in the monasteries where the schools were located 
(Lall, 2010). Conversely, parents found that children were more willing 
to do homework at home. Overall, teachers, parents and head monks 
all agreed that the changes witnessed in the children affected by the 
new teaching methods were positive and outweighed the problems of 
discipline and respect.
Child-centred approaches was often seen as a ‘foreign’ or ‘Western’ 
way to teach. In the long discussions about Myanmar’s transition into 
‘modern’ times and how children should be equipped for life outside 
the school and the home, it was often suggested that there was a need 
for a Myanmar-centric CCA which would encompass Asian – and in 
particular local – values. One training provider mentioned how CCA can 
be compared to Buddha’s teaching – a warm relationship but with 
respect, and that teachers had to know how to cultivate the respect for 
teachers, parents and other elders. Child-centred approaches could reflect 
Buddhist values if teachers were properly trained and had a deeper 
understanding of their own culture. It did not necessarily mean the loss 
of boundaries even if the child was at the centre and even if the child was 
able to ask questions. Clearly, this is a very fine balance to strike and most 
engaged in this conversation tended to say that they were not sure how to 
do it. Only one other teacher trainer spoke at length how the image of 
Buddha and his teaching had to be used as an example for the classroom, 
and that CCA was not incompatible with the Myanmar culture, but rather 
that the old style of teaching was what was incompatible with a Buddhist 
way of teaching and learning.
However, a number of issues were raised – including first and 
foremost the extra work required to apply CCA in the classroom. Most 
teachers were familiar with lesson planning but a CCA session requires 
careful thought as to what aids are needed and when, so that classroom 
preparation also meant time management. Since teaching aids were 
often not readily available, teachers would either have to think of an 
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easily obtained substitute from their home, or construct and build props 
themselves. Given the paucity of materials such as colour pens and glue, 
this was not always easy and required more than just good ideas and 
creativity. One training provider had developed teaching aids from 
recycled materials and showed teachers how to make their own, but in 
some very poor areas even these materials might not be available, and at 
times teachers were seen struggling with just a blackboard and a few 
pieces of paper on which to draw pictures.
The time factor was mentioned many times as teachers felt that 
they could not necessarily cover the required lesson in the time allocated, 
especially in classrooms with too many students. Giving individual 
attention to small groups of students not only ate into the allocated time 
but also meant that in some cases the rest of the class then posed a 
discipline issue, as students would start to run around and disrupt the 
learning environment. In these cases, at least one teaching assistant 
would be required, and this again would mean extra work as teaching 
would have to be coordinated. Yet, far more worrying for the teachers 
than the issue of time and discipline, was the fact that many felt they 
might be asked questions they would not be able to answer. In a culture 
where the respect for teachers is so deeply ingrained, some felt that 
having an ‘ignorant teacher’ could fatally undermine their position. In 
order to avoid this potential scenario, teachers said they would have to 
read much more. This again was extra work and often there was no 
means to acquire this extra knowledge (limited access to the internet, 
few if any books, etc.). Head monks, trainers and teachers all agreed that 
teachers still needed to learn and practice the CCA methods, and that 
the teachers were not used to the self-reflection and collaborative 
procedures which underlie such teaching. Those who had successfully 
mastered the method (very few felt this way) said that teaching had 
become easier due to the changed attitudes of the students. But some, 
mainly the males and teachers of older classes, felt that the new 
methodology was not necessarily appropriate across the board and that 
CCA should be used only for ‘some subjects’ or for the younger classes.
Aside from the extra work and time required, there were logistical 
difficulties in applying CCA in the schools as they are currently built and 
equipped. All complained about class sizes and teacher-to-student ratios 
– often at 100 students to one teacher. This was generally compounded 
by the lack of space. One classroom visited was so full that the teacher 
had to climb on the benches where students were sitting to get from the 
first row to the back of the classroom. The space was so tight that a 
stray dog entered and hid behind a bench and could not be chased out. 
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The teacher-to-student ratio did not seem that important when there 
were teaching assistants or second teachers present, and when there was 
enough space to form small groups of students to work together (i.e. if 
furniture could be moved). Often, the lack of space affected teaching in 
other ways as well. Not often mentioned but still important is the fact 
that many classes take place in one room or hall with few if any partitions, 
so that those classes engaged in CCA type exercises will often disturb 
each other. In one school, CCA methods were restricted to three hours 
a day so that everyone ‘would have their turn’ in the hall. Linked to the 
large classes is the issue of managing to cover the lesson in a certain 
amount of time. With a small group, the teacher could spend time 
with each child, however, with large numbers of students, some groups 
received little attention or were left out altogether. Teachers also 
frequently grumbled about the lack of time to get through a lesson.
A number of the schools visited had double shifts of classes. The 
teachers all taught both shifts, which meant an early start and an 11-hour 
day, with no time to prepare lessons and even less time to construct 
teaching aids. Sometimes, there were libraries where teachers could get 
extra information – although the books contained therein were often of 
limited value to a CCA curriculum. Only one school visited had useful 
materials for both students and teachers.
The teachers interviewed mentioned that in many schools where 
they had colleagues, the principal was unhappy with any change of 
teaching methodology. If the principal or the head monk of the cluster 
was not supportive, teachers would encounter difficulties. This was 
compounded by monks who felt that their environment should not be 
disturbed by noisy children all day long (a particular problem for the 
double shift schools with a 6 a.m. start). See Figure 3.5 for children 
leaving a monastic school after class. The fact that parents were hard to 
engage (mostly because of their living hand to mouth) also meant that 
it was more difficult to get them to understand and support what the 
children were doing at school.
Clusters and networks
Across Myanmar, the monastic schools often operate in a cluster, with 
networks assisting each other. Zobrist discusses how abbots and head 
nuns have a wide-reaching network through which they support 
one another and discuss education and school management topics 
(Zobrist, 2015).
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The creation of the Monastic education development 
Group (MedG)
The Monastic Education Development Group (MEDG) was established in 
2011 in order to improve the quality of monastic education. The group 
was initiated by the chairs of the state and regional MESC and was 
accredited by MoRA in 2014. It had 11 elected head monks and was 
led by the head monk of Phaung Daw Oo, U Nayaka (Ohnmar Tin and 
Stenning, 2015: 19). The MEDG office is based at the Phaung Daw 
Oo monastery. In some ways, MEDG followed from the Phaung Daw 
Oo’s ‘Centre for the Promotion of Monastic Education’ that U Nayaka 
created to coordinate CCA training across monastic schools over a decade 
ago. Its mandate is to support teacher training, systems development 
and improvement to the school environment. The group is meant to be 
both a national level coordination body and implementation provider.
More recently, teacher training has been one of the activities 
spread through the monastic networks. The cascading methodology of a 
number of training providers means that teachers at monastic schools 
get trained as trainers and subsequently train the teachers in their own 
school, and later the teachers in the affiliated schools. Teachers and head 
Figure 3.5 Monastic school in Mandalay, 2010. Source: Author.
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monks frequently cited Phaung Daw Oo as the source of information 
on training opportunities and often, the location of training courses.27 
In 2012, a learner-centered competency-based teacher training for 
the monastic system was developed with support from Pyoe Pin.28 
Now distributed through the Yaung Zin teacher development group, the 
Yaung Zin ‘Competency-Based Teacher Training Programme’ for primary 
teachers was designed for Myanmar non-state schools (primarily 
monastic and community schools). The programme aims to improve 
the development of teachers and students in the non-state education 
sector where many teachers are untrained or undertrained in their 
roles of teaching and facilitating learning. It consists of 8 modules that 
can be completed in 31 days, and teachers who complete the programme 
receive a certificate of completion.29 Interestingly, the Yaung Zin 
programme includes mentoring to ensure that newly trained teachers 
have proper support to implement what they have learned in the training 
back in their classrooms – something that was lacking in most of the 
other CCA training. The MEDG now accredits the Yaung Zin programme 
and offers it to new and untrained monastic teachers across the monastic 
networks. If the teachers are successfully assessed, they receive the 
Yaung Zin Certificate of Competence.30
Beyond supporting teacher training, the MEDG offers administra-
tive training. By 2015, they had trained about 600 staff in 300 schools 
(Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, 2015: 20). Between 2013 and 2015, the 
MEDG developed a ‘comprehensive school approach’ to develop capacity 
in leadership and management, teacher education, school environment 
(including a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene – ‘WASH’ – programme), and 
parent and community engagement in 100 model monastic schools in 
order to support the delivery of quality basic education.31
The role of donors: The Myanmar Education 
Consortium (MEC)
Monastic schools are mostly supported by their local communities. 
In some instances, there are foreign donors, either through small 
foundations or through occasional visits. Some international aid organi-
sations became involved in monastic education through the delivery 
of CCA training described above. As this engagement increased, and as 
the government wanted the education reforms to include hard-to-reach 
children and young people who are often unable to take part in 
mainstream schooling, donors decided to pool their funding. In 2012, in 
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order to streamline funding to the monastic and ethnic education sectors, 
the United Kingdom and the Australian Governments established the 
Myanmar Education Consortium (MEC). According to MEC’s advocacy 
strategy (MEC, 2015), it has the overall goal of increasing the number 
and proportion of children in Myanmar accessing and completing 
quality basic education: ‘In particular, MEC aims to increase the quality 
of and access to complementary (non-government) education including 
early childhood, primary and non-formal education programs.’ MEC 
also has a role advocating for the involvement of the Myanmar 
Government in supporting civil society engagement in education. 
Compared to the role of donors in other education sectors, monastic 
schools get rather less attention and money, despite educating over 
300,000 of Myanmar’s children.
The role of monastic schools in maintaining ethnic 
languages and culture
Monastic schools also have a role to play in the maintenance of ethnic 
languages and cultures, especially for the Buddhist ethnic nationalities 
such as the Mon, Karen (70 per cent of whom are Buddhist), Shan 
and Pa-O. Their role is largely one of supporting the communities 
through summer schools, and the degree to which monasteries and 
monastic schools are involved varies considerably from state to state. 
In some cases, the monks will be responsible for training the teachers; 
in other cases, they will simply offer the space for communities to 
organise the summer classes. They do not usually teach the regular 
government curriculum in an ethnic language – with a notable exception 
described below.
Taungalay Monastic school
Just outside of Karen State’s capital Hpa-An is the State’s largest monastic 
school, which offers schooling from KG to Grade 10. The Taungalay 
Monastic School provides accommodation for 150 boarders (who have 
travelled from as far away as Ye and Dawei), out of a total of more than 
500 students, nearly all of whom are Karen.32 As well as the main school, 
there are six associated satellite schools in nearby Karen villages, 
illustrating the far-reaching influence of the head monk. In an interview 
in 2016, he confirmed that he has good relations with the SEO and has 
received help from a number of NGOs and agencies, such as the Adventist 
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Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), the Karen Development Network, 
Thabyay Education Foundation33 and Yinthway Foundation.34
The school trains its own teachers, many of whom are their own 
graduates who have returned. To help the students matriculate, 
government school teachers volunteer to teach in Grade 10. Although 
the school follows the government curriculum, this is offered in Pwo 
Karen with some form of transfer to Burmese at post-primary level. They 
also cater for Karen children whose families live outside Karen State. 
In an interview in 2016, the head monk reiterated that this means that 
girls were especially safe whilst growing up. They accept transfers from 
the KNU and schools on the border.
The Taungalay Monastic School also provides Pwo language 
teaching after hours, and in the summer holidays. Taungalay is, therefore, 
an exception in that the regular government curriculum is available 
in an ethnic language. In Mon State, a few Mon national schools 
‘converted’ to monastic schools around 2009–10 when the existing 
ceasefire was under threat. However, in contrast to Taungalay, they were 
not run by the monastery, instead they used the monastery as a location 
to run a school that had until then been managed by the Mon National 
Education Committee (MNEC), the New Mon State Party’s (NMSP) 
education department. Many of these schools have now officially reverted 
back to MNEC control. This will be considered further in Chapter 7 of 
this volume.
summer language and culture programmes
In ethnic areas, especially Mon and Karen States as well as the Pa-O Self-
Administered Zone (SAZ) in Shan State, monastic schools are active in 
culture and language summer schools. The programmes differ from state to 
state and between ethnic groups, however, they usually emanate from col-
laboration between the ethnic Literature and Culture Committees (LCC) and 
the Sangha (monks), offering training programmes for volunteer teachers 
who then are able to teach children enrolled in Myanmar state schools 
(where Burmese is the language of instruction) in their mother tongue.
Mon monastic summer school and literacy programme
In the 1990s, and particularly after the 1995 NMSP ceasefire, monastic 
education initiatives expanded considerably. Before the ceasefire, Mon 
monks had for many years been conducting various forms of language 
and culture teaching, particularly in the school summer holidays (March–
May), but these activities were not systematically coordinated until after 
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the ceasefire. In 1997, Mon Literature and Culture Society members, 
including students and graduates of Mawlamyine University, in 
partnership with some progressive monks, began to organise Mon 
Summer Literacy and Buddhist Culture (MSLBC) training in a number 
of monasteries. By 2010, there were 310 monasteries across 16 townships 
(in Mon and Karen States, and Tanintharyi, Bago, Yangon and Mandalay 
regions) taking part.35 While the extent of MSLBC training activities 
has expanded as a direct result of the increased space created by the 
NMSP ceasefire, Mon armed groups were not directly involved in these 
initiatives. Although NMSP leaders have occasionally attended MSLBC 
closing ceremonies, and sometimes attempted to co-opt this movement 
into the Mon armed nationalist cause, the summer training remains 
largely independent. They are based in and ‘owned’ by the monastic 
and lay communities, and have been, therefore, less susceptible to 
suppression. This characteristic was illustrated by the fact that after 
foreign funding was withdrawn in 2010, the MSLBC training continued in 
nearly all of the monasteries in which it had previously been conducted. 
Township-level examinations also continued, where prizes were awarded 
for outstanding students. However, the withdrawal of external funding did 
undermine Mon educators’ ability to conduct all-Mon region examinations, 
or to provide incentives for outstanding students and teachers (Lall and 
South, 2013a and b).
Pa-O monastic summer school
The Pa-O monastic summer school has been in operation for over 
37 years. The length of course depends on the village, but usually varies 
between 10 and 15 days, although some villages offer month-long 
courses. Some courses are for adults and some for children. Monks give 
annual teacher training for five days every year and every village sends 
two people to be trained, who then go back and deliver the course. When 
the programme started, they had between 200 and 300 teachers, but 
now there are over 4,000 teachers teaching around 10,000 people 
every year. According to the Pa-O National Organisation (PNO), it is 
compulsory for all young people between the ages of 20 and 25 to 
attend. The teachers are offered certificates after the training. The 
PNO’s Parami Development Network, the Pa-O literature and culture 
organisation, and the Sangha work together to make sure the summer 
school takes place every year during Ta Baung (around March) either in 
private houses, village halls or monasteries.
Monastic-based language and literature programmes like the Pa-O 
and Mon summer schools are supported by the community. Volunteer 
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teachers in the Pa-O system only need support in kind during the 
one-week training phase, as they then return home and teach in their 
own villages. Head monks raise the necessary money for books and 
graduation ceremonies from well-wishers and local donors. This is 
similar for the Karen, Kachin, Mon and Chin teachers, although some 
programmes require the community to support the volunteer teachers 
whilst they are teaching, especially if they are not from that village.
Conclusion
Iris Young’s framework indicates that monastic schools are a key 
mechanism in Myanmar’s education system to combat marginalisation, 
and aim for the inclusion of the poorest in society. By ensuring that the 
monastic schools and teachers are supported through donations from 
society, monastic heads undermine the exploitative relationship of the 
tuitions system within the government education system to which poor 
parents are subject. Monastic schools contribute to supporting ethnic 
minorities as well, but (as shall be seen in Chapter 6 of this volume) only 
a small number are able to deal with the lasting disadvantages that 
come from the dominance of Burmese as the language of instruction. 
This is more so in ethnic areas such as Mon and Shan State, where 
monastic schools provide ‘summer schools’ that use the medium of ethnic 
nationality language, thus counteracting the ‘Bamar’ cultural imperialism 
promoted through the government schooling systems.
Phaung Daw Oo in particular has been a beacon for the various 
monastic networks in raising the profile of the work done by monastic 
schools. Well before the 2012 reforms, Phaung Daw Oo was able to 
improve teaching methods in the classroom despite the lack of resources 
that characterise the monastic education system. It was largely through 
the efforts of Phaung Daw Oo’s abbot, U Nayaka, that monastic schools 
formed networks enabling international donors to not only engage with 
Myanmar’s education system (when government schools were in effect 
closed to donors – apart from UNICEF), but also to support the cascade of 
more proficient teaching to many schools across the whole country. In a 
reverse of fortune, the poor children attending monastic schools often 
had access to better teaching pedagogy before better-off children in 
government schools.
The Myanmar Government in the meantime has recognised the 
importance of monastic schools in delivering education where the 
government system might be unable to reach. The relationship between 
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the government and the monastic sector is now based on recognition and 
respect, whilst monastic schools in turn reduce the powerlessness of the 
poorest sections of Myanmar society.
Notes
 1 The word for ‘school’ in Myanmar language is the word for ‘monastery’ (kyaung). 
 2 ‘Sangha’ is the term used to denote the community of Buddhist monks.
 3 The corresponding decay of the monasteries’ schools was described in at least one government 
report as a ‘national calamity’ (Report on the Public Instruction, 1954: 16, cited in Cheesman, 
2003: 55).
 4 This was a dramatic contrast to the Sangha’s historic role: ‘where under certain circumstances 
its power and resources could become so great as to overwhelm a kingdom completely, and 
lead to its demise’ (Aung-Thwin, 1985, cited in Cheesman, 2003: 57). 
 5 Interview: Yangon, 8 June 2010.
 6 There are three departments under Ministry of Religious Affairs: Department of Religious 
Affairs; Department of Promotion Propagation of Sasana; Department of International 
Theravada Buddhist Missionary University.
 7 Although the responsibilities for each entity is clearly defined, as is the relationship between 
the three bodies, Zobrist (2015) notes that head monks do find that communication 
between them is not always what it should be and that there is at times confusion about 
who is responsible for what.
 8 Apparently, the MoE declined the invitation to attend.
 9 The eight resolutions are as follows:
1. Quality assurance for monastic education. 
2. Implementation of integration of Myanmar educational activities and international 
practices. 
3. Find ways and means for sustainability of monastic education. 
4. Inclusion of environmental, moral and civic education in the curriculum. 
5. Making effort for establishment of monastic teacher education colleges and monastic 
education universities. 
6. Implement the 24 points of Chapter 9 of the Monastic Education Policy, which was agreed 
and adopted in this second monastic education seminar. 
7. Experience sharing among monastic schools. 
8. Making effort to upgrade monastic schools from primary level to middle school level to 
high school level.
10 This means that there could be well over double that amount in the non-registered 
but affiliated monastic schools, and even more children when border areas are taken into 
account.
11 Ohnmar Tin and Stenning note that many monasteries have already established small IGAs 
such as water purification and brick making (Ohnmar Tin and Stenning, 2015: 23). Shine 
Hope, one of the corporate donors, originally gave money to subsidise salaries. Recognising 
that they were creating dependencies and in light of the recent government salary subsidies, 
the profits donated are now used to conduct sewing training and provide technical support to 
introduce a micro credit system. At the 2nd Monastic Education Conference (May 2015), there 
was a workshop specifically to discuss ideas on how to sustain monastic schools. Part of the 
impetus for this workshop came from a Mandalay-based businessman who wants to support a 
nationwide monastic school social enterprise. The premise is that working as a collective they 
would have better market access for their product. 
12 Phaung Daw Oo, described later in this chapter, is one of the two permitted high schools.
13 Theoretically, the certificates should be recognised by all government schools. There are, 
however, reports that as the endorsement is at the discretion of the TEO, it can depend on the 
relationship between the head monk and the TEO. In some middle schools, they also ask the 
students to sit a placement test before confirming their place. There is no recognised transfer 
certificate for middle and high school so any student continuing to monastic middle school 
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can only continue their education in the monastic system. If a monk or nun wants to complete 
middle and high school in a government school they have to re-enter lay life (Ohnmar Tin and 
Stenning, 2015: 24).
14 Interviews by the author with monastic heads. Zobrist also discusses HIV status students in 
monastic schools (Zobrist, 2015).
15 Interview with an abbot who had many children of Indian origin in his school in 2016.
16 Interviews with monastic heads in 2011 and 2016.
17 ‘Thadama Zawtikar Yone, with a near 50 per cent drop-out rate, has a young head monk in his 
early thirties who has received 2 months training in Chang Mai on the RWCT (Reading, 
Writing and Critical Thinking) course run for Burmese teachers by “Education Burma”. 
This situation of a young monk who has received educational training abroad is very rare 
within the monastic community. During our interview, we learnt how keen he is to experiment 
with more practical teaching approaches, often applying the “observation method” (one of 
the 21 methods of the CCA, which requires outdoor activities). The monastic school also 
possesses a newly constructed library (also unusual within the monastic community).’ 
From: Peace Interfaith Initiative Myanmar, 2009. 
18 Training of Teachers (TOT).
19 Myanmar had only 11 years of schooling at the time of the fieldwork.
20 The differential teaching system (fast track versus normal) creates difficulties between 
students as those in ‘normal’ classrooms would have wanted to have the same number of 
hours of teaching in the preferential circumstances of their peers. In that school, the normal 
sections of primary and middle schools receive 3.5 and 4 hours’ instruction in Myanmar in 
classes of around 100 students each. The fast track sections receive 5 hours in English with a 
max of 30 students in each classroom.
21 This was also before the expansion of the private schools in Mandalay – so some parents might 
have now chosen the private school option where teaching and learning is also in English.
22 See preceding chapters of this volume for more on the issues of rote learning and exams.
23 Hantha trainers developed in 2005 with the help of a former state school teacher who 
started to facilitate former government teachers becoming ‘teacher trainers’. They are using 
a cascading cluster system and are active across monastic networks. The centrepiece of their 
model is that they train teachers in the classroom. They have developed their own training 
manual in Burmese and also showcase a number of teaching aids for teachers that are made 
out of local and recycled materials and are easy to copy and reproduce. Shalom (Nyein 
Foundation) has specialised in training teachers in the ethnic minority areas since 2005. They 
have worked with Yangon-based consultant Dr Thein Lwin to train their master trainers who 
have cascaded the model to 60 other teacher trainers. Yinthway started teacher training in 
2008 and has come to CCA through their programme on early childhood development and 
early childhood books. They developed a relationship with UNICEF and then developed three 
model schools in Yangon, Lashio and Mandalay. They have been funded by INGOs and work 
with local partners on the ground that include Christian organisations in ethnic minority areas 
and monastic schools. APEF was built up after Cyclone Nargis (2008) and based its method on 
the training offered previously by UNICEF. The programme is linked with Phaung Da Oo 
monastery, which has established the Centre for the Promotion of Monastic Education (CPME) 
that has in-house trainers who help train teachers across the wider network linked with this 
monastery. In 2008, 150 teachers were trained to become independent trainers and 50 of 
these were taken over by Yinthway as facilitators for their own programme. APEF also 
recruited some of these trainers and APEF’s teacher training programme began in earnest in 
March 2009. They now have 12 master trainers who work in different areas of the country and 
train teachers across monastic networks in the Delta and Yangon division. They have also 
developed their own training manual in Burmese. Save the Children came in with teacher 
training after Cyclone Nargis and brought with them a methodology designed for areas in 
conflict and crisis. 
24 The diagram was constructed on the basis of the interviews conducted with the training 
providers (Lall, 2011). It refers to CCA training only. The MoE manages its own teacher 
training in its teaching colleges. However, it relied on UNICEF and JICA to provide CCA 
training for the government teachers.
25 The author was given access to a few full training manuals and overall some form of materials 
related to teacher or trainer training by five organisations.
26 Reproduced from Lall (Lall, 2011: 227). 
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27 This is, however, only the case when the head monk or principal of the school is willing to 
propagate the new teaching method. In a number of monasteries there is resistance to new 
teaching methods as hierarchies change and the children become noisier. Even a head monk 
with ‘a vision’ can find battling the traditional monastic community difficult at times.
28 The course was developed on the back of the needs assessment and report on CCA in monastic 
schools conducted and written by the author. Pyoe Pin was a British Council programme that 
later registered as a local NGO. 
29 According to the MEDG website, training may be undertaken in two lots of four modules 
or teachers may do all eight modules in one programme. The modules which comprise this 
teacher training programme are as follows:
• Learning needs and learning styles
• Teaching and learning strategies
• Classroom management
• Teaching and learning aids
• Assessment
• Lesson planning
• Professional development and the reflective practitioner
• Working with parents and the community.
30 This assessment usually takes place about four or five months after completion of the 
teacher training. Success in this assessment indicates they are able to apply their Yaung Zin 
learning effectively in their classroom (MEDG website: https://www.medg.org/about-us/our- 
approach).
31 MEDG website: https://www.medg.org/about-us/our-approach.
32 Students were reported as 90 per cent Pwo, 5 per cent Sgaw and 5 per cent non-Karen.
33 Thabyay’s programmes are designed to support students and key community and civil society 
workers: ‘We help them to acquire the skills, knowledge, networks and assistance to foster self-
directed, sustainable development in their communities and the wider society.’ http://www.
thabyay.org/.
34 ‘Yinthway is a local NGO whose goal is to promote and support the holistic development of 
children in communities in Myanmar.’ http://www.yinthway.org.
35 Data from Mon education CBOs interview with Nai Soe Than in Moulmein in 2011.
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4
Higher education: Towards 
international standards in 
a neo-liberal world
Introduction
The quality of higher education (HE) has deteriorated sharply in Myanmar 
since independence when Rangoon University was seen as a leading 
HEI in the region. Today, HE is seen as a key part of the education reform 
process as well as a driver for future change with regard to employment 
and Myanmar’s desire to catch up with the ASEAN region. HE can have 
a catalytic role in recovery and development of conflict-affected societies 
(Milton and Barakat, 2016), as seen in post-Soviet countries (Fullan, 
2001) and in periods following regime change (Couch, 2019; Esson and 
Wang, 2018). However, evidence demonstrates that reform strategies 
need to account for economic growth, human rights and national identity 
to support national development (Couch, 2019). Therefore, a balance 
needs to be struck between engaging with international organisations to 
link with global scholarship (Altbach, 2009) whilst accounting for local 
contexts and conditions (Naidoo, 2007).
This chapter reviews how the reforms have impacted Myanmar’s 
universities across the country, starting with a snapshot of Yangon and 
Mandalay Universities in 2005 and 2006, when the author was teaching 
there during the summer months. The chapter then moves to the main 
HE reform agenda including the development of the National Institute of 
Higher Education Development (NIHED)1 that has started training senior 
academic staff across the HE sector, as well as other new HE-related 
structures that have been put in place by the NESP. The chapter engages 
with the vexed issue of decentralisation, including the rotation of staff 
appointments, the changing role of research and how universities are 
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starting to engage with issues of access, quality and designing their own 
curricula. At the time of writing, HE, though almost free and despite 
there being over 150 institutions across Myanmar, is only accessible to a 
small number of mostly middle class students, with the poorer students 
enrolling in one of the world’s largest, but possibly also worst, distance 
HE systems.2 The chapter discusses the inequalities, particularly the 
issues of limited access of ethnic minority young people due to a severe 
language disadvantage3 that emanates from their lack of access to 
basic education. Unless engaged with, this is likely to lead to long-term 
structural inequity problems. As observed by the ADB in an analysis of 
the financing of HE in Asia: ‘Any higher education system that fails to 
cultivate the breadth of talent in society – men and women, rural and 
urban, rich and poor – is sacrificing both quality and efficiency’ (ADB, 
2016). The risks of ignoring inclusive growth could lead to a long-term 
stalling of the reforms, lower growth and rising inequalities that could 
result in socio-economic tensions, including armed conflict. However, 
Myanmar’s HE reform is driven first and foremost by the desire of policy 
makers to regain international respect for the Myanmar universities, 
which means that issues of inclusive growth and inequalities are seen 
as less important than creating an elite system with the support of 
international universities and a new drive for top universities to look for 
partnerships as part of their internationalisation process.
Background
Modern HE came to Myanmar through British colonialism. Rangoon 
College was opened as an affiliated college of the University of Calcutta 
in 1878. It became ‘University College’ in 1920 shortly before being 
amalgamated with the Baptist Judson College to form Rangoon University. 
Mandalay University was added in 1925. Further teacher training, medical 
and agricultural colleges were added to Rangoon University between 
1930 and 1938, although during World War II, the university was shut 
down. A year after independence, in 1949, the Burmese Government 
re-opened Rangoon university by bringing together relatively autonomous 
colleges and making them into university faculties. Mandalay University 
was established as a separate university in 1959, and both Yangon and 
Mandalay Universities were placed directly under state control in 1963 
soon after the Ne Win military coup. A year later, the technical faculties 
of education, engineering, economics and medicine were removed from 
both Yangon4 and Mandalay Universities, given degree-awarding powers 
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as separate technical and professional institutions, leaving both universi-
ties with the liberal arts, science and law. In effect, the amalgamation of 
previous years was reversed, creating a larger number of smaller, specialist 
universities, akin to the system India was also developing. The 1973 
University Education Law consolidated the new division between arts and 
science universities and technical institutes (CESR, 2013: 4). The same 
University Education Law explicitly deprived HEIs of financial autonomy. 
As with other state institutions, universities had their budget estimates 
approved by the state and had to ensure that all expenditures were 
consistent with state-approved norms (CESR, 2013: 7). In 1982, English 
was re-introduced as the official medium of instruction.5
1988 and the student protests
Student protests in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the closure of 
universities for extended periods. In Yangon, universities were closed 
for 10 of the 12 years from 1988 to 2000. In light of the protests, the 
government decided to relocate much of the country’s undergraduate 
provision outside of the urban centres, making it harder for students to 
engage in politics and protest. A number of these institutions were new 
HEIs registered with other ministries. Mandalay and Yangon Universities 
lost their undergraduate programmes (CESR, 2013: 5).6 Needless to say, 
universities that had been isolated from the rest of the world throughout 
the ‘Burmese way to Socialism’ years became even more isolated after 
the protests. Myanmar academics had very little opportunity to go abroad 
and foreigners were not allowed on any of the campuses. Only a few 
academics received scholarships to complete doctorates, mainly in Japan, 
returning to teach in the Myanmar system upon return. Without access to 
international research, new books, journals and the internet, Myanmar’s 
HEIs simply became a form of schooling that used set textbooks and rote 
learning without any research input or innovation. Laboratories were 
under-resourced, libraries stocked materials that were obsolete and out 
of date and teaching spaces were old and dusty. The universities therefore 
deteriorated rapidly.
The universities in 2004, 2005 and 2006
In the early 2000s, there were hardly any academic links between 
Myanmar universities and international HEIs or foreign academics, 
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especially from the West. Limited contact continued through doctoral 
scholarships with Japanese HEIs. All contact between university staff and 
foreigners was tightly controlled. Myanmar academics needed approval 
from the MoE for any travel abroad and permission to invite any foreigners 
onto their campus. The only programme to support Myanmar academics 
in the social sciences was set up by Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, a Myanmar 
academic who had completed his PhD at Cornell University in the US, 
and was at the time based at the National University of Singapore. 
With financial support from the German political foundation Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), whose regional headquarters were in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, he developed a programme to enable foreign 
(including Western) academics to come and teach intensive courses to 
Myanmar junior academics at Yangon University. After lobbying helpful 
regime contacts, Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Professor Robert Taylor, a 
long-time Myanmar specialist, managed to get permission from the 
government for foreign academics to teach at Myanmar universities. The 
programme ran for the first time in the summer of 2004 with academics 
mainly based at National University of Singapore, a few of whom were 
American citizens. In the summer of 2005, the programme was again 
conducted, and this time included an academic from the University of 
London7 and one from the Hiroshima Peace Institute in Japan, with the 
team being allowed to teach not only in Yangon University, but also in 
Mandalay University. These academics between them offered ‘updates’ 
in anthropology, international relations, political economy, history and 
research methods, and despite being recorded, they could say anything 
and teach what they wanted. Money from KAS was used to purchase 
suitcases full of books to bring into the country, and these were then 
left for the university libraries. Most of these books would have been 
photocopied and passed on amongst academics, as it was impossible 
at that time to purchase books from the outside (Lall, 2016a). The 
programme ran again in 2006, although only in Yangon and only for 
Yangon University academics, with an even wider variety of subjects 
and international staff, one of whom had travelled from the US. In the 
summer of 2007, the teaching programme ran into some trouble as the 
permission to teach at the university was withdrawn at the very last 
minute, after the academics had arrived in Myanmar.8 The experience 
was eye opening to those who had come from outside Myanmar, in that 
many of the young university teachers were completing their PhDs with 
little or no access to contemporary or up-to-date materials in their 
subjects. Staying in touch post-programme was also challenging, as their 
email communications were monitored. The experience was eye opening 
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for the Myanmar colleagues too, as they heard about the transformation 
of the universities in the West, the competition for research funding, the 
pressure to publish, etc., none of which they were familiar with.
Higher education today
At the time of writing, there are 174 HEIs in Myanmar (MoE, 2016) 
under the jurisdiction of eight different ministries and these fall into 
two broad categories: arts and science universities and the technical and 
professional universities. In 2012, there were only eight universities 
permitted to award doctorates.9 At the time of writing, all the HEIs are 
state-financed and accept students after matriculation, depending on 
their grades. The HE GER is low, at 15.96 per cent (UNESCO, 2019a). In 
2018, arts and science universities had 266,833 registered students, tech-
nological universities had 75,455 registered students and the recently 
added teacher education colleges (dealt with in Chapter 5) had 20,069 
registered students bringing the grand total to 362,357 students (MoE, 
2019c). Those who cannot afford to live away from home access the very 
poor quality distance education programme that serves around 500,000 
students. The total number of students enrolled increased by 14.5 per 
cent from 2016–7 to 2017–8 (MoE, 2019c: Fig 2.6.2, 52) and the total 
number of foreign students in the country was 425 in 2017–8, alongside 
176 foreign experts (MoE, 2019c: Fig. 2.6.5 and 2.6.6, 54) with 62 per 
cent of those from China (MoE, 2019c: Fig. 2.6.10). There are 13,610 
teachers in HE (MoE, 2019c: 147–8). According to the CESR, 82.6 per 
cent of academic staff and 60 per cent of students in 2012 were female 
(CESR, 2013).
To date, Myanmar’s universities have operated quite differently 
from most other HE systems in the world. Everything is very centralised 
and the universities have hardly any autonomy.10 The curriculum and 
the assessment are set by the MoE. The hiring of staff is also coordinated 
by the government and most staff are rotated every two to four years to 
universities around the country, making the setting up of research teams 
almost impossible. The centralised ‘command and control’ system has 
resulted in strict hierarchies with many senior academics worried about 
taking decisions that might be counter to the ministry’s wishes. Although 
the elite universities have been promised limited autonomy from the 
education reform process – such as being able to hire local staff and 
choose their students – the fact that the government controls the budget 
means that the reality of university governance is severely limited. There 
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are large differences between regional universities in remote areas, 
especially in ethnic states, and urban institutions. For example, universi-
ties in ethnic states will often have some local staff, who will not 
necessarily be rotated as part of the national system.
University-led research in Myanmar
There has been no systematic research culture at Myanmar universities 
for a number of decades. It is true that even today after almost eight years 
of education reform, academics at Myanmar universities are not research 
active in the same sense that Western universities would understand 
the term. There are multiple reasons for this – not least the job rotations 
every few years where academics are assigned to a new university 
anywhere in the country. This makes developing a personal research 
portfolio challenging and it is almost impossible to develop a stable 
research team. In addition to this, the process of getting permission to 
undertake research is complex and as with everything else in Myanmar, 
is a top-down process with little input from the bottom. There is no 
incentive for academics to add to what is already a very full workload 
of teaching and administration. Research is not only inadequately 
supported, but does not count formally in the promotion structure 
(CESR, 2013: 32). This, however, does not mean that research is not 
taking place at universities. Senior staff of 11 universities from around 
the country11 took part in a one-year HE leadership and management 
programme, entitled ‘Transforming Higher Education in Myanmar’, set 
up in partnership with the MoE in Myanmar, the Irrawaddy Policy 
Exchange (IPE) and the BC and run by the UCL Institute of Education in 
2018 (Figure 4.1).12 As part of the programme they were asked to 
present one research project of their institution that either had been 
published or was going to be published. The results were surprising in 
the diversity and depth of what was presented. Some research was part 
of newly established international collaborations, other research was 
led by individual academics, other research again focused on improving 
the teaching and learning experience of their students. The research 
projects were later presented at Myanmar’s first HE conference attended by 
Dr Myo Thein Gyi, the Union Minister for Education (Figure 4.2). Linking 
research to community benefit and teaching is new and still in the very 
early stages, however it is clear that given the space, academics will want 
to undertake research. According to the CESR, centres of research 
excellence were just beginning, but these were: ‘still not well benchmarked 
Figure 4.1 Transforming Higher Education Programme, senior 
management from 11 universities, 2018. Source: Author.
Figure 4.2 First National Higher Education Conference with Minister 
of Education, 2018. Source: Author.
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against international standards, and funding arrangements for them are 
unclear’ (CESR, 2013: 32). This development means that it is likely that 
elite universities will start to develop a more sustained research culture, 
most likely with the help of some of the internationalisation processes 
and links with international universities (further discussed below).
Teaching and learning challenges
Higher education curricula and subject syllabuses are out-dated because 
teaching is not linked to research, and because Myanmar HEIs have not 
had access to international content, models and standards for a number 
of decades. The ministry has traditionally set what is taught, including 
choosing textbooks. Students are expected to learn content by heart and 
demonstrate their ‘knowledge’ of the subject in an exam. The teaching 
methodology, which resembles the rote learning or ordinary school 
classrooms, is part of the problem. This means that students are not 
expected to use what they have learnt to solve problems or demonstrate 
independent critical thinking skills. The CESR Phase 1 Report on Higher 
Education (CESR, 2013) pointed out that no feedback on either the 
curriculum or teaching and learning experience is collected from 
students, and that employers and industry have no opportunity to 
contribute to curriculum development, making graduates woefully 
inadequate for the labour market.
To start to address this, the BC funded a short programme to help 
improve HE teaching methodology. It was offered both in Yangon and 
Mandalay Universities in 2017 and the report on the programme 
concluded that: ‘The workshops proved without doubt that there is an 
appetite for changing professional practice in HE and that once new 
practices have been modelled with participants they are adopted enthu-
siastically’ (Wright and Stoakes, 2017: 5–7). It was reported that the staff 
who took part were interested in receiving more staff development so 
that their practice would be closer to what is practiced internationally. 
The report also explained that part of the problem was that university 
teachers had had no pedagogical training, and whilst they knew their 
subject, they were used to teaching from the textbook. The experience is 
similar even at very senior levels. Many of the university staff such as 
rectors, pro-rectors and heads of department who took part in the 
‘Transforming Higher Education in Myanmar’ training mentioned above, 
also expressed a great desire for more autonomy in the classroom, on 
what to teach and how to teach it – especially those from the elite 
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universities who now have increased access to resources. Things are even 
more difficult in universities in remote parts of the country where there is 
little internet access and where books and materials are still out-dated. 
However, two (both located in ethnic states) of the 11 participating uni-
versities undertook a project on student experience and changing 
teaching methods as an experiment to see how this would affect students. 
The feedback they received showed that the more interesting classes 
resulted in reduced student absenteeism. This was also reflected in the 
earlier BC study that focused on teaching methods, where HEI teaching 
staff had come to the conclusion that in many cases the reasons for 
absenteeism was the lack of motivating classes, often due to the textbooks 
but also the lack of teaching skills and the failure to constructively align 
the teaching, learning and assessment: ‘If the mode of assessment is 
usually an end of year/semester exam which asks students to memorise 
knowledge from the textbook, there is little reason to attend the classes’ 
(Wright and Stoakes, 2017: 23).
The NESP does put the issue of quality at the heart of HE reform, 
linking its problems to the centralised model of governance, the 
inadequate infrastructure and the lack of staff training in ‘experiment-
focused’ methodologies. However, the NESP also explains that: ‘University 
education is criticised for too much emphasis on a rote-learning 
culture and not providing students with knowledge and skills relevant 
to Myanmar’s societal and employment needs’ (MoE, 2016: 55). This 
means that teaching methods need to improve and university staff need 
support at different levels. For example, class sizes, access to the internet, 
up-to-date materials and the assessment system are all barriers to 
improving the teaching and learning experience at Myanmar universities. 
A key part of the problem also relates to the language of instruction 
being English, when so many Myanmar students leave school without a 
decent grasp of the language, and while so many university teachers also 
lack fluency.
A report on the workshop on the issue of English as the university 
language of instruction, organised by the British Academy and École 
Française d’Extrême-Orient, notes that national law allows individual 
universities and departments to choose their preferred language of 
instruction, either English or Burmese or some combination of the two, 
but that in practice Myanmar universities have adopted a policy whereby 
English is used as the sole medium of instruction with explanations 
of terminology or concepts in Burmese if necessary (British Academy 
and École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 2015). The policy emanates from 
the perception that English is important for the students to master and 
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that any quality international HE system needs to be conducted in 
English. In 1962, the Ne Win Government had overseen a ‘nativisation’ of 
university materials, many of which were translated into Burmese in 
order to remove what was perceived as the ‘colonial legacy’ of the British 
from Myanmar’s education system.13 However, this period is also 
associated with poverty and economic decline, and consequently, 
Burmese language is associated ‘with economic failure and insularity’ 
and people ‘think of the Burmese language as somehow not sufficient’ 
(British Academy and École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 2015: 6). 
Consequently, in 1985, English textbooks were reintroduced into the 
universities and by 1990 the use of English at universities had become 
the norm. In light of this, it is interesting to note that before the 2015 
election, the NLD suggested that the: ‘Medium of instruction shall be 
decided independently by each university (for example, English, 
Burmese, etc.)’ (Mackenzie, 2013: 16).14
In practice, however, it is clear that many of the academic staff 
tasked to teach in English have not mastered the language well enough 
and that students do not understand sufficient English to follow classes 
either. This became apparent when, at the BC–IPE-funded programme 
of ‘Transforming Higher Education in Myanmar’, a translator was 
required to summarise all English lectures by the visiting international 
staff to make sure that all senior academics were able to follow the 
proceedings. There is also a discrepancy between staff in Yangon and 
Mandalay Universities and staff in universities across the country. 
Therefore, the adoption of English as the language of instruction is 
highly problematic and makes university education even less accessible 
to ordinary Myanmar citizens, especially those of ethnic backgrounds 
whose mother tongue is not Burmese and who have struggled to 
understand their Burmese-speaking teacher at school. This language dis-
advantage, discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this volume, remains one of 
the biggest barriers for ethnic students to access HE.
Higher education in reform
Higher education reforms began in 2012 just like the reforms of the 
other education sectors under the CESR. However, the first indication of 
the changes that were to come was during Vice President Dr Sai Mauk 
Kham’s visit to Mandalay University in July 2011 (New Light of Myanmar, 
2011). His address included the message that an educated society was 
needed to: ‘lead the establishment of a modern and developed nation’ 
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and that whilst the government had spent a lot of money on establishing 
HEIs and there were more and more graduates, the quality of the 
graduates was ‘lower gradually’ and ‘the qualification of faculty members 
is also declining’. This was the first time such a senior member of the 
Myanmar Government admitted that Myanmar’s HE system had quality 
issues. Dr Sai Mauk Kham, himself an ethnic Shan, also referred to 
inclusive and equitable HE (New Light of Myanmar, 2011: 16): ‘University 
is a garden where students like colorful flowers blossom. Faculty members 
are like gardeners. Only when over 100 species of flowers blossom, will it 
be a beautiful garden.’
These concerns were reflected in the CESR reports, but were largely 
absent from the new law. A key part of the reforms was the drafting of 
the National Education Law in 2014 that defined the key issues facing 
HE in Myanmar as: university autonomy, the right to form unions and the 
right of universities to formulate their own curriculum (Kamibeppu and 
Chao, 2017). The National Education Law (2014, amended 2015) was 
not without controversy; as mentioned in Chapter 2, student protests 
occurred in the streets of Yangon and other cities in Myanmar. As 
discussed earlier in this volume, student protests have been part of 
Myanmar’s political scene since independence, but tight controls meant 
that hardly any protests took place between 1990 and 2014.15 Rose 
Metro argues that student protests are linked to the country’s history as 
students have protested for decades not only on education issues, but 
also on social and economic issues (Metro, 2017). After the new National 
Education Law was made public, the students organised themselves 
under the banner of the ‘Action Committee for Democratic Education’ 
(ACDE) and went back onto the streets (The Irrawaddy, 2015).16 Some of 
their 11 demands17 were framed in terms of equity and social justice. 
This included the demand about equality for students with disabilities 
and the inclusion of ethnic languages in HE so that ethnic students 
could more easily take part. Other demands focused more on issues of 
governance and autonomy, in particular, the freedom to establish student 
and teacher unions, as well as the inclusion of teachers and students in 
HE policy making. Metro argues that the National Education Law makes 
it clear that the three governments – the SPDC (1988–2010), the Thein 
Sein USDP-led government (2011–5) and the NLD-led government 
(2015–onwards) – have very similar conceptions of ‘democratic education’ 
and want to centralise control of HE and HEIs (Metro, 2017: 211). She 
argues that the autonomy promised to universities by the National 
Education Law is largely symbolic, as the NEPC will retain control over 
the curriculum. ‘… the law functions like an elaborate shell game, in 
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which autonomy is promised to regional and local authorities, but actual 
decision-making power remains in the hands of the central government’ 
(Metro, 2017: 213). Students felt this way as well, and the initial student 
protests began in May 2014. These were followed by a 4-day march in 
November 2014 and a 60-day ultimatum to the government to organise a 
quadripartite meeting that was to include the student leaders, the NNER, 
members of parliament and the government. The Minister of Education, 
Dr Mya Aye, urged the students to meet with EPIC. When the students’ 
ultimatum expired, protesting students from around the country went 
on a 404-mile march. The first quadripartite meeting took place in 
February 2015. At the start of that meeting, the NLD issued a statement 
that the leader of the NNER, Dr Thein Lwin, who had until then been an 
NLD central committee member, did not represent the party, disowning 
him and the NNER movement completely. This came as a shock to 
students who could not understand why the NLD would not support 
them at such a crucial time. It also showed that the NLD would side with 
the government rather than the protesting students when it came to 
governance, centralisation and control issues. The quadripartite negotia-
tions did not reach a satisfactory conclusion and student protests 
continued. In March 2015, the government used force, cracking down on 
the students, beating them with batons in the streets and arresting 
them.18 Ultimately, the contentious National Education Law was revised 
in 2015, but there were only minor concessions from the government and 
it remained largely as it had been originally drafted.
The National League for Democracy’s (NLD) higher 
education reform project
Education has remained a key priority of the NLD Government. Former 
Rector of West Yangon University, Dr Myo Thein Gyi, a hardliner during 
the 2014 student protests,19 was appointed Minister of Education by Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi.20 Since 2016, he has headed the education reform 
process focused on delivering the priorities as defined by the NESP.
Three strategies for HE reform are identified in the NESP (MoE, 
2016), based on the National Education Law and the CESR. These are: 
‘to strengthen higher education governance and management capacity; 
to improve the quality and relevance of higher education; and to expand 
equitable access to higher education’. The NESP expects universities to 
gradually become more autonomous. Whilst devolution offers universities 
the opportunity to take control, the biggest hurdle remains the centralised 
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budget that does not allow individual institutions to make their own 
decisions. Universities will, therefore, face challenges to develop their 
own research agenda. Curricula that have traditionally been passed 
down from the MoE to teach subjects will have to be revised, and courses 
supplemented with new and relevant material for which individual 
universities and not the MoE will be responsible, without much in the 
way of resources for making such changes. For the first time, universities 
will have to engage with issues such as ethics, student engagement, 
international engagement and at high-level meetings new ways of 
funding are being discussed which could mean significant changes for 
the way universities operate.21 The first steps in this direction have been 
taken with Yangon and Mandalay Universities being allowed to select 
their students, and it is expected that as a next step they will be allowed 
to hire some of their own staff,22 with this being a test case for granting 
autonomy.
The NLD’s focus has been on the historical flagship of Yangon 
University, with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi pushing to restore it to its former 
‘glory’ as one of Asia’s leading universities. She personally asked both 
Britain and Australia to support Yangon University’s development. In 
fact, Yangon University was expected to become the first autonomous 
arts and science university, although interviews at the MoE in September 
2019 showed that the MoE planned to have 14 universities reach autonomy 
across two clusters – Yangon and Mandalay – by the end of 2020.23 In his 
early assessment of Myanmar’s HE system and the potential for reforms, 
Professor Kenneth King had noted that academic freedom was key to 
some, but less so to others whose priorities were more around a more 
balanced teaching schedule:
Academic autonomy meant different things to different people. 
Academics were in fact civil servants and many were not in fact 
anxious to change this status. For others, academic freedom meant 
a change to the situation in which they had almost no free time. 
For staff in regular arts and science universities there were major 
demands on their time from the several cycles of assessment, and 
intensive 10-day preparation, related to the requirements of the 
distance university students. This was compulsory for them, so 
their concern was not so much academic freedom, but they had 
almost no free time at all during the year. (Mackenzie, 2013:16)
Before coming to power the NLD had promised: ‘educational freedom in 
order to increase opportunities for learning, raise the secondary school 
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completion rates and the quality of education’ (Thein Lwin, cited in 
Mackenzie, 2013:16). The recommendations go on to promise: ‘There 
shall be academic freedom in research and freedom to publish the 
findings. Universities shall have the freedom to engage with different uni-
versities and institutions around the world for educational purposes’ 
(Thein Lwin, cited in Mackenzie, 2013:16). The BC report points out 
that: ‘the same “Recommendations” suggest that although different 
university departments should write their own curriculum, they also say 
that the university’s council should compile a draft curriculum, and then 
send it up to the Universities Central Council for approval’ (Mackenzie, 
2013:16), so it is unclear how much autonomy and academic freedom 
will actually be given.
Yangon University’s test case shows how the top-down nature of 
education reforms is likely to impact universities in a rather more 
cosmetic than substantive way. Drawing on Arnhold et al.’s educational 
reconstruction conceptual framework (Arnhold et al., 1998), Esson 
and Wang analysed the reform process of Yangon University in 2013 
and argued that efforts have failed to consider the ideological and 
psychological reconstruction of the university within the reform process 
(Esson and Wang, 2018). Esson and Wang describe how, in November 
2012, a special parliamentary committee personally chaired by Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi was formed to oversee the reform of Yangon University. 
Once Yangon University was designated as a ‘Centre of Excellence’ and 
given priority to upgrade its facilities to international standards, the 
physical reconstruction began with (in 2012–3) a budget of MMK 6446.6 
million (approximately USD 7.2 million) – just in time for President 
Obama’s visit. Government funds were supplemented by a donation of 
MMK 500 million (approximately USD 555,000) made by Yangon 
University alumni. According to Esson and Wang, the money was spent 
mostly on cosmetic changes such as painting and decorating while the 
staff and students would have prioritised upgrading basic facilities such 
as water and electricity supplies (Esson and Wang, 2018: 1184–90).24 
Esson and Wang go on to describe how a library officer complained that 
despite the reforms: ‘both of the main libraries still do not have a 
computerised search facility, and people still have to use manual card-
catalogues for book searches’ (Esson and Wang, 2018: 1190). In keeping 
with the traditional top-down way of implementing change, policies have 
been implemented with little or no consultation with staff and/or 
students (Esson and Wang, 2018: 1192). The article does describe other 
positive changes that have emerged as part of Yangon University’s change 
in status – one being that staff are now allowed to engage internationally 
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and enter into international collaborations, principally with the aim to 
facilitate staff capacity building. More on this is detailed below.
Myanmar’s new higher education institutions
The NESP requires new HE coordinating bodies to be established to 
underpin the change process in HE. This includes the NEPC in 2019, 
NIHED and the Rectors’ Committee (established in 2018). The NEPC is 
the overarching body, independent from the MoE, and focused on the 
formulation and implementation of the reform of education policy. It was 
designed to have an executive role in advising and coordinating HE policy 
and legislation in the form of Myanmar’s 30-year Long-term Education 
Development Plan as well as coordinating with development partners 
(Channon, 2017). At the time of writing, the NEPC comprises three 
committees: the National Curriculum Committee, the National Accreditation 
and Quality Assurance Committee (NAQAC), and a Rectors’ Committee, as 
well as an affiliated National Institute for Higher Education Development.
The Rectors’ Committee was established in March 2018 with 
representatives from 173 of Myanmar’s public universities. It is a 
coordination, collaboration and negotiation body that is supporting uni-
versities with reform, and is meant to guide the process leading to 
autonomy, starting with limited decentralisation. It is expected to become 
the collective national HE governance body representing and taking 
collective responsibility for a system of autonomous universities.
NAQAC is responsible for quality policies for the entire education 
sector. Currently, NAQAC is focusing on developing standards and 
guidelines for accreditation and quality assurance for Myanmar’s HEIs, 
based on the relevant ASEAN instruments. At the time of writing, it is 
unclear how institutions will relate their own governance and quality 
structures to NAQAC.
NIHED was established: ‘to improve higher education governance 
and management’ and ‘build individual skills and strengthen institu-
tional capabilities’. Its mandate included supporting policy makers 
through research and supporting HEI senior staff through training so 
as to sustain the reform process. The BC–IPE-funded programme of 
‘Transforming Higher Education in Myanmar’ was tasked with training 
the senior trainers of NIHED and co-constructing part of a leadership and 
management curriculum with them.
These new administrative structures are meant to support the HE 
reform process and move universities towards more autonomy, yet in 
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many ways they maintain traditional hierarchies. Structural change is 
also not sufficient in achieving what is a monumental shift. The sectoral 
needs assessment undertaken by the Leadership Foundation (UK) in 
2016–7 suggested that senior HE staff needed training at three levels – 
system, institutional and personal. This included training in funding, 
quality assurance, institutional accountability, information management, 
planning and reporting, governance frameworks, leadership behaviours, 
institutional strategy development and how quality systems can be set up 
to improve research, teaching and assessment. It also included practical 
management skills such as leading and managing change, motivational 
skills, stakeholder management (including with potential international 
university partners), analysis and critical thinking and effective decision 
making. The main challenge for the university staff is how to work in an 
increasingly autonomous system, rather than take orders from above. 
At the moment, it looks like the NEPC may simply replace the MoE in the 
top-down role it has played, unless the academic staff receive relevant 
training to change ways of working across the system. To remedy this, the 
Leadership Foundation suggested that development for rectors and pro 
rectors: ‘should focus on strategy, quality assurance, management 
information and sources of funding’ and that: ‘training for administrative 
Heads and Registrars should focus on data, governance and strategy 
issues’ (Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, 2016: 17).
Distance education: Increasing access?
There are a number of reasons why Myanmar hosts one of the world’s 
largest (but also possibly worst) distance education systems, with around 
500,000 part-time students. In part, distance education offers access to 
the poorer sections of society, where students can study part time whilst 
still working and living at home. It also received state support as a result 
of the 1988 and 1990 student protests – students who are not living 
together in university residences are less likely to get involved in national 
protests. The current system is coordinated by two distance education 
universities, Yangon University of Distance Education (YUDE) for Lower 
Myanmar, and Mandalay University of Distance Education (MUDE) for 
Upper Myanmar. There are 19 bachelor-level courses delivered by 35 
learning centres (15 for YUDE and 20 for MUDE) in day universities 
providing national coverage (Fawssett and Gregson 2016: 3). However, 
teachers have not been trained to deliver courses appropriately through 
a distance learning pedagogy. Distance education arts students attend 
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the day university twice a year, once to enrol, between January to March, 
the other time for 10 days to prepare for and sit the exam at the end of the 
academic year (October–November) for what is in effect a cramming 
session that covers the same material as what is usually delivered over 
four months for full-time students. Science students are additionally 
required to attend 12 weekends over the year for practical sessions. There 
are no dedicated distance education staff. All sessions are delivered by 
day university teachers25 mostly in Burmese – something they have to do 
on top of their regular workload of teaching day students. Since the exam 
preparation cramming sessions cover the same material the students 
have been asked to learn at home, students do not always attend for the 
whole 10 days although it is compulsory (Fawssett and Gregson, 2016: 
20–1). Some teachers also offer private tuition for both full-time and 
distance students, which allows students to engage with the teachers 
directly. Most people in Myanmar are aware of the low quality of the 
distance education system, yet interestingly research by the Open 
University found that employers (that were interviewed for that research) 
said they did not distinguish between distance education and full-time 
HE degrees, rather employment depended on the skills of the candidates 
(Fawssett and Gregson, 2016: 27).
Inclusive higher education?
Given that HE is almost free and there are over 150 institutions around 
the country and a large distance education system for those who have to 
work or cannot live away from home, one could imagine that Myanmar 
has an inclusive tradition of HE. Yet the CESR Phase 1 Report on Higher 
Education quotes that only 11 per cent of Myanmar youth are able to 
access HE (CESR, 2013). Entrance to university depends on students’ 
scores in the matriculation exam, taken in Grade 10 at the age of 16.26 
According to the MoE, 35 per cent of those sitting pass the exam, and of 
these 40 per cent are from urban areas, 32 per cent from rural areas, and 
21 per cent are from poor families (MoE, 2014: 21). There are important 
regional differences, with Chin State having the lowest matriculation 
pass rate at 17 per cent. It is clear that students from urban areas are 
almost twice as likely to go to university as poorer students from rural 
areas, who would additionally have to bear the cost of boarding, a major 
disincentive for poor families.27 The fact that there are few scholarships, 
and those that do exist are so low (sometimes just a few hundred MMKs 
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a month) that they barely warrant the effort of the application compounds 
the problem, so it is not enough that fees are low.28
There are also substantial gender differences in HE. Girls overall 
tend to do better than boys although rural girls are still at a disadvan-
tage.29 In fact, superficially, the gender disparity seems to go against boys 
and men with significantly more female students enrolled than male 
students. This is even more pronounced in the arts and science HEIs. 
There are also more female university teaching staff – mirroring the 
imbalance of female–male teachers in schools, largely because the low 
salaries make the profession unattractive to men. Disaggregated figures 
for HE are not available, however the IHLCS shows that, for the overall 
education sector, employment represented 1 per cent of the overall 
male workforce, compared with 4.9 per cent for women (Mackenzie, 
2013: 27–8).
Traditionally, the main focus of ‘inclusion’ in education in Myanmar 
has been on poorer sections of society through donations to monasteries 
to support monastic schools (as seen in Chapter 3), rather than equality 
and equity pertaining to the unequal access to education of different 
ethnic groups.30 This inequity has been brought to the fore through the 
incomplete peace process that has run in parallel with the wider 
education and other reforms (Lall and South, 2018). It is generally 
recognised that ethnic students have had less access to education as a 
whole, and HE in particular, largely because of lasting disadvantages 
due to the language barrier at primary school level. Currently, there is 
no ethnic breakdown of participation of ethnic students in HE.31 The 
CESR Phase 1 Report on Higher Education had already identified this 
gap, saying it was unclear how Myanmar’s wide ethnic diversity was 
represented in HE (CESR, 2013: 1). Equity in this report is represented 
in terms of a traditional belief in: ‘the five pillars of Myanmar society – 
farmers, workers, students, monks and the military’ and the need to 
unite them (Channon, 2017: 22). This is to foster an atmosphere of: 
‘empathy and trust … in the pursuit of a common goal’ which is posited 
as: ‘the development of the nation’ (CESR, 2013: 22). The difficulties 
involved in achieving this are acknowledged and inequality and poverty 
are cited as major obstacles. Two recommendations in this CESR 
Phase 1 Report on Higher Education included, first, to support modelling 
exercises designed to determine the relative costs and benefits of 
widening access to HE, including the option of raising fees; and second, 
to develop an index of minimum quality using teacher-to-student 
ratios. In comparison with the CESR Phase 1 Report on Higher Education, 
which identified barriers to access on the basis of ethnicity as a key 
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priority (explicitly referencing the Rohingyas), the CESR Phase 2 Report 
(Brady and CESR, 2014) shied away from explicitly addressing exclusion 
resulting from ethnicity, gender, religion, language or disability 
(Channon, 2017). Emerging out of the CESR reports, one of the NESP 
strategies for the reform and development of the HE sector is to expand: 
‘equitable access to higher education’. It is unclear who is included in 
this definition of ‘equity’ but one can deduce from the wider text that 
the prime focus is on the poor as opposed to those from minority 
backgrounds, especially those whose first language might not be 
Burmese.32 The recommendations include creating a good learning 
environment (including good dormitories for those coming from distant 
locations) and promoting student support programmes so that students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds can access and complete their studies. 
This last NESP component is rather thinner than the others and the 
language is significantly watered down from the original CESR Phase 1 
Report on Higher Education.
Senior MoE staff are aware of the issues of inclusion, widening 
participation and inequity between ethnic groups and regions. This was 
evident when a member of the NEPC gave a presentation at the second 
National Conference on Higher Education in October 2018 in Yangon’s 
Diamond Jubilee Hall. His presentation entitled ‘Equity in Myanmar’s 
Higher Education: Opportunities and Challenges’, emphasised that 
engaging with these issues was still a major priority of Myanmar’s HE 
reform.33 Explaining the disparities across Myanmar society based on 
geographic regions, ethnic groups (in this case, based on numbers of 
people living in ethnic states as opposed to an ethnic breakdown),34 
socio-economic status, disability and gender, he held that increased 
disparity would widen the social divide, gradually leading to social 
unrest, and conflict and chaos in the society. Therefore ‘equity interven-
tions’ were needed to reduce disparities and include marginalised 
groups to ensure social justice, and facilitate social cohesion, peace and 
prosperity of the whole society. Based on data from the 2014 census, 
examples of inequity presented included the higher urban rates of 
education completion, much higher numbers of urban female than male 
students enrolled in HEIs, and 68 per cent of young people from the 
richest quintile attaining education levels beyond secondary education 
versus only 1.2 per cent of those from the poorest quintile going 
beyond secondary education. Although not explicitly expressed, it was 
acknowledged that rural-based ethnic young people are, therefore, least 
likely to achieve similar education outcomes to their Bamar35 urban 
counterparts.
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Referring to the relevant policy texts of the 2008 Constitution, the 
2014 and 2015 National Education Law, the 2015 Law for Protection of 
the Rights of National Races and the 2015 Law on the Rights of Persons 
with Disability, the senior policy official explained that Myanmar, as 
part of its reforms, had made commitments to reduce inequity from a 
legislative perspective, but that programmes were needed to put these 
into practice. One way forward, he suggested, was to establish more 
HEIs across the country to address the imbalanced distribution reflected 
in too many students (60 per cent) enrolling in the low-quality distance 
education programmes. The urban and rural divide is also seen in the 
allocation of resources, reflected in regional universities having much 
worse teacher-to-student ratios than urban institutions, with a teacher- 
to-student ratio of 1:5 in Yangon University but 1:29 in Kalay University 
in the west of the country. The key challenge that emerged from the 
conference keynote was that of balancing equity and inclusion on one 
hand, and quality and excellence on the other, captured through the 
phrase ‘Inclusive Excellence’. Figure 4.3 shows the follow-on session 
where participants were asked to think about how to work on inclusion 
at an institutional level.
Figure 4.3 Second National Higher Education Conference, 2018: 
Building Quality and Equity in Higher Education. Source: Author.
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This policy perspective is supported by Lynne Heslop’s interviews 
of two MoE officials, who saw the government’s efforts towards peace-
building reflected in the opening of universities in rural and ethnic 
areas to enable greater access and participation of marginalised and 
conflict-affected communities (Heslop, 2019). One of them is quoted as 
saying: ‘We would like to consider the inclusive and equitable access for 
the education, because Myanmar has very diverse ethnic groups. That’s 
why in every region and state there are universities for social science, 
science and engineering and computer universities’ (Heslop, 2019: 
184–5). Heslop argues that, on the one hand, the opening of more uni-
versities in ethnic states can be seen to contribute to a more equitable 
access to HE, but that on the other, keeps ethnic intellectuals separate 
from the Bamar majority areas, to possibly counter student activism and 
possible challenges to the state.
Competing with the region and international 
collaborations
As mentioned in the introduction, Myanmar’s HE reform has been 
driven by the desire to catch up with the rest of the world and to give 
students suitable skills for the job market. Much of what is happening in 
HE is, therefore, being contextualised within ASEAN and Myanmar’s 
desire is to adopt ASEAN standards as benchmarks for its own reform 
goals. The CESR Phase 1 Report on Higher Education also saw adapting 
to ASEAN benchmarks as a way to engage with Myanmar’s issues of 
wider societal inequalities and social justice (CESR, 2013: 2):
Myanmar’s Human Development Index (HDI) remains low in 
comparison with those of its Southeast Asian neighbours. Income 
distribution remains unequal, with significant disparities evident 
between rural and urban incomes, and geographically. A Gender 
Inequality Index (GEI) of 100 is higher than neighbouring 
ASEAN member states. Rates of poverty declined from 32.1% in 
2005 to 25.6% in 2010 – but these figures do properly reflect the 
extent of the poverty gaps between rural and urban populations, 
ethnic groups, and combinations thereof. The UNDP’s Human 
Development Report for 2011 showed over 23% of the population 
suffering multidimensional poverty, 13.4% of the population as 
being vulnerable to poverty, and 9.4% of the population as being 
vulnerable to extreme poverty.
 
HDI scores, though up from 0.30 
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in 1990 to 0.48 in 2011, remain the lowest for Southeast Asia. 
Myanmar’s global HDI rank is currently 149, of a total country 
count of 187.
 
These circumstances impact directly on educational 
participation and progression.
It is clear that the current state of Myanmar’s HE system compares 
unfavourably with its neighbours in the region in terms of investment in 
education, research output, knowledge economy indices and enrolment 
ratios. The government has recognised that alongside the need for 
infrastructure development to match modern universities in the region, 
there is also a need for capacity building in teaching, administration and 
research quality as significant priorities if Myanmar is to be comparable 
to its neighbours and wider afield. In fact, the evidence from the CESR 
and the NESP suggests that Myanmar wishes to align its HE system with 
its neighbours in order to move to become a world-class HE system 
that can enter global university rankings. Multiple interviews with 
the Department of Higher Education at the MoE have shown this to be a 
prime motivator and that both the MoE and the senior staff of the NEPC 
want to see Yangon University listed in a recognised rankings system. 
In order to do this, Myanmar HEIs have begun the process of integration 
into the ASEAN University Network Quality Assurance Framework 
(AUN-QA).36 The aim is not solely academic – adapting to shared and 
recognised frameworks is also driven by the concern to develop a 
recognised qualifications system that will promote greater workforce 
mobility. Human capital creation and a qualified workforce is part of 
NESP’s mission statement (MoE, 2016: 188): ‘to produce graduate human 
resources who possess the required qualifications for the construction 
of a new, modern, developed, disciplined, democratic nation’, requiring 
graduate qualifications to be accepted outside of Myanmar. This is also 
why Myanmar is taking part in the EU-funded SHARE programme that 
focuses on quality assurance and transferability of degrees.37 SHARE’s 
overarching objective is to: ‘strengthen regional cooperation, enhance 
the quality, competitiveness and internationalisation of ASEAN HEIs 
and students, contributing to an ASEAN Community beyond 2015’. 
SHARE activities build on the related ASEAN Qualifications Reference 
Framework (AQRF) Task Force that is being developed by the ASEAN–
Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA). Part of the work 
is also to develop a credit transfer system that aims to facilitate student 
mobility, that in turn is supported by intra-ASEAN and ASEAN–EU 
scholarships.
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international engagement and international partnerships
Funding to HE by international donors and agencies has been limited – in 
fact, Heslop argues that HE has been largely neglected by development 
partners and international aid agencies (Heslop, 2019). A range of 
short-term capacity-building programmes have been funded by UNESCO, 
the BC and the Open Society Foundation. While Australia, the UK, Japan 
and China offer scholarships, JICA is the only development partner that 
has a sustained programme of support for some of Myanmar’s technical 
HEIs, in particular, Yangon Technological University and Mandalay 
Technological University. The representative for JICA in Tokyo mentioned 
that their particular focus is on engineering, the medical and agricultural 
sectors. Overall, JICA is collaborating with six technical universities in 
Myanmar, including establishing labs at Yangon Technological University 
as well as sending academics in residence to Yangon Technological 
University and Mandalay Technological University to help enhance 
research capability and the quality of undergraduate teaching. Beyond 
this, Japan is supporting 26 Myanmar HEIs by strengthening the 
Engineering Education ASEAN Network (Phase VI, 2018–21). Aside from 
offering scholarships for 44 doctoral students at Japanese universities, 
JICA also supports HE by linking HEIs with industry, sending university 
students to companies for internship in Thilawa SEZ, which is largely 
run by Japanese companies.38
Most of HE’s international engagement seems to be through 
university partnerships where Myanmar universities have signed MoUs 
with international counterparts. At the start of the reforms, in 2012, such 
MoUs were signed without much thought of how to leverage them to the 
advantage of the Myanmar HEI. In 2014–5, the MoE reported 102 MoUs 
and MoAs with foreign institutions, falling to 51 and 29 in the subsequent 
2 years (MoE 2019c: 53, Fig. 2.6.4). Many ended up in a filing cabinet 
without much follow up. Most international universities have been par-
ticularly interested in engaging with Yangon or Mandalay Universities 
as opposed to regional universities, or technical specialist universities 
in Yangon and/or Mandalay. Esson and Wang describe how Yangon 
University has developed its programme of internationalisation through: 
‘visiting academics programmes with the Open Society Foundation, 
two centres of excellence – one in collaboration with the University of 
Cologne (Germany), and the other a joint venture with Johns Hopkins 
University (USA) and Chung Aung University (South Korea), and the 
e-Tekkatho project (an on-line and off-line library database project) with 
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the University of Manchester (UK)’ (Esson and Wang, 2018: 1191). These 
collaborations have not been without challenges and whilst staff and 
students in Esson and Wang’s research hope that such exposure will serve 
as a catalyst for change, all those taking part still face the challenge that 
any fieldwork that might be required still has to be authorised, and are 
subject to ‘long standing and ingrained attempts to control academic 
freedom’ (Esson and Wang, 2018: 1192). Their research shows that 
academics in the sciences had more freedom to conduct the research as 
they wished compared to those in the arts and social sciences.39
Lynne Heslop’s doctoral work examining the international collabo-
rations of four Myanmar HEIs (three government universities and one 
private HEI) with British institutions, shows that the benefits of such 
collaborations are also limited for the Myanmar partner universities. 
Her study exposes the injustice in the HE international interactions as 
well as how the internationalisation processes that are supposed to help 
build the capacity of Myanmar HEIs actually end up: ‘entrenching in- 
equalities in the global circulation of knowledge production, perpetuate 
the epistemological subordination of Myanmar researchers, and create 
or maintain economic, cultural and political hegemonies in resources 
and power, reproducing the dependencies of Myanmar public HEIs and 
privileging Northern HEI partners’ (Heslop, 2019: 5). Her work, focused 
on answering the question in how far HEI partnerships could improve 
social justice in Myanmar, concludes that these kinds of interactions do 
not in general allow for greater social justice within Myanmar or between 
Myanmar and the wider world of global academia.
Mid-Term Review of the NESP
As already discussed in Chapter 2, in the summer of 2019, the NESP 
reached its mid-point and the MoE organised a MTR (MoE, 2019b and 
2020) to establish if the reforms were ‘on track’. For HE, this meant 
reviewing the three drivers for change.
With regard to ‘Strengthening Management (including autonomy)’, 
the MTR reports that the Rectors consider ‘Autonomy’ the highest priority 
reform. While the NESP does not envisage full independence of HEIs, 
it was envisaged that they should have autonomous decision making 
over elements such as: governance and management; academic profile 
and curriculum; external and financial partnerships; and research. The 
MTR reports that the Department for Higher Education has increased 
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technical support to an initial lead batch of (no more than eight) HEIs: 
‘to make integrated progress with establishment of new arrangements 
for autonomy, piloting of new admissions process, piloting quality 
assurance processes, providing management and leadership support to 
Rectors’ and HEI management’ (MoE, 2020: xiii). Autononomy was 
officially granted to 16 HEIs in September 2016.
In regard to the driver of ‘Quality and Relevance’, which includes 
developing a quality assurance framework for all sub sectors so as to 
provide a framework for, and assessment of, the achievement of quality 
of education against standards, with the aim of sustaining the reforms 
over the long term, the MTR reports that: ‘Progress has been made: 
an external quality assurance system for Higher Education is in 
development’ and due to be implemented in 2020 (MoE, 2020: x–xi).
There is less of a review of what has been achieved in relation to 
‘Equitable Access’. The MTR reviews distance education and concludes 
that it is: ‘widely available but needs significant improvement’ as the 
number of students accessing this system of HE: ‘is now approximately 
equal to the number of students attending university’. The MTR seems 
to conclude that least progress has been made in this area as: ‘There 
appears to be little investment in the development of online resources 
or the development of dedicated delivery platforms. There was little 
investment in developing quality face-to-face events to supplement the 
individual, home based learning’ (MoE, 2020: x–xi). No more is said on 
how to rectify the inequities within the system.
Conclusion
As Myanmar embraces a globalising world, HE in Myanmar is poised 
for a deep transformation. Developing indigenous HE systems has been 
a pathway out of dependence on colonial powers (Castells, 1994). 
However, neo-liberal policies can function to recreate dependent rela-
tionships, especially if international standards become the domestic 
benchmarks and links with global universities are the main medium for 
quality enhancement. The international markers for success may need to 
be adapted with new criteria and incentives (Naidoo, 2007).
As discussed by Kandiko-Howson and Lall, there are possibilities 
for developing countries such as Myanmar to showcase models for 
excellence that build on traditional values, notably inclusion, care for the 
environment and more sustainable ways of living (Kandiko-Howson 
and Lall, 2020). However, while the pathway of internationalisation 
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that Myanmar’s HE system has chosen might take it out of international 
isolation, there is a risk of creating new exploitative relationships 
(through the MoUs universities are signing that benefit the international 
partners more than themselves). In order to become ‘recognised’, the 
universities in Myanmar have to accept international practices. Some of 
these will improve the quality of their research and teaching, others, such 
as competition for funding, will just reproduce neo-liberal policies that 
are failing in other countries. The desire to promote (and to financially 
support) developing competitive research-intensive universities places 
pressure on flagship urban institutions to work towards international 
levels of research and publications, whereas regional universities are not 
brought into this discourse. This is likely to increase stratification of the 
system, exacerbating the urban and rural divide and subsequent conse-
quences for equity across the country. For example, a neo-liberal push for 
international collaboration with urban flagship universities is at odds 
with local needs for HE to promote integration and social justice across 
ethnic regions and conflict-affected regions within the country (Heslop, 
2019). Domestically, it is clear that a tiered – perhaps even three-tier 
system – is being proposed, with Yangon and Mandalay Universities at 
the helm of an elite system, and regional universities in ethnic states 
at the bottom of the pile, not being given the required autonomy, and 
not benefitting from greater investment. This, in turn, will embed the 
disparities between ethnic students who manage to get into universities 
close to home, compared to the Bamar students accessing urban HE 
provision, in turn, exacerbating the already existing social inequalities. 
What is proposed is a system that will not be able to increase social 
justice. Second- and third-tier universities, their staff and students 
are unlikely to receive the same recognition and respect as their elite 
counterparts. The NESP MTR already shows that issues of equity and 
access are not the sector’s top priority.
Notes
 1 The author was part of a small team training the NIHED senior trainers and supporting NIHED 
in its first HE training of 11 universities.
 2 There are over 500,000 students at the University of Distance Education (Yangon) that serves 
Lower Myanmar and at the University of Distance Education (Mandalay) that serves Upper 
Myanmar. The largest Open University in the world is India’s Indira Gandhi Open University 
with around 4 million students, however, it offers both distance and face-to-face education.
 3 This is a double disadvantage as HE is supposed to be in English, and the books are in English, 
even if the actual teaching is in Burmese. Many ethnic nationality students are unable to 
matriculate because of their poor levels of Burmese, making it impossible for them to access 
HE. Those who do make it then find that following course materials in English presents a 
double challenge.
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 4 Renamed when Rangoon was renamed Yangon.
 5 Having been replaced in 1962 by Burmese. 
 6 This has recently been reversed as part of the education reforms with both universities now 
having resumed undergraduate provision. 
 7 The author was the academic from the University of London. 
 8 U Than Aung was the Education Minister with whom Professor Robert Taylor and Dr Kyaw Yin 
Hlaing negotiated the first few teaching programmes at Yangon and Mandalay Universities. 
He was replaced by Dr Chan Nyein who cancelled the programme for the MoE, so it was 
arranged to move the teaching to the Myanmar Fisheries Federation (MFF) and the students 
came from Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). More on the role of MFF 
in Lall, 2016a. 
 9 ‘Yangon University, Mandalay University, Yangon Institute of Economics, Yangon Institute 
of Education, Mawlamyine University, Monywa Institute of Economics, Meiktila Institute of 
Economics, and Yangon University of Foreign Languages. About 2,000 candidates were 
enrolled in PhD programmes across these eight institutions – but this figure may not be entirely 
reliable. Possibly, as many as one-half of these candidates were enrolled at the University of 
Yangon’ (CESR, 2013: 8).
10 Universities have: ‘no authority on appointments, travel, research, promotion, curriculum 
development, disciplinary association conference, even the planning of a golden anniversary 
university conference’ (senior staff comment). Another rector noted that there was ‘no 
authority to appoint even lower order maintenance staff, even a window-cleaner. Everything 
had to go up ‘through proper channels’. ‘Even when a member of staff is invited to a prestigious 
conference in the region, the conference date may have passed before any decision is taken 
“on high”. If someone is allowed to travel to a meeting, their passport has to be returned 
afterwards.’ […] HEIs have been formally without financial autonomy since the 1970s. 
However, from 1998, there has been the possibility of a measure of income generation through 
what are termed Human Resource Development (HRD) courses in most if not all HEIs under 
the MoE. These often take place early in the day, before regular working hours, or after work. 
As the CESR notes, the scale and the income associated with what are in effect parallel courses 
are not well known. But in at least one major university, the HRD numbers in masters and 
diploma courses are almost 50 per cent of the entire university enrolment. Also, CESR notes 
that the total number of HRD courses are 195 as compared with regular courses which are 
215 (CESR, 2013). 
11 Yangon University, Yangon Technological University, Yangon University of Education, 
Yangon University of Economics, Medicine 1 (Yangon), Mandalay University, Mandalay 
Technical University, Yezin Agricultural University, Taunggyi University, Sittwe University and 
Myitkyina University.
12 The BC-funded training focused on managing change and engaging senior staff with issues 
pertaining to developing their own curricula and assessments, and developing a research 
strategy as well as developing international partnerships with foreign universities. The author 
was part of the training team.
13 Burmese – which is the official language – is the native spoken language of approximately 
30 million people out of a total population of over 53 million (British Academy and École 
Française d’Extrême-Orient, 2015: 5).
14 But presumably not including any ethnic languages.
15 There were some protests in Yangon in 1996, but they were put down very quickly.
16 Discussed also in Chapter 2.
17 The 11 demands are as follows:
• Inclusion of representatives of teachers and students in legislation process of education 
policies and laws, by-laws and other related laws
• The right to freely establish and operate student and teacher unions and legal recognition 
for them
• Establishment of National Education Commission and University Coordination 
Committee mentioned in the approved National Education Law
• Self-determination and self-management on educational affairs of individual state/regions 
and schools
• Modifying current examination and university matriculation system
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• Modifying teaching methods to such that ensure freedom for thinking and self-studying 
of students
• Inclusion of a provision in the National Education Law that ensure freedom for the 
practice of ethnic languages and mother tongue-based multilingual education for ethnic 
populations and tribes
• Inclusive education for all children including children with disabilities
• Resumption of enrolment for students previously expelled from schools due to the student 
uprisings
• Allocation of 20 per cent of national budget for education
• Regulating of free compulsory education up to middle school level rather than primary 
level
18 BBC News. 2015. ‘Myanmar riot police beat student protesters with batons’. 10 March 2015. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-31812028. 
19 https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/19825-opposition-builds-over-ministers.html
20 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had appointed herself Minister of Education before the new role of 
State Counsellor was created for her.
21 https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190604151019822. 
22 This of course is bound to create a difference between locally hired staff attached to individual 
universities versus staff hired by the MoE, who rotate between institutions and have government 
employee status. Whilst the universities are aware that this will create issues, at the time of 
writing, no solutions have been proposed.
23 In September 2020, 16 universities were granted autonomy.
24 Sanchez, J. (forthcoming). Blinded like a State? Urban sanitation, improvement and high 
modernism in contemporary Myanmar. Political Geography. 
25 There is a system of rotation (Fawsett and Gregson, 2016: 8).
26 University entrance is being changed as part of the ongoing curricular and examination 
reforms process. It is unclear at the time of writing if the matriculation will stand, and be taken 
in Grade 11 or 12, and/or if universities will offer their own entrance exams (as in Japan).
27 Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR, 2013). According to a preliminary analysis of 
data from the IHLCS (IHLCS, 2011: 9) in Myanmar in 2009–10, the net enrolment rate of 
young people aged 18–21 in HE was 10.6 per cent, but with some marked disparities between 
different groups of young people. Among urban households, almost 30 per cent of 18 and 
19 year olds were enrolled in HE, compared with about 9 per cent for rural households, and 
less than 5 per cent for poor rural households. 
28 ‘[…] in the interests of equity, tuition fees are kept low, with 20,000 MMK (USD 23.50) 
commonly cited. A policy of having low tuition fees is very much in accord with regional 
initiatives to move towards more inclusive HE models, which do not discriminate against 
the poor, rural dwellers, women and ethnic minorities. In HEIs managed by the Ministry 
of Defence and all students are employees and have military ranks, no fees are applied, a 
practice that, according to one Rector allowed these HEIs to ensure that perhaps half their 
intake came from rural areas, with another 30% coming from poor families’(Mackenzie, 
2013:18).
29 To remedy this, the pass mark for university entrance for boys has dropped (Fawssett and 
Gregson, 2016: 8). 
30 Myanmar has 135 recognised ethnic groups and seven ethnic states that have a majority of 
ethnic residents. More on this in Chapters 6 and 7 of this volume.
31 The 2014 Census shows the break-down of people whose highest education attainment is post-
secondary education by state, but not by ethnic group. In any case, the percentage of those 
having completed tertiary education in ethnic states is lower than the national average of 9 per 
cent (GoM, 2017: 56).
32 And who are therefore disadvantaged for life as they will have done less well on the school 
matriculation examination that to date is the entrance exam for all universities. 
33 See Kandiko-Howson and Lall, 2020 for more detail.
34 The ethnic breakdown figures in and outside the ethnic states collected in the 2014 Census 
remain unpublished. See Chapter 6 in this volume for more details.





38 Interview with Tokyo- and Yangon-based JICA staff on the HE reforms in 2018 and 2019.
39 One head of department based in the arts explained that all research proposals have to be 
submitted to the MoE not only for funding, but general approval, and the Ministry does not 
approve research topics deemed ‘politically sensitive’ (Esson and Wang, 2018: 1192–3).
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5
Teacher education and training: 
Is changing practice possible?
Introduction
The chapter focuses on the reforms and the restructuring of teacher 
education and training in light of the issues faced by student teachers and 
teacher educators. Drawing on original survey data collected across 
20 education colleges1 in the midst of the reform process in 2015 and 
2016, it engages with the views, hopes, challenges and fears faced by 
those who want to become teachers. As teacher training is being revised 
at the time of writing, the chapter can only reflect the realities as they are 
in the midst of flux, rather than discuss any tangible results of the reforms 
in this part of the education sector. What is clear throughout the process, 
however, is the lack of attention paid to the issues of inequalities inherent 
in the teaching profession as it stands.
The chapter also engages with a number of additional teacher 
training programmes supplemented by development partners, in 
particular, the more recent engagement of the BC-funded ‘English for 
Education College Trainers’ (EfECT) project that focused on upgrading 
teacher educators’ English and teaching methodology; and the UNESCO 
‘Strengthening Teacher Education in Myanmar’ (STEM) programme that 
is responsible for the review and upgrading of the pre-service teacher 
education curriculum. The chapter discusses how this teacher education 
curricular review is not in sync with the curricular reforms of basic 
education (discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume), as they are supported 
by different aid agencies with little communication or coordination. 
Teacher education is, therefore, another example of the tensions that arise 
from these uncoordinated efforts to improve education across Myanmar.
The issues relating to teacher education are complex, shaped by 
cultural gender politics and inequitable structures that result in many 
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more female teachers in the system, yet with more of their male counter-
parts reaching positions of power by becoming TEOs or SEOs. Issues 
with ethnicity and language, specifically the special challenges faced by 
the few ethnic nationality student teachers who manage to get into the 
education colleges, are touched on and expanded upon in Chapter 6.2 
While the lack of ethnic teachers is a real issue for ethnic nationality 
children who cannot understand Burmese, this chapter focuses on gender 
inequities and discusses how reformed teacher education might become 
a key part of sustaining peace and social justice across the country.3
Background on teacher training
Until the 2012 education reforms, Myanmar did not have a comprehen-
sive teacher education policy. Consequently, there was no framework 
for pre- or in-service teacher training and none for the professional 
standards the various education stakeholders were supposed to meet. 
According to a JICA report, pre-service teacher training had stopped in 
1971 but was re-instituted in 1998 when five teacher training colleges 
(TTCs) and 14 teacher training schools (TTSs) were upgraded to 
education colleges (JICA, 2013). The system that is being reformed today 
has, therefore, been in place virtually unchanged for around 20 years.
Teacher trainees, known in Myanmar as student teachers, are 
required to have graduated with matriculation from upper secondary 
school. The main way of becoming a teacher has traditionally been to take 
the Diploma in Teacher Education (DTEd), a two-year post-matriculation 
course. Previously, there was a one-year certificate qualification route to 
become a primary school teacher, but the new pre-primary teacher training 
(PPTT), a four-month course for graduates to become primary teachers, 
has now replaced this. The DTEd allows teachers to teach at middle school 
level, although they will start as primary assistant teachers when they 
graduate, and then move up to middle school after five years when they 
can become junior assistant teachers (JAT). Under this system, if teachers 
wanted to become secondary school teachers or move on to administrative 
posts in education, they needed a Bachelor of Education degree that could 
be acquired at the Institutes of Education in Yangon or Sagaing, for those 
in Lower and Upper Myanmar respectively.4 The whole system is being 
revamped as the new teacher education curriculum is being upgraded to a 
four-year degree level course, further discussed below.
The traditional basic career path of a teacher was linear, from 
primary assistant teacher (PAT), to junior assistant teacher (JAT) through 
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to senior assistant teacher (SAT) and above. By gaining years of teaching 
experience and upgrading teaching certificates and degrees, teachers 
advanced in their careers and increased their salaries, moving from 
primary schools to secondary schools as they became more experienced. 
Due to the ascending linear salary system, once a teacher started their 
career, they started looking for a better position in a higher level school. 
It also meant that the most inexperienced teachers were serving at 
primary level, often in the most difficult and remote parts of the country, 
and the more experienced teachers were in secondary schools in urban 
areas. As discussed further below, this linear model is also being changed 
as part of the reforms, so that student teachers train towards a level 
(primary or secondary) and a specialisation.
At the time of writing, there are 22 education colleges and two 
institutes of education that produce around 10,000 teachers annually.5 
In the 2019–20 academic year, education colleges admitted 3,343 
first-year student teachers (1,676 female and 1,667 male), for the new 
four-year degree programme (May San Yee, 2019). These numbers are 
lower than those for previous years, presumably, to ensure manageability 
for education colleges in the roll-out of the four-year degree programme. 
The four-year degree programme discussed further below was rolled-out 
in December 2019 for first-year student teachers while the second-year 
courses continue to follow the previous two-year curriculum.
To date, the Institutes of Education in Yangon and Sagaing approve 
any changes to the curriculum and ensure consistency across the board of 
the education colleges. The curriculum is quite demanding: 17 subjects 
are covered in the first year and 14 in the second year, including the 
following (UNESCO, 2016):
• Subject content knowledge: knowledge and understanding of 
school subjects in the basic education curriculum (referred to as 
academic subjects). The subject textbooks are all in English, which 
creates issues.
• Pedagogic content knowledge: teaching methods and ways of 
assessing learning related to specific subject areas, and how these 
are matched to the capabilities of learners (referred to as ‘methods’ 
courses).
• Professional studies: understanding how children learn; knowledge 
and skill in classroom management and pastoral care; knowledge 
of effective techniques to promote learning; acquisition of profes-
sional identity as a teacher; and awareness of relevant educational 
legislation, responsibilities, etc.
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• A short 9-week teaching practicum referred to as block teaching.
• Co-curricular subjects include music, art, agriculture, physical 
education, domestic science, and industrial science. These courses, 
on the whole, appear to be considered the bottom of the ‘curricula 
hierarchy’.
Classes in ICT are offered in all education colleges. The ICT teacher 
educators teach basic Microsoft programs with training handbooks that 
are often out of date. Student teachers have access to computers during 
these classes although they often have to share. The lack of reliable 
electricity supply and non-functioning computers mean that practical 
‘hands on’ training is not always possible. According to a UNESCO site 
visit, the teacher educators are also responsible for fixing the computers 
when they break and supporting the education college staff to do their 
own computer-related work (UNESCO, 2016: 12–3).
Teacher educators use a combination of methods that include 
demonstration, whole-class teaching using question and answer, lecture 
and some simulation. However, the main emphasis is on theoretical 
knowledge about teaching and not on demonstrating how to teach or 
using learner-centric approaches so that student teachers experience 
the teaching methodology they are supposed to apply. The academic 
subject textbooks serve as ‘manuals of instruction’ for activities that are 
to be conducted by the teachers. Despite the fact that many teachers will 
face challenges that include language barriers as well as multigrade 
teaching during their posting, the diversity of potential learners and their 
different abilities are not addressed by the pedagogical approaches that 
are taught at the education colleges.
Anecdotal evidence6 shows that different education colleges 
do use different teaching strategies, sometimes including storytelling, 
observation, demonstration and role-play. Demonstration lessons include 
one demonstration for each subject the students will have to teach – 
including maths, Myanmar language, English, science, geography and 
history. The student teachers are then asked to give feedback. There 
is also ‘peer teaching’ that involves groups of student teachers making 
lesson plans, which are delivered to the other student teachers and the 
education college teacher educator, who then gives feedback. It seems 
that this strategy is practiced before the ‘block teaching’.7 However, 
discussion as well as question-and-answer sessions appear to be the most 
commonly used methodologies, emphasising the passive methods that 
predominate in the classrooms across Myanmar. It seems that teacher 
educators and their students predominantly apply the method in which 
they have been taught when they themselves are teaching.
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During the nine-week block teaching where student teachers 
practice in schools, they often find themselves left to their own devices, 
barely supported by the already overloaded local head teacher or the 
teacher educators. Feedback on a recent project spoke of ‘surviving’ 
rather than ‘learning’ on the job.8 Many student teachers found that the 
theory they have been taught is quite different from the practice they 
have to apply, leading to confusing situations. As a part of the block 
teaching students are now encouraged to conduct basic action research 
under the heading of ‘lesson study’. This includes choosing a classroom 
action research theme, designing the lesson plan, being observed using 
observation tools and checklists and receiving constructive feedback. 
Clearly, for this to work well requires the support of peers and the head 
teacher, which is not always readily available.
To date, the education colleges have been perceived as second-class 
institutions within Myanmar’s educational hierarchy. The education 
colleges have extremely limited budgets, out-dated curricula and 
textbooks, and inadequate teaching and learning resources.9 The teacher-
to-student ratio is supposed to be 35–40 students per teacher educator, 
although there is evidence of larger classes with up to 55 student 
teachers.10 Teacher educators are considered overworked, not only 
because of the time spent teaching, but because they need to prepare 
classes, mark correspondence work from in-service teachers and manage 
continuous professional development (CPD) activities for in-service 
teachers (UNESCO, 2016: 12–3).
It is notable that despite this structure for training teachers, there 
are still a large number of untrained teachers serving in government 
schools, especially in the remote and conflict-affected areas. An often 
cited figure from the MoE in 2000 states that approximately 57 per cent 
of primary teachers, 58 per cent of middle school teachers and 9 per cent 
of high school teachers had never attended any teacher training (Thein 
Lwin, 2000). These figures are 20 years old, but the recent recruitment 
of daily wage teachers by the government to increase overall teacher 
numbers might have increased these numbers.
The reforms
When the 2012 reforms started, the MoE was in the midst of implementing 
its 30-Year Long-Term Plan for Basic Education 2001–31, one of the 
priority areas being teacher education and specifically the reduction of 
in-service uncertified teachers, ensuring full strength of teaching staff for 
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basic education schools in border areas and improving the quality of 
teacher education (JICA, 2013). These aims were overtaken by the NESP 
reform priorities for teachers that include the following three priority 
areas:
• Strengthening teacher quality assurance and management, 
including the introduction of teacher competency standards, 
deployment and promotion mechanisms.
• Improving quality of pre-service education using the recently 
developed Teacher Competency Standards Framework (TCSF) as a 
driver for improvement.
• Improving the quality of teacher CPD including access to a coherent 
system with basic recognised qualifications and mentoring, and 
targeted training for the new basic curriculum.
Section 50 of the revised 2015 National Education Law stipulates the 
following:
Teachers shall:
a) be allowed to research freely without impact to the national 
benefit
b) be allowed to choose methods which are relevant to the 
curriculum freely for the development of learning
c) have the opportunity to continue to learn internal or in foreign 
for improving quality of teaching
d) be allowed to apply to their desired schools or regions freely
To meet the legal and NESP goals, teacher education requires an overhaul.
A new teacher training curriculum and degree
To meet ASEAN standards, the teacher education system is preparing 
to shift to a four-year degree, a basic pre-service qualification that will 
replace the two-year DTEd. The teacher education curriculum requires 
new content so as to link in with the new basic education curriculum 
(JICA’s ‘CREATE’ project).11 A new curriculum is being developed by 
technical experts including education colleges’ teacher educators and 
coordinated through UNESCO’s ‘Strengthening Pre-Service Teacher 
Education in Myanmar’ (STEM) project, covered in more detail below.12 
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The first-year curriculum was introduced in December 2019. STEM’s 
focus has been to ensure that student teachers master the competencies 
– a combination of content knowledge, skills and attitude needed to 
produce effective learning for pupils in a classroom – shifting from the 
way they were taught themselves (by rote) to the new student-centred 
way. The training approach is changing in that teachers no longer only 
receive the theoretical knowledge to teach, relevant in a content- 
based curriculum, but receive training in the ability to teach through 
a competency-based approach. A validation survey for the TCSF is 
currently being piloted by the MoE before national implementation.13
No publically available study has collected data on how education 
colleges, teacher educators and student teachers are managing with 
the new curriculum and the new teaching method or what challenges 
they face in understanding and implementing these. According to a 
consultant from TREE, feedback collected for STEM revealed that 
teacher educators struggled with new subjects, the number of activities 
that have to be conducted in limited time, and understanding some of 
the learning outcomes. Some teacher educators complained that the 
English curriculum was dense, the Myanmar translation confusing and 
the education colleges lacked resources to support lesson planning.
Part of the change in qualification and coursework has been the 
development of a TCSF between 2017 and 2019 as a set of written 
standards underpinning ambitions for the creation of a teaching 
workforce with the: ‘professional knowledge, understanding and skills 
associated with the role and duties expected of Myanmar’s teachers and 
the process of teaching’ (MoE, 2019d: 5). The TCSF was developed by a 
core working group led by Dr Aung Min, retired Rector of the Yangon 
University of Education, supported by Dr Aye Aye Myint, Acting Rector 
of the Yangon University of Education, and included members from 
the Yangon University of Education (YUOE), the Sagaing University of 
Education (SUOE), the University for the Development of National Races 
(UDNR),14 as well as invited representatives from Yankin, Thingangun 
and Hlegu Education Colleges.15 Technical assistance was provided by 
UNESCO’s STEM project.16
The field testing of the framework by the TCSF working group in 
2016 involved 76 test sites that included education colleges as well 
as schools. Data was collected from student teachers and teacher 
educators as well as serving teachers, head teachers and principals 
of education colleges. The report documents that those interviewed 
understood the intent of the framework but that the technical language 
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made it difficult to use and respondents felt the language needed to be 
simplified. Stakeholders also had concerns on how the framework would 
be implemented, especially for those teachers with less experience (Aye 
Aye Myint and Myo Win, 2016: 21–2). This conclusion is supported by 
UNESCO’s report on STEM and the TCSF that found the introduction 
of generic international standards to Myanmar creates challenges: 
‘Likely issues include difficulties in understanding the language in these 
products, in transitioning from current to new practices, and difficulties 
around a lack of knowledge in skills required in using the products’ 
(UNESCO, 2019b: 21).17
Dr Aung Min, the retired Rector of YUOE writes in the foreword to 
the TCSF (MoE, 2019d: 2) the following:
In Myanmar’s tradition, it is believed that “Knowledge is treasure; 
Teachers matter and teachers are at the centre of the learning 
process.” In Myanmar society, teachers are regarded as one of the 
“five gems” (Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, parents and teachers). 
While remaining in this highly respected position, we must recognize 
that, as education moves towards a learner-centred approach, the 
role of the teacher is changing to that of a facilitator. (…) At present, 
our teachers need to be equipped with the teacher competencies 
necessary for them to move from a teacher-centred approach, in 
which teachers engage in purely direct instruction as the sole source 
of knowledge, to a learner-centred approach, in which the teacher 
provides guidance and support, coaching and facilitation. In a 
number of different countries, competency-based teacher training 
programmes are based on the following categories: knowledge, 
skills, and attributes or values. (…) The content of each category has 
been aligned with the Myanmar context.
The standards are not only going to be used to assess and train student 
teachers at education colleges, but will also form the basis of their 
professional development throughout their teaching career. The draft 
document states the following (MoE, 2019d: 3):
As Myanmar raises the quality of the education system, through 
reforms to the basic education curriculum and structure of 
schooling (Kindergarten to Grade 12), it needs teachers with the 
right values, skills and knowledge to be effective practitioners. To 
achieve this objective, Myanmar needs a strong system of teacher 
education (pre-service and continuing), with programmes that 
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provide the theoretical foundations to produce graduates and a 
quality teacher workforce with the kinds of professional knowledge, 
understanding and skills associated with the role and duties 
expected of Myanmar’s teachers and the process of teaching.
As part of the reformed system, teachers will now train for a certain 
level: KG, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary plus a subject 
specialisation of their choice. The complete set of competency standards 
includes teaching competence – the role of the teacher in the classroom, 
directly linked to the act of teaching (pedagogical content knowledge) 
as well as teacher competence – the wider systemic view of teacher 
professionalism including the role and responsibility of the teacher as an 
individual, within the school, the local community and as a participant 
in professional networks (MoE, 2019d: 9).18 With an interesting nod to 
the international community and the development partners involved in 
the education reform process, the document emphasises that the 
framework: ‘is grounded in the culture of the country’ (MoE, 2019d: 7) 
and demonstrates: ‘values and attitudes consistent with Myanmar’s 
tradition of perceiving teachers as role models’ (MoE, 2019d: 17). Whilst 
not explicitly mentioned, this seems to be a reaction to the various 
programmes such as the Western CCA pushed upon Myanmar teachers 
in the years preceding the reforms.19
Promotions and transfers
Changes to the promotion and transfer system are also planned, but are 
currently quite unclear. Teachers are all civil servants, and major reforms 
are under way as detailed in the Civil Service Reform Strategic Action 
Plan.20 According to JICA: ‘the civil service personnel management 
system is not administered consistently … [and] nepotism and bribery 
are still common practices for recruitment, transfer and promotion’ 
(JICA, 2017b: 1). President Thein Sein brought in significant wage 
increases for teachers to relieve issues created by corruption and the 
tuition business, without which teachers could not survive. According to 
the WB, the whole wage bill of all civil servants had therefore increased 
quite dramatically.21 As of 2013, annual pay and allowances have also 
been increased whereby all civil servants receive a monthly bonus. 
A new ‘hardship pay’ was introduced for civil servants (including 
teachers) who serve in ‘hardship’ areas, mainly remote border areas, to 
incentivise them to work there.
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With the new qualification being a university degree, the implemen-
tation and management of pre-service teacher education has been shifted 
within the MoE from the Department of Teacher Education and Training 
(DTET) to the Department of Higher Education. In-service teacher 
training, however, will go on under the DEPT.22 While teacher educators 
become academics teaching towards a four-year degree, it is unclear if 
they will have to rotate from one campus to another, as their peers at 
universities do. A new points-based system is being put in place where 
teacher educators can accrue points according to a number of criteria – 
qualifications, research output, departmental activity, seniority and other 
activities. Panels, including members from the MoE, unions and depart-
mental staff, will then make recommendations on appointments. The 
Department of Higher Education is encouraging teacher educators 
to undertake research and is disbursing grants for this purpose.23 The 
structure of the education colleges is likely to change significantly as the 
curricular reforms progress. For education colleges to be able to confer 
degrees, they must have powers equivalent to universities. Options 
for status change of education colleges are already being discussed 
and the Higher Education Bill is likely to describe the final decision, 
but integrating education colleges with existing universities was one 
possibility being discussed.
It is unclear how the new system will affect the appointment and 
deployment system for basic education teachers, although a more 
devolved approach is being considered: ‘Since 2013–4, state/region 
education officers can make some decisions about teacher deployment, 
including daily wage teachers’ (MoE, 2016: 40). However, to date, the 
collaboration of education colleges and TEOs is limited to attending 
graduation ceremonies at education colleges and coordinating practicum 
placements for education college students,24 rather than becoming 
involved in deployment of teachers to areas of need.
Teachers: Needs and supply
The issue of deployment links in with the problem of teacher needs 
and teacher supply. Every year, teacher vacancies are reported by all the 
TEOs and, based on this available data, teacher posts are compiled into a 
list by the DBE by 1 March every year, from which requests for the new 
teachers are sent to the DEPT. The DEPT then provides a new teacher list 
and the DBE forms the educational committee chaired by the director 
general to deploy newly certified teachers from education colleges and 
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institutes of education. JICA’s report maintains that new teachers are 
considered depending on their specialised subjects and native hometown, 
but evidence on the ground does not bear out the claim that considera-
tion of mother tongue and cultural background are linked to new posts 
(JICA, 2013). Exact data on the supply and demand of teachers does 
not seem to be available publically, although conversations with state 
education officers across four states and regions in the past few years 
point to the fact that the supply of teachers is insufficient to meet the 
demand, especially in remote areas.25
Problems and challenges with teacher education
The current realities of teacher education include a long list of challenges 
that include the following issues: the teaching at the education colleges, 
the practicum, ICT, CPD, along with the uncertainties of the changed 
degree structure. The existing practicum system does not prepare 
student teachers for the real world and the student teachers do not get 
adequate support or feedback. This often means they are unable to use a 
student-centred pedagogy as they face overcrowded classes, classroom 
management issues, resource shortages and at times language difficul-
ties. With regard to access to computers and the internet during training, 
the education colleges have few computers (more likely to be desktops 
than laptops), and these are often located in administrative rooms. 
Student teachers tend to use their personal phones to access the internet, 
and instruction on how to use ICT in teaching is not a systematic part of 
their training.
Even if student teachers leave the education college reasonably 
well prepared, it is not easy for them to develop their skills further 
later in their careers. This will be a particular problem as those who 
have taken the two-year diploma are likely to be seen as second rate to 
those completing the future four-year teaching degree. There is no 
systemic CPD framework in place and principals do not see this as their 
responsibility. Most CPD consists of one-off workshops, or a series 
of workshops as the current mode of CPD.26 Other recognised CPD 
options include Master Degrees and PhDs, and there are also ‘National 
Competitions for Teaching Aids and Action Research’ held twice a year, 
as well as informal CPD programmes at some colleges where short 
refresher courses are available. Although it is being reformed, the teacher 
education curriculum does not prepare teachers for the realities on the 
ground such as multigrade teaching, the short supply of ICT and other 
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teaching resources, large classes and language difficulties (Stigler and 
Hiebert, 2007). These issues reflect the study on student teachers (Lall, 
2015 and 2016b) that is detailed in the next section of this chapter.
Views from 20 education colleges in 2015–6
In 2015 and 2016, the first ever study of student teachers was conducted 
as part of the British Council funded EfECT project (discussed further 
below). The survey was distributed to 100 students in each one of the 
existing 20 education colleges by British Council staff during the academic 
year of 2015, and repeated in 2016. It is unclear how the responding 
students were chosen.27 However, the study was able for the first time to 
reveal who in Myanmar chose to go into the teaching profession, for what 
reasons, and what challenges they faced. The study also serves as a 
baseline for teacher education before the NESP reforms really began to 
affect Myanmar school education.
In 2015, there were 2,003 respondents, 1,005 in their first year of 
study and 969 in their second year of study. There were 29 respondents 
who did not specify which academic year they were in. Of the 2,003 
respondents, 791 (39 per cent) were male and 1,196 (60 per cent) were 
female and 16 did not specify their gender. As would be expected, the 
majority of students were between 17 (37.7 per cent) and 18 (42.69 per 
cent) years of age. However, there were 3 per cent of younger students at 
16 years of age, and a few older ones between 19 and 23. In the first year 
of study, there were 764 and in the second year there were 725 Bamar 
students, with 241 (year 1) and 244 (year 2) identifying as ethnic 
students. Just under 93.5 per cent self-identified as Buddhists, with 108 
(5.4 per cent) Christians and only 17 Muslims (< 1 per cent), signalling 
a sharp lack of religious diversity.
The survey was repeated in 2016 and there were again 2,003 
respondents, 951 in their first and 1,050 in their second year of study. 
There were two respondents who did not specify which academic year 
they were in. There were 796 repondents who took the survey for the 
second time; there were 460 male and 479 female students (year 1) and 
466 male and 580 female students (year 2). For this survey, there 
was a higher male representation with 47 per cent male respondents 
compared to 39 per cent male respondents in 2015. The increase in the 
number of male respondents was due to the increase in those belonging 
to the non-Bamar ethnic groups. However, overall, the intake of men in 
education colleges is much lower than women, as teaching is seen as a 
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less attractive profession for men, although once in the system, male 
teachers tend to move up the ranks more swiftly than their female 
counterparts. Similar to 2015, the Bamar ethnic group constituted 74 per 
cent of the total respondents. Almost 25 per cent of the respondents 
identified themselves as members of ethnic groups, and only four 
respondents did not specify their ethnic group. Almost 93 per cent of 
respondents identified themselves as Buddhists, 6.2 per cent as Christians 
and 0.7 per cent as Muslims. As would be expected, the majority of the 
students were between 17 (35 per cent) and 18 (44 per cent) years of 
age. Again, there were about 3 per cent who were younger (16 years 
of age) and there was a similar proportion of older students between the 
ages of 19 and 23.
In year one of the research, the survey did not ask about matricula-
tion marks, however, upon requests from a number of donor agencies, 
this question was added in 2016. The self-reported matriculation marks 
of the respondents in 2016 suggested higher performance among the 
Bamar ethnic group, with a majority of the respondents scoring in the 
range of 400–99. The performance of the non-Bamar ethnic groups 
was in the lower range between 300–99. Women performed higher than 
their male counterparts. The difference between ethnic groups was not 
unexpected as pupils for whom Burmese is not a first language struggle 
to follow the lessons in Burmese at government schools, and generally 
lag behind Bamar students throughout their academic careers. This has 
always resulted in a lower numbers of ethnic teachers, so that that the 
cycle of ethnic underperformance repeats itself – an issue elaborated 
upon in Chapter 6 in this volume.
Being a teacher in Myanmar is a challenging profession. Despite the 
respect bestowed by society, salaries are low and, as civil servants, 
teachers are sent where the government deems it needs them. Younger 
teachers are often sent to remote areas, where life is especially hard 
if they do not speak the local language. Mairead Condon’s Masters 
dissertation revealed that many women who entered the teaching 
profession felt it was impossible to marry. They were often posted away 
from their families, and husbands unable to move with them might not 
accept this kind of an arrangement – a situation her respondents found 
deeply unjust (Condon, 2017). It was, therefore, interesting to find out 
more about the motivation of the students in wanting to become a 
teacher. In both years of the study, around half the students said they 
wanted to serve their country or contribute to society. The second most 
important reason was a stable job and a regular salary – although it is not 
high, at least it is guaranteed. A small percentage cited love for children 
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or parental expectations. The numbers of those responding that their 
‘parents pushed them’ can probably be attributed to the young age of 
respondents. Only very few said that they did not want to become a 
teacher and had no choice. The main significant difference between male 
and female students was with regard to a stable and regular salary, with 
more women choosing that option as motivation. Given the social and 
economic changes in Myanmar that include rampant inflation, a stable 
government job can be attractive. Whilst the teaching profession has 
traditionally been badly paid, this – as mentioned above – changed with 
the Thein Sein government (2011–5) increasing pay for public servants 
and teachers, and offering a bonus for those working in remote and 
conflict-affected areas.
Respondents were asked where they wanted to teach once they 
were qualified and they were asked to choose between where their family 
was located and where the government needed them or would place 
them. Reflecting the motivation of wanting to serve their country, around 
two-thirds were happy to accept the government’s choice. This seems 
related to a great sense of nationalism and personal responsibility 
towards the development of their country.
In both years, career goals were fairly evenly distributed across the 
sector. Very few respondents wanted to join a private school or envisioned 
a career outside of the education system. Looking in more detail at the 
responses, and adjusting for sample size differences between men and 
women, it became clear that for those who expressed their career goal as 
being a teacher at secondary school, women were 50 per cent more likely 
to state that as a goal. Women were also a third more likely than men to 
pursue the goal of becoming a teacher educator or a head teacher. Men 
were 50 per cent more likely to state their desire of becoming a township 
education officer as a driver for being a teacher, and a quarter more likely 
than women to state their desire of becoming a state education officer as 
a career goal – posts that hold real power compared to head teachers in 
schools. This is reflected in Myanmar’s administrative reality where 
women are more prevalent in the teaching profession at every grade 
(including head teacher) apart from senior administrative posts such as 
township education officers or state education officers, which are mostly 
held by men. For those who expressed their career goal as moving on 
from teaching as a profession (which has an impact on attrition), men 
were one-and-a-half-times more likely than women to state that goal 
before completing their training, possibly because of salary issues.
One of the main issues the survey endeavoured to uncover was the 
challenges student teachers expected to face in the classroom and how 
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their training prepared them for these issues. Student teachers, recently 
having left school, understand the issues of the education system both 
from the student as well as the teacher perspective, making them the 
ideal respondent to review the state of education across Myanmar. 
Responses to the question about what challenges the student teachers 
expected once they became teachers were incredibly varied and detailed. 
Student teachers gave very frank and very personalised answers, 
revealing anxieties and worries in commencing their profession. The 
answers fell into several categories that included: lack of classroom 
experience, a real worry of implementing CCA, infrastructural issues 
that include everything from lack of transport to too many students in 
class, dealing with parents, living far away from home, being sent to a 
remote area, language issues and confronting student and family poverty.
The quotes below are samples from a very rich set of responses 
that was given across the 4,000 plus surveys. Very few said that they 
expected to face no problems, or felt confident enough to deal with 
whatever arose. However, in the section asking them how prepared they 
felt to start their career as a teacher, the student teachers mostly said 
that they felt prepared enough to teach children at school. Two major 
issues that emerged across the two years were classroom experience and 
CCA. The qualitative data pointed to a marked lack of confidence, as 
student teachers felt they did not have the practical, in-classroom 
experience that they would need to be able to apply what they were 
learning at the education colleges. Some spoke of their shyness and their 
fear in dealing with students for the first time. A few also mentioned that 
children might have a better understanding of the new technologies than 
their teachers and they might not be able to respond to all questions, 
something which made them particularly nervous as it would erode 
respect for them. Responses by students included the following (Lall, 
2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘The difficulties are having little classroom experience and not 
being friendly with the students, being at the start of the career and 
being worried, and being tired of doing the teaching and admin 
stuff.’
• ‘When I become a teacher, I’d be younger than other teachers, so 
the students might not show respect. I’m worried that I can’t 
overcome the new experiences and I can’t put the teaching theories 
into practice. But I’ll try.’
• ‘Technology has improved now. The children are curious and 
inquisitive. I suppose only if teachers know about everything, they 
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will be able to answer the children’s questions. The children will 
expect teachers to be aware of the development changes.’
• ‘The problems that I might have when I become a teacher is how 
to control and manage students. As I am the only son in my family 
and I don’t have any siblings, I have never done baby-sitting. So it 
would be difficult for me to manage and monitor students. Teaching 
knowledge is pretty good through the training at this college. 
However, we still need to know how to monitor students.’
• ‘Limited classroom experience, large number of students and too 
many lessons to cover in limited period.’
• ‘Inexperience in teaching, weak in classroom management, 
numerous students to handle and unfamiliar with the lesson.’
The fear of using/practicing CCA is directly linked to a lack of classroom 
experience and the fact that often the student teachers themselves are 
not taught with this methodology. In addition, teachers expressed the 
fear of being overtaken by student knowledge. The student teachers 
point to the fact that CCA requires them to have a lot of knowledge, as 
students would expect them to answer questions on everything under the 
sun. They also pointed to the practicalities of overcrowded classrooms, 
short periods, lack of teaching aids and not enough time to cover all the 
material on the syllabus. Lastly, they were aware that school cultures, 
older teachers and parents might not be supportive of what is a relatively 
new teaching method in Myanmar.
• ‘If CCA is used, I need to have a lot of knowledge to be able to answer 
the students’ questions so I think I have to read so many books. I also 
need to guide them [the students] to develop right attitudes so that 
the standards of the education system of Myanmar will be upgraded.’
• ‘There might be delays in lessons because of not having enough 
time if we use CCA; we might not complete the lessons in time 
because individuals need to think and answer. These problems are 
more common in schools where there are many students and just a 
few teachers.’
• ‘I will face difficulties in the rural areas because Myanmar is a 
developing country and so there aren’t enough classrooms and 
teaching aids; [in those circumstances] I will have difficulty in 
teaching. Plus, there are not many schools that use CCA and it’s 
difficult to use it.’
• ‘Approaching CCA can be difficult as it is a new methodology and 
not widely used in Myanmar. I might not be able to answer the 
students’ questions because of my inadequate general knowledge.’
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• ‘[I] won’t be able to use CCA when we are in rural areas because of 
[constrained] classroom space and other conditions.’
• ‘Problems with parents, colleagues and the education staff because 
of the difference in teaching techniques and not all the teachers 
use CCA.’
• ‘There are difficulties in accomplishing CCA [objectives] because 
most students are used to rote learning and are not good at thinking 
on their feet.’
These responses reflect issues that had been uncovered in previous 
research where teachers find CCA impossible to administer due to 
overcrowded classrooms, time and material constraints as well as the 
chapter-end tests that dominate the pace of the syllabus (Lall, 2010, Lall 
2011; Lall et al. 2013). Since student teachers are aware of the realities 
of the classrooms where they themselves have been taught not that long 
ago, they cannot see how – without significant structural transformation 
of the system – the teaching method can be successfully changed.
Other difficulties included the exam system, the problems in the 
classroom (the result of the lack of preparation), tuitions (most teachers 
give priority to tuitions), the need to deal with the parents (some parents 
are likely to offer bribes), and private schools, regarding which one 
respondent commented: ‘those schools spoil the teachers and just focus 
on making their school famous’. Some further comments of note were as 
follows (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘In G4 and G8 exams are held for students by the government. If 
I am responsible for grade 4, when students fail the government 
exam, I have to explain why this has happened to the superiors. 
That is why, starting from grade 1, students are allowed to pass 
exams only if they are qualified.’
• ‘Having lots of students, heavy workload and the exam system. 
As I can’t pay full attention to the students, it leads to rote learning.’
• ‘The system today is exam-oriented so we can’t provide the 
knowledge they need … there is little time to teach all subjects. We 
can’t help students reach their true potential.’
Infrastructure as a challenge was a broad category and referred to 
inadequate textbooks, too many students in a classroom, a lack of 
teaching aids, too little time to get through the materials, but also 
practical considerations such as issues with public transport both for 
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the students and themselves. Some further comments were as follows 
(Lall 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘The textbooks are not up to date, so I will have difficulty in adapting 
the text to the outside world, e.g. Science and Geography subjects 
are not practically useful subjects, they [the students] can’t make a 
living with those. For the students, earning is more important than 
learning. I’ll also face difficulty in using teaching aids.’
• ‘The difficulties are having too many students and too many lessons 
to teach in a short time. The teacher will be stressed when the 
number of students and teachers are not balanced. If there are 
many lessons to finish in a short time, there won’t be any preparation 
time and we can’t focus on teaching the key concepts.’
• ‘Because I want to teach in rural areas, the difficulties are with 
transportation, food and accommodation, teaching, managing 
language and social dealings.’
• ‘Because the number of classrooms and the number of student 
numbers are not matched, too many students gather in one 
classroom. This makes it difficult to teach them, to guide them and 
to teach them with the CCA approach.’
• ‘Transportation can be a problem. Although urban areas are very 
modern and developed, there are many children who are living in 
very far places and poor regions. It could be difficult to educate 
these children.’
• ‘There will be problems with the school building, toilet, pure water, 
living and food.’
• ‘The problem with living, water, electricity, teaching aids, and 
having not enough teachers are prevalent in remote areas.’
Communication, social structure and hierarchy issues that included 
worry about lack of respect, social communication with parents who 
are less educated and the fear of communication with superiors, were 
other prominent themes. It showed that the student teachers were 
very aware of how important communication issues are, and that they 
felt unprepared to deal with this particular aspect of the job. Many 
had problems of self-confidence, and some were afraid of students and 
superiors alike. The status of a teacher is crucial, as they feel they will 
be young and inexperienced, yet expected to live up to a professional 
ideal by colleagues and parents alike. Some comments were as follows 
(Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
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• ‘I will have social problems with the senior teachers and difficulties 
in the workplace because of my lack of experience – and I’m still 
learning.’
• ‘Firstly, teachers must deal with students’ parents. Then, they have 
to associate with people from the community. As the social status of 
being a teacher is so high, teachers need to be very careful how to 
behave in society. When we meet naughty students, it is our duty 
to train them very well.’
• ‘As I am an ethnic person and a small and short person; I think 
I could face difficulties in getting respect from the children and to 
communicate well with children.’
• ‘If I’ve got my position in a very far place, I’ll have the usual problems 
like communication. It’s hard for me to take responsibility for 
students. I’m not sure that students will understand my teaching.’
• ‘When I become a teacher, I may face the problems of having less 
experience, social problems and dealing with my superiors.’
• ‘Problems with parents, colleagues and the education staff because 
of the difference in teaching techniques and not all the teachers 
use CCA.’
Parents were also seen as a challenge for the student teachers. In 
Myanmar, parental involvement in education is rare, and usual only 
amongst the middle classes living in urban areas. Student teachers 
understand that in rural areas parental priorities will be different, and 
whilst all parents want their children to be well educated and do well, 
parents might not always be able to support their children adequately. 
In addition, becoming a teacher gives the young student teachers a 
respected social status that can complicate relations with parents. Some 
have prejudices towards rural populations referring to parents as ‘less 
intelligent’. Some comments were as follows (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘If I become a teacher, the difficulties are having problems with the 
parents. In some places, the parents have little knowledge and so 
they can’t train their children. So the children might be spoilt, their 
thinking might not be creative and they might not listen to the 
teacher.’
• ‘The difficulty is that the village people don’t encourage education 
since the parents dropped out from their middle school and there 
are no graduates.’
• ‘I need to understand the parents because they want their children 
to be educated and they rely on us for this.’
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• ‘I have to face the problem of lack of trust of students’ parents and 
[constant blame on teachers for student’s performance] because 
most of their parents think that teachers are greedy.’
Living away from home and far away from parents was less prominent 
than the other issues detailed above, but it did worry quite a number of 
student teachers. Most are very young, and until now have been able to 
rely on their families for help and support. The first posting is likely to be 
in a remote or rural area, far away from home where they have no support 
networks. Some comments were as follows (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘The difficulties are having to work in a remote area because my 
parents are old now. Plus, I’m the youngest in the family and I won’t 
be able to take care of my parents if I have to work in far away 
places.’
• ‘My parents will feel very sad if I’m away from them because my 
father loves me so much and he doesn’t eat well without me, even 
when I’m studying in another town near to my place.’
• ‘The problems related to transportation, teaching and living 
associated with remote areas … the need to choose the right 
methods and the security issue.’
• ‘Difficulties in food and accommodation due to being away from 
home.’
Being posted to a remote area, that could be a ‘black’ zone or conflict 
area was also a fear expressed by a large number of student teachers. 
They worry about shortages of water and food, not being used to local 
food and customs, lack of transport and not having family support. 
Serving in a school located in such an area also means that there is a 
shortage of teachers, resulting in multigrade teaching and that sometimes 
students cannot attend class due either to having to help their families or 
due to the on-going conflict. Some comments were as follows (Lall, 2015; 
Lall, 2016b):
• ‘The difficulty is food and accommodation because if I need to go to 
a remote area, there are no relatives, no place for me to stay, and if 
I have to stay in someone else’s house, I won’t be comfortable.’
• ‘In remote areas the students can’t attend the classes regularly and 
I need to do lots of duties because there won’t be enough teachers.’
• ‘If you serve in far-away places, it can be difficult to live and adapt to 
a different society.’
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• I have to face issues such as no electricity, poor telephone network, 
food availability in a remote area.’
• ‘The problems with transportation, water shortage, parents, 
children from the different backgrounds, and having to work in 
brown areas.’
Language is another overarching theme, often linked to being posted in a 
remote area where students do not speak Burmese. There were some 
respondents who were worried they would not be understood and then 
there were those who were more worried they would not be able to 
understand the students (or parents) where they were posted. These 
challenges were more prevalent with student teachers who were being 
trained in ethnic states, but they were not often mentioned by respondents 
in Bamar-majority regions. A few student teachers voiced their fear of not 
being able to speak English well enough to teach at higher levels. Another 
set of student teachers said they were shy and therefore their voice did not 
carry, their language was not clear and that this frightened them. Some 
comments were as follows (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘I will have difficulty with the language, for instance, if I have to 
work in some states with ethnic groups, we might face the problems 
of not understanding each other’s language.’
• ‘There will be difficulty in teaching English because it is not our 
mother tongue and there will be difficulty in pronouncing it 
correctly.’
• ‘The difficulties are with languages in the border areas, if there are 
so many people who don’t understand Myanmar, the teaching 
won’t be effective.’
• ‘The government does not know how to assign teachers to several 
provinces. If you are wrongly assigned to work in a place speaking a 
different language, you have to manage to speak in a different 
language and to predict how children feel. All these are hardships 
faced by a teacher.’
• ‘The problems with dialects and people living there, because of living 
in remote areas, they might not understand Myanmar language.’
• ‘Problems with the dialect, having not enough contact with the 
students and students might not understand the classroom 
language when teaching English.’
Very few respondents thought poverty of the resident population at their 
posting was another problem they might face. Those who did worried 
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about not being able to solve the problems that the children and their 
families faced and somehow felt responsible. This links in with the status 
of the teacher in Myanmar society, who are seen as natural leaders in 
society representing wisdom and, therefore, possibly expected to solve 
community issues.
Some respondents tended to see students as part of the problem, 
saying that they were dirty, rude or less intelligent. Some comments were 
as follows (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘I’m worried about whether I could manage a large number of 
children since in some schools a large number of students are stuffed 
in one classroom like the schools I went to when I was young. I also 
find it annoying if the students do not care for personal hygiene.’
• ‘The students might be dirty, rude and they don’t understand my 
language.’
• ‘To face the parents of the students because now, government has a 
rule that we are not allowed to strike children if they become rude. 
If we strike them for their rudeness, parents will send a complaint 
letter to officials; in addition, if we can’t teach those rude children, 
the parents will blame us.’
Some respondents were even afraid of children, but interestingly, these 
were not the ones who admitted that they did not want to become 
teachers. Some comments were as follows (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘I am so afraid of the children that I don’t dare to face them. When I 
am in front of the classroom, I may be shaking. I don’t like to be 
blamed. I am worried if the children will understand my teaching 
because I don’t have enough experience.’
• ‘The problem is that I am afraid of children. Because of the fear 
of children, it could lead me to put in less effort in teaching 
comprehensively.’
The fewest responses came from those respondents who did not see the 
challenges or problems ahead, and those who felt that they would be able 
to manage whatever came their way. Some comments were as follows 
(Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b):
• ‘If I become a teacher, I don’t think I will have difficulties because I 
will teach my students with as much effort as I can. Plus, I will have 
prepared for the lessons.’
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• ‘If I become a teacher, I believe that there will be almost no difficul-
ties because I have confidence and a strong personality and I am 
interested in teaching children as well as training them to be decent. 
However, many challenges there are, I wouldn’t give up this job for 
the sake of the children and their parents.’
• ‘The problem just depends on my attitude; I will try to find solutions 
to all those teaching problems because I have this desire to do my 
job for the best.’
• ‘A teacher needs to manage different students from different 
backgrounds, so we need to learn teaching and also to fulfil the 
needs of the students who have different natures and personalities. 
I’m confident enough as I am now in the second year at this 
Education College and I’ve learned the methods of teaching, those 
of motivating the students, and of tackling the difficulties from 
subjects like Psychology and Education Theories.’
• ‘There won’t be big problems because I’m willing to serve my 
country. But I’ll have a problem with my family because they aren’t 
supporting my career choice.’
• ‘I chose a career in teaching to support and serve the State. […] 
There are difficulties in any jobs. But I am ready with the spirit of 
teacher [to face] whatever problems I meet because my hobby is 
exactly the same as my career.’
The overall findings from the two-year study (Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b) 
concluded that, at the time of writing, teacher education does not include 
sufficient practical classroom experience as an integral part of the 
training, and teacher training methodology is teacher centric and not 
learner centric. Students find it difficult to apply child-centred methods 
themselves as they have mostly not been taught this way themselves. 
It also concluded that newly qualified teachers are not supported in 
the early years of their training and that young teachers and student 
teachers are worried as to how to stay on top of new or changing 
knowledge and how to answer student questions. It also concluded that 
there is insufficient IT access and training at the colleges that can lead to 
a gap between teachers and students, especially in urban areas; and that 
no ethnic language training is made available for those who will (or want 
to) be posted in ethnic or remote areas.
Over recent years, development partners have started to support 
the education colleges’ reforms to improve teacher education, most 
recently as part of the NESP.
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Development partners supporting teacher education 
and further training
One of the main early projects supporting teacher training was JICA’s 
‘Strengthening of Child Centred Approach’ active from 2004 to 2011. 
In addition to training, the project also proposed concrete descriptions 
of teacher competencies. In the 2000s, the MoE requested JICA to help 
develop a teacher’s guide to new textbooks that they had published 
in order to support teachers’ understanding of child-centred approaches. 
A number of workshops and seminars were conducted by JICA to 
introduce CCA to the education colleges and improve teacher training. 
They also developed model lesson plans for active learning, and 
introduced peer review of lessons (British Council, 2016: 17). Other CCA 
programmes developed in parallel, but many focused on teachers 
in the monastic or ethnic systems, which were easier to access than 
government schools.28
The three major programmes run by development partners 
that engage with teacher education and teacher training include the 
UNICEF’s School-based In-service Teacher Education (SITE) project and 
competency frameworks, TREE under the DFID-funded Myanmar UK 
Partnership for Education (MUPE) programme (the former BC EfECT 
programme) that focuses on English and teaching methods of teacher 
educators and UNESCO’s STEM. There are a few other smaller 
programmes as well, such as UNICEF’s head teacher training that is 
offered to 5,000 head teachers in 34 townships, focusing on management 
and instructional leadership. The programme is delivered through a 
cascade model of training and includes school assessment tools, advice 
on planning and how to mobilise the community and, most importantly, 
the head teacher’s role in teacher development and CPD for staff. This 
programme, although helping to develop school leaders, has limited 
effect on the education of student teachers or early career teachers.
Supporting UNICEF’s in-service and teacher education for 
teacher educators (SITE)29
UNICEF’s SITE was funded by a consortium including the British, 
Australian, Danish and Norwegian aid agencies and was part of QBEP 2.30 
The SITE project piloted a programme of school-based professional 
development for existing primary teachers in Mon State in 2012. This 
included teachers in government, monastic and ethnic/community 
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schools. The project was based on a series of ten self-study distance 
learning modules, allowing teachers to draw on their classroom 
experience and helping them collaborate with other teachers in inter-
school clusters (Higgens et al., 2016: 109). The focus was on the 
development of pedagogical skills and reflective, child-friendly teaching 
practices. Since teachers did not leave their schools for training, the 
learning was grounded in the reality of the teachers’ individual classroom 
realities. Experienced teachers are meant to support younger, less 
experienced colleagues and the head teacher has a mentoring role. 
Capacity building included a programme for in-service teacher training 
based in schools (SITE) that a local network of state-level training 
staff, including teacher educators at education colleges, and TEO staff 
provided through cluster-based, in-service training sessions and 
monitoring visits. Head teachers were offered a five-day course to help 
them in their role to provide guidance to teachers during SITE activities. 
Part of SITE also included working with the BC to produce competency 
frameworks for teachers, teacher educators, head teachers and TEOs. 
The integrated nature of the programme, allowing teachers from 
different sectors to work on these CPD modules, has been one of 
the very few instances that the ‘silo-ed’ sectors of Myanmar’s education 
system has been broken down.31 However, the independent final 
evaluation showed that in order to change their behaviour, teachers 
needed more training in interactive approaches and how to include 
discussions and dialogue in their teaching, as well as opportunities 
for peer-to-peer support (Stenning, 2018: 11). At the point of the final 
evaluation, no questions were asked as to why teachers were not doing 
these things or what the barriers were. Issues raised included the lack of 
an initial needs assessment and the top-down nature of the project 
(UNICEF, 2016: vii, 21–2).32 One of the main issues at the time was that 
the SITE CCA approaches were not supported by the examination system. 
Another significant factor hindering SITE activities were transfers and 
promotions. For SITE to work, a ‘critical mass of teachers’ were needed, 
without which other teachers lost motivation (UNICEF, 2016: 32).
The English for Education College Trainers (EfECT) 
Project – now replaced by Towards Results in Education 
and English (TREE)
The EfECT project was initiated in 2013 when former President Thein Sein 
asked the UK Prime Minister during a state visit to provide expatriate 
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teacher–trainers to work in Myanmar’s education colleges to support 
teacher educators with English proficiency and teaching methods. This 
became a GBP 4.5 million DFID and BC-funded project that deployed 
50 expatriate staff (half taken from the BC and half from the Voluntary 
Service Overseas) across 20 education colleges and two institutes of 
education to work with 2,200 teacher educators.
In response to the failure of CCA in government schools, EfECT 
developed a teaching methodology course which combined learner- 
centred approaches with the use of direct instruction, and which 
emphasised developing critical thinking and building on prior knowledge 
throughout (Clifford, 2016). According to Ian Clifford, who headed the 
programme and whose MA dissertation examined how EfECT impacted 
teacher agency: ‘teachers have traditionally had few opportunities to 
make choices and realise their agency as professionals. […] If a pedagogy 
which encourages autonomy in students is to be promoted then teachers 
themselves must be enabled, and given the tools, to make choices about 
their subjects, careers and methods’ (Clifford, 2016: 32). Because of 
decades without much autonomy, teachers and teacher educators had 
little confidence in using different approaches and teaching methods. 
Teacher educators cited a range of structural constraints to the use of 
alternative methodologies including time, assessment, class sizes, 
classroom layout, levels of student teachers’ motivation, training, and 
fears around the perceptions of teacher educators. Clifford’s findings 
showed that the programme offered a range of methods to teacher 
educators, including some support for promoting more teacher-directed 
whole-class teaching such as direct instruction, and that they felt 
empowered to choose the type of method that was appropriate in different 
circumstances.
The focus of the programme, however, was in the first instance 
the use and quality of English. According to the EfECT needs analysis 
(British Council, 2015), around a third of teacher educators are expected 
to teach their subjects with English as a medium of instruction. In reality, 
Burmese is used, as neither teachers nor students are proficient enough 
in English. In fact, the levels of English of the teacher educators was 
found to be very low (British Council, 2015).33 Drinan, who was engaged 
by the BC to undertake two studies to support the work of the CESR in 
2013 commented on this as well: ‘Instructors teaching English sometimes 
teach in English but more often in Myanmar. This is because students 
enter the college with low matriculation results and low levels of English 
language proficiency. Those spoken to felt most of their students were 
elementary level at reading and writing. Their speaking and listening is 
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even lower. Very few enter the education colleges at an intermediate 
level and those who do are probably graduate educators from university. 
Therefore, the translation method is used in teaching and students 
“learn” through memorisation’ (Drinan, 2013: 31).
Overall, EfECT was deemed to have had a positive outcome as 
teacher educators improved their English and increased their confidence. 
Simon Borg, who undertook the final evaluation of the programme 
commented: ‘Relative to their position at baseline, TEs across Myanmar 
made measurable and visible progress in their English proficiency, 
knowledge of teaching methodology, confidence, teaching skills and 
basic reflective competence. Their entry levels of English were particularly 
modest, and the fact that they performed as well as they did over the two 
years on a programme taught entirely in English is further evidence of 
EfECT’s achievements’ (Borg et al., 2018: 84).
Towards Results in Education and English (TREE) 2019–24 builds on 
EfECT and aims to improve the quality of teaching of teacher educators 
and academic oversight of management staff in teacher education institu-
tions (Myanmar Teacher Education Working Group, 2019). There are 
four integrated workstreams: CPD; English proficiency and pedagogy; 
systems strengthening through practicum and partnerships; and inclusive 
practices and disability. These workstreams will integrate two cross- 
cutting themes – educational technology and research and monitoring – 
which develop over three phases: Foundation, Consolidation and 
Continuation. At the time of writing, TREE is in the process of deploying 
50 trainers to work in the education colleges and use education technology 
in order to support the workstreams (DFID, 2019). TREE is supported by 
DFID with GBP 12 million (DFID, 2019).
UNESCO’s ‘Strengthening Pre-Service Teacher Education 
in Myanmar’ (STEM) project
The UNESCO’s ‘Strengthening Pre-Service Teacher Education in 
Myanmar’ (STEM) project is funded by DFAT, the Australian bilateral 
development agency. There are a number of programme elements that 
relate to teacher education and the management of education colleges. 
In the first instance, STEM is focusing on the reform of the teacher 
education curriculum over a five-year period that will transform the 
teacher education curriculum in the education colleges to degree level. 
STEM also aims to improve the ICT equipment for the education colleges, 
with teacher educators being trained in how to use ICT, and STEM 
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developing a curriculum module around ICT for teacher educators to 
deliver to student teachers.
STEM was originally conceived of as one component of the 
multi-donor ‘Quality Basic Education Programme’ (QBEP). QBEP 
consisted of three components, with UNICEF having responsibility for 
Output One (policy), while UNESCO had responsibility for delivering 
Output Two (curriculum/pedagogy) and Output Three (management) 
(UNESCO, 2016: 14–5). Under the QBEP, STEM was initially intended 
to focus on four pilot education colleges. However, the MoE felt that all 
education colleges needed to be involved. In 2014, Australia decided to 
directly fund the partnership with UNESCO for the implementation of 
STEM, independent of the QBEP programme (UNESCO, 2016: 14–5). 
STEM Phase One (2014–7) focused on three outcome areas: teacher 
policy, curriculum and pedagogy, management and ICT. According to 
the curriculum review report (UNESCO, 2016: 14–5; DFAT, 2017), STEM 
had successfully worked on the following outputs:
• the current curriculum at ECs has been reviewed and a new 
two-year diploma curriculum has been proposed
• the curriculum framework for a four-year degree programme 
for basic and middle school teachers has been drafted
• a teacher-competency framework has been drafted using a 
participatory process
• an ICT subject has been developed and is being delivered in 
all education colleges, each education college now has two to 
three ICT tutors and the programme is continuing to support 
the capacity building of ICT teachers through training, the 
installation of internet infrastructure in all education colleges 
and the development of an e-portal.
The Draft Education College Curriculum Framework is at the heart of 
the most important change as it will require teachers to be educated to 
degree level. UNESCO says that the focus is to ensure that student 
teachers master the competencies (a combination of content knowledge, 
skills and attitude) needed to produce effective learning for pupils in 
a classroom. The training approach is changing in that teachers no 
longer only receive the (theoretical) knowledge to teach – relevant in 
a content-based curriculum – but receive training in the ability to teach 
through a competency-based approach. The Draft Education College 
Curriculum Framework is linked to the TCSF discussed above, which 
describes the minimum competency standards a teacher should be able 
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to demonstrate (UNESCO, 2016: 16). The new proposed modules include 
the following:
1. Educational Studies: that focuses on the ability to teach rather 
than just being knowledgeable of teaching.
2. Curriculum and Pedagogical Studies: an integrated approach 
wherein the underlying educational theory and knowledge 
required is learned through practicing real teaching and 
applying concepts in the classroom. Academic subjects are to 
be taught in conjunction with how they need to be taught in 
either primary or middle school.
3. The Practicum: extended from the current curriculum, 
monitored and supported to contribute to learning from 
feedback and practice.
4. Core skills: communication, use of language, additional 
English, and ICT have been added as new core skills.
5. Self-study and reflection: ensuring time for investigation, 
self-study and reflection, especially online as connectivity 
improves. (UNESCO, 2016: 16)
While the changes seem to address some of the shortcomings of the 
current structure, there seem to have been insufficient links between the 
teacher education curriculum to the new basic education curriculum. 
JICA’s CREATE MTR (Mizuno et al., 2019) confirmed that there had been 
a collaboration mechanism between CREATE and UNESCO–STEM to 
link the new primary school curriculum with the new education college 
materials (lesson plans, lecture notes and student handouts) and that 
‘Grade 1–3 training modules for education college teacher educators 
was developed and distributed at the time of the Central Training.’ 
(Mizuno et al., 2019: 11) But it also seems that not all CREATE materials 
were introduced to the teacher educators and student teachers in 
education colleges because the timings of the two projects were not 
coordinated. In the event, some of the materials provided by JICA to 
UNESCO arrived too late to be included in the training materials.34 This 
does not seem to be seen by JICA as too much of a problem because it has 
produced detailed teacher guidebooks, which allow even less well-
trained teachers to deliver the class with CCA elements. Each chapter has 
detailed suggestions on activities, questions with the relevant answers 
(so no teacher loses face in front of the children) and an explanation on 
how to achieve the required learning outcomes. There seems to be a 
fundamental disconnect between what UNESCO has in mind for the 
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teachers, and what JICA is designing for the classroom, showing how 
poor the development partners’ coordination is.
STEM has also been working on the management of the 22 
education colleges in light of the changes brought about by the NESP. 
The UNESCO management review report (UNESCO, 2016) explains 
that the new organisational structures of the education colleges are 
not clear to education college staff and that education college staff, 
including managers and administrators, are not clear on the roles and 
responsibilities of each position in the new education college structure. 
To UNESCO, this indicates a need to review existing guidelines for the 
management of education colleges, and the development of policies 
and guidelines in areas where they have not yet been developed 
(UNESCO, 2016: 6–7). The UNESCO report also recommended that ICT 
needs to be mainstreamed as an integral part of efficient education 
college management and will require more ICT equipment, software and 
training. In addition, the report mentions the need for a systematic 
training programme for education college staff, including management 
staff, such as a human resource development programme. While 
education colleges have college management boards, these do not have 
the decision-making authority to propose necessary posts or adjust the 
number of staff and how these are allocated. UNESCO suggests that the 
development of an online sharing platform for education colleges could 
facilitate greater learning and collaboration between teacher educators 
at the different education colleges, which could enhance their profes-
sional development (UNESCO, 2016: 24). Given that education college 
management is centralised at MoE department level, the management 
issues are likely to remain challenging.
The Australian Government reports that STEM has operated in a 
difficult environment and that problems included the restructuring of the 
MoE following the 2015 elections, and policy decisions being deferred 
until after the establishment of the NEPC in October 2016. Nevertheless 
the programme continues – STEM Phase Two (2017–20) started in 
January 2017 and builds on STEM Phase One, adding a fourth output 
related to human rights, equity and promotion of gender equality.35
The National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) Mid-Term 
Review on teacher education
The MTR Inception report (MoE, 2019b) reminds the readers that the 
NESP had promised an integrated approach in order to reform both 
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teacher education and management. The report however finds that: ‘the 
emphasis on reforming teacher management is either overlooked, 
de-emphasised or not yet actioned’ (MoE, 2019b: 45). Nevertheless, 
the MTR acknowledges that progress has been made with regard to the 
Teacher Competency Standards Framework: ‘The standards, elements 
and indicators of the Teachers Competency Standards Framework 
(TCSF), Beginner level, have been developed and piloted and NEPC has 
provided feedback on this. The TCSF aligns with the learning outcomes 
of the four-year competency-based teacher education programs, which 
are to be implemented throughout Myanmar from 2020’ (MoE, 2019d: 
46). In line with the four-year degree structure, the MTR Inception report 
warns that there could be a lack of teachers between 2021 and 2023:
‘To fill this gap MoE has introduced six-months teacher training 
programs for graduates and has proposed the reintroduction of 
Daily Wage Teachers. While these may be short-term solutions to 
maintain teacher strength in the near future, the potential risks 
of reintroducing Daily Wage Teachers (such as increase in the 
number of teachers who apply for promotion to teacher higher 
grades) need to be mitigated, such as through defining a clear time 
period for their deployment’ (MoE, 2019b: 47).
The final MTR report (MoE, 2020) acknowledges that reform mechanisms 
for teachers have been slow and that there still is no Teacher Task Force 
to support an effective teacher management system (MoE, 2020: vii). 
The final report reiterated the issues of a potential lack of teachers 
between 2021 and 2023 due to the four-year degree programme (MoE, 
2020: ix). A masterplan to support recruitment, training for teacher 
educators, building of classrooms and expanding provision of accommo-
dation on campus has been developed. Despite this, there may still be a 
shortage of teacher educators and teachers.
With regard to the priority recommendations for NESP 2019–2021, 
the MTR suggests: ‘Assign high priority to development of strategies 
for the retention of quality teachers through better mechanisms for 
teacher recruitment, deployment, career pathways, and promotion’ 
(MoE, 2020: xiii) in addition to addressing the other issues promised 
by the NESP such as the Teacher Task Force and expanding the TCSF 
at beginner level across all schools. The MTR also recommends that 
it is a priority of education colleges to ensure the effectiveness of the 
new four-year programme as well as the student-centred pedagogical 
approach.
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Conclusion: Teacher education and social justice
The system of teacher education and the teaching profession is inherently 
inequitable. Not only do teachers face their own social justice challenges 
partly due to material constraints, and partly due to the local cultural 
outlook, but teacher education is instrumental in reproducing the same 
social justice issues again and again. The main issues are around gender 
and ethnicity. According to JICA, more than 80 per cent of teachers are 
female. However, only 60 per cent of female teachers become head 
teachers and fewer make it to TEO positions, something reflected in 
the expectations of the student teachers surveyed between 2015 and 
2016 (see Lall, 2015; Lall, 2016b). Serving in conflict-affected areas and 
deployment to remote areas favour men getting quicker promotions 
because they are able to serve in difficult areas, unlike their female counter- 
parts. Recent reforms have tried to address the gender imbalance by 
raising salaries and lowering the selection criteria for men, not something 
that the higher-achieving women are likely to find fair.36 However, the 
issues are more than just salaries. Teaching is seen in Myanmar as a 
service profession where the teacher serves society and is a role model to 
the community in which they work. The transfers often mean that female 
teachers cannot marry, as their husbands might not be able to find a job 
where they are posted. Mairead Condon examined how teacher educators 
felt empowered by their position, finding that teacher educators often 
chose not to marry, both because of society’s expectation and to be ‘free 
from family’ and able to dedicate their lives to their profession (Condon, 
2017). She explained how many of the younger women coming to the 
profession thought these expectations were unfair and that men would 
never behave in this way (Condon, 2017). It can be argued that the 
structure of the teaching profession, as well as the teacher educator 
profession, is in fact exploitative of women and that they do not receive 
the same recognition or respect as their male counterparts.
Marginalisation is rife, and remains unaddressed in teacher 
education and the teaching profession. There are fewer ethnic minority 
teachers in schools than their Bamar counterparts,37 in part because the 
matriculation exam is offered only in Burmese, which is not the mother 
tongue of the ethnic students.38 The Ministry of Border Affairs runs the 
University for Development of National Races (UDNR) located in 
Ywathitgyi, Sagaing Region, that focuses on educating ethnic groups 
in the border areas (JICA, 2013). For decades this has been seen as the 
answer to ‘ethnic teachers’, but the system is in effect discriminatory. 
Education and tEachEr training: is  changing PracticE PossiblE? 191
The lack of ethnic teachers perpetuates the problem of more ethnic 
students not making the matriculation grades that would allow them 
then to become teachers themselves.39
Recent changes in the 2017–8 academic year suggest access to 
education colleges appears now to have become more equitable and 
inclusive. According to Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, the MoE now has a 
township-based enrolment policy for the DTEd teacher-training pathway, 
which means that every year a number of places in the education colleges 
are reserved for candidates in each of the townships of the state/region 
(Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020).40 Therefore, applicants in remote, 
rural, ethnic or poor townships no longer have to compete with those 
in townships with better education and economic opportunities or 
with a predominantly Bamar population. Previously, applicants from the 
majority group Bamar could apply to education colleges in ethnic states. 
As many of them usually performed better in matriculation examinations 
than ethnic students did, they were admitted to education colleges at the 
expense of ethnic applicants.41 This policy is indeed progress, but will take 
time to feed ethnic teachers through the system, balancing the numbers 
with the Bamar majority. Certain ethnic groups from remote areas might 
remain unrepresented, especially if their performance is below that of 
other candidates. Salem-Gervais and Raynaud report that the director 
general in charge of the education colleges in the MoE’s higher education 
department believes that ‘compromises are needed between at least 
three imperatives: (1) the necessity to train more teachers to keep up with 
the recent progresses in access to schooling and efforts to diminish 
student/teacher ratio; (2) decentralization and the training of more local 
teachers; and (3) maintaining the education standards of the teachers’ 
(Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020: 109).
Despite modest improvements, education colleges still need to 
proactively ensure their progress towards equitable and inclusive HEIs 
in all their practices including preparing student teachers to be able to 
apply inclusive pedagogy, for instance, in ensuring learning achievement 
of ethnic children who will have to learn in the Myanmar language. 
According to TREE, reflecting other conversations with SEOs, TEOs and 
teachers over the past decade it was striking that many teacher educators 
and heads of departments seemed to have neither awareness nor interest 
in ethnic culture and language issues for teachers or students. This was 
something they were not preparing student teachers for, possibly due to 
lack of practical experience in local classrooms, and as most teacher 
educators were Burmese, possibly lacking sensitivity around language 
and cultural needs.
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The importance of the fear of language barriers is reflected in 
the views from the 20 education colleges in 2015 and 2016 as detailed 
earlier in the chapter. TREE also questions the wisdom of ‘partner schools’ 
clustered around the education colleges envisioned by the four-year 
degree course that is in the making, which will mean that student 
teachers are not exposed to the areas where most of the ethnic nationality 
groups reside, institutionalising the discrimination further. TREE found 
that in certain cases, the limited scope for shaping policy was used 
positively by local SEOs and TEOs:
For example, in Kayah State the State Ministers of Social Affairs, 
with the support of the Minister of Ethnic Affairs, developed and 
implemented what amounts to a policy of positive discrimination/
affirmative action for accepting ethnic Kayah students into Loikaw’s 
new education college. As a result of the Minister’s formal request 
to the Union Minister of Education, the education college can now 
apply criteria including completion of Grade 10 in Kayah State or a 
Kayah ethnicity stated on one’s national registration card.42
However, in essence, this requires leaders to have a view that differs 
from most others. The fact that teacher educators, teachers and student 
teachers do not question issues around ethnicity and language makes 
them complicit in the reproduction of dominant hierarchies that reinforce 
marginalisation (Metro, 2019) and forms of Bamar ‘cultural imperialism’ 
as ethnic differences are not affirmed. Teachers have been accused of a 
failure of promoting critical thinking and not deviating from textbook 
content. Higgins et al. go as far as to say that the: ‘pedagogy is seen 
as reproduction of violence – rewarding obedience and replication’. 
(Higgins et al., 2016: 92). Their research shows that teachers within 
government and ethnic systems were aware of the potential of history 
to contribute to peace building, but felt constrained by existing curricula 
frameworks. However, the problem goes further in that the teachers’ 
own sectarian approaches to history ‘undermined their commitment to 
exploiting the subjects to contribute to social cohesion’ (Higgins et al., 
2016: 123).
Education colleges have made some progress in inclusive access 
in terms of gender, yet according to the NESP MTR (MoE, 2020: 48) 
the numbers of female student teachers still far exceeded those of 
male student teachers from 2014–5 to 2017–8.43 The root cause of the 
disparities remains fundamentally structural and the education reforms 
are not engaging with the structures that recreate the inequity and social 
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justice challenges. The full new teacher education curriculum cannot 
yet be judged. However, given that the changes to the basic education 
curriculum do not address gender and ethnic disparities in a systematic 
way, it is questionable how far the new education college degree will 
engage with social justice issues that are so engrained in Myanmar’s 
culture and society.
What the reforms do offer is an increased level of monitoring 
through the new teacher competency framework. It is unclear how far 
this new system of accountability will focus on the teaching and learning 
process, promote equity in the classroom and the staff room, and/or be 
used as a tool to control. Technical monitoring might not engage with 
the actual learning happening in the classroom, but rather focus on 
indicators that can be easily measured, ranging from number of students 
and teachers, to other materials they find present in the school (Higgins 
et al., 2016: 97). So while there is an urgent need to reform teacher 
education, what is on offer does not at present engage with the structural 
inequalities of the system. The question remains as to how far the 
additional interventions in teacher education and training offered by 
development partners are able to engage with these issues.
No donor/development partner-led work seems to directly 
engage with the inherent issue of gender disparity, however, Higgins 
et al. claim that conflict, peace and by extension ethnic issues are 
being considered (Higgins et al., 2016). The Research Consortium on 
Education and Peacebuilding looked at teacher education interventions 
and development partner support through a ‘peace promotion lens’. 
Their premise is that teachers are a critical component for the peace 
process to be successful and sustainable. Teachers they spoke to agreed, 
for example, stating the following:
… They are the medium connecting, like improving the youths, 
for students to understand the country, to understand each other 
and the foundation of the country in every sector. So the teacher is 
very important, the teacher needs to understand contemporary 
issues and conflict issues and needs [to be] more proficient in their 
language, their subjects. (Higgins et al., 2016: 98)
However, teachers’ primary role as expected by parents and the MoE is 
not to promote peace, but to complete the curriculum so as to prepare 
children for exams. Examining four development partner programmes,44 
they concluded that all programmes had: ‘frequent implicit and indirect 
approaches to enhancing the peace building role of teachers.’45 The team 
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claims that teachers to whom they spoke understood that the pedagogical 
and managerial skills they were given through the training was relevant 
to their roles in the classroom, especially to establishing peaceful relations 
at their school, but this did not necessarily reflect on the wider issues 
of ethnic relations, conflict and peace across the country. However, the 
emphasis on demonstrating respect, a lack of bias when dealing with 
student diversity, critical thinking, and using problem-solving techniques 
do teach students different approaches to solving issues without violence. 
How difficult all of this is will be made clear in the next two chapters 
of this volume that engage with education issues faced by the ethnic 
nationalities across Myanmar.
Notes
 1 At the time there were only 20 education colleges. There are now 22.
 2 Chapter 6, dedicated to language, looks in more detail at the alternative teacher education 
college that was set up by the Pa-O to specifically train those ethnic nationality candidates that 
failed to get into the education colleges.
 3 Language issues are dealt with in Chapter 6 of this volume.
 4 In 2013, and as a part of the education reforms and a way to increase the number of teachers 
in schools, uncertified teachers who have been working at monastic or private schools have 
been allowed to join government schools under a special scheme. These teachers receive a 
month of training and are then employed at a lower salary and without benefits. After a year, 
they can become permanent staff. ‘Since the start of the policy an additional 72,000 teachers 
(representing nearly a quarter of all teachers employed) had been recruited and deployed in 
this way’ (Unpublished WB report on impediments to effective teaching, Yangon 2015). The 
new teacher hiring policy means that it is now much easier to join the profession. This also 
means that state education officers and township education officers now have a greater say 
in which teachers they wish to hire or fire, which previously was the prerogative of the 
ministries in NPT.
 5 The education colleges in Chin and in Kayah State were opened very recently.
 6 Informal discussions with EfECT tutors.
 7 A nine-week practicum in schools.
 8 Informal discussions with EfECT tutors.
 9 The curriculum is being revised – more on this later in this chapter.
10 Informal discussions with EfECT tutors.
11 For more on CREATE see: https://createmm.org/en. At the time of writing, Grades 1–3 and 
Grade 6 textbooks are already in use.
12 See for example: http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/news/strengthening-pre-service-teacher- 
education-myanmar.
13 The purpose of the survey is to ascertain the extent to which teachers understand education 
reform, awareness of the TCSF and whether the TCSF captures effective teaching practice 
in Myanmar.
 
Efforts have been made to disseminate the first level of the TCSF and seek 
feedback; some stakeholders view the TCSF to be over ambitious and catering to the most 
capable teachers. The survey was not accessible for review. 
14 A report for the British Council 2015. ‘English for Education College Trainers’ (EfECT) Project 
Needs Analysis, 15. There is also a smaller teacher training system run by the Ministry of 
Border Affairs to place assistant teachers from Myanmar’s ethnic groups in border areas where 
Myanmar is not the main language spoken. The Ministry of Border Affairs runs the University 
for the Development of the National Races which conducts five-year courses to train teachers 
from minority groups through a similar curriculum but with additional ‘special co-curricular’ 
subjects such as traditional medicine, martial arts and military training.
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15 Specialised advice provided by three national advisers Dr Khin Zaw, Dr Htoo Htoo Aung, 
Dr Myint Thein and U Zaw Htay, retired Director General of the Department of Higher 
Education.
16 Funded by the Governments of Australia and Finland.
17 Other issues include: ‘The context of the relative status, remuneration and profile of current 
teachers across Myanmar (mostly under-qualified women with variation in skill between 
locations) is absent. This detail would clarify the means or resources, incentives and barriers 
to skills upgrading for this group, and for the reform of education colleges. It would also test 
the feasibility of certain delivery platforms such as distance learning for teachers in rural 
locations. The documents do not convey the ethnic diversity of Myanmar and the fact that 
teachers will likely need competencies in multilingual, multicultural classroom management.’ 
(UNESCO, 2019b: 21–2).
18 There are four domains: Domain A: Professional Knowledge and Understanding; Domain B: 
Professional Skills and Practices; Domain C: Professional Values and Dispositions; Domain D: 
Professional Growth and Development.
19 For an analysis of the issues surrounding CCA in Myanmar schools, see Lall, 2010 and Lall, 
2011.
20 The operation and legal framework of Myanmar’s civil service is described in a number of 
related laws, namely the 2010 Union Civil Service Board Law, 2011 Union Civil Service Board 
Rules, 2013 Civil Service Personnel Law and 2014 Civil Service Personnel Rules.
21 ‘Specifically, during the period 1972–2013, nominal wages were only increased six times.’ 
Unpublished WB report (2015) on the impediments of effective teaching. The wage structure 
was fixed in nominal terms during the following periods: 1. 1972–88; 2. 1989–93; 3. 
1993–2000; 4. 2000–6; 5. 2006–9; 6. 2010–3; and 7. 2013–4.
22 The ‘TREE Political Economic Analysis’ is not in the public domain but was shared with the 
author. (TREE Political and Economic Analysis: 9)
23 Discussion with the Director General of the Department of Higher Education in September 
2019.
24 While assistant township education officers (ATEOs) cannot monitor the student teachers 
during their practicum period, ATEOs instruct the respective head teachers to supervise and 
mentor the student teachers (Thornton and Tolmer, 2017: 17). 
25 The demand for teachers will also increase across the system as the school years are expanded 
to include KG plus 12 years of schooling, and the transition from a two- to a four-year teacher 
education course slows the production rate of new graduates. 
26 A four-year School Mentoring and Cluster Programme has recently been put in place aimed at: 
‘Providing in-service continuous professional development to the approximately 90,000 
primary school teachers’. 157 mentors were trained in 2016 in 50 townships, and each month 
a mentor would do 3 weeks of mentoring and have approximately 30–40 mentees with which 
to work. Mentors are trained by a core group consisting of professors from YUOE and some 
education college educators who provide training twice a year for 5–7 days. Mentees are 
teachers with no teaching certificate or unfinished qualifications and with less than three years’ 
teaching experience. ‘Myanmar Additional Financing for the Decentralizing Fund to Schools 
Project (P157231) Community Participation Planning Framework (CPPF), DRAFT, 2016–2017’ 
– cited in Drinan and Zin Zin Win, 2017: 24.
27 Neither the BC nor the author had any input into which student teachers took part.
28 See Chapter 3 on Monastic Education for more on CCA programmes.
29 The final evaluation was conducted by Montrose in 2016. It is unclear how much of the 
programme has continued since then.
30 Quality Basic Education Programme (QBEP) was a four-year (2012–6), USD 76.6 million joint 
Myanmar Multi-Donor Education Fund (MDEF) and MoE effort to strengthen the provision, 
quality, and administration of government basic education. The QBEP programmes supported 
education reform before the NESP brought in the nine transformational shifts. This included 
capacity building and providing direct education services in 34 select disadvantaged 
townships.
31 The Myanmar MoE has provided in-service training for government and Mon National 
Education Committee (MNEC) teachers together, but this was not deemed a success by 
the MNEC teachers. For more on MNEC, see Chapter 7 on EAO education provision in this 
volume. 
32 Final Report Dr Mike Thair (Montrose).
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33 The Report found that levels of English of the teacher educators was low, with 75 per cent 
having a level lower than B1 on the Common European Framework (i.e. 75 per cent lower than 
the intermediate level teacher educators might be expected to have).
34 ‘UNESCO with Montrose has applied some parts of the materials provided by the project to 
develop textbooks and teachers’ guides.’ (p.11 italics added) ‘CDT (Curriculum Development 
Team) and TET (Teacher education team) as well as UNESCO officers explained that it varies 
between subjects but about 50% of materials provided by the project (CREATE) were 
integrated into the Year 1 textbooks and teachers’ guides partly or as a whole. […] In some 
subjects, because the new curriculum materials from the project were provided after the 
UNESCO STEM project had developed the draft of textbooks, it was too late to reflect those 
materials from the project into EC curriculum.’ (Mizuno et al., 2019: 13).
35 The project is being implemented with approximately USD 7.1 million funding support 
by Governments of Finland, Australia and UK provided in varying timeframes (UNESCO, 
2019b). 
36 According to JICA, 2013, one institute of education has now fixed percentages at intake 
(60 per cent male and 40 per cent female). 
37 There is no hard data on this. According to the JICA report (JICA, 2013), course completion 
data suggests that between 1964 and 2010, only 12,493 ethnic teachers have been deployed in 
the system.
38 And there is no offer to lower entrance requirements for ethnic students as has been done to 
increase numbers of male students.
39 This is further discussed in Chapter 6 on language in this volume. 
40 Criteria include the overall capacity of the local education colleges and the student population 
in each township of the state/region, of course, but also the gender of the candidates (a 50/50 
ratio) as well as their subject stream (‘30 per cent arts, 30 per cent science and 40 per cent 
“mixed”). (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020: 109). 
41 Information from informal conversation with staff working for TREE who met with education 
college staff in ethnic states. 
42 From an unpublished report for TREE.
43 For example, 39,249 female and 8,821 male students in 2017–8 academic year (MoE, 2020: 
48). According to a conversation with the staff working for TREE, some education college 
staff believed that selection criteria for male applicants were relaxed in 2019–20, in order to 
increase male teachers and improve the gender ratio among schoolteachers.
44 The BC’s EfECT; UNICEF’s SITE; UNICEF’s HT; and Monastic Education Development Group’s 
Yaung Zin modules (Higgins et al., 2016: 112–3).
45 ‘However, some interventions did explicitly engage with the peacebuilding agency of teachers. 
For instance, the addition of “Conflict Sensitivity” to UNICEF’s head teacher training addresses 
issues of conflict resolution. This emerged out of a recognition within aid agencies and 
amongst recipients of initial training for head teachers that handling conflict and building 
peaceful relationships between students, staff and the wider community was a key aspect of 
the school leader’s role’ (Higgins et al., 2016: 114).
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6
Ethnic education: Language and 
local curriculum issues
Introduction
Despite the reforms, education has remained highly centralised, with 
only Burmese language being allowed as the official means of instruction. 
Policy under the NLD Government has not changed much, although 
ethnic minority languages are now allowed as ‘classroom language’ to 
help explain concepts when necessary,1 mother tongue-based multi- 
lingual education (MTB-MLE) is not presently Myanmar education 
policy, marginalising ethnic hopes and concerns.2 The only concession 
from the government has been the introduction of a ‘local curriculum’ 
(LC) of one period a day for the first three years of education that is 
locally developed and can be taught in an ethnic language.3 The 
development of this LC and its roll-out is haphazard and uneven, 
privileging larger, more organised ethnic groups. This chapter engages 
with the often overlooked voices of minorities within minorities 
relegating their views on language, education and language of instruction 
(LoI), and how this shapes their relationship with both the more 
dominant ethnic groups as well as the ruling Burman majority. All these 
minorities work hard to preserve their ethnic language and culture, 
and depending on where they live and how many other minorities are 
in the same area, have varying views on what the LoI for their children 
at school should be. Despite the prevailing view that most ethnic families 
want their children to learn in their mother tongue or ethnic language, 
there are some who want Burmese to remain the LoI. Many who took 
part in the 2018 fieldwork in Shan and Rakhine States emphasised that 
Burmese was the essential language for their children to be able to get 
good jobs and bring their families and communities out of poverty.4 
Not all communities, therefore, support an MTB-MLE system, and some 
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say they prefer multilingual local teachers who can explain and still use 
the Burmese textbooks with their children. This chapter looks at the 
issue of ethnic language, education and how different ethnic groups want 
the government to deliver a more socially just education system that 
allows their children to compete with their Bamar peers, rather than 
facing a life-long disadvantage that begins in primary schools.
Background on Myanmar’s ethnic diversity and 
languages
Myanmar is divided into seven states (populated mostly by ethnic 
nationality communities)5 and seven regions dominated by the majority 
Burman (Bamar) ethnic group. Demographic statistics remain contested, 
despite a census – the first in 31 years – held in 2014 which calculated 
the population at 51.4 million people (GoM, 2017).6 It is estimated 
that non-Bamar communities make up around 30–40 per cent of the 
population, including Shan 9 per cent, Karen 7 per cent, Rakhine 4 per 
cent, Chinese 3 per cent, Indian 2 per cent, Mon 2 per cent and other 
5 per cent.7 The official categories of 135 ‘national races’ (taingyintha) 
recognised by the government are deeply problematic, representing 
arbitrary and often imposed identities (Cheesman, 2017). Although 
ethnicity is fluid, subject to re-imagination over time and in different 
contexts (Anderson, 1983), in Myanmar, it has become a fixed category 
and a key element in leveraging access to political and economic 
resources. Ethnic communities, however, are rarely homogenous in 
terms of ethno-linguistic orientation or policy preferences, and the 
ethnic diversity extends to intra-group dynamics. Furthermore, in many 
parts of Myanmar, larger ethnic groups such as the Karen, Kachin, 
Rakhine and Shan co-exist with smaller minority communities like the 
Pa-O, Danu, Lahu, Lisu, Wa, Htet, Dainet, etc. This diversity also translates 
into a linguistic challenge with over 100 languages spoken throughout 
the country (MEC, 2017).
Nicolas Salem-Gervais explains in the first of his three-part series 
on ethnic education on the ‘Tea Circle’ website, that some ethnic 
languages are spoken by millions, others by thousands, or only hundreds 
(Salem-Gervais, 2018). Some are spoken in limited areas whereas others 
are spoken across different states, and sometimes across the border in 
China, Thailand or India as well. Some are very similar to the national 
language Burmese, others belong to completely different ethno-linguistic 
families. Some are relatively homogenous, while others have numerous 
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sub-dialects, which are not necessarily mutually intelligible (like Naga). 
Some have one script whilst some have no script – and others have 
several. This is not an uncommon situation across Asia or even other 
parts of the world, however, in Myanmar, it has meant that under military 
rule the Bamar majority has used this diversity as an excuse to impose its 
language and culture, a process referred to as ‘Burmanisation’, allegedly 
to keep the country united. Burmanisation started in the early 1960s 
after Ne Win’s military coup.8 As explained in more detail in Chapter 1, 
the main precepts of what was in essence an assimilation policy, included 
all ethnic groups needing to accept the majority Bamar cultural norms, 
reinforced by the army with regard to any ethnic separatist movements. 
Burmanisation included Buddhism being made the official state religion, 
and Burmese (‘Bama saga’) the only official language of the Union, 
including being the official LoI at all government and monastic schools. 
This deliberate process in turn contributed to the birth of individual 
ethnic consciousness (Kheunsai, 2017) and has been key in sustaining 
the ethnic armed organisations for over half a century of armed ethnic 
conflict. Since then the suppression of minority languages has been one 
of the main grievances of ethnic nationality people, as a unitary language 
policy was a key pillar in the military regime’s Burmanisation of national 
culture (Houtman, 1999; Callahan 2004). This policy resulted in the 
jailing of ethnic language teachers and ethnic nationality citizens were 
forbidden to use their language in public. The imposition of the policy 
varied from place to place, with some communities continuing to use 
their ethnic language, which was often easier in remote places, where 
even the government authorities were represented by ethnic people 
(Jolliffe and Speers Mears, 2016).9 In response to Burmanisation, ethnic 
nationality elites developed alternative non-formal, mostly after-school 
systems through the civil society sector, and in particular faith-based 
(Christian and Buddhist) associations to maintain their languages, 
scripts and culture. Some larger ethnic communities built their own 
schooling systems complete with education departments and teacher 
training facilities, run by Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), CSOs 
or the communities themselves (Lall and South, 2018; South and Lall, 
2016a, 2016b and 2016c; Lall, 2016a). These separate education systems 
that are based on the mother tongue are discussed in Chapter 7 of this 
volume. This chapter engages with the issues faced by ethnic nationality 
groups who have struggled to keep their language and culture alive 
without having access to EAO-run schools. In particular, it focuses on 
those smaller ethnic nationality groups who have battled against the 
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odds of dual discrimination – that of larger Bamar majoritarianism as 
well as larger ethnic groups that dominate the state, often because they 
are represented by an armed group.10 These smaller groups have 
generally not had access to any mother tongue or mother tongue-based 
multilingual education systems, and more often than not are dependent 
on Burmese government or monastic education provision supplemented 
by summer schools, community teacher support and/or after school 
language provision.
Minority languages, education reform and 
the peace process
One of the key challenges facing the government since the reform 
process started in 2012 has been to reach a consensus on language 
education policies that meets the diverse needs and hopes of all groups 
and can help promote social cohesion, ensuring that all children have an 
equal opportunity to learn effectively across the country. The education 
reform policies discussed earlier aim to meet the government’s stated 
commitments to EFA as outlined in the 2016 NESP, and promise to 
improve quality of education, including for ethnic nationality citizens 
and marginalised communities in remote conflict-affected areas. This 
is a key social justice issue for the affected communities. As discussed in 
previous chapters of this volume, the five main aspirations of the NESP 
are quoted as access, quality, equity, inclusion and efficiency (MoE, 2016: 
57). As such, the reforms represented a window of opportunity to reverse 
decades of Burmanisation by engaging with the needs of the ethnic 
nationality communities. This should have been a priority given the 
historic disparity of achievement of ethnic children in government 
schools, largely due to the language gap that children face when having 
to learn in Burmese despite their mother tongue being quite different. 
In the first study of its kind in Myanmar, research by Shalom (Nyein 
Foundation, 2011) shows that ethnic nationality children, especially in 
remote and conflict-affected areas, cannot read or write Burmese at the 
same speed as their Bamar peers, and subsequently often drop-out 
of school (Nyein Foundation, 2011). Testing a total of 474 students 
across Grades 2–5, they found that ethnic students who were able to 
read a whole passage took between three and four times as long as their 
Bamar counterparts. Of those surveyed, 15 per cent could not read at all 
and 18 per cent could not read the whole passage.11 Research conducted 
on language in Chin State showed that students:
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simply cannot always understand their lessons. They are thrown 
into a curriculum which presupposes they can speak the language 
and are familiar with the orthography, and with teachers who often 
cannot speak additional languages other than Burmese. They are 
not being taught from the perspective of needing Burmese as an 
additional language. Many participants described not being able 
to understand anything at school. For example, one participant 
explained that he had memorised everything but he had ‘nothing in 
his head’. Learning is reduced to ‘decoding’ and rote memorisation 
rather than learning. (Edwards, 2018: 5)
This created lifelong and insurmountable disparities between these 
ethnic children and their Bamar peers. Those who do stay in the education 
system are often unable to join university due to poorer matriculation 
marks, resulting in a cycle of lifelong disadvantage for the individual, 
their family and the whole community. These research findings are born 
out in the 2014 Census data that shows how children and families in 
ethnic states are less literate, access fewer schools, and are less well-off 
than those living in the Bamar dominated regions. This disparity is 
aggravated for those in rural areas which are remote and conflict affected, 
where there are few if any Bamar residents, and where government 
education often cannot reach. As discussed later in this chapter, the 2014 
Census also masks disparities between ethnic groups and especially the 
intra-state disparities of the smaller ethnic groups that make it impossible 
to know how ‘minorities within minorities’ are faring.12
The peace process and the NESP
Despite ethnic aspirations to see their languages recognised and used in 
the formal education system, neither the peace process nor the education 
reforms have delivered. Part of the problem has been the separation 
between the education reform process and the peace process. Ethnic 
language provision was largely absent in the formal nationwide ceasefire 
negotiations and the subsequent broader peace process from 2012, as 
these focused in the first place on securing and monitoring ceasefires. 
The nationwide political dialogue that was planned following the signing 
of the NCA in 2015 was expected to include multiple stakeholders 
(government, parliament, Tatmadaw,13 EAOs, ethnic civil society, etc.) 
and would focus on these ‘softer’ issues. Interviews in 2014 and 2015 
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with key EAO leaders (Aung Htung and Lall et al., 2015) showed that 
even the ethnic leaders were not raising issues of education and language 
as their focus was on getting the terms of the ceasefire right, a negotiation 
process between the Thein Sein Government and the EAOs that would 
take several years, culminating in the November 2015 ‘nationwide’ 
ceasefire agreement that ultimately only eight of the EAO groups signed.14 
The political dialogue process has stalled since 2015, and the on-going 
negotiations still fail to address issues pertaining to education and 
ethnic language. Ethnic nationality representatives at the various twenty-
first-century Panglong conferences run by the NLD confirm that neither 
language policy nor education is on the ‘peace agenda’ despite this 
being a high priority issue for the ethnic communities. The talks in July 
201815 yielded 14 new basic principles, among which for the first time is 
a reference to an ‘all-inclusive education system’, a point which was not 
further clarified at the meeting (Salem-Gervais, 2018).
The education reform process failed in this regard as well. The 
CESR that underpinned the creation of the NESP16 did not engage 
adequately with issues of ethnic language and ethnic education. There 
was only one meeting between ethnic education providers and the 
CESR team in the summer of 2013 (Figure 6.1).17 As a part of their 
Figure 6.1 Ethnic education representatives meet Comprehensive 
Education Sector Review (CESR) team, 2013. Source: Author.
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Peace Building Education and Advocacy Programme, UNICEF-funded 
Australian education and language specialist Professor Joseph Lo Bianco 
from the University of Melbourne to advise on issues pertaining to mother 
tongue and mother tongue-based education. The initiative became part 
of a multi-country project (also involving Thailand and Malaysia) entitled 
Language, Education and Social Cohesion Initiative (LESC). The LESC 
programme in Myanmar focused mainly on exploring the link between 
language and educational equity, in order to ‘encourage national reconcili-
ation and ethnic rights’, ‘support small minority languages’ where there 
were speakers of a number of different languages, ‘improve literacy and 
education in Burmese’ and ‘build a culture of dialogue and ethnic 
education’ (Lo Bianco, 2016). Lo Bianco facilitated dialogue meetings, 
starting with one held in Mae Sot, Thailand in 2014, which resulted in 
the creation of the advocacy and action group, Myanmar/Burma 
Indigenous Network for Education (MINE).18 Later, various meetings 
held at state and union level with selected ethnic nationality representa-
tives19 developed the Nay Pyi Taw Principles on Language.20
In as far as the CESR was concerned, LESC resulted in the Early 
Childhood Education team including mother tongue-based education 
for all children at primary level in their draft bill. The Education 
Thematic Working Group (ETWG) established an Education and 
Language Sub-working Group after the ETWG supported a meeting on 
language and cohesion in September 2014. This piggy-backed on a 
regional Language Education and Social Cohesion Workshop, supported 
by UNICEF to consider the next steps for multilingual education for 
Myanmar. The meeting allowed for 156 participants from government, 
state and union parliaments, development partners, INGOs, CSOs, uni-
versities, private schools and international/national education experts 
to meet each other and discuss the issue of language and education in 
Myanmar. The final part of LESC was the International Conference 
on Language Policy in Multicultural and Multilingual Settings hosted 
in Mandalay in February 2016. The conference was attended by over 
300 participants who discussed both the state of multilingual education 
and language policy in diverse countries as well as critical issues and 
development in language policy and planning in Myanmar.21 However, 
the ideas of MTB-MLE promoted by the initiative and the conference 
were ultimately rejected by the government and the MoE. The Peace 
Promoting National Language Policy for Myanmar was quietly shelved 
after the NPT policy summit of June 2016.22
There was not much change in this regard after the NLD formed 
a government in 2016. Despite making other changes, language and 
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LoI policy under the NLD government has not fundamentally departed 
from only Burmese being allowed as a means of instruction (Lall and 
South, 2018). The only concession made by the NLD in their revision of 
the NESP is that ethnic minority languages are now allowed as ‘classroom 
language’ to help explain concepts when necessary. However, using any 
ethnic language in the classroom effectively would require recruiting 
local teachers, or teachers who have learnt an ethnic language. According 
to UNICEF, 70 per cent of teachers working in ethnic areas do not speak 
local languages (Joliffe and Speers, 2016: 37) and although recent 
interviews conducted by Salem-Gervais and Raynaud suggest that more 
ethnic teachers are being recruited through a new township priority 
system (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2019a and 2020), discussed in 
Chapter 5, there is no official policy or text that bears this out at the time 
of writing and the effects of this policy are still to be assessed.
Research has borne out that fluency and literacy in the mother 
tongue are the basis for learning other languages (Ball, 2011; Ball, 2014; 
Cummins, 2000). Those with a strong foundation in their mother tongue 
develop stronger literacy ability in the school language with knowledge 
and skills transferring across languages (Cummins, 2000). The level of 
competence in the second language is related to the level of competence 
they have achieved in their first language (Khan, 2014). If children are 
forced to transition too soon from mother tongue to schooling in a second 
language, their first language may be attenuated or even lost (Benson, 
2004; Ball, 2014). Despite the strong evidence of mother tongue and 
mother tongue-based education benefits, including fewer drop-outs and 
better levels of achievement, mother tongue-based multilingual education 
(MTB-MLE) is not presently Myanmar education policy.
Myanmar has been using a monolingual ‘submersion’ system, 
where the majority language is used as the sole LoI (Ouane, 2003), 
an approach that can curtail children’s development, perpetuating 
poverty. Even where students are able to ‘pronounce’ words in the second 
language, it may take many years before they understand what they 
are reading (Kosonen, 2005; SIL, 2018). The problem is particularly 
acute for children who have no contact with the LoI in the remote 
communities in which they live. This has impacted on ethnic hopes and 
concerns about equal access to, and quality of, education for their 
children (Lall and South, 2018).23
The reason is rooted in Burmanisation – the government believes 
that a unitary language is essential in holding the country together, a 
belief that is neither unusual regionally, nor likely to change.24 Research 
in multi-ethnic environments points to the importance of a common 
Ethnic Education: LanguagE and LocaL curricuLum issuEs 205
language and comprehensive school system for ruling governments to 
cement the foundations upon which national states and national 
identities are formed (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). Fishman refers to 
the choice of a particular language as fundamental to the project of 
national integration and standardisation (Fishman, 1973), and Callahan 
identifies language as a cohesive factor that helps on the one hand to 
create alliances for unity and power, and on the other as a divisive and 
differentiating factor that tends to reinforce conflict and antagonism 
in Myanmar society (Callahan, 2003 and 2004).25 The choice, therefore, 
for the government is greater social justice with equal education 
and linguistic rights for all citizens, including the ethnic nationality 
communities versus control of ethnic nationality communities through 
language, education and ultimately employment opportunities. Given 
the predominance of Burmese as a marker of power of the Bamar 
majority, it is, therefore, not surprising that MTB-MLE is not seen by the 
government as an acceptable option.
Ethnic language teaching in government schools and 
local curriculum development
Instead of offering MTB-MLE, the diversity of the country is being 
recognised through the introduction of a LC of one period a day in KG, 
Grade 1 and Grade 226 that is locally developed and that can be taught in 
an ethnic language. The teaching of ethnic languages in government 
schools that started in 2013 is different from the development of this LC, 
a more recent initiative that started in 2016–7, although as shall be seen 
below the two do overlap. The LC initiative is broader as it encompasses 
cultural and local content that is relevant at state level.
The formalisation of teaching ethnic languages in government 
schools started in Mon State, where the state parliament dominated by a 
Mon party (2010–5) lobbied the central government for the inclusion of 
Mon as a subject in government schools across Mon State. They were 
successful and a programme was set up training Mon language and 
subject teachers across the state, some of which even came from the 
Mon National Education Committee (associated with the New Mon 
State Party, the Mon EAO – see Chapter 7 of this volume). The passing 
of the private school bill in 2011 (Myo Thant, 2011), which allowed 
the teaching of ethnic languages, showed that the policy concerning 
government schooling and language was loosening, and that there would 
be options for ethnic organisations to teach ethnic languages. Some other 
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ethnic communities followed the Mon example, although not in such a 
systematic manner. In 2013, when the MoE announced it would help 
train ethnic teachers so that ethnic languages could be taught after 
school,27 the practice did not spread widely – possibly because it required 
communities to organise themselves, and possibly because subjects 
taught after school and not examined are often seen as an unnecessary 
extra burden on children.28 Edwards reports the same issue occurring in 
Chin state as follows (Edwards, 2018: 3):
Many parents expressed concern language lessons were being 
held outside school hours when children might be tired. All 
parents wanted their children to learn their mother tongue, but 
they did not agree on how children should access this learning. 
Some believed that it was enough to learn it within the family 
and the community, others said that church summer school was 
sufficient (generally a maximum of two weeks per year), others 
wanted mother tongue to be taught as an additional subject 
within the curriculum and others believed mother tongue should 
be the medium of instruction with a full mother tongue-based 
curriculum.
The idea of the LC system depends largely on the support of LCCs, local 
CSOs and in some cases UNICEF. Based on the 2014–5 Education Law 
(Article 39, f and g), a LC is meant to allow each state and region to 
introduce locally relevant content, amounting to 14 per cent at primary 
level, and 10 per cent in middle and high schools (although only 5 per 
cent is allowed in Grade 12) of the total teaching hours.29 This means one 
period a day at primary level, with three of the five periods dedicated to 
the teaching of the local language, and two are meant to cover general 
knowledge of the state.30
The (re)introduction (Salem-Gervais, 2018) of ethnic languages 
throughout government schools in ethnic nationality-populated regions 
is significant in that it allows all ethnic and linguistic groups to see their 
language, script and culture recognised in the government education 
system, possibly improving access and commitment from ethnic families 
who have felt marginalised. According to Salem-Gervais, this recognition 
will increase the value of the ethnic languages in the eyes of their 
communities, possibly contributing to their long-term survival. He also 
believes that the official recognition of these languages may even have 
some effect on national reconciliation.31 As will be discussed in more 
detail below, fieldwork over nine months in 2018 across all ethnic states 
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shows that the development of this LC and its roll-out is still haphazard 
and uneven, privileging larger, more organised ethnic groups.32
According to the MoE in the 2018–9 school year, 54 ethnic minority 
languages were being taught officially to over 750,000 children, in 
12,248 schools, by a total of 28,783 teachers, across all the states and 
regions. Recent MoE statistics indicate that 64 languages are now being 
taught in 2019–20 (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020). However, the 
situation on the ground is not always clear or consistent, and depends 
on the attitude of state/region and TEOs, and individual head teachers.33 
There are also challenges regarding which language should be offered 
at which school, and what to do in multilingual and multi-ethnic schools. 
Other challenges include teacher training and whether these classes 
can be held during school hours or only after school. The timing of such 
classes being particularly important as discussed above, however, in 
multilingual communities having classes in one language and not in the 
others means that those not covered during school are forced to take 
place outside of school hours.
A key issue that has been raised by many stakeholders and 
respondents who took part in the research is the salary and status of 
these teachers. Where requested, government funds were raised for 
a stipend for the teachers, but MMK 30,000 (USD 22) per month 
for 10 months a year to cover the teaching of one period a day is often 
insufficient to attract and then retain ethnic language teachers. In Pa-O 
communities, the classes were not being held between 2016 and 2018 
because no teachers could be recruited at this level of remuneration. 
More recently, in 2019, things on the ground seem to be changing; 
Salem-Gervais and Reynaud note that 2018–9 MoE data indicates that 
47 per cent of the 23,811 ‘30,000 kyats’ ethnic language teachers are in 
fact government school teachers, teaching ethnic minority languages 
in addition to other subjects, and receiving this amount in addition to 
their salary (Salem-Gervais and Reynaud, 2019a and 2019b). The 
numbers of these teachers are, however, falling (from 10,760 in 2018–9 
to 7,080 in 2019–20), in part, because the MoE has found it difficult 
to verify these classes are taking place, and also because the government 
is now privileging ethnic teaching assistants (TAs) – a position created in 
2017 through a collaboration between the MoE, the Ministry of Ethnic 
Affairs (MoEA) and the LCCs. The first batch of around 5,200 ethnic TAs 
was appointed for the 2017–8 school year. Those part-time volunteer 
teachers who had a bachelor degree and completed training can over 
time become permanent government staff.34 The others remain on daily 
wage salaries at MMK 4,800 a day (USD 3.5), much better than the 
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30,000 MMK offered per month to the ‘volunteer language’ teachers. The 
ethnic TAs are expected to help ethnic children, using the ethnic language 
as a classroom language and they are expected to teach the LC, especially 
the ethnic language as a subject. The ‘volunteer language’ (30,000 MMK) 
teachers who were trained by the LCCs and who only teach the 20 hours 
per month in government schools are likely to be phased out as the 
numbers of ethnic TAs increase.
The LC is not only about teaching the ethnic language – it is meant 
to include a wide range of subjects that primarily are relevant to the 
state and can include subjects such as agriculture, local economic 
activities or computer skills, but could also be used for the teaching of 
content related to local identities (Salem-Gervais, 2018). Currently, 
however, content seems to vary since there is not as yet an agreed 
state-level LC anywhere. According to Salem-Gervais, the development 
of the LC has resulted in new curricula for the teaching of 25 languages 
in Grades 1–3, as well as 3.5 million copies of storybooks for KG in the 
66 languages being used in government schools (Salem-Gervais, 2018). 
However, a number of schools implementing the policy are either using 
books that were developed under the Thein Sein Government (with the 
help of the UNICEF-led ethnic mother tongue language initiative, LESC, 
mentioned above) that were usually used outside of school hours, or they 
are using materials designed for language summer schools, usually 
developed by the local LCC. State Education Offices have to approve the 
textbooks that are to be used in these lessons, and LCCs of the different 
ethnic groups have faced the challenge of standardising materials that 
had been used across communities in summer or Sunday schools, and 
which often had different scripts and varied spellings depending on 
religion and denomination.
This has led to disagreements between community leaders, the 
splitting of communities and the creation of new LCCs who are in 
disagreement with each other.35 Intra-ethnic disputes usually focus on 
which LCC/language-dialect/script should be used – particularly in 
towns, as these are more multi-ethnic than most villages. On some 
occasions, communities split on religious lines as well, especially between 
different Christian denominations. The Akhas of eastern Shan State, for 
instance, currently use two different ‘common’ scripts, the United Akha 
Orthography (created in 2004) and the Common Akha Orthography 
(created in 2008), depending on their religious and political affiliations.36 
A Deputy Education Officer in Chin state (a Dai Chin) explained that: 
‘rival LCCs write to him, asking the MoE to bar other LCCs from teaching 
in “their” schools villages, and also complain to NPT – which is a headache 
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for him.’37 Government acceptance of LCC teaching in schools also 
depends on whether the community in question is recognised as having 
a script and literature that is linked to the list kept by MoE.38 Those ethnic 
communities/languages that are not on the list have added difficulty 
teaching in schools. The complexity of the politics of language teaching 
has resulted in the creation of new LCCs, some of which focus on 
developing new scripts. However, this has also led to pitching intra- 
ethnic identities against each other, creating new sub-groups with 
particular political aims. As described by Salem-Gervais and Raynaud: 
‘They are always defined in contrast to other, neighbouring or encom-
passing political projects, sometimes even aiming to “purify” their 
languages by creating words to replace loanwords borrowed from other 
languages which are, or have been, influencing their own’ (Salem-
Gervais and Raynaud, 2019a).
Five out of seven ethnic states (Mon, Karen, Kayah, Kachin and 
Chin) are now working on developing locally relevant content for their 
state’s LC. In interviews in 2018, SEO officials said that the structure of 
the LC had been prescribed centrally, as the MoE felt that the groups 
developing it did not have the technical expertise to do so, as well as to 
avoid any overlap with the national curriculum. Participants invited by 
the MoE to take part in the LC development included representatives 
from the local LCCs, technical experts, university professors from relevant 
departments of the local universities such as agriculture, education 
colleges, ethnic affairs ministers and NGOs. The role of EAO education 
departments in the process is problematic and interviews confirmed that 
EAO representatives who did attend any of these meetings felt their 
voices and expertise were drowned out by the large number of partici-
pants.39 The role of the SEO seems to vary between states. In one case, a 
SEO noted that none of his staff were from the relevant ethnic group, and 
all had been posted to the office and, therefore, they could not contribute 
much to the LC. In other cases, the SEOs do have local ethnic staff, who 
are interested in being involved. UNICEF40 has been acting as a facilitator 
providing technical and financial support by facilitating meetings at state 
and at national level.
It seems that the individual state government (as opposed to the 
SEO) needs to take the lead for LC development and ask for it to 
commence. This can be problematic as state governments rarely have 
enough funds, and ethnic languages are not always seen as a priority. 
Although Salem-Gervais and Raynaud point to some budgets being 
transferred from NPT to the state administrations, the figures they cite 
show that much less money is transferred to states (as opposed to regions) 
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and the amounts are quite low overall (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 
2020). The Shan State Government has not yet asked to take part in the 
development of their LC, so whilst there is a period for LC in KG, Grade 1 
and Grade 2 in every government school for the delivery of this 
content, it is not being implemented. Respondents from the Shan, Pa-O, 
Danu, Intha, Khun Tai, Lahu and Wa mostly knew that the ethnic 
language could be taught outside of school hours as in the Thein Sein 
Government provision, but did not know that this had now been shifted 
to within school hours as a part of LC. Fieldwork in 2018 showed that 
LC or ethnic language was not taught for any of the groups visited 
either in Taunggyi Township or Kengtung Township. On the other side of 
the spectrum is Chin State, ironically the state where there are most 
languages.41 According to UNICEF and research conducted by Ashley 
South,42 Chin State is probably the most advanced state with regard 
to developing LC content. The Chin State Parliament passed a policy 
directive for LC content and they have been establishing MoE-led 
Township Literature and Culture Committees in each township, with 
seemingly variable LCC involvement. There are 31 Chin dialects approved 
by the SEO for teaching in government schools.
It needs to be remembered that despite the LC development being a 
step in the right direction for the inclusion of the many ethnic minorities 
in Myanmar, it does not solve the main issue for ethnic children of starting 
their schooling and understanding their teacher – essential ingredients 
for children to remain in school and achieve at par with the majority 
community. The LC is unlikely to solve the main discriminatory issue 
of understanding and achievement between groups. This is discussed in 
more detail in the next section.
Census data for key issues highlighting literacy and 
achievement
The 2014 Census was conducted during March–April, and was the 
first since 1983. This section draws on some of the key issues in the 
Thematic Report on Education (GoM, 2017) including literacy, school 
attendance and school attainment to showcase the disparities between 
states and regions, which by extension indicates differences between 
the ethnic nationality groups and their Bamar counterparts – although, 
as mentioned earlier, the 2014 Census did not release the figures 
broken down by ethnic group and this masks disparities between and 
within groups.
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Overall, the literacy rate in Myanmar was 89.5 per cent. 
Unsurprisingly, younger people were more literate than older people, 
and urban dwellers were more literate than those who live in rural areas 
(Table 6.1). As shown in the same table, there were wide disparities 
between states. Shan State had the lowest literacy rates at 64.6 per cent, 
with Kayin State at 74.4 per cent and Chin at 79.4 per cent. In Kayah, 
Kayin, Chin, and Mon, the difference between rural and urban was 
more than 10 age points, and in Shan was as high as 27 points. The 
lowest 10 districts for literacy were all in Shan State with the lowest in 
Makman District where adult literacy was just 24.9 per cent (GoM, 2017: 
25, Table 3.4).
School attendance up to age of 12 was slightly higher in rural areas, 
but was significantly lower after that age (GoM, 2017: 34, Table 4.2). 
Table 6.2 shows the lowest rates are in Kayin (65.2 per cent) and Shan 
(55.9 per cent).
There were also large differences in the percentages of the 
population with no schooling between states and regions. Table 6.3 
shows that Shan (44.9 per cent), Kayin (31.8 per cent) and Chin (25.8 
per cent) had the highest proportions of people who had not had any 
schooling. Table 6.3 also shows that the proportion with no schooling is 
consistently much higher in rural than in urban areas.
The 2014 Census had a section on children not in school aged 7–15 
of which there were almost 500,000 who had never attended school 
(GoM, 2017: 43).43 Non-attendance levels were more than twice as high 
in rural areas (6.2 per cent) than in urban areas (2.2 per cent), and this 
was the case at all ages (GoM, 2017: 43, Table 4.7). Table 6.4 shows that 
the highest proportions of 7–15 year olds who had never attendance 
school were in Shan State (21.9 per cent) and Kayin State (10.1 per 
cent). It was also reported that over a third of those who had never 
attended school were from the lowest wealth quintile ‘reinforcing the 
link between affordability and attendance’ (GoM, 2017: 49).
Although there was no specific question on the reason for not 
attending school in the 2014 Census (GoM, 2017: 46), the CESR, in full 
swing at the time, found that the reasons for not attending were (in order 
of importance): high costs; lack of interest; personal illness; agricultural 
work; and care for family. Drop-out rates are high during the transition 
from primary to lower secondary, and a language barrier is a significant 
factor to children from minority groups dropping out of school (GoM, 
2017: 46).
Educational attainment is a key variable in indicating disparities 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aged 25 and over is significant as those aged 25 and over are likely the 
parents of current school-aged children. Table 5.1 (GoM, 2017) shows 
that 0.4 per cent have a postgraduate or a Master’s degree, and only 5.2 
per cent completed upper secondary, while 61.3 per cent of the population 
had either completed primary school, not completed primary school 
or had no education at all. There are large differences in the highest 
completed level of education between states and regions. Table 6.5 shows 
that those in Shan and Kayin were the least well educated. In Kayin, over 
a third of the female population aged 25 and over (35.6 per cent) reported 
having no level of education, while in Shan the situation was even worse 
at 49.8 per cent, rising to almost 60 per cent in rural areas of Shan State 
and over 80 per cent in some districts of Shan State.
The 2014 Census data also show a clear relationship between 
the level of educational attainment and household wealth (GoM, 2017: 
57). Table 6.5 (GoM, 2017) shows the distribution pattern of educational 
attainment when cross-analysed by the household wealth index. The 
percentage of the population with no completed level of education 
was highest in the lowest wealth quintile (30.1 per cent); however, the 
proportion of those who completed primary school is not significantly 
different across the wealth index quintiles. There were large differences 
in the percentages of the population with no schooling between states 
and regions. Table 6.3 also shows that Shan (44.9 per cent), Kayin (31.8 
per cent) and Chin (25.8 per cent) had the highest proportions and that 
the proportion with no schooling is consistently much higher in rural 
than in urban areas. In Shan State, more than half of the population aged 
25 and over in rural areas reported having no schooling, compared with 
just a fifth in urban areas (GoM, 2017: 60).
These figures show huge disparities between states in educational 
provision and attainment. Given that the census was not implemented in 
some conflict-affected areas, the actual situation on the ground is likely 
to be far worse for ethnic nationality children in the most remote regions. 
The lack of information on smaller minorities also masks the pronounced 
disadvantages that occur for them within larger ethnic groups.
This chapter now turns to the often overlooked voices of minorities 
within minorities, in two of Myanmar’s ethnic states (Shan and Rakhine 
States) that continue to experience severe education and conflict issues, 
masking the needs of smaller groups.44 It discusses their views on 
language, education and the LoI, and how this shapes their relationship 
with both the more dominant ethnic groups as well as the ruling Burman 
majority. Whilst all minorities within minorities that were consulted do 
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they want Burmese to remain the LoI as they see it as the essential 
language for their children to be able to get good jobs and bring their 
families and communities out of poverty.45 Burmese, they argue, provides 
the various communities in multi-ethnic settings with a level playing 
field they feel is fairer, than if Burman linguistic domination was replaced 
with another ethnic language – for example, the dominant ethnic 
language of the state in which they live.46 The communities discussed 
below, therefore, do not support an MTB-MLE system that might see 
larger ethnic languages replace Burmese, and would prefer multilingual 
local teachers who can explain the Burmese textbooks to their children. 
It needs to be recognised, however, that there are other similarly small 
minority communities that do want MTB-MLE. Research conducted for 
MEC by SIL showed that Naga, Kayah and some Chin groups expressed 
the desire to have MTB-MLE (SIL, 2018). The example of the Nagas is 
striking (SIL, 2018: 22):
Very few Nagas complete their education as a result of the language 
barrier in school, the lack of access to school, and insufficient 
teachers available for rural schools. Those Nagas who do complete 
their education typically travel to Yangon, India or Thailand. Living 
outside their home areas and studying other languages may result 
in weakening their mother tongue proficiency. Many fear that 
without attention to MTB-MLE the children will continue to grow 
up with weakening levels of mother tongue proficiency.
Some background on Shan and Rakhine States and 
the communities that live there
Both Shan and Rakhine States are home to a dominant ethnic minority as 
the state’s majority population, and contain smaller ethnic groups as well 
as Bamar residents. The Shan people are the country’s second-largest 
ethnic nationality after the Bamar, and their state is the largest ethnic 
state in the Union. Shan State is also home to many other ethnic groups, 
including Kachin, Pa-O, Palaung, Wa, Ta’ang, Karen, Lahu, Lisu, Akha, 
and others (Jolliffe and Speers Mears, 2016). As seen in the previous 
section, Shan State has some of the most concerning census data related 
to literacy, education attendance and attainment. In Shan State, adult 
literacy rate was just under 65 per cent compared to 89.5 per cent 
nationally (GoM, 2017: 22, Table 3.2) and in rural areas the female 
adult literacy rate was only 51.8 per cent (GoM, 2017: 24, Table 3.3). 
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS220
The 10 districts with the lowest literacy rates were all in Shan, including 
Makman District where only 24.9 per cent of adults were literate (GoM, 
2017: 25, Table 3.4). Youth literacy rates in Shan were 76.8 per cent 
(GoM, 2017: 25). A quarter of households in Shan State (24.9 per cent) 
were classified as illiterate (GoM, 2017: 29, Table 3.8). The 10 districts 
with the highest proportions of the population aged 25 and over with 
no schooling were all in Shan, where in Hopan and Makman Districts 
over 80 per cent of the population aged 25 and over had no schooling 
(GoM, 2017: 62, Table 5.8). Whilst the census information does not 
distinguish between the Shan majority and the other ethnic minority 
groups, evidence from the field shows that some of the low literacy 
statistics are due to children not understanding the language the teacher 
speaks in the classroom. This is also the case for Shan children, but 
particularly acute for children from the smaller minorities who rarely, if 
ever, will have a teacher in their class able to speak their language. 
Drop-outs are often linked to children not being able to understand the 
government teacher who usually does not speak the local language. 
Another reason for the low levels of schooling and literacy is that Shan is 
a conflict-affected state with nine or more armed groups operating in 
different parts of the state. During 2018–9, over 9,000 people were 
displaced to 33 IDP (Internally Displaced Person/People) sites47 due to 
clashes between the armed groups and the Tatmadaw, and in North 
Eastern Shan State due to the fighting between two local EAOs – the Shan 
State Progressive Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State 
(RCSS) Political wing of a Shan army. These conflicts mean that 
government teachers mandated to these regions often flee when the 
fighting starts, and schools cannot operate. Anecdotal evidence collected 
in one of the conflict areas in South Eastern Shan State shows that locally- 
and community-recruited teachers tended to stay with their community 
even through the conflict.
Problems in Rakhine’s education sector have been substantially 
exacerbated by the inter-communal conflict between Buddhist and 
Muslim communities that has affected the state since 2012, and more 
recently by the new conflict between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar 
Tatmadaw (REACH, 2015). Figures differ widely, but in 2015, UNICEF 
estimated there were 124,000 conflict-affected children aged 3–17 years, 
many of whom were residing in internal displacement camps and in 
need of education support (UNICEF, 2015: 27). Whilst some of these 
camps have now closed and children have been returned to schools, a 
total of 128,000 people from the as yet unresolved conflict remain in 
IDP camps.48 A new conflict gathered pace towards the end of 2018 and 
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affected parts of the state including the Mrauk U area (visited for 
fieldwork in 2018 before the conflict started), that is home to many 
minority communities such as Chin, Dainet, Mro and Thet, many of 
whom live in abject poverty in very remote areas. In 2019 UNOCHA 
estimated that the new conflict had displaced 30,000 people and it seems 
this has increased since.49
Literacy rates at 84.7 per cent in Rakhine are better than in Shan 
(GoM, 2017: 22, Table 3.2). However, the rate declines to 76.9 per cent 
for women in rural areas. The SEO confirmed in an interview (October 
2018) that all government teachers speak Rakhine, most are local 
and are able to use Rakhine in the classroom. However, non-Rakhine 
minorities will not have teachers who speak their language and face the 
dual disadvantage of having to engage both with Burmese and Rakhine. 
Whilst these languages are close, they are nevertheless different enough 
to confuse children whose mother tongue is somewhat different and who 
have not been exposed to either Rakhine or Burmese before arriving at 
school. As with Shan State, the census education data does not distinguish 
between ethnic groups. The figures for attainment at primary school 
level in Rakhine are marginally better than in Shan State: 20.9 per cent 
completed primary versus 12.1 per cent in Shan – possibly because the 
number of minority children is proportionately fewer. However, only 
4 per cent completed secondary education, similar to the 3.7 per cent in 
Shan (GoM, 2017: 56, Table 5.4).
Minority within minority positions
During field work for research conducted in the summer and autumn of 
2018 in Shan and Rakhine States,50 minority within minority community 
respondents emphasised that the preservation of their culture and 
language was important and, therefore, they did want a LC in their 
language for use in government schools. In many cases, they felt that 
it was unfair that larger groups had their textbooks recognised for 
teaching in government schools whilst smaller groups did not. However, 
the issue they faced was not the fact that their language was or was not 
being taught in government school (during after-school hours), but 
rather the fact that they wanted their children to learn Burmese and 
learn it well so that their community members would be able to join 
the Myanmar government higher education system and become profes-
sionals.51 ‘Since Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) the 
children learn Burmese. The ECCD teachers are Wa, but the community 
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insist on Burmese unless children don’t understand. That way the 
children have less problems later’ (Wa LCC. Field notes, autumn 2018). 
The head of the Wa LCC in Kengtung explained that few Wa had done 
well historically because of the language barrier. His personal experience 
was that he had failed when he was young, but then he learnt Burmese 
and he was able to get a government job. He added that: ‘Only when 
the children are good in Burmese they can get higher education to 
become government staff. Not enough Wa are working as government 
staff.’ Burmese was seen as more valuable than their mother tongue, 
as knowing Burmese was seen as a way out of the poverty faced by the 
whole community, especially those living in remote areas. The fact that 
government teachers did not speak the local language was seen as a 
problem, not because they could not teach in the mother tongue, but 
because these Bamar teachers could not explain Burmese to their 
children: ‘This is not their fault, but they don’t see the needs of the 
community’ (Akha leader, head of a boarding house for rural Akha 
children. Field notes, autumn 2018) (see Figure 6.2).
The Myanmar Government was not seen as helpful in supporting 
the ethnic communities learn either their own language or Burmese. The 
‘best way’, as suggested by the respondents, was for local bilingual 
Figure 6.2 Conversation with the Akha community 2018. Source: Author.
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community members to be recruited and trained as teachers so as to be 
able to bridge the language gap, allowing smaller minority children to 
stay on in school rather than drop-out due to a lack of understanding. 
However, few ethnic students make it into the state-based education 
colleges (Lall, 2015).52 To fill this gap, the Pa-O have set up their own 
Teacher Education College for ethnic teachers, which is discussed in 
more detail below.
A number of ethnic organisations that took part in the research 
(in this case, the Akha in Kengtung and the Mro in Mrauk U) had set up 
boarding houses in urban areas for their ethnic children so they can 
attend better schools, and the children were given remedial Burmese 
lessons so as to improve their achievement levels and their chance 
of continuing on into secondary, post-secondary and possibly higher 
education. These organisations worked on the preservation of their 
language and cultures as well, but the prime focus was on their children 
being able to finish school, and move on to secondary school and later 
higher education. The head of the Akha boarding house explained (Field 
notes, autumn 2018):
15 years ago there were no Akha educated people. […] Children 
now learn Burmese in kindergarten. During their time in school 
they faced problem with the language. [they stay] in village 
school till grade 5, then they go to the city in grade 6, in the village 
they spoke only Akha but when they came to the city they have 
to speak Burmese. […] At the beginning they face problems, but 
later the problems get solved. So many learn from Burmese 
teachers. They learn and then the problem is solved. Last year 280 
Akha students passed metric and among them 7 or 8 received 
distinction in Myanmar language.
This was the pride of the community, and they had kept the newspaper 
cutting with the names of the Akha students for all to see. One organisa-
tion had mobilised its diaspora to provide scholarships for children that 
managed to gain access to a university. The Danu group had set up a 
foundation to help students with education-related fees, particularly for 
higher education.
None of these smaller minorities felt that setting up their own 
schools using their mother tongue (as has been done by larger ethnic 
communities such as the Mon, Karen and Kachin) was either viable or 
desirable, and all were fearful that any system privileging a particular 
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ethnic language in the state as part of the LC would mean that their 
children would find education even harder. A MTB-MLE system based on 
the state language53 was something they definitely rejected, knowing 
that their community was too small for their language to be accepted as 
the mother tongue in an MTB system.
There were of course differences between communities in urban 
and in rural areas. A lack of education and lack of information 
on laws, policies and rules was seen as an acute barrier for all rural 
non-Shan and non-Rakhine minority respondents in navigating 
government bureaucracy. When they came to towns and had to interact 
with government, they were discriminated against because they did not 
speak Burmese correctly, or did not understand how they were expected 
to behave with officials. A majority of the respondents explained that 
their communities all spoke the mother tongue – so that was not the 
problem – but the only way for their community to improve their situation 
was to learn more Burmese so they could understand the laws and 
communicate with the ‘ruling’ Burmese. They generally felt that their 
community remained ‘backward’ due to the fact that they did not have 
educated representatives to represent them in dealing with government. 
‘Ordinary people don’t know about the laws or even the amendments. 
Officials themselves are not clear themselves. So implementation is not 
effective. Ordinary people lose self-confidence, being not sure what they 
are allowed to do and what not’ (Rural Danu respondent. Field notes, 
autumn 2018). The Dainet leaders (see Figure 6.3) spoke of the fear 
that the lack of education and language knowledge created: ‘[We are] … 
afraid to go to government office. We can’t write a letter, have low 
education, can’t speak Rakhine or Burmese language, therefore [there is] 
discrimination’ (Field notes, autumn 2018). They felt that if as an organ-
isation they were able to have an office in an urban area, they would have 
more status and it would help the development of their community. 
Students would also have a place to stay to attend an urban school, 
starting a cycle that could bring their communities out of poverty.
Lack of education was also related to poverty as some of these 
communities are located in remote and conflict-affected areas: ‘In the 
villages there are drop outs, the parents take children out after they 
reach 10 years of age as they need to work in the field’ (Akha community 
leader. Field notes, autumn 2018). Lahu leaders spoke about the same 
issue: ‘The main barrier is when the Lahu come to the urban area, not 
used to using Burmese. In remote areas how much Burmese do they 
learn? In the urban areas because of the mixed ethnic classrooms 
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and because they use it outside school, the children learn.’ The Thet felt 
multiple language development was the best way: ‘We speak Thet at 
home. We speak Rakhine and Burmese with outside people, in Maungdaw 
we speak the forbidden language with our Muslim neighbours’ (Field 
notes, autumn 2018). They claim the children do not have language 
problems at school as the Thet community lives in mixed villages close 
to the Rakhine community. Remote areas where there are pure Thet 
villages and the residents cannot understand Rakhine are of course 
disadvantaged. A few respondents noted that the Pa-O have successfully 
overcome some of their marginalisation by improving the education 
levels of their community through the use of Burmese and by encouraging 
their children to study to higher education levels. When speaking to the 
Pa-O leaders a clear strategy emerged. The Pa-O, being a large minority 
within minority and concentrated in a geographical area around 
Taunggyi, were particularly clear about what non-Shan minorities in 
Shan State needed to do.54 A Pa-O National Organisation (PNO) leader55 
explained that one generation ago, the Pa-O were mainly poor farmers 
with very few finishing primary school. The Parami Network (a Pa-O civil 
society organisation, see Figure 6.4) adopted the goal of increasing 
the number of Pa-O in the Myanmar government administrative ranks, 
Figure 6.3 Members of the Dainet community, 2018. Source: Author.
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS226
and the key strategy to attain this goal was seen as success in government 
education. Today, while the older Pa-O generation are still farmers, 
younger Pa-O have moved to towns like Taunggyi and have white-collar 
jobs. Research conducted by Celine Margontier-Haynes as part of her 
MA dissertation on the language and culture of the Pa-O, showed 
that the younger urban-based Pa-O do not necessarily speak Pa-O to 
their children, and that with the focus on Burmese many can no 
longer communicate with their rural relatives, especially grandparents 
(Margontier-Haynes, 2016). This was seen as a problem by many who 
felt speaking Pa-O is an essential part of the Pa-O culture, but others 
felt it was more important for their children to do well and get good 
jobs by being proficient in Burmese. Yet there was great unhappiness 
with the government education system, both in rural and urban areas. 
The Pa-O LCC and parents who discussed these issues in focus groups 
said that teachers do not teach effectively, and in fact focus on earning 
extra income through private tutoring.56 In particular, respondents from 
the PNO said they were unhappy with the education that the Pa-O 
children were receiving. The most popular solution was to push for more 
Figure 6.4 Members of the PNO, PDN, PWEF and PLCO with Daw Aye 
Aye Tun, 2016. Source: Author.
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bilingual teachers who would be able to explain Burmese school content 
in Pa-O. This was the underlying motive in setting up their own teacher 
education college – to train more ethnic teachers for their community 
and others like them.
Example of a solution: The Pa-O Teacher 
Education College
The PNO has developed an innovative teacher training system. Finding 
that an insufficient number of Pa-O ethnic nationals were being accepted 
into the state-run education colleges, the PNO leaders negotiated with 
the Shan SEO to open their own teacher education college in 2016 (see 
Figure 6.5). This followed the same two-year teacher training curriculum 
as all education colleges, and the students received training from teacher 
educators employed in the Taunggyi education college. In addition, the 
college offered extra modules in Pa-O and ethnic languages. The recruits 
were ethnic nationality student teachers who had applied, but not been 
Figure 6.5 Shan State Pa-O Teacher Education College, 2018. Source: 
Author.
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accepted, into the education colleges in Taunggyi and Kayah State. The 
college opened its doors in January 2016 with 113 student teachers from 
10 ethnic nationalities, including Pa-O, Danu, Shan, Kayah and others. 
The programme was residential and the trainees first lived with local 
families whilst the dormitories were being built. Although set up privately 
by Pa-O civil society groups, the Shan SEO recognised the student 
teachers graduating from this education college, as their own education 
college did not supply sufficient teachers every year.57 All student teachers 
from the first batch graduated in 2018, and all of them were appointed by 
the MoE as primary school teachers in government schools in Shan and 
Kayah States (except one who went on to study at the Sagain University 
of Education). However, rather than all student teachers being sent back 
to serve in Pa-O-speaking communities (or communities where they 
speak the local language), those from outside the Self Administered Zone 
(SAZ)58 were sent to remote areas in Shan State where there are other 
ethnic communities, and where they do not speak the relevant language. 
Although these schools have vacant positions, those were filled by non-
Pa-O-speaking teachers or graduates from the Taunggyi government 
education college. As a result, schools in Pa-O areas in Taunggyi district 
did not receive Pa-O-speaking teachers, in effect defeating the original 
purpose of the college.
The ethnic nationality graduates from this college are clearly 
not enough to fill the required gaps. More teachers, especially from 
remote areas where there are shortages of teachers, need to be trained 
so that they can return to their homes and teach. This view is supported 
by a member of the Pa-O LCC who said that ‘… for rural areas where 
there are language barriers we need teachers who can explain things 
in Pa-O, and qualified teachers who have to be patient to make sure 
the children learn’. Other respondents have similar views. A member 
of the SAZ Leading Body said some head teachers do not support the 
teaching of Pa-O in schools, even if the school serves a Pa-O community: 
‘However, if there is a Pa-O teacher in the school, then he or she can 
explain things in Pa-O and teach Pa-O to the children’ (Field notes, 
autumn 2018).
Conclusion: Issues for children and social justice 
and equality
The government’s development of a LC has led to many new questions – 
including which language should be taught, by whom, and in which 
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schools. Clearly, the MoE is trying to meet the aims of the NESP which 
emphasises: ‘support and promotion of ethnic languages and cultures, 
including for primary-age ethnic children who speak different languages’ 
and ‘prioritizing the needs of schools in less developed areas to make 
education more accessible to all’ (MoE, 2016: 32).
These directives in themselves aim to improve the situation for 
ethnic nationality children and their families – and especially the smaller 
minorities who do not have an armed group to represent their views and 
position. At this point, there is not sufficient decentralisation to allow for 
the relevant local voices to shape what language they want taught in 
their schools, or if and how they want to be taught ethnic languages. 
Beyond education, there is also a need to recognise ethnic languages in 
the relevant states in areas of public administration and justice (South 
and Lall, 2016a and b), as languages have to be used and recognised to be 
deemed of value to any community.
Returning to Iris Young’s framework, it is clear that the LC does not 
reverse the process of marginalisation embedded in the government’s 
education system that impacts so adversely on smaller minority groups 
(Young, 2005). In fact, rather than greater inclusion, the manner in 
which it is being developed and rolled-out is sewing division even within 
the ethnic groups. The respondents interviewed for this chapter believed 
that in order for their community to be treated with respect, and 
recognised by the government and wider administration, they needed 
more access to Burmese – even if this promoted a form of Bamar cultural 
imperialism. Many felt powerless in light of how the authorities treated 
their culture, and the lack of materials they had been asked to present to 
contribute to the development of the LC.
However, the result of the critique also depends on the social justice 
framework used. If, instead of Young, we use the ‘4 R framework’ of 
Novelli et al.: redistribution, recognition, representation and reconcilia-
tion (Novelli et al., 2015) – also used in Chapter 7 of this volume to 
explore EAO education systems59 – and apply it to the issues of language 
and LC, the Government of Myanmar could argue that they are in fact 
making significant progress. The MoE is for the first time committing 
resources to ethnic language education by paying teachers to deliver 
the LC, and by hiring ethnic TAs. Allowing ethnic textbooks to be used 
during the school day means the MoE is in effect recognising these 
languages and the right of the ethnic groups to teach their language 
and culture to their children. The MoE has also ensured representation 
from all these groups to co-develop the LC. In doing so, MoE officials 
have argued they are working towards reconciliation, and even though 
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education is not part of the peace process, they see this as a peace 
promotion strategy.60
The views explored in this chapter nevertheless leave open the 
broad debate on the teaching of ethnic languages through either a LC 
or by developing a full MTB-MLE system. The census points to the 
fact that the lack of MTB-MLE in Myanmar means that the country will 
retain long-term structural disadvantages for certain groups. There are 
ethnic armed groups and affiliated organisations that have developed 
alternative, parallel MTB-MLE systems for their communities and four of 
these are described in the next chapter. At the time of writing, it is 
impossible to judge if the children who go to these schools fare better 
than ethnic children in government schools. In fact, SIL (2018), in their 
research for MEC write about how the term ‘MTB-MLE’ has been taken to 
mean almost any system that uses the mother tongue in the classroom. 
They argue that MTB-MLE is technically quite specific in the way 
programmes are structured, so that children can scaffold their learning 
at the appropriate times and that this is quite lengthy (minimum six 
years) and difficult to achieve, and not even those systems described next 
represent complete and full MTB-MLE provision.
Notes
 1 Adding the stipulation of ethnic languages being allowed to be used as ‘classroom languages’ 
under certain circumstances was one of the very few changes by the NLD government, 
who otherwise took up the NESP almost unchanged after they took power. However, according 
to Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, the original version on the 2014 Education Law actually 
allowed ethnic languages as a LoI and this was changed in 2015 (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 
2020): ‘The second paragraph (b) of Article 43 in the first version (2014) of the Education 
law included provision for using ethnic minority languages as a medium of instruction 
during primary and secondary education: (b) If there is a need, an ethnic language can be used 
alongside Myanmar as a LoI at the basic education level. This paragraph was amended in 
2015, after the student demonstrations, in what is in fact a step back in terms of introducing 
ethnic minority languages in formal education’ (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020: 79).
 2 As Chapter 7 of this volume will show, many larger ethnic nationality groups would like 
MTB-MLE. But even just using an ethnic language in the classroom would require recruiting 
local teachers, or teachers who have learnt an ethnic language. According to UNICEF, 70 per 
cent of teachers working in ethnic areas do not speak local languages (Jolliffe and Speers, 
2016: 37). More on this later in this chapter.
 3 It should be noted that the NESP MTR’s recommendations that came out in early 2020 for 
Basic Education include the surprising suggestion for the NESP 2019–21: ‘Promote and 
implement use of national ethnic languages as the primary language of instruction in initial 
years of education, and provide language-appropriate curriculum adaptation, learning materials 
and continue engagement of language assistants.’ (MoE, 2020: xii). Given Myanmar’s education 
and language policy to date, it is unclear how this would be implemented. Like many suggestions 
of the CESR regarding ethnic equality and equity, this recommendation could just vanish and 
not make it into NESP 2019–21. 
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 4 Those who propagate MTB-MLE emphasise that it allows the children to learn Burmese better 
if children start in their mother tongue. This might be true, however, for small minorities there 
is a very real fear that if MTB-MLE were to become Myanmar policy, the larger state languages 
would become the LoI, making it even harder for their children to learn as there would be two 
‘foreign’ languages involved rather than just one.
 5 Ethnic minorities reject the terminology that includes the word ‘minority’ and prefer to be 
referred to as ‘ethnic nationality communities’ or simply ‘ethnic’, which is respected in this 
volume.
 6 The 2014 Census, designed by the UN Population Fund and conducted by the Ministry of 
Immigration and Population, was seen as deeply problematic, especially with the way that it 
allowed respondents to self identify their ethnic group. In particular, there was no Rohingya 
category, Rohingya being asked to self identify as Bengali. The 2014 Census was also not 
held in some conflict-affected areas. Ethnic and religious figures have not been published. 
For more on this, see https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/counting- 
costs-myanmar-s-problematic-census and Callahan, 2017. 
 7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html
 8 More detail on how this was propagated through the education system in Chapter 1 of this 
volume.
 9 Although discussions the author held with ethnic nationality respondents in ethnic states and 
conflict-affected areas in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 always go back to how repressive 
the Burmanisation policy was, official policy seems to have been different – at least until the 
late 1980s: ‘According to the official curriculum guidelines, ethnic languages could be taught 
up to Grade 3, with a maximum of five 45-minute classes a week [in certain areas]’ (Thaung 
Htut, 1980, cited in Salem-Gervais, 2018). Textbooks for several ethnic languages were 
also produced during the 1970s and 1980s for the teaching of the main ethnic languages 
(usually those associated with one of the ethnic states). The MoE also compiled detailed 
reports dealing with ethnic languages during the 1970s – one of their explicit aims being 
to assess the challenges of teaching Burmese in those regions – and many ethnic languages 
were taught outside of the schools, both by lay and religious organisations (the involvement of 
the latter helping to mobilise human and material resources while often contributing to 
decrease the suspicions of the authorities). ‘In practice, interviews suggest widely varying 
experiences from one government school to another, even within the same ethnic group, 
depending on specific local conditions, such as the proximity to conflict, the benevolence of 
local authorities, the ethnic composition of the school, the interest of the population and 
the availability of ethnic language speaking teachers’ (Salem-Gervais, 2019). According 
to Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, under SLORC, ethnic languages were further sidelined 
(Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020: 41): ‘In the early 1990’s the official program from the 
MoE indicated that schools could choose to allocate up to 2 sessions of 30 minutes a week 
to the subject of ethnic languages, on the slot dedicated to physical education and school 
activities.’ This seems to have ceased in the mid 1990s.
In her MA thesis on language in Chin state, Nicola Edwards describes meeting communities 
with local teachers that had continued to use the ethnic language in government schools until 
quite recently. Being remotely located meant that the Bamar authorities simply could not control 
what was occurring (Edwards, 2018).
10 It is also important to note that in some instances language persecution of minorities came not 
only from the central state and the army, but also from local dominant armed ethnic groups 
(Salem-Gervais, 2018). 
11 ‘Grade 2 ethnic average reading time 208.34 seconds versus Bamar reading time 64 seconds; 
Grade 3 ethnic average reading time 177.35 seconds versus Bamar reading time 50 seconds; 
Grade 4 ethnic average reading time 179.94 seconds versus Bamar reading time 68 seconds; 
Grade 5 ethnic average reading time 65 seconds versus Bamar reading time 20 seconds’ 
(Shalom (Nyein Foundation), 2011: 13)). 
12 These findings were also discussed by a senior NEPC member in his presentation at the 
2nd Myanmar HE conference in 2018, where a senior Myanmar education official gave 
a presentation on social justice. See Chapter 4 of this volume and for more details, see Kandiko-
Howson and Lall, 2020.
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13 Myanmar Army.
14 These were: the Karen National Union (KNU)/Karen National Liberation Army (Peace 
Council) KNLA (PC), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Restoration Council of 
Shan State (RCSS), Chin National Front (CNF), Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA), 
Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF). Two 
further EAOs (New Mon State Party and Lahu Democratic Union) signed later under the 
NLD government. 
15 A fourth round of talks was held in August 2020 but no decisons pertaining to education were 
discussed.
16 The CESR recommendations related to ethnic and mother-tongue education were:
• Develop coordination strategies for networking among ethnic-minority organisations 
operating in education (for example, Karen, Chin and Mon organisations); the network of 
monastic education schools; religious, economic and social organisations, as well as 
organisations focused on gender equality and women’s development organisations; and 
organisations for inclusive education.
• Strengthen direct connections existing between state/division governments and state/
division education sectors.
• Use education as a tool to strengthen peaceful coexistence among ethnicities and 
exchange strategies.
• Encourage more cooperation between the MoE and international/local NGOs in border 
areas and areas that have no peace. In doing so, the Ministry should first develop trust 
from the people and then collaborate according to the Nay Pyi Taw Accord.
17 As a part of her work with AUSAID, the author organised the first and only meeting between 
the CESR team and a large number of ethnic education providers from around the country 
in July 2013. It had been hoped that a follow-on meeting would be held both with the 
CESR team in order to bring the education issues into the CESR as well as involving 
the Myanmar Peace Centre to bring education issues onto the peace negotiation table. 
Unfortunately, certain groups based on the Thai-Burmese border convinced development 
partners to hold the next meeting in Mae Sot, Thailand, making it impossible to discuss the 
education issues with the Myanmar-based CESR and Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) teams, 
who were nevertheless the key actors in the reform process at the time. Ethnic education 
issues, therefore, were left out of both the CESR and the peace process. For more, see Lall, 
2016a. 
18 Myanmar/Burma Indigenous Network for Education (MINE) called for the following actions 
to be considered and entrenched in national education policy reforms:
• For the short to medium term at least, maintain existing community and ethnic nationality 
schools and do not replace them with government schools.
• Encourage collaboration between community and ethnic nationality schools and school 
systems and the government school system to improve education delivery.
• Recognise and support community, religious and non-state actor-administered schools.
• Allocate budget for teacher stipends and teaching and learning materials for community, 
religious and non-state actor-administered schools.
• Support for school management and data collection for community, religious and 
non-state actor-administered schools.
• Support for local mother tongue-based curriculum development.
19 A number of ethnic education groups told the author that they disagreed with LESC and that 
they were not part of the process that created the NPT principles.
20 Nay Pyi Taw principles:
• Unity: by supporting all to learn Myanmar language and literacy, for common and equal 
citizenship. 
• Diversity: by supporting ethnic and indigenous communities to maintain, enjoy and 
transmit their languages to their children.
• Cohesion: by promoting inclusion and participation for ethnic and indigenous minorities. 
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• Education: by improving equitable access and participation, literacy, vocational and life 
skills, and academic standards.
• Employment: by raising standards in Myanmar, English and mother tongues, where 
relevant, to help young people enter the competitive labour market including in trades 
and professions.
• Service delivery: by supporting communication planning to make sure that public 
administrations communicating effectively with all citizens especially interpreting and 
translation in health, legal contexts and social services.
• International relations: in order to support trade, diplomacy and travel through widespread 
knowledge of English, and labour migration in the context of ASEAN mobility, and learning 
of strategic foreign languages.
• Inclusive communication: by integrating support for visually and hearing-impaired 
persons, and other citizens with communication difficulties. 
• Ethnic rights: by recognising the unique cultures and traditions of Myanmar’s indigenous 
people.
The NPT principles (part of the NPT Accord) and UNICEF’s way of working was not accepted 
by all ethnic nationality education stakeholders, with a number pulling out of the process 
because they felt their voices were not being taken into account. In the end, one high profile 
ethnic CSO found their name was used to endorse the UNICEF process at a public meeting in 
Mandalay without their consent.
21 For more details on the activities preceding the conference, see Lo Bianco, 2016.
22 Myanmar Education Consortium, May 2018, personal communication.
23 Many international treaties and declarations recognise the right for indigenous and ethnic 
minorities to use and learn their mother tongues including: the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 (ILO: 1989: Article 28); the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Minorities Declaration (UN, 1992: Article 4); or the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007, Article 14); and at national levels, 
including in Myanmar, many constitutions acknowledge the right for indigenous and 
ethnic minorities to use, learn and preserve their languages. These rights however, are not 
always implemented (Kosonen cited in Benson, 2004; Kosonen, 2017; Kosonen, 2019; 
Mohanty, 2009).
24 Anonymous interviews with ministry officials including those working on the CESR as well as 
a Government Minister for Education between 2012 and 2018.
25 The issue of Burmanisation goes beyond language and also encompasses culture. According to 
Edwards, Cheery Zahau, a Chin politician and political activist, in a public discussion in 
December 2016 described how the Myanmar history curriculum is ‘full of Burmese kings 
killing people’ with no mention of ethnic histories. Beyond historical figures, Buddhist 
principles are also prioritised in the curriculum: ‘For example, Nyein Foundation research 
showed even grade 2 primary books contain questions about Nirvana and other complex 
religious concepts which would probably be beyond Christian children in some mountainous 
villages in Chin State who are unlikely to have ever seen a temple, or monks, or monasteries, 
or heard about Nirvana. Because the curriculum presumes knowledge of these, and 
presupposes the learners are native speakers and Buddhists, there is no specific teaching of 
these concepts to support children’s comprehension’ (Edwards, 2018: 6–7). 
26 Referred to as Grades 1, 2 and 3. Officials said in interviews in 2018 and 2019 that this can 
be developed up to Grade 9, different states and different communities within states have 
developed materials to different levels.
27 Reported in the Myanmar Times (El Thae Thae Naing, Myanmar Times, 2013). 
28 Focus group discussion with parents in Mon and Shan State between 2015 and 2018.
29 Although the LC has currently only been developed for the first 2–3 years of education, it is 
being allocated time in the official curriculum for all grades: ‘In primary schools, the LC takes 
up five periods a week (120 periods per year, over a total of 840 periods in lower primary and 
960 in upper primary, equivalent to about 15% and 12,5% of the teaching time respectively) 
and can include, according to local situations: Ethnic languages and their histories, traditions 
and cultures, local geography and economic situation, as well as Agricultural businesses. 
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In middle schools, the LC occupies four periods a week (108 periods per year, over a total 
of 1080 periods, 10% of the total teaching time). The LC can include: Ethnic language 
and culture, Career skills, Basic computer skills, Basic information and communication 
technology, Agriculture and Home management skills. Finally, in high schools, it corresponds 
to four periods a week (108 periods per year, over a total of 1080 periods, 10% of the total 
teaching time) for Grade 10 and 11, and only two periods per week for Grade 12 (5% of 
the total teaching time). Under the current version of the BECF, the possible subjects are 
identical to those proposed in middle schools.’ (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020: 152–3). 
30 The development of the LC is based on two articles of the 2015 New Education Law 
(amendment): Article 39(g) which says: ‘there shall be freedom to develop the curriculum 
in each region’, while Article 44 states that regional and state governments can introduce the 
teaching of ethnic languages and literature: ‘starting at the primary level and gradually 
expanding [to higher grades]’.
31 According to some estimates, 50 per cent of the world’s 6–7,000 languages could be extinct by 
2050. While this concern seems less acute in Myanmar, it is still a concern – out of the 
119 languages identified by Ethnologue, 20 are categorised as ‘in trouble’ or ‘dying’ (Salem- 
Gervais, 2018). 
32 The LC is not accepted by all ethnic education stakeholders as the solution to ethnic linguistic 
and education grievances. As discussed in Chapter 7 of this volume, any larger ethnic groups 
such as the Shan, Mon, Karen and Kachin would prefer MTB-MLE (Lall and South, 2018; 
South and Lall, 2016b and 2016c) and those with parallel and separate MTB-MLE systems 
would prefer to see their schools and teachers recognised and in some cases even supported by 
the government.
33 In some cases (for example, parts of Mon State), ethnic languages are used during school 
hours; elsewhere, ethnic language teaching still occurs outside of school hours. This is 
problematic because pupils are often tired and not motivated to learn if subjects are not 
included in the regular school day and do not count towards final grades.
Salem-Gervais and Raynaud agree that provision is uneven: ‘Different regions and 
towns present different situations […] while six languages are being taught in Hpa An 
township (four Karen languages, Mon and “Southern” Pa-O), there is no schools teaching 
more than two languages in the city of Hpa-An for 2019–2020. Mon is being taught in about 
40 schools of Mawlamyine township, but not in the city itself (where summer classes are 
available). According to the Regional MoE office’s statistics, for the year 2019–2020, over 
16,000 children are learning an ethnic language in the Yangon Region, in 284 schools located 
in 13 townships (out of 2,700 schools in 44 townships). For this year, the languages available 
(sometimes out of school hours, during the summer break but inside the school premises 
in some instances) are Sgaw Kayin, Western Pwo Kayin, Tai Long Shan, and Asho Chin. 
In the city of Taunggyi, Shan State, no ethnic minority languages were taught in government 
schools at the beginning of the 2019–2020 school year.’(Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 
2019b: 123). 
34 https://www.mmtimes.com/news/govt-promote-ethnic-language-teaching-assistants.html. 
35 In some cases, community leaders spoke about how the involvement of the Thailand-based 
Christian Language organisation SIL had resulted in disagreements between community 
members as they might be working with one group rather than another, or favouring one 
orthography over another.
36 Salem-Gervais and Raynaud discuss issues arising from language and script standardisation 
in more detail. They note: ‘Some political and linguistic projects have indeed striking 
similarities with the priority given to the common “Myanmar” (Burmese) language and 
identity by successive governments over the whole Union. In the case of Kachin State for 
instance, in the perspective of federalism, a number of political actors would like to promote 
the “Kachin” (Jingphaw) language – historically, to a large extent, a common language 
for the various Kachin groups – as an official language for Kachin State and a medium of 
instruction for primary schools. While some non-Jingphaw Kachin actors do agree with 
this perspective, most wish to promote their respective identities and languages (at the 
time of writing, 6 Kachin – Jingphaw, Lacid, Lhaovo, Lisu, Rawang and Zaiwa – and 
5 Shan – Tai Leng, Tai Khamti, Tai Leu, Tai Long and Tai Sar – groups are officially recognised 
by the Kachin State Government)’ (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2019a). This reflects what 
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minority within minority respondents said in the 2018 research in Shan State, as discussed 
further below.
37 Discussion with Ashley South after his research in Chin State 2018.
38 Sixty-eight languages are currently accepted by the MoE for development of teaching 
materials.
39 In Mon State, the interview with the MNEC representative on the LC committee explained 
that there were too many people who did not know anything about either the Mon language 
or the Mon culture. In Karen State, the KNU’s Karen Education Department (KED) refused to 
take part, as they felt this would endorse a government-led process, without being able 
to influence it. 
40 Between 2012 and 2017, UNICEF developed early learning materials in ethnic languages 
for KG in 65 languages, along with teaching guides and big books. They expect the Grade 1 
curriculum draft to be completed by the end of 2018. They expect that it will then take 2–3 
more months to finalise it and provide teacher training before June 2019 when the next school 
year starts. The timeframe for LC development is not fixed, and depends on how long those 
involved take to complete the tasks. 
41 When talking to government officials about teaching ethnic languages, they always use Chin 
State as an example, and say that it is impossible to do so because of the large number of 
languages across the country, and particularly in this one state.
42 Discussion with Ashley South after his research in Chin State 2018.
43 According to a presentation by MEC based on UNICEF and UNESCO data, only 19.35 per cent 
of rural children and 36.44 per cent of urban children aged four accessed pre-school/ECCD. 
The overall rate of Out-of-School Children (OOSC) is 12.26 per cent, dependent on wealth/
poverty with 17.2 per cent OOSC in the lowest wealth bracket, and 7.3 per cent in the highest 
wealth bracket. Thirty-six per cent of children involved in child labour are out of school. 
Highest rates of OOCS were in Rakhine (33.8 per cent), Mon (15.95 per cent), Chin (15.9 per 
cent) and the lowest rates in Kayah (7.3 per cent), Shan (7.5 per cent), Kachin (9.4 per cent) 
and Magwe (9.5 per cent).
44 These are two examples that highlight issues also faced in other ethnic states, but are not 
representative of all minority within minority positions across Myanmar.
45 All respondents were clearly asked if they would prefer MTB-MLE if this were a possibility and 
they were informed that children perform best in the MTB-MLE system, learning both their 
mother tongue as well as the Union language. Despite this, respondents preferred Burmese as 
a LoI. It seems that there is a recognition that if MTB-MLE were to be offered it would not 
happen in the smaller minority languages and the respondents were especially fearful of their 
children having to learn the larger minority’s mother tongue such as Shan or Rakhine as part 
of such a system, creating more rather than fewer problems for them.
46 In her research on language in Chin State, Edwards found that: ‘Some parents were so 
concerned about their children struggling at school they explicitly made decisions to speak 
Burmese as much as possible at home to help their children at home. Others had to learn 
Burmese themselves to be able to do this.’ (Edwards, 2018: 5)







50 The field trip to Shan State focused on Taunggyi and surrounding areas as well as Keng Tung, 
covering south and eastern Shan State. Overall, 9 key informant interviews and 12 FGD (with 
82 participants) were conducted. Respondents included representatives from the EAOs, CSOs, 
ethnic political parties, ethnic Members of Parliament, one ethnic Minister, local thought 
leaders, LCCs/ Literature and Culture Associations (LCAs), as well as students, parents and 
school board members. Separate research during that same trip was conducted with the Pa-O 
in the Pa-O SAZ in Hopong and Pa-O villages around Taunggyi through key informant 
interviews and FGD. In this research, phase eight key informant interviews were conducted 
with respondents representing the Parami Development Network, PNO, PNLO, members of the 
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Pa-O SAZ Leading Body, Pa-O MPs, the Pa-O Education College principal, head teachers in 
schools serving Pa-O communities, and a Pa-O monastic school head monk and the monk in 
charge of education there. A total of 6 FGDs were held with a total of 45 participants including 
the Pa-O LCC, Pa-O political party representatives, Pa-O Education College trainees and Pa-O 
and Shan parents, most of whom are sitting on school committees or boards. Interviews 
were conducted in English, Burmese, Shan and Pa-O depending on the respondents with a 
translator present. In Rakhine, data was collected during a field trip to Sittwe and Mrauk U and 
a Chin village a few hours up river from Mrauk U. Three key informant interviews and three 
FGD (with 31 participants) were conducted with non-Rakine ethnic leaders. Two further key 
informant interviews were conducted – one with the monastic head whose school in Sittwe 
offered residential education to ethic minority children from remote areas and another 
with the Rakhine SEO. Interviews were conducted in English, Burmese, Rakhine and other 
minority languages depending on the respondents with a translator present.
51 This has been confirmed by Salem-Gervais and Raynaud who write: ‘Another question, not 
to be overlooked in the introduction of minority languages in formal education, is the 
interest of ethnic minority parents and children themselves, who often see languages such as 
Burmese, English, or those of neighbouring countries (especially Chinese and Thai) as keys to 
modernity and economic opportunity’ (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2019b).
52 As mentioned earlier, Salem-Gervais and Raynaud claim that there are changes afoot to recruit 
more ethnic teachers to make the ‘classroom language’ policy possible (Salem-Gervais and 
Raynaud, 2019a and 2020). There has also been a recent policy change in recruiting ethnic 
students to education colleges in ethnic states, discussed in Chapter 5.
53 Similar to India’s ‘3 language formula’.
54 Pa-O is spoken by up to 2 million people. Most live in Shan State, with some in Kayin 
State, Kayah State, Mon State, and the Bago Division. The Pa-O Self-Administrative Zone 
encompasses three townships in Shan State.
55 Formerly an armed group, the PNO has transformed itself into a political party and contested 
the 2010 and 2015 elections at different levels. Currently, the PNO has 10 MPs in the two 
houses of the Union Parliament and the Shan State Parliament. Some of the State MPs are in 
the SAZ Leading Body, which is a governance mechanism laid down in the 2008 Constitution. 
The PNO set up a social affairs department, which later was transformed into an NGO 
called ‘Parami Development Network’ (PDN). The PNO as an armed group has also become a 
people’s militia (pyithu sit), which is under Myanmar Army command, and also under the 
Pa-O Military Council led by the former PNO leader Aung Kham Hti. The PDN was founded 
in 1991 when a PNO bilateral ceasefire agreement with the government was signed. Until 
2010, the PDN functioned as the social affairs department of the PNO and collaborated with 
the Ministry of Border Affairs and donors for local development. The PDN has now been 
registered as an NGO. Their contribution to language and education is through supporting 
monks, and by the Pa-O LCC organising summer literacy classes every year in the SAZ and 
other Pa-O villages. The PDN, including the PDN Deputy Chair (a former teacher) has been 
involved in KG curriculum development (invited by UNICEF). The PDN plays a brokering or 
facilitating role in the education of Pa-O communities. They have supported community 
schools to submit requests to TEOs for sanctioning schools to become government schools, 
following up with District, State and also at DBE levels. They collect data on Pa-O children in 
government schools in the SAZ and other townships in Shan State to advocate for the SEO 
to support Pa-O teaching in schools. The PDN also supports the Pa-O Education College, not 
financially but by helping the education college with student welfare, for example, finding 
accommodation for students before the dormitories were ready and dealing with safety and 
protection of students.
56 The LCC saw it as a main issue, perhaps because they are from urban areas where private 
tutoring is widespread.
57 The Teacher Education College has only been allowed to run for five years by the MoE to meet 
temporary needs for teachers, despite the fact that there is an increasing need for ethnic 
teachers. In Taunggyi, the education college can only accept 300 trainees but each education 
college should be producing 400, so it was agreed that the Pa-O college could train 100. 
The respondents were upset that despite the government not being able to meet the 10,000 
teachers a year quota, this college is supposed to close after 5 years.
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58 The Pa-O were given their own SAZ in 2010. The SAZ Leading Body consists of 12 members, 
including 25 per cent military personnel. The Leading Body negotiated with the Union and 
State government to open the Pa-O education college. One of the members of the Leading 
Body and also a CEC member is responsible for social affairs, which includes education. 
59 The 4 R framework is also used in Higgins et al., 2016. However, the report engages only with 
the government and the Mon education systems. 




Ethnic education: Recognising 
alternative systems run by 
ethnic armed organisations
Introduction
The previous chapter engaged with issues of language and education 
and how issues of language can marginalise entire communities. It also 
covered the government’s offer of ‘inclusive’ education through the 
development and roll-out of the LC as well as the views from some of 
the minority within minority communities that broadly agree with 
the government that Burmese needs to remain the main LoI. This view, 
though legitimate, is limited to certain communities, notably some (but 
not all) minority within minority community respondents in Shan and 
Rakhine State. Larger ethnic groups, and some smaller ones such as the 
Naga would prefer MTB-MLE provision (Dekker et al., 2018a). As Dekker 
et al. succinctly note:
This is not to say that after-school or other informal interventions are 
without value; research and experience has shown the benefits of 
acquiring mother tongue literacy skills regardless of the academic 
setting. But the dramatic improvements in all subject areas found in 
true MTB-MLE programs cannot be expected to be achieved through 
limited mother tongue instruction. (Dekker et al., 2018b: 11)1 
In fact, good MTB-MLE programmes result in better literacy and numeracy 
skills in all languages the children learn, giving them a better future within 
multilingual countries. MTB-MLE exists in Myanmar, but is not offered by 
the government. Rather, different forms of mother tongue education or 
MTB-MLE are offered by some EAOs and their education departments, 
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mostly in remote and conflict-affected areas where government teachers 
are unable or unwilling to serve. These systems, however, are not 
recognised by the government and are often seen as ‘second class’, both by 
the authorities as well as some of the ethnic parents living in urban areas.
This chapter uses the education systems under the authority of four 
major EAOs to discuss the relationship between ethnic nationality 
communities and the state. Drawing on data collected between 2011 and 
2018, in schools run by the New Mon State Party’s2 MNEC, the Kachin 
Independence Organisation’s3 KIO Education Department (KIO-ED), 
the Karen National Union’s Karen Education Department (KED) and the 
Revolutionary Council of Shan State’s Education Department (RCSS-ED) as 
well as their administrations, the chapter discusses the issue of recognition 
of alternative and separate education systems. These systems have in effect 
been filling the gap for education provision in remote and conflict-affected 
areas for the Myanmar government, while at the same time offering 
education services in the children’s mother tongue. It is clear that addressing 
the language issue is a central part of finding a sustainable resolution to 
Myanmar’s armed conflict. Yet the key issues of conflict go beyond language, 
and this chapter engages with the core problems of recognition of EAO 
authority in education in areas under their control, and how the issues of the 
peace process, language policy and federalism are inextricably intertwined.
Going beyond Iris Young’s framework (Young, 2005), this chapter 
uses Novelli et al.’s ‘4 R’ framework (mentioned in Chapter 6) that 
examines how ethnic education systems provided by EAOs provide: 
‘redistribution’ (equity and non discrimination, access to resources and 
equitable outcomes across communities); ‘recognition’ (accepting and 
respecting a diversity of identities, including of language and religion); 
‘representation’ (participation of all groups at all levels of the education 
system), and; ‘reconciliation’ (how society deals with past injustices and 
the psychosocial effects of conflict) (Novelli et al., 2015).4 Given the lack 
of involvement of the Myanmar government with these education 
systems, the Young framework is less relevant. The ‘4 R’ framework 
engages both social and transitional justice approaches, recognising 
multiple dimensions of inequality and has been used to study education 
and peacebuilding in various conflict settings across the world.
Background on the ethnic conflict peace process
It will be clear from earlier sections in the book that the Myanmar 
government education system developed under military rule has 
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considerable shortcomings when it comes to Novelli et al.’s ‘4 R’ framework, 
especially so in regard to ethnic minority children. As detailed in Chapter 6, 
Myanmar has suffered from ethnic conflict for over 50 years. Much of this 
civil war has raged between the Tatmadaw and a range of armed ethnic 
organisations (EAOs) that have been fighting for autonomy against the 
militarised central government (Smith, 1999), some since independence. 
The conflict is ongoing in certain areas and ‘reconciliation’ (the 4th R), 
as shall be seen below, has not yet been achieved; there is as yet no 
peace education and peace is not part of the new curriculum. The 1962 
coup engendered a ‘Burmanisation’ process whereby language (Burmese) 
and religion (Buddhism) became central pillars of the state, resulting 
in large-scale marginalisation and a resentment of ethnic groups that 
remains in place to this day. ‘Recognition’ (the 2nd R) of the country’s 
diversity of language, culture and religious traditions has not transcended 
the education reforms. Earlier chapters have dealt with the differentiated 
achievement and retention outcomes between different states of the 
Union, and whilst the available data masks the differences between ethnic 
groups, the reality is that ethnic children do less well than their Bamar 
counterparts, which shows that ‘redistribution’ (the 1st R), especially 
equitable outcomes across communities, is an aspiration that will not be 
achieved easily as part of the reforms. Lastly, ‘representation’ (the 3rd R) 
and the one that underpins lasting change, is largely absent – the issue of 
adequate numbers of ethnic teachers has not yet been addressed systemat-
ically, although some anecdotal research evidence points to the fact that 
there might be some changes afoot in government recruiting processes. 
In fact, Higgins et al. explain how the direction of the education reform 
process might harm rather than resolve Myanmar’s conflict situation 
(Higgins et al., 2016: 11):5
The National Education Sector Plan (NESP) and the Education 
Law suggest that ‘peace building is everywhere and nowhere’: 
everywhere in the sense that there seems to be a recognition of the 
need to place the education reform process in the actual context of 
inequalities and frustrations, yet it is nowhere as a peace building 
logic or language is notably absent from key reforms. The reform 
and policy direction potentially might do more harm rather than 
address the root cause that drove many aspects of the conflict in 
the first place: a lack of fair redistribution of resources and 
opportunities, a reflection of recognition of the various linguistic 
and cultural needs, a sincere representation and a participatory 
process that not only informs but rather engages with oppositional 
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and minority perspectives to on the long run enable first steps to 
addressing the grievances expressed through and inflicted by 
education through reconciliation (bold in the original).
Ethnic armed organisations governance and 
education systems
Despite being weakened after decades of conflict, most armed ethnic 
organisations still enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy among the 
communities they represent (Lall and South, 2018). In part, this results 
from the public services, including education (and particularly teachers 
and schools) that these EAOs provide in areas which the Myanmar 
government does not reach. Ad hoc ethnic nationality education systems 
were developed by some armed ethnic groups during the chaotic early 
years of the Civil War in the 1950–60s, with attempts to standardise 
these systems during the 1970s. Since the 1980s, and particularly with 
an influx of external support across the Thai border following the 1988 
democracy uprising in Burma, non-state education systems expanded 
and formalised. In addition, a wide range of civil society actors also 
became active in the field of non-state education provision among 
ethnic nationality communities, including through the implementation 
of non-formal and part-time programmes.6 Communities in conflict-
affected regions of Myanmar have struggled to provide education to their 
children, often under incredibly difficult circumstances, and education 
services have been repeatedly disrupted by the armed conflict.7 Whereas 
most schooling is organised and owned by communities with varying 
degrees of external support, teachers, curricula and funding come from 
two main sources: the government and EAOs. Many schools and 
communities engage, often uneasily, with both sets of education actors 
(Jolliffe and Speers Mears, 2016).
Education: The litmus test
Ethnic education systems vary widely (see Table 7.1). As detailed in an 
earlier publication (South and Lall, 2016a), in Myanmar the ethnic 
nationality education system can be seen as a proxy for ethnic 
relationships with the state itself. These ethnic education activities are 
representative of broader struggles for self-determination, and serve as a 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and centralisation can be plotted along a continuum, ranging from 
demands for outright independence from the Union through varying 
forms of autonomy and decentralisation. In relation to education, 
separatist agendas can be represented by schools featuring little or no 
Burmese language teaching, using a mother tongue curriculum (often 
radically different to that of the MoE), to the promotion of mother 
tongue-based teaching in schools that also teach Burmese and broadly 
follow the government curriculum, albeit modified according to local 
contexts and conditions. In this framing, the MNEC’s education provision 
model (described below) has achieved a fairly high degree of local self-
determination in education, while retaining links to the Union (Lall and 
South, 2013a and 2013b). This was previously also the case with the 
KIO system which, under pressure as a result of the resumption of 
armed conflict in 2011, seems to be moving towards a more separatist 
model, similar to that adopted historically by the KNU. These positions in 
relation to education and language use can be taken as proxies of different 
actors’ views regarding a broader range of state/society issues, and the 
distribution of power and resources between the central government 
and ethnic polities (South and Lall, 2016a). For example, those who 
seek to use ethnic languages as a primary medium of administration 
in ethnic states can be expected to adopt strong/maximalist positions 
regarding the extent to which natural resource revenue and other 
financial and political goods should be retained at – or redistributed 
to – the local/state level, and may even argue for complete separation 
of the ethnic polities from the Union. Moderates may adopt positions 
according to which ethnic languages are used together with Burmese, or 
in a supplementary manner at the state level – corresponding to varying 
degrees of decentralisation or federalism, a key issue in the ongoing 
peace process (South and Lall, 2016a). These positions are reflected 
below in the description of the various ethnic education providers.
Effects of the peace process on ethnic education
The peace process in Myanmar has had both positive and negative 
impacts on ethnic education. There is, as seen earlier, a lack of strategic 
and policy connection between education issues and the politics of the 
peace process, with both processes having been kept separate (Higgins 
et al., 2016; Lall, 2016a). However, the NESP that came out of the education 
reforms emphasises that the Myanmar government intends to improve 
equitable access to quality education for students at all levels of the 
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national education system, emphasising the need for education benefits to 
be shared among broad segments of the population, and for currently 
excluded groups not to be left behind. Part of this included the engagement 
with education systems run by EAOs, therefore inextricably linking the 
required changes to the peace process.
After two years of difficult negotiations, leaders of eight EAOs 
signed a NCA with the Myanmar government and army on the 15 October 
2015 in Naypyidaw. Figure 7.1 shows Chief of Army General Min Aung 
Hlaing just before signing the NCA. This document has remained 
problematic and divisive, as indicated by the decision of some 10 EAOs 
not to attend the event or sign the NCA, and only two other armed groups 
(the NMSP and the LDU) signing in February 2018. The peace process 
in Myanmar has undergone further setbacks since (Lall et al., 2020). In 
December 2018, two signatory armed groups, the KNU and the RCSS, 
suspended participation in joint aspects of the peace process – meaning 
that representatives of these groups could not meet officially with the 
government (a situation not fully resolved at the time of writing). Despite 
the unilateral ceasefire announced and held by the Tatmadaw between 
21 December 2018 and April 2019 (later extended to September 2019),8 
Figure 7.1 NCA ceremony 2015 with General Min Aung Hlaing on the 
screen as he prepares to sign. Source: Author.
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and a series of unofficial meetings held mostly in China and Thailand 
between government and EAO representatives, no further progress 
seems to have been made.
With regard to the NCA and education, Chapter 6 of the NCA 
acknowledges the roles of signatory EAOs in the fields of education, 
health, natural resource management and security, and provides for 
international assistance in these sectors in partnership and cooperation 
with the government. The government has acknowledged the NCA 
signatory groups’ administrative and service delivery roles, and they are 
now challenged to re-invent themselves as post-insurgent organisations. 
Those EAOs that signed the NCA were removed from the Unlawful 
Associations, making their engagement with international development 
partners easier. However, the EAOs and their administrations remain in 
place with no clear pathway for organisational transformation.
While the EAOs might not have changed much, there has been 
significant change with regard to government access to the conflict-
affected areas. The negotiation leading up to the NCA and the signing of 
the NCA allowed the government to assert its authority in previously 
autonomous, ethnic nationality-populated areas, including through 
teacher provision and school buildings (Lenkova, 2015), particularly in 
Myanmar’s southeast. Jolliffe and Speers Mears note how KNU HQs 
had: ‘issued numerous warnings that the government is expanding its 
presence prior to negotiation through the provision of education support’ 
(Jolliffe and Speers Mears, 2016: 64). They explain that in Kawkareik 
Township (KNU defined East Daw Na region), 32 schools (of which 
29 were KED-only schools) had been offered MoE teachers between 2012 
and 2015 and that 13 schools eventually accepted the teachers (Jollife 
and Speers Mears, 2016: 66).
This has resulted in widespread local resentment of ethnic 
nationality stakeholders who are concerned that international aid 
agencies and donors are, perhaps inadvertently, supporting a government 
strategy of pushing state structures into conflict-affected areas without 
taking account of existing local activities and services or the impacts 
on peace and conflict dynamics, thereby placing traditional EAO and 
ethnic education systems at risk (Lall and South, 2018). These systems 
are important as they provide services to at least 300,000 children in 
Myanmar, in schools either directly administered by non-state education 
departments or in ‘mixed’ schools, jointly administered by the MoE and 
EBEPs.9 Often these schools are located in remote and conflict-affected 
areas where the government either has no schools, or where government 
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teachers are unable or unwilling to serve. In these areas, EAO schools 
provide a service to the community and in effect also to the Myanmar 
government, whose responsibility includes the education of all Myanmar 
children no matter where they reside.
Four of the most prominent ethnic nationality systems are briefly 
described below. The chapter then discusses the difficulties the Myanmar 
government faces in engaging with EAOs (and vice versa), and how the 
education reforms are changing the landscape of education in remote 
and conflict-affected ethnic nationality-dominated areas, yet have still 
not brought about increased social justice for the ethnic nationality 
communities who live there.
Ethnic education in Mon State: The Mon National 
Education Committee and the Mon National Schools
The Mon population consists of about 750,000 Mon in Myanmar,10 with 
perhaps 1 million people self-identifying as Mon, including people who 
do not speak the language fluently (South, 2003). The vast majority of 
the Mon are Theravada Buddhist, and since the pre-colonial period the 
Mon Buddhist monkhood was responsible for recording and reproducing 
elements of Mon national and religious history, and transmitting the 
Mon language in a context where many observers expected this to die out 
(South, 2003). Under the U Nu parliamentary government of the 1950s, 
schools in some areas were permitted to teach ethnic languages. However, 
as described in Chapter 6, school curricula were centralised and the 
LoI became Burmese across the country following Gen Ne Win’s military 
coup in 1962. Conflict between the NMSP and the government had been 
raging since independence in 1948. In 1972, the NMSP Central Education 
Department was established, with the Mon school system being reformed 
in 1992 with the formation of the MNEC.11 The MNEC developed an 
MTB-MLE education system in which Mon is used at primary level, tran-
sitioning to Burmese at middle school, and more-or-less following the 
government curriculum, mostly in translation with additional modules 
in Mon language and Mon history. Graduates of the MNEC’s Mon National 
Schools (MNS) speak fluent Mon, but the system was designed so that 
MNS graduates are also able to sit government matriculation exams in 
Burmese, allowing them to access Myanmar universities (Lall and South, 
2013a and 2013b).
Following a ceasefire with the government in June 1995, the NMSP 
controlled a ‘ceasefire zone’ where the NMSP exerted varying degrees 
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS248
of military and administrative influence in Mon-populated areas of Mon 
and Karen States.12 At the time of the ceasefire, the MNS system consisted 
of 76 schools (including one high school) which were located in the 
NMSP ‘ceasefire zones’ and in the three main Mon refugee camps (South, 
2003). Research conducted in 2011–2 established that the ceasefire 
allowed for the Mon education system to spread to the government-
controlled zones, with some two-thirds of MNS operating outside of the 
ceasefire areas (Lall and South, 2013a and 2013b).13 Figure 7.2 shows 
a Mon National School in 2013. In 2018, MNEC supported a total of 
132 Mon National Schools (including three high schools, 16 middle 
schools, 91 primary schools and 22 post-primary schools) across Mon 
State, Karen State and Tanintharyi Region. There are 10,779 students 
and 787 teachers at MNS in total. The MNEC supports 156 teachers at 
92 mixed schools as well.14
Whilst there has been an informal system in place for MNS students 
to sit government exams and to be able to transfer to government schools 
where there are no MNEC middle and high schools, cooperation between 
the Mon and the state education authorities is based on personal 
relationships in the local setting and vary between township, districts 
and villages. Transfers between the two systems remain a major issue, as 
the MNEC system is not officially recognised. Stakeholders interviewed 
Figure 7.2 Mon National School, 2013. Source: Author.
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in 201815 said that the government had made transfers easier as part of 
the reforms by systematising the tests the MNS students have to take, 
as they were trying to recruit Mon students to their system. Others 
disagreed, claiming that transfers had been made harder as students 
had to take an exam in Math, Burmese and English in order to be allowed 
to transfer, whilst previously, transfers were locally arranged between 
head teachers of the different systems. Some parents interviewed in 2018 
also alleged that in some government schools the head teacher asked the 
transferring student(s) to take an exam in each and every subject, not 
only in the three required ones, so as to block the transfer.
Since the mid-1990s, Mon has also been taught as part of the 
curriculum in just under 100 ‘mixed schools’. These institutions are 
government-run schools, where the MNEC provide (and usually support 
financially) one or more Mon-speaking teachers, and also have some 
input into the syllabus, especially for history. Collaboration between the 
two systems has been on the increase, including more meetings between 
SEO officials based in Mawlamyine and MNEC representatives, largely 
due to a forward-thinking head of the MNEC. This started with a UNICEF-
organised workshop in September 2013,16 and was followed by some 
joint in-service teacher training. The increased collaboration was made 
easier by the fact that the NMSP system used the government curriculum 
in translation. Yet despite this, the collaborative efforts have not all been 
happy experiences, with many NMSP teachers feeling they were treated 
like ‘second class teachers’ when taking part in these activities, and not 
being allowed to wear their national school uniform (which differs from 
the government teachers’ uniform).17 The increased ethnic language 
provision and the development of the LC, described in Chapter 6, in 
government schools has also complicated matters, with Mon language 
teachers who had previously worked in mixed schools not being 
appointed to teach the Mon language as part of the officially sanctioned 
ethnic language provision in their school and being replaced by another 
LCC-provided teacher.18
Reverting to Novelli et al.’s ‘4 R’ framework, the MNEC education 
provision offers ‘redistribution’ in that it gives access to non-discriminatory 
education and helps Mon children with equal outcomes by providing 
an MTB-MLE education framework. In not denying the communities 
access to Burmese as the official government language, it fulfils the 
requirement of (reverse) ‘recognition’. By allowing its teachers to get 
trained with government teachers, and supporting a mixed school system 
in government schools where Mon parents and teachers have equal say in 
their children’s education, it also supports ‘representation’. Therefore, 
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it can be argued that the Mon education system is indeed part of an 
approach that supports ‘reconciliation’.
Ethnic education in Karen State: The Karen Education 
Department and community schools
During the colonial period, Christian missionaries, and later government 
officials, encouraged a sense of national identity among the previously 
scattered Karen community, leading to the emergence of Karen social 
and political movements in the late nineteenth century (Smith, 1999). At 
the time of independence in 1948, the Karen nationalist movement was 
well organised, with Western-educated elites coveting independence. 
This resulted in over 60 years of armed conflict that only ended with a 
ceasefire in 2012. The KNU subsequently signed the NCA in 2015. Despite 
the 1962 restrictions on ethnic language education, some churches and 
monasteries continued teaching informally, particularly in Christian 
Sgaw and Buddhist Pwo dialects. Only a minority of the Karen population 
live within the borders of the official Karen State that was established 
in 1952, with large Karen-speaking populations living in Yangon, 
Ayeyarwady and Tanintharyi Regions, eastern Bago Region, Mon State, 
as well as in refugee camps in Thailand.19
The education system in Karen-populated areas is highly diverse, 
reflecting the heterogeneity of this community, numbering approxi-
mately 5–7 million people in Myanmar (Lall and South, 2013a).20 Most 
schooling is owned and organised by communities with varying degrees 
of external support, with some other schools having been built by the 
government, and in some cases having had teachers and rudimentary 
teaching materials supplied. In such ‘mixed schools’ resources are 
sometimes supplemented by materials and teachers supplied by border- 
based CBOs or EAOs.
The KNU founded schools in areas under its control in the 1950s. 
In the 1970s, an Education Department was established near the Thai 
town of Mae Sot. The KNU’s Education Department (KED), along with its 
affiliate organisation the Karen Teacher Working Group (KTWG), operate 
together as the Karen State Education Assistance Group (KSEAG).21 They 
provide teacher stipends, pre-service and in-service teacher training, 
administrative support and schooling materials. Well suited to local 
needs, this system diverges significantly from the Myanmar government 
education system, not least through the use of Karen (mostly Sgaw) as 
the LoI, with only a limited focus on Burmese. Given the differences 
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between the systems and the lack of recognition of KED schooling, KED 
school graduates find it difficult to enter the government education 
system or access opportunities in Myanmar or abroad (Lall and South, 
2013a and 2013b).
The KED is part of the KNU administrative governance structure 
and oversees school administration and policy across 28 KNU designated 
townships through a network of field education staff, and school 
management committees/PTAs. These include District Education 
departments in each of the KNU’s seven districts. The KSEAG is in charge 
of the provision of school and learning materials, while KTWG for 
pre- and in-service (mobile) teacher professional development. KED 
and KTWG jointly operate two teacher-training colleges at the Thai–
Myanmar border. In 2017–8, they together supported 1,573 schools, 
from primary to post-secondary education – of which around 330 use the 
KED curriculum (serving around 23,000 students), 612 use a mixture of 
KED-MoE curriculum and 631 use the MoE curriculum (both serving 
around 156,000 students).22 In 2015, the KED published its Education 
Policy that amongst other stipulations in its basic principles stated the 
following:
Every Karen shall learn his own literature and language.
Every Karen shall be acquainted with Karen history.
The Karen culture, customs and traditions shall be promoted.
Our own Karen culture, customs and traditions shall be made to be 
respected by the other ethnic nationalities, and the cultures, customs 
and traditions of the other ethnic nationalities shall mutually be 
recognized and respected.
The KED system, similar to that of the MNEC, fosters ‘redistribution’ by 
supporting equitable outcomes across communities. While the KED 
schools that do not offer Burmese do not fulfil the aspect of (reverse) 
‘recognition’, the many mixed schools where the KED provides Karen 
teachers, do support mutual ‘recognition’ and ‘representation’ as well as 
‘reconciliation’. That said, the separatist curriculum used in KED schools 
which does not allow the children to re-enter the Burmese education 
system, does not support ‘reconciliation’ and it is these children that will 
find it most difficult to engage with Myanmar as their country once the 
conflict subsides (Lall and South, 2013a and 2013b).
Other Karen EAGs also administer schools in their areas of authority. 
For example, there are nearly 100 schools in areas under the control of 
the DKBA. Another ex-KNU faction, the KNU Peace Council, administers 
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33 schools with around 3,000 students. These include two high schools 
(up to Grade 10) in Htokoko and We Ler Muh on the Thai–Myanmar 
Border. These schools receive stationary support from KSEAG, while 
teacher salaries are paid directly by the Peace Council.
Ethnic education in Shan State
In Shan State, the extremely wide variety of ethnic education stakehold-
ers falls roughly into four main categories that include EAO and non-EAO 
education providers. The major EAOs mostly offer education services 
or support in the main Shan language (referred to locally as ‘Tai’ or 
‘Tai Long’). These organisations have differences on a linguistic basis 
between those using five tone Tai/old Shan language (this includes 
education organisations linked to the RCSS) and those using six tone Tai 
(the reformed version of Shan language as used in northern Shan State), 
including education organisations linked to the SSPP, Kaw Dai and the 
Karli paramilitary group/Border Guard Force (BGF) 7th Brigade.23 There 
are also CSOs that are involved in Shan education, but are not affiliated 
to any EAO and do not work directly with any EAO. Others include LCA/
LCCs, mostly associated with the smaller non-Shan ethnic minorities 
across the state, offering education services or support in the ethnic 
minority languages, the work of which has been discussed in Chapter 6.
There are three non-government Shan-based curricula in operation 
that include the original Shan language textbooks developed during 
the country’s first parliamentary period by the Shan State Government, 
based on the books used in the Sabwa era. These were revised by 
Sai Aung Htun and submitted to the state government and approved 
in 2012–3 for the teaching of Shan in government schools (KG and Grade 
1–3).24 The curriculum does go further than Grade 3 and is used in 
certain mixed settings as explained below. These books use five tones. 
An alternative set of textbooks was developed by the Shan Literature and 
Cultural Association (SLCA), particularly by Sai Pha and Dr Sao Sang Ai. 
Although based on the books submitted to the government, they have 
been revised to use six tones.25 The content has been updated and 
photos are used instead of illustrations. These books are printed by the 
Mandalay-based SLCA as the government refused to accredit a new set 
of books just two years after printing the first set. Township LCAs decide 
which books to use (five or six tone) depending on the location and the 
teachers, with those in the north generally using six tones, while those 
in the south generally use five tones. Some of the books at the Taunggyi 
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LCA are shown in Figure 7.3. Beyond the two sets of books there is also 
the RCSS curriculum developed by a Shan teacher,26 which includes Shan 
language, maths, geography and history up until Grade 6, all in Shan 
language using five tones (discussed further below).
In Shan State, it is important to understand that the vast majority 
of rural schools are community owned and administered. The MoE, 
EAOs, CSOs, monastic networks and others might then help to organise 
these schools and provide teachers, textbooks, curricula, pathways for 
examinations and accreditation amongst other things, and then bring 
these schools under their system. However, such affiliations are not 
always permanent.27
Ethnic armed organisation Education
The RCSS28 provides support to over 200 schools, including over 100 
Shan National Schools, which are directly under RCSS administration, 
most of which are close to or across the Thailand border. The other types 
of schools are categorised as government, monastic or community 
schools. The RCSS HQ is at Loi Tai Leng (in the government defined 
Langkho Township). In 2017, Chairman Yawd Serk established a new 
Figure 7.3 Shan language books developed by the Shan Literature and 
Culture Association. Source: Author.
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Education Commission to reform and develop the Education Department. 
The reform efforts focus on improving teacher training, establishing 
common learning and assessment standards and strengthening MTB-MLE. 
Responsibilities are divided and devolved: the Education Department deals 
with funding, teacher training, human resources, finance and curriculum 
development; the regional education committees that oversee two or three 
townships each select teachers, monitor schools and coordinate with the 
HQ to provide assistance.
The first RCSS school was established at the HQ in 2000 to serve 
the IDPs who had been displaced by conflict. Schools fall into different 
categories, being on a continuum with decreasing government funding 
and involvement, with mixed RCSS-government schools that combine 
the government curriculum and the Shan curriculum (language, history, 
social norms and culture), and where both government and RCSS 
provide financial support while communities provide in-kind support for 
the teachers. The schools are usually government schools, built by the 
government, but in remote locations where government teachers refuse 
to serve.29 The RCSS provides the salaries for the locally recruited 
teachers. These are local arrangements that involve the local TEO but not 
the SEO in Taunggyi. A local NGO, the Centre for Rural Education and 
Development (CRED) and the RCSS Education Department (and occa-
sionally the MoE) provide teacher training and the TEO and village 
administrator select teachers who have to speak Shan. The mixed RCSS-
monastic schools also mix the government curriculum and the Shan 
curriculum (language, history, social norms and culture), with some 
teachers in these schools receiving a stipend from the RCSS and the RCSS 
Education Department, while CRED provides teacher training. There are 
also RCSS-supported community schools where the RCSS curriculum is 
taught and communities provide the infrastructure and in-kind support for 
the teachers, whilst the RCSS provide the teacher salaries and the RCSS 
Education Department and CRED provide teacher training. Schools that 
are referred to as ‘national schools’ are also essentially community schools 
that teach the RCSS curriculum but do not receive any support from the 
government at all, and have often been set up under the guidance of the 
RCSS. There seems to be a subtle difference between National Schools and 
RCSS-supported community schools as they are categorised separately 
by the Education Department. Over the last 10 years, the RCSS has been 
contributing funds more systematically to establish schools, hire teachers 
and pay teacher salaries. However, schools are sometimes taken over by 
the government in situations where the Tatmadaw takes control of 
previously RCSS-dominated areas (or in cases where the RCSS takes back 
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control, reverting back to the community with RCSS support). Overall, 
there are over 400 RCSS-supported teachers on the Myanmar side of the 
Thai–Myanmar border.30
The RCSS Education Department developed a curriculum in 2002, 
initially covering Grades 1–6 in seven subjects, that is used in the Shan 
national schools. The textbooks are copied and distributed by the RCSS. 
The teacher who designed the curriculum confirmed in an interview in 
2018 that she studied the curricula of 10 countries,31 before designing 
what she believed was appropriate for Shan children. This curriculum is 
completely different from the Myanmar government’s, making any 
transfers between the RCSS and the MoE system impossible.32 The RCSS 
curriculum does not go to Grade 10, however, the RCSS secondary 
schools use parts of the Thai curriculum for higher grades as well as some 
materials translated from Burmese textbooks.33 The RCSS-supported 
schools teach in Shan as much as possible, but in some schools of mixed 
ethnicity respondents reported that in this case Burmese was occasionally 
used. It is unclear whether Burmese is taught systematically as a subject in 
Shan National Schools. Some parents were emphatic that it is not taught 
because the community is against it; others said Burmese is taught where 
teachers are available. However, RCSS schools in the Loi Tai Leng (HQ) 
area teach English and Thai, and students who attend these schools are 
able to continue their studies in Thailand after completing secondary 
school at Loi Tai Leng.
Other EAO education systems in Shan State include the Karli 
People’s Militia Force, Kunhein Township (previously, the 7th Brigade of 
the SSA) and the SSPP Education Department. There are 67 schools 
in the Karli area, 37 of which were previously run by the militia but are 
now government schools, and 30 of which they still support. Currently, 
the militia supports 79 teachers in 197 villages (West Salween) and 
another 20 (East Salween) across a total of 217 villages under their 
control. The teachers use Shan language and the Sai Pha curriculum 
(the same as that used in Kaw Dai schools). Burmese is not taught in 
their schools, and they send their teachers to government schools to 
teach Shan. The Karli People’s Militia Force Education Department, 
supported by Sai Pha, provides a one-month pre-service teacher training 
in the summer.
The Shan State Progress Party34 was established in 1971, as the 
political party wing of SSA, which had been founded in 1964. Their 
education programme started in 1971 and mostly supported community 
schools, including literacy campaigns and out-of-school training. According 
to Kim Jolliffe, the system has been revamped since 2015 to provide 
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full-time basic education under leaders with experience in NGOs in 
Thailand and elsewhere, and with funding from the SSPP central treasury. 
There are currently 3,700 students in 53 ‘Shan national’ primary schools, 
and teachers are also provided to 20 mixed schools. In total, the system 
has 88 teachers on full salaries, in addition to 17 teachers that rely on 
community donations but get training and ‘technical management’ from 
the SSPP Education Department. There is also a full high school at Wanhai 
(SSPP HQ), which uses the full government curriculum. The MoE provides 
3 teachers and 15 others are trained and paid for by the SSPP. All 
the funding and resources for the school come from the SSPP, while the 
community provides firewood and other assistance. Shan language, history 
and civic education are all provided during school hours.35
Shan national primary schools in that area use the six tone Shan as 
a LoI, and the curriculum as developed by the Shan LCA.36 The Shan 
National School system has only been in operation since 2015, so, at the 
time of the research, the oldest children were in Grade 3 and there is not 
yet a functioning pathway for them to continue to middle school. Teachers 
all do a pre-service three-month ‘community leadership strengthening’ 
intensive course which covers politics, constitutional issues, human 
rights, women rights and basic healthcare. Some of that is supported by 
CRED, which gets technical support from KTWG.37
non-Eao education organisations
There are many non-EAO education organisations involved in education 
across Shan State. Two of the most prominent are CRED and Kaw Dai. 
CRED, previously known as the Rural Development Foundation Shan 
State (RDFSS),38 is a CSO that supports education across Shan State 
including with some of the non-Shan minorities.39 CRED/RDFSS started 
in the Namlan area, organising community and monastic schools in rural 
areas as well as a boarding house in Namlan (built with support from the 
organisation ‘Child’s Dream’), so that children from rural villages could 
move to the town to continue on to middle school. CRED/RDFSS has 
been attempting to build a network across the Shan education systems, 
called the Tai Education Network, to move towards common language 
policy, common curriculum and common training for teachers. In recent 
years, CRED has increased its collaboration with the RCSS and SSPP40 
along with a number of other community school and monastic networks 
across the state by providing a range of education services to EBEPs, 
monastic and MoE schools, including teacher training and support such 
as teacher stipends and classroom materials.41
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Kaw Dai was originally established in 1998 as a CSO focused on 
issues of human rights and community health. According to Guyot et al., 
Kaw Dai means ‘Shan association’ and has the connotation of a caring 
community that extends from one’s village to the whole Shan people, 
wherever they may live (Guyot et al., 2016). As of 2005, they started to 
work in education, opening a school for IDPs. They are based in Karli, 
Kunhein Township in the territory of the Karli People’s Militia Force. 
They receive financial support from the militia to run both their schools 
and the Shan Community College. Some of their staff in 2018 are 
depicted in Figure 7.4.42 They have a post-primary school from Grades 
4–9, with 217 boarding students as well as five other community primary 
schools (Grades 1–3) across five areas. The 59 teachers for these schools 
are provided by Kaw Dai, some of whom have been trained under 
Dr Thein Lwin in Thailand. The post-primary/secondary school in Karli 
accepts students from beyond their feeder schools as well. The schools 
use a curriculum developed by the chair of Kaw Dai’s, Sai Pha (who 
reformed the five tone ‘old’ Shan language to make it six tones), and the 
organisation benefits from a number of well educated and dedicated 
staff based in Karli, Lashio and Yangon. The curriculum is all in Shan 
(using six tones), with their own Shan language, Shan history and 
geography textbooks, while Burmese, English and Thai are taught as 
Figure 7.4 Kaw Dai, Shan State, 2018. Source: Author.
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foreign languages. The 11 teachers at the college are mainly graduates 
from their former Yangon-based programme. Kaw Dai also provides Shan 
language, history and culture classes to government schools outside of 
school hours, mainly in northern Shan State. To support Shan language 
summer programmes, the chair of Kaw Dai (Sai Pha) provides two-week 
teacher training to high school students around 12 townships across 
Shan and Kachin States, as well as Mandalay and Bago Regions, for six 
months every year. They then volunteer to deliver Shan language 
and literature programmes organised by the SLCA in community centres 
during the summer. Kaw Dai’s mission goes beyond education – they 
aspire to promote democracy and justice by nurturing young Shan to 
serve their community with education, political awareness, protection of 
the environment, community service, and advocacy.43
Across Shan State, achievement of the ‘4 R’ framework varies. All 
education systems help with ‘redistribution’, as children are able to 
understand teachers, achieve better outcomes and have an equitable 
education where they are not discriminated against. However, with 
regard to ‘recognition’, ‘representation’ and ‘reconciliation’ there are 
multiple, varying issues. The RCSS curriculum bears no resemblance to 
the Myanmar government curriculum, and in many of the RCSS schools 
it seems that Burmese is not taught, so that transfers are impossible. 
It is also clear that smaller minority languages are not represented and 
recognised, so that some Shan families are catered for, but not others. 
This kind of a system does not support ‘reconciliation’ between groups. 
There are clearly other mixed schools, some of which receive RCSS 
support, that do support ‘representation’ and ‘reconciliation’, though this 
appears to be only between the majority Bamar and the Shan, while the 
inclusion of smaller ethnic groups and their languages is uncertain.
Ethnic education in Kachin State
Kachin dialects include different branches of the Tibeto-Burmese language 
family. The largest number of speakers use Jingphaw, with 630,000 
speakers in Myanmar, 37,000 in China and 5–6,000 in India. The majority 
of the Kachin in Myanmar are members of different Christian denomina-
tions. It is significant that the Kachin almost certainly make up a minority 
of the population of Kachin State, with tens of thousands Kachin people 
living in neighbouring northern Shan State (Jaquet, 2015).
The main EAO education system is provided by the Education 
Department of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). The KIO44 
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was established in 1961 and fought for over three decades for freedom 
and self-determination for the Kachin people. Following a 1994 ceasefire, 
17 years of relative peace allowed a strong and dynamic civil society 
sector to re-emerge. Nevertheless, the 1994 ceasefire is widely regarded 
as a failure, as it did not result in a political settlement to the decades of 
armed ethnic conflict, despite the KIO’s good faith participation in the 
then military government’s National Constitution Convention. The KIO 
ceasefire broke down entirely in June 2011, when the Myanmar Army 
launched new offensives against the organisation. In the nearly nine 
years since fighting started again in Kachin areas, the KIO has lost 
territory, much of it of significant strategic importance. The conflict has 
created over 100,000 IDPs, many of whom live in camps on the Myanmar 
side of the China border. These people have ‘voted with their feet’, as 
some 80 per cent have chosen to flee to KIO-controlled areas, rather than 
remain under the authority of the Myanmar government (South, 2018).
In the KIO HQ in Laiza on the China border, the organisation 
acts as a well-functioning government, administering departments 
of education, health, agriculture, etc., each with their respective and 
effective bureaucracies and training centres. Larger towns and villages 
have electricity and internet access, and many of the trappings of a 
de facto nation-state, including, their own system of car registration, 
traffic police, fire brigade, etc. Following the 1994 KIO ceasefire, the 
then military government made a commitment to supporting civilian 
community rehabilitation jointly with the KIO in two main sectors: 
immunisation, and allowing KIO high school students to enter 
government schools and sit matriculation exams. For this reason, the 
KIO decided to adopt the government curriculum, including using 
MoE textbooks. The KIO schools’ use of government curriculum was 
modified slightly, removing objectionable elements of the history and 
some other syllabi (for example, lessons about the Myanmar flag) and 
the LoI was mostly mother tongue (primarily, but not exclusively) 
Jingphaw. KIO students at all levels experienced few problems transi-
tioning between the two systems. However, in 2010, following the KIO’s 
refusal to be transformed into a Myanmar Army-controlled Border Guard 
Force (BGF), the MoE began restricting transfer between the two systems. 
Transfers were halted entirely by official decree following breakdown of 
the ceasefire in June 2011 (South and Lall, 2016b and 2016c).45
Since the resumption of fighting, the KIO system has started 
to diverge from that of the government. At present, the curriculum 
still follows the MoE, but the KIO Education Department has begun 
printing its own materials, and expects that these will increasingly 
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reflect the Kachin’s ‘own curriculum’ as Kachin education stakeholders 
start to develop their own curriculum framework.46 This approach aims 
to develop an education system based on mother-tongue teaching, with 
Burmese mostly confined to foreign language status (equal, or secondary, 
to English and Chinese) and, therefore, likely to diverge significantly 
from that of the government. This policy raises a number of issues 
including the likelihood that future KIO school graduates will not speak 
fluent Burmese.
As of 2018, the KIO Education Department administers 167 schools 
(including 8 high schools and 17 middle schools) with 1,534 teachers 
serving over 22,000 students.47 Before the ceasefire broke down, there 
were 58 KIO schools in the Eastern Division, now there are only 28; 
before 2011, there were 24 KIO schools in Shan State, now only 5 remain. 
Some of these schools have now been replaced by those in the IDP camps. 
Before 2011, some of the KIO schools were located in government- 
controlled or ‘mixed’ areas. With some exceptions in areas of ongoing 
armed conflict, most are now located in KIO-controlled areas. Several 
pre-existing KIO schools have seen student numbers more than double 
with the influx of IDPs. One KIO high school from northern Shan 
State has moved entirely, to be rebuilt in Mai Ja Yang, together with 
540 students and teachers.48 Because of a lack of qualified teachers, the 
quality of education in IDP camps is probably declining. IDP children 
in KIO schools generally do less well in exams than non-displaced 
children. According to UNICEF, 70 per cent of IDP students drop out 
after primary school. The KIO has built a new high school at Je Yang 
(one of the largest IDP camps), and children in camps close to Laiza and 
Mai Ja Yang can access high schools in these two KIO-controlled towns. 
For other IDP children, however, access to education is more difficult. 
Therefore, the KIO Education department, often in partnership with 
churches, runs a number of boarding houses, allowing IDP children from 
the camps to stay in the vicinity of KIO high schools.49 The KIO has had 
its own teacher training since 1997, with their Institute of Education in 
Mai Ja Yang providing short and longer courses (between a few weeks 
and two years), yet at present they cannot train enough teachers for the 
needs of all schools, particularly so with the recent influx of IDPs.
At the time of the research there were also reportedly over 2,000 
KIO high school graduates who had not been able to sit government 
matriculation exams.50 For the KIO Education Department, the long-term 
aim is to develop channels into further education that are not dependent 
on the government. An impressive range of options already exist, with 
KIO high school graduates having been placed in tertiary education 
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colleges in India, China, Thailand, Singapore and elsewhere – often with 
accompanying scholarships. Furthermore, there at least six further 
education institutes in KIO-controlled areas (a KIA officers academy; KIO 
agriculture and nursing colleges in Laiza; the Federal Law Academy; the 
Institute of Liberal Arts and Sciences (ILAS) and the KIO Education 
Department’s Institute of Education in Mai Ja Yang).51 However, it is 
unlikely that the KIO would be able to identify sufficient tertiary education 
places – and scholarships – for all KIO school graduates. Therefore, while 
Kachin education authorities are committed to meritocracy, the risk is that 
only (or mostly) the children of elites such as the KIO/KIA leaders will 
benefit from limited opportunities for access to higher education.52
In a potentially significant development, in April–May 2018, the 
Kachin SEO issued an official announcement that children without 
‘records of achievement’ (i.e. KIO schoolchildren, including IDPs) 
would be able to join MoE schools after taking placement tests, with no 
further scrutiny. Implementation of this policy seems to vary between 
townships. For many parents, this was a positive development giving 
them options. The KIO-ED has remained officially neutral on this issue, 
allowing children to join government schools on their own volition, 
but not promoting the practice. Unofficially, there is probably some 
disquiet at this development as it seems that fairly large numbers of 
IDP families have been moving from KIO-controlled areas to camps 
in government-controlled Myanmar in order to access education. The 
primary motivation seems to be that children could receive official school 
certificates (especially the Grade 5 and Grade 8 Board Exams; and 
matriculation so as to enter Myanmar higher education).53
Kachin Education consortium
The main non-state ethnic education providers are grouped under 
the Kachin Education Consortium (KEC) that also includes the two 
nationwide ‘Kachin’ national NGOs, Metta and Shalom foundations, that 
provide capacity-building/training and other forms of education support, 
but do not directly administer schools.54
The one organisation that has managed to develop an entirely 
independent Kachin Curriculum in Jingpaw is SaJaNa55 that provides 
education services for Kachin both in Kachin and Shan States. A Baptist 
church-based organisation with its HQ in Special Region 5, its curriculum 
is used in 25 schools in northern Shan State and 24 in Kachin State, 
mostly located in government-controlled but at times quite remote areas. 
It was founded with the financial help of a Kachin militia amid profound 
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dissatisfaction with a government system perceived as irreparably 
damaged and dysfunctional – both in terms of rote-learning teaching 
practices and a Burman/Burmese-dominated curriculum. With the 
help of Hope International, SaJaNa has developed a system owned 
and delivered by local Kachin, primarily Jingphaw stakeholders, 
delivering student-centred, mother-tongue-based education. According 
to SIL, SaJaNa is the only organisation that offers a complete MTB-MLE 
experience, as Burmese is taught throughout the early grades as a 
second language (Dekker, 2018a: 38 and 57).56 At the time of writing, 
the earliest established two schools in northern Shan State are offering 
up to Grade 7, and they are adding a further one grade-level each year. 
On previous visits in 2015 and 16, SaJaNa schools were experienced 
as wonderful learning environments, with committed teachers and 
engaged children. Potential problems with this system are similar to 
those discussed above in relation to KIO schools: the lack of accreditation, 
meaning that SaJaNa school graduates will not easily be able to sit 
government matriculation and other exams.
The Kachin Education Foundation (KEF) was established in 2014 
and has played a leading role in developing education policy among 
Kachin stakeholders, enjoying a close relationship with the KIO-ED. 
It currently administers 17 schools in government-controlled areas 
in and around Myitkyina, Bhamo and Kutkai (northern Shan State). 
Through its Naushawng Education Centre in Myitkyina, KEF offers 
a number of short and longer courses to post-high school Kachin 
students, focusing particularly on English language and computer 
training. KEF also administers independent schools which follow the 
SaJaNa curriculum. The LoI is primarily Jingphaw, although KEF is 
beginning to add some other dialects. Fieldwork by Ashley South in 2018 
found that a few parents transferred their children after KEF Grade 1 
back to MoE schools due to concerns about relatively limited Burmese 
language teaching, and lack of accreditation for non-government 
schools.57 Beyond KEF, the various Kachin churches also supply volunteer 
teachers to various government and non-government schools and their 
contribution has become vital due to the conflict. Some volunteer 
teachers from the Catholic church are seen at a workshop in Myitkyina 
in 2015 in Figure 7.5.
In the Kachin context, the resumption of armed conflict since 
2011 has led to greater pan-Kachin unity and cohesion around an 
ethno-linguistic core, identified particularly with the Jingphaw identity. 
Significant elements among non-Jingphaw communities seem not to 
object to adopting this dominant dialect as a Kachin lingua franca, 
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although some sub-groups find the dominance of Jingphaw problematic. 
Associated with massive and widespread human rights abuses, the 
renewed fighting has alienated many of those in the diverse Kachin 
ethno-linguistic community who previously were willing to consider a 
future as part of Myanmar. Since the resumption of armed conflict, KIO-
administered schools have been switching more to Jingphaw and English, 
and teaching less Burmese. This is part of a general move to disengage 
from government education, and to develop a more distinctively Kachin 
school system.58
The KIO-ED was similar to the MNEC system in that it met all 
‘4 R’s’ of Novelli et al.’s peace and education framework. However, the 
resumption of conflict means that not only KIO schools but also those run 
by SaJaNa, while supporting ‘redistribution’ through equitable access 
to education for equitable outcomes, no longer meet the ‘reconciliation’ 
part of the framework. It is also debatable if they meet the ‘recognition’ 
and ‘representation’ elements of the framework. SaJaNa offers Burmese 
as a second language allowing the children in its care to learn the official 
Myanmar language, but their system and curriculum does not allow 
children to transfer. The KIO still mostly uses the government curriculum, 
which does allow for transfers (when the government is in the mood) but 
Figure 7.5 Kachin State non-government teacher workshop, 2015. 
Source: Author.
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they teach less and less Burmese. Non-Jingpaw speaking groups are 
neither represented nor catered for in either of the two systems.
Engaging with the government
There are understandable historic reasons for the emergence of separate 
education systems, and they do offer education in a language the children 
can understand, making them popular across communities that have 
developed a historical mistrust of the Bamar-dominated administrative 
systems. However, these separate systems have some distinct disadvan-
tages: limited options for school graduates if they cannot speak Burmese 
and have no recognised qualifications, and difficulty for graduates 
to re-integrate into the Myanmar HE system, or consider themselves 
citizens of the Union. Furthermore, separate systems marginalise 
already poor and vulnerable communities, leading to long-term disad-
vantages. A system of recognition, accreditation and transfer, which 
includes remedial Burmese language training for those who want to join 
government schools, has yet to be negotiated.
Although the NESP (MoE 2018, Section 5.2.2) includes a goal to: 
‘develop a partnership mechanism to support the participation of 
different education service providers in basic education reforms’, the 
MoE has found it particularly challenging to engage with EAO education 
departments. It seems that the MoE officials generally believe that 
the standards offered by EAO schools are lower than what government 
schools provide.59 In discussions about possible ways forward, Mon State 
was singled out as the one place where a possible collaboration between 
the MoE and an ethnic education system could be developed, as the 
MNEC broadly uses the government curriculum and the MNEC already 
has links with the SEO (see Figure 7.6). All other potential collaborations 
were seen as challenging based on the issues of different content and 
standards across the systems. The main issue for some MoE officials is a 
concern that all children in Myanmar should learn the same curriculum 
content, as well as the requirement that they should reach equivalent 
standards of learning.60 For a transfer process to be formalised, at the 
very least common agreed standards would have to be developed.
The language issue was also seen as a barrier to collaboration in 
relation to transfer mechanisms, as several MoE respondents felt that 
the ethnic children who had attended ethnic schools would not speak 
sufficient Burmese, putting extra strain on already overburdened 
classroom teachers.61 This feeling is widespread, despite the fact that the 
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NEL Chapter 7, Establishment of Curriculum and Curriculum Standards, 
Section 42, states (GoM, 2014b): ‘The Ministry, Division or State 
Governments, and Self-Administered Division or Region Governments 
shall (i) arrange for the ability to communicate and transfer between 
government and other schools and (ii) help to open classes to develop the 
ethnic groups’ literature, language, culture, arts and traditions’. Whilst 
the latter point is covered in the MoE’s development of the LC with the 
various ethnic LCAs (as discussed in Chapter 6), the issue of remedial 
language support in transfers between systems62 to promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all remains to be addressed.
Developing a relationship with the government MoE is no easier 
from the EAO side. Demands are similar across systems focusing in the 
first instance on recognition of their schools and teachers as well as 
standardising easier mechanisms for student transfers: ‘Ethnic schools 
need recognition by the government, so students can switch to the same 
grade, with the help of special language upgrading classes. They [the 
Figure 7.6 Joint MNEC and Mon SEO workshop 2018, led by Viren Lall 
with Mi Kun Chan Non translating. Source: Author.
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government] need to make rules for this, so that this arrangement is 
spread throughout the country’.63
There are many barriers to collaboration with the government; 
they include the historical Burmanisation, which has resulted in de facto 
discrimination and the lack of equal rights for all ethnic nationality 
communities across the social and economic domains. Some barriers are 
more structural and include the centralised nature of the government, 
such as the fact that education decisions cannot be taken at state level, 
resulting in the government retaining control over the LoI and curricular 
content (Lall et al., 2020). For the Mon, whose system is possibly closest 
to that of the MoE, the main concern remains that the Union level MoE 
does not understand the value of MTB-MLE and that the State Counsellor 
herself was against MTB-MLE being used as a system in Myanmar 
schools.64 It was felt by Mon respondents that since the state level 
government and the MoE did not have any decision-making power with 
regard to education in ethnic states, there needed to be advocacy directly 
to the State Counsellor and the MoE in Nay Pyi Taw by organisations 
such as UNICEF and Save the Children, who understand that MTB-MLE 
allows ethnic children to learn better overall when they are able to start 
education in their own language. The NLD was described as being 
very ‘new’ in the matters of politics and governance, and few if any NLD 
MPs were deemed knowledgeable about different multilingual/mother 
tongue-based education systems in general and on ethnic education 
systems in particular.65
Despite these barriers, two EAO education departments have taken 
part in very preliminary discussions.66 This poses the risk of those willing 
to engage with the MoE being criticised by ‘hardliners’ within ethnic 
communities for engaging with the government. But in the face of the 
increasing threats to the EAO education systems, such an engagement 
has become salient. These threats include issues of finance and the 
related issue of losing teachers.
Financing EAO schools has become a particular problem for all EAO 
education systems. Before Myanmar’s opening to the Western world 
after 2011, EAOs received cross-border funding, mostly through Thailand 
from cross-border-based NGOs, that supported schools, teacher training 
and teacher salaries as well as materials and textbooks for the children. 
This aid has now largely moved away from the border and the inter- 
national development partners focus and support is on the reform process 
within Myanmar (Lall and South, 2018). Communities have always 
supported their teachers, mainly by contributions in kind, but there is 
simply not enough money for the system to work smoothly. A particular 
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issue is teacher salaries. In the last two years, a large grant from Norway 
has helped NMSP to pay its teachers, but nevertheless this salary is a 
fraction of what government teachers receive. As the conflict has been 
paused since the 1990s, and MNEC teachers now have direct contact 
with government teachers, not least in joint government training, this 
highlights the huge disparity, and leads to the risk of losing teachers 
across all EAO education because of the unstable financial situation.67 
Whilst teachers have a strong commitment they need secure livelihoods 
so they can remain in the job. During a government school recruitment 
drive under the Thein Sein Government, some skilled teachers transferred 
to the government system as daily wage teachers.68 Those who have 
integrated into the government system have both job security as well as a 
pension, an attractive package that the MNEC cannot match. A related 
issue is the low matriculation rates at the Mon National High Schools, 
especially in Nyisar, which some parents say is due to a lack of ‘skillful’ 
teachers available in such a remote location (interviews 2015).
The quality of teachers and student achievement has become 
a contentious issue. Previously, the quality of instruction in MNSs 
was seen as better than in government schools (Lall and South, 2013a 
and 2013b); this is now the reverse, reinforcing the status government 
schools have gained in Mon communities, and leading to new parental 
choices (Lall and South, 2018). During the time of conflict and military 
dictatorship, parents actively wanted their children to attend Mon 
National Schools (interviews across Mon State in 2011 and 2012). This 
was in part for linguistic and nationalist reasons, in part due to the lack of 
choice in more remote regions. Since the reform process started, more 
government schools have moved into former conflict areas, changing the 
education dynamics. In some cases, there has reportedly been coercion 
by government teachers who visit parents and pressure them to send 
their children to government schools, in other cases parents chose the 
government alternative as they know children can continue their 
education through to university without any of the transfer problems 
that can occur when the children have to switch systems. According to 
some respondents (interviews in 2011, 2012 and 2016), those parents 
who choose to send their children to MNSs for nationalist reasons, 
to protect their language, literature (script) and culture, are declining in 
numbers. Since the conflict is seen to have ended some time ago, and the 
government is no longer seen as a military dictatorship, the ‘protest 
value’ of using MNSs has diminished. ‘MNSs rely on the community 
but the community now has more trust to the government school, so 
this reduces commitment of the community. Under military rule the 
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commitment of the community was stronger, now that the government 
has changed, they are less anti-government’ (Mon Teacher, Mudon, 
2018). Teachers and MNEC officials see this as a worrying trend as they 
believe that without their schools Mon language will not be learnt 
adequately by Mon children. They are concerned both for the children 
who come from Mon-speaking households and who in a Burmese 
language system suffer lower achievement and loss of communication 
skills, as well as for the wider, more educated urban-based Mon 
population, where Burmese is sometimes spoken at home, but where 
there is a risk of losing the essence of Mon culture. ‘Education is the 
essence of the ethnic identity. To have freedom of the ethnic identity is 
important. Therefore, MNS are important. We can produce good Mon 
leaders’ (Mon Teacher, Mudon, 2018). Many teachers who took part in 
discussions in 2016 and 2018 thought that parents did not understand 
the benefits of MTB-MLE, and that the Mon community also needed to 
be informed about why mother tongue-based learning helps children 
achieve better in the long run.
Conclusion: Harnessing ethnic armed organisations 
systems for increased social justice
EAO education officials and ethnic parents who send their children to 
EAO-run schools generally feel that the government has a responsibility 
in supporting both the teachers and the infrastructure of ethnic 
nationality schools on the basis of giving ethnic people equal rights – ‘We 
need government support without their control.’ This was justified by 
the fact that in the remote area where the government was not able or 
willing to open a school, or where even if there was a government 
school, government teachers would refuse to stay, the EAO was doing the 
government’s job.
So there is less responsibility of the government to the remote areas 
and MNEC is taking the responsibility so children can continue 
their education. Really good for the MoE. Therefore, MoE should 
recognise the school. (MNEC official, 2018).
This is a reflection of ‘redistribution’ – in that there needs to be non- 
discrimination in access to resources and equitable outcomes in 
education, ‘recognition’ – in that the government was seen to have to accept 
and respect the diversity of its own country as well as ‘representation’ – 
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where communities have the same right to participate in setting up 
education systems. It also links in with the desire by other, smaller ethnic 
communities discussed in the previous chapter, to have local teachers who 
speak the local ethnic language in order for the communities to ‘own’ the 
system and feel they benefit from it.
It is clear from the above that in order for Myanmar to achieve 
a sustainable and just peace, educational reform and practices will have 
to engage with the past injustices and the effects of decades of conflict. 
Part of the reconciliation process, therefore, is about the recognition 
of EAO systems, so that ethnic communities feel their language and 
culture is represented in the Myanmar education system. Only through 
recognition will equitable redistribution occur. And whilst the NESP 
text sets out the aim for this to be achieved, the path of negotiation is 
proving difficult.
Notes
 1 Dekker et al. maintain that: ‘Of the 11 EBEPs we met, only four (possibly five) are positioned 
to develop true MTB-MLE programmes in the next 2.5 years. Only KED, MNEC, KEC, KnEDN, 
and (possibly) CRED have complete control over a sufficient number of “independent 
[primary] schools.” Other organizations support “community schools,” but these are 
transitioning (by intent) into government schools at a fast rate – a process which will accelerate 
as international funding of the MOE rises. Even long-standing, strong EBEPs like the MNEC 
and KED are losing schools to the government system through attrition, as community 
members feel that government funding will alleviate their financial burdens while giving 
children the opportunity to study the national curriculum (opening the door to higher 
education and better jobs)’ (Dekker et al., 2018b: 11).
 2 The NMSP has maintained a ceasefire with the government since 1995.
 3 The KIO saw its 17-year ceasefire collapse in 2011.
 4 The ‘4 R’ framework is also used in Higgins et al., 2016. However, that report engages only 
with the government and the Mon education systems.
 5 Higgins et al.’s analysis is based on the text of the NEL 2015 and the National Education Sector 
Plan (i.e. the text developed under the Thein Sein Government by 2015, that was adopted by 
the NLD almost in its entirety in 2016) rather than the actual reform process that took root 
after 2015, but that rather confirmed their fears.
 6 ‘Formal education’ is used to indicate regular schooling, whether implemented by government 
or non-state groups, or a mixture of these; ‘non-formal education’ refers to extra-curricular 
(usually part-time) education activities, implemented by a range of (mostly non-state, 
community-based) agencies.
 7 See for example, the Report by the Karen Human Rights Group (2011). https://khrg.org/
reports/year/2011.
 8 https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/ethnic-armed-alliance-extends-ceasefire-rest-year, 
and https://elevenmyanma.com/news/tatmadaw-extends-unilateral-ceasefire. 
 9 More details on this in Lall et al., 2020.
10 Plus an estimated 80,000 Mon speakers in Thailand.
11 MNEC Aim: ‘To create a society that ever continually makes learning for its capacity 
improvement so as to build a federal union state that is destined to provide its people at least 
with basic education and enables all ethnic groups of people to peacefully coexist’. MNEC 
Objectives: ‘For all Mon children to access basic education; To maintain unity in diversity; 
To develop friendliness among the ethnic nationalities; To maintain and promote ethnic 
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culture and literature; To develop technological knowledge; To produce good sons and 
daughters of the nation; To help the outstanding students attain scholarship awards for 
continuing their education up to the international universities.’
12 In February 2012, NMSP leaders re-confirmed a ceasefire with the Thein Sein Government 
and in 2018 they signed the NCA. 
13 In addition to the MNS, many Mon monasteries continued to teach elements of the Mon 
language and culture through the MSLBC training in a number of monasteries that have 
expanded over the years. While the extent of MSLBC training activities has expanded as a 
direct result of the increased space created by the NMSP ceasefire, Mon armed groups were not 
directly involved in these initiatives. See chapter 3 in this volume.
14 Figures given by MNEC. The SIL MEC Inception report (Dekker et al., 2018c) has different 
figures: MNEC provides mother tongue-based education to over 25,000 students (11,000 in 
133 Mon national school with 610 teachers. 14,000 students with 161 teachers for Mon 
language in 96 government schools, 12 ECCD Schools, 1 NFE centre, 831 teachers, 20 ECCD 
teachers, 42 programme staff.
15 Fieldwork was conducted in the course of 2018 across Mon, Shan and Rakhine States.
16 Attended and co-organised by the author.
17 Discussed at length in FGDs in Mon National Schools in 2018.
18 According to interviews with MNEC leaders in 2018, MNEC has representation on the LC 
development committee for Mon State, but finds itself outnumbered by non-Mon stakeholders, 
creating new tensions in what the MNEC believes should be a collaborative process led by 
them working with the SEO.
19 ‘In the context of the Myanmar Army’s brutal counter-insurgency campaigns since the 1970s, 
hundreds of thousands of Karen and other ethnic nationality citizens have fled the country to 
refugee camps in neighbouring Thailand. In 2015, some 30,000 children attend 80 schools in 
the seven Karen and two Karenni refugee camps in Thailand. These camps receive assistance 
from a range of international NGOs, and are administered by the Karen and Karenni Refugee 
Committees respectively, with education organised by the Karen Refugee Committee 
Education Entity (KRCEE), and the Karenni Education Department (under the authority of the 
KNU and KNPP respectively). Since the peace and reform processes began there have been 
some voluntary returnees, and there are calls for a more systematic return of these refugees, 
with declining international aid to the camps.’ The Border Consortium. 2015. The Border 
Consortium Programme Report, January–June 2015 (Bangkok). https://www.ecoi.net/en/
document/1431034.html.
20 Karen dialects occupy the Tibeto-Burman branch of Sino-Tibetan languages. There are some 
12 Karen language dialects, of which the majority speak Sgaw (particularly in hill areas and 
among Christian communities) and Pwo (especially in the lowlands and among Buddhist 
communities). The size of the Karen population is unknown, no reliable census having been 
undertaken since the colonial period. Many commentators emphasise the Christian identity 
of the Karen. However, not more than 20 per cent of the Karen population are Christians. 
There are also some small populations of Karen Muslims.
21 The KSEAG was formed in 2005 by KTWG, KED and various partner organisations. According 
to KTWG, in 2013–4 KSEAG supported 6,154 teachers, 141,632 students and 1,294 schools. 
https://ktwg.org/education-assistance/.
22 These figures were provided by a KED official in 2018. Dekker et al. have similar figures: 1,573 
schools with 317 schools KED administered, and using MTB; 5,652 teachers; 22,968 students 
in 1,256 mixed schools; 15,443 teachers; and 152,693 students in mixed schools (Dekker at 
al., 2018c).
23 Former affiliation of SSA-N Brigade 7.
24 Interviews with Shan Literature and Culture Association in Taunggyi and other Shan 
stakeholders in Yangon and Shan State in 2018.
25 Sai Pha, who met the author at Kaw Dai in 2018, explained that the six tone system allows to 
distinguish between similar sounding words, while the five tone creates confusion.
26 Personal interview with the teacher in Taunggyi in summer 2018 who developed the 
curriculum, but who asked to remain anonymous.
27 Discussion with Kim Jolliffe who has worked on public services in northern Shan State. 
28 After decades of conflict, the RCSS signed the NCA in 2015, but has to date refused to consider 
any formal discussions of collaboration in education with the government.
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29 Certain areas are designated by the Myanmar government as ‘black areas’ where there has 
recently been, or is continuing, armed conflict. Although government teachers and health 
workers are sent to these areas (and now also remunerated better because of the risks), many 
do not stay.
30 During the 2018 fieldwork, no data was collected about the RCSS’s support to schools in camps 
on the Thai side of the Thai–Myanmar border, nor was the RCSS asked about how its system 
functioned in Thailand.
31 Including India, US, Norway, Thailand, Philippines and Sri Lanka.
32 Respondents told the author there was currently no transfer mechanism and no transfers were 
taking place.
33 The curriculum developer met the author and explained that she left the RCSS in 2006 and 
that she had developed materials up to certain Grades: maths only for 2 grades, geography for 
Grades 2, 3 and 4; science for Grades 1, 2 and 3; and history not all Grades. However, some 
subjects including Shan were developed up to Grade 8. Other respondents explained that the 
secondary curriculum is based on the Thai curriculum.
34 The SSPP has not signed the NCA, and is in conflict both with the Tatmadaw and the RCSS.
35 Discussion with Kim Jolliffe who has worked on public services in northern Shan State.
36 Interview with Sai Pha at Kaw Dai in 2018.
37 Interview with CRED officials in Taunggyi in 2018.
38 According to a senior CRED member, RDFSS was advised to register as CRED so that its 
activities would not be limited to Shan State.
39 CRED facilitated two workshops on Shan National Education Policy and Planning, in 
March 2017 and December 2016, supported by MEC – but no details in English seem to be 
available.
40 Although they collaborate with the education departments of the EAOs, respondents were 
keen to emphasise that while they have good relations with the different EAOs, this does not 
mean they support them.
41 Much of this support comes under its partnership with the Rural Indigenous Sustainable 
Education (RISE) network and is supported by the EU via ADRA. 
42 The schools received some donor support from the Swedish Burma Committee in the past.
43 Aims as listed on https://www.kawdaiorganization.org/:
• To build the capacities and skills of Shan youth so that they become community leaders in 
areas of need in the Shan State.
• To provide academic education for Shan students so that they can pursue higher education 
abroad.
• To provide basic education and home for internally displaced children and poor children 
across the Shan State.
• To empower grassroots community through political education to become active citizens.
• To create sustainable community economy through community learning centre.
44 Other Kachin armed groups include the ex-communist New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) 
and ex-KIO Kachin Defense Army (KDA), both of which agreed ceasefires with the government 
in the 1990s (for more detail see South, 2003: Chapter 5). The KIO has not signed the NCA.
45 At least until 2018 – see developments about this later in this chapter.
46 Author interview in London with Dr Lu Awn, head of the Mai Ja Yang College, April 2019.
47 Actual numbers including IDP schools are likely to be higher. Author interview in London with 
Dr Lu Awn, head of the Mai Ja Yang College, April 2019.
48 Author interview in London with Dr Lu Awn, head of the Mai Ja Yang College, April 2019.
49 As documented in the unpublished WB report by Lall et al., 2020. Fieldwork for this by Ashley 
South. Also confirmed in discussions with Dr Lu Awn in April 2019. See more on the Kachin 
situation in South, 2018. 
50 This was pointed out in a personal interview with KIO Maj Gen Sumlut Gun Maw in Chiang 
Mai in 2016. He shared the government directive that no longer allowed students from KIO 
schools to transfer to government schools or take matriculation exams. Interview with 
Dr Lu Awn in April 2019 (London) shows that this problem is ongoing although there are some 
changes detailed below.
51 The author visited both Laiza and Mai Ja Yang in 2015 and was shown around most of the 
tertiary education facilities.
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52 Bawk La notes: ‘there are not enough places at [KIO FE colleges] … to accommodate all of the 
students who wish to pursue higher education … At least one third of students who have 
completed standard 10 in KIO schools still need to join Myanmar government-controlled 
schools … [However,] despite having attained standard 10 matriculation, students from KIO-
controlled schools are forced to re-enter the formal system in government-controlled schools 
at a level two years lower’ (Bawk La, 2017: 17–9). 
53 Private conversation with Dr Lu Awn, Rector of Mai Ja Yang College, April 2019.
54 Dekker et al. state that overall the KEC supports 23,000 children in Kachin and northern Shan 
states with 1,862 teachers; 70 education officers; 217 principals; and 400 school management 
committees that include the KIO and SaJaNa (SJN) – Shan State Kachin Baptist Union schools 
(Dekker et al., 2018c).
55 Northern Shan State Kachin Baptist Union church-based education.
56 See Lall 2016c for points from the meeting with SaJaNa administration in Lashio.
57 Conversations with Ashley South who conducted fieldwork in Kachin in 2018.
58 Fieldwork in Kachin State in 2015–6.
59 Confidential interviews with MoE officials including a number of director generals from 
different departments on issues pertaining to ethnic education 2017–9.
60 Confidential interviews with MoE officials including a number of director generals from 
different departments on issues pertaining to ethnic education 2017–9.
61 Confidential interviews with MoE officials including a number of director generals from 
different departments on issues pertaining to ethnic education 2017–9.
62 National Education Law (2014, Parliamentary Law No. 41) The objectives of national 
education are, among others: ‘To develop union spirit and to create citizens who respect, 
value, preserve and develop all the ethnic groups’ languages, literatures, culture, arts, 
traditions, and historical heritage’ (Chapter 2 (c) Objectives). 
63 Quotes from Mon and Kachin respondents during confidential meetings between 2018 and 
2019.
64 This was clearly expressed at a meeting between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NMSP 
leadership during a meeting that was earmarked to discuss education issues. This came up 
during one of the interviews with NMSP leadership, the person had been present at the 
meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was meeting with Nai Hongsa and other NMSP officials. 
The fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi personally said that she did not support MTB-MLE and 
even (incorrectly) claimed that Assam in India is dropping the three language formula that is 
based on MTB-MLE was re-confirmed with the head of MNEC. This was related to the author 
during a meeting in Mawlamyine in 2018 and re-confirmed in 2019 in Yangon.
65 Conversations with MNEC and other Mon education stakeholders 2018 and 2019.
66 As part of the MEPP that was facilitated by the WB in 2018.
67 The situation is slightly different in Kachin State; first, because the conflict is ongoing, second, 
because KIO teachers are better paid than those working for MNEC and KED, with higher 
parental contributions (apart from parents in refugee camps).
68 The same problem was reported in monastic schools in 2013–4 (See Lall, 2016a and c).
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Conclusion: Whither social justice 
in Myanmar?
This book has covered the Myanmar education reform process, how it is 
affecting Myanmar citizens and what they think about it; it is not a book 
that looks at Myanmar as a case study with reference to the wider 
global social justice debates. But since education is a globally accepted 
pathway to social justice, the country’s reforms leading towards a more 
participatory system (Lall, 2016a) offer an opportunity to make major 
policy changes across society and the NLD promised such change, it 
is pertinent to review the massive reform effort undertaken by the 
government across the different education sectors.
The policy–practice gap
Historically, there has been a large variation in the extent and mix of dep-
rivations experienced across the different states/regions, townships and 
schools. The presence of widespread poverty and a stagnant economy 
over decades have been key factors affecting education services and the 
experience of children and teachers within schools and students and 
academics in universities. In light of this, the 2015 NLD election manifesto 
was like a breath of fresh air, promising after decades of oppression to 
put citizens first, in particular focusing on the most vulnerable, weaker 
sections of society. Education was presented as a key pillar of the strategy; 
the NESP1 addressed all the right headings – aiming for inclusive and 
equitable quality education accessible to all. One can deduce from the 
official texts – many of which have been reviewed in this volume – that 
there is a general understanding across both government and the civil 
service of the issues the country faces with regard to poverty, ethnic and 
religious discrimination, and other widening gaps between the most dis-
advantaged sections of society, both urban and rural, and those who are 
in power politically and economically.2 The policy texts indicate that 
these issues were understood both under President Thein Sein’s and 
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Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership. While Myanmar’s citizens might not 
have expected such changes under the USDP Government, the NLD 
manifesto promised a social justice agenda, underlining the existing 
policy texts. What is more – the new policy texts developed under the 
NLD all re-emphasise the social justice priorities. But in practice, the 
policies are not being implemented; on the ground one can see much 
activity but not that much change. There is a clear, yawning policy–
practice gap, raising the questions as to why the current reality does not 
reflect the publically declared intentions.
One reason might be time; while five years is a very short time to 
judge any government’s successes and failures, the reforms started at 
least five years before the NESP was put into place – and if the decade of 
JICA and UNICEF work is taken into account, an uneasy picture emerges 
of education reforms that are repeated and amplified, but that do not 
change enough on the ground to embed and become sustainable. The 
CESR and the resulting NESP were supposed to break that cycle, but as 
the MTR shows, despite some improvements, this has not been the case. 
This raises the question if the impediments to change are structural, 
including for example, hierarchies and other barriers that cannot simply 
be wished away by policy texts using the right discourse. This book has 
pointed out many barriers for stakeholders, but they have not been 
engaged with by either the government or the development partners. 
The issues stakeholders face are well known as reviews of previous 
programmes pointed to much the same issues – yet it seems that the 
lessons from programmes before 2010 and between 2010 and 2015 have 
not been learnt. Another reason might be the dissonance between the 
neo-liberal development agenda pushed by many (not all) development 
partners that clashes with the social justice-inspired policy texts, as well 
as the general uncoordinated approach taken by development partners 
that have put such a burden on the MoE. Caught between the policy texts 
written by the government and the priorities of development partners, 
it feels like ministry-based stakeholders as well as those further below 
do not own the change process; some claim they do not even understand 
it. In the end, the responsibility for the success of the reforms (or lack 
thereof) lie with the current NLD-led government, and not with the 
development partners. Therefore, another reason could be the NLD’s 
own policy shift from state responsibility to ‘self reliance’ (McCarthy, 
2019). In all likelihood, the reasons for the policy–practice gap is a 
combination of all the above.
The data in this book shows that important pieces of the puzzle are 
stakeholder challenges and ownership, which are in turn underpinned 
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by clashing domestic and international policy priorities. Stakeholders 
(i.e. MoE staff at all levels, teachers, teacher educators, student teachers, 
students and parents) are experiencing challenges across the changing 
system and these challenges are not being addressed. Most programmes 
do not ask how their participants perceive and understand the education 
reforms and in particular what barriers they face. As a result, the reforms 
are experienced as a top-down enforcement, rather than something that 
is collectively owned.
In the first instance, the education reforms affect MoE staff across 
the sector at three levels – at the top ministry level, at the more localised 
administrative levels such as the State/Region Education Offices and 
TEOs and at school levels. Currently, there is very little material in the 
public domain documenting how MoE staff are dealing with the reforms. 
A My-Equip Organisational Constraints Analysis (OCA) (Fullerton and 
French, 2019) of certain MoE departments identified barriers pertaining 
to ‘rules, guidelines, policies and systems; work culture; human resources 
and skills; material and financial resources as well as culture and 
attitudes’. A key issue seems to be a lack of clarity in comprehending the 
wider reform agenda. Unless MoE staff understand what is changing 
and why, they are unlikely to be able to own the process. Discussions 
held in the summer and autumn of 2018 and the spring of 2019 at the 
MoE in NPT, showed that staff at all levels require new skills – at the top, 
director generals and their deputies need to move away from centralised 
authority to devolved decision making. Further down, staff to whom 
the work is delegated need new skills, in particular with regard to 
cross-departmental collaboration and the confidence to contribute to 
programme design. Since the MoE itself is part of a larger hierarchical 
government structure and has to fall in line with other ministries and 
the government, changing hierarchical structures will prove a long-term 
challenge. It emerges that the new ways of working and behaviour 
change has in effect to be authorised and directed in order to be accepted; 
but much of a devolved decision-making culture actually goes against 
traditional Myanmar culture where hierarchies rule supreme.
Further down the education structure, many lives are affected. 
As Chapter 2 on basic education has shown, the principal change for 
serving teachers is the changing pedagogy linked to the new primary 
curriculum that is being rolled-out with limited support both with regard 
to learning aids and classroom-based assessment resources. The JICA 
CREATE MTR, which reviewed (in a limited way) how teachers felt about 
the new curriculum, states that teachers complained of a number of 
barriers. These included insufficient time to prepare the lessons and 
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teaching subjects they had no training in – such as performing arts and 
visual arts. But the main issue seems to have been the cascade training 
(Mizuno et al., 2019: 16), where the lower down the cascade, the thinner 
the transmission of the concepts required for the new curriculum, with 
teachers struggling to understand and use the new materials.3
A preliminary review was conducted by OPM of how the new 
formative and summative assessment system is affecting teachers (OPM, 
2019). It seems that rapid changes have resulted in parallel systems in 
the same school, which means that some teachers are teaching both the 
old and the new curricula with both pedagogies depending on which 
class they were seeing. Teachers are worried as they do not feel they have 
the pedagogical skills to use the new approach, in particular that they are 
unable to conduct classroom assessment on individual students due to 
the lack of experience with the new system and large class sizes.
Teacher–parent relations have also been affected by the new 
curriculum as parents report they cannot check what children have 
learnt.4 This was mentioned both in an interview with JICA (autumn 
2019, Yangon) as well as in the JICA CREATE MTR (Mizuno et al., 2019), 
where teachers explained that parents did not understand the new 
curriculum and were worried about their child being excluded if they did 
badly, especially at Grade 5. As the new curriculum, the new teaching 
methods and the new assessment system are rolled-out, parental support 
and understanding will be needed if the new curriculum and assessment 
systems are to become a success.
Looking back, the main difficulties stakeholders face in the current 
reform process are similar to the ones uncovered in previous research, 
prior to the roll-out of the NESP, in particular, previous UNICEF 
programmes, such as QBEP. This shows that previous lessons have not 
been learnt. The barriers broadly fall into three categories – culture: in 
particular hierarchies and reporting pathways; structure: particularly 
lack of sufficient or adequate training and infrastructural: limiting the 
successful roll-out of the new curriculum and assessment system.
The barriers do not only emerge in basic education, but also in 
higher and teacher education. The new higher education policies, 
influenced by global neo-liberal trajectories of higher education around 
the world are likely to cement inequalities. It has been seen that a 
three-tier system is being proposed, with Yangon and Mandalay 
Universities at the helm of an elite system, and regional universities in 
ethnic states at the bottom of the pile. This will embed the disparities 
between ethnic students who manage to get into universities close to 
home, compared to the Bamar students accessing urban higher education 
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provision, in turn exacerbating the already existing social inequalities. 
Second- and third-tier universities, their staff and students are unlikely to 
receive the same recognition and respect as their elite counterparts. But in 
order to compete internationally, Myanmar’s HEIs feel they have to play 
by international norms and rules, despite the domestic costs.
With regard to teacher education (and teaching as a profession), 
the system is inherently inequitable. Not only do teachers face their own 
social justice challenges due in part to material constraints and low 
salaries and in part to the local cultural outlook, but teacher education is 
also instrumental in reproducing the same social justice issues again and 
again. The main issues are around gender and ethnicity. Over 80 per cent 
of teachers are female, but only 60 per cent of female teachers become 
head teachers and fewer make it to TEO positions. Teaching is seen in 
Myanmar as a service profession where the teacher serves society and is 
a role model to the community in which they work. The transfers often 
mean that female teachers cannot marry, as their husbands might not be 
able to find a job where they are posted (Condon, 2017). Marginalisation 
is rife, and remains unaddressed in teacher education and the teaching 
profession. There are fewer ethnic minority teachers in schools than their 
Bamar counterparts, in part, because the matriculation exam is offered 
only in Burmese, which is not the mother tongue of the ethnic students. 
Recent changes in the 2017–8 academic year in ethnic states suggest 
access to education colleges appears now to have become more inclusive, 
but these changes still have to work through the system and it will be 
years before there are an equivalent number of ethnic teachers to the 
number of ethnic students.
The book also reviewed how alternative systems provide more 
social justice to the people they serve than the reformed government 
provision – possibly without the fanfare of large policy documents and 
election manifesto promises. Monastic schools, for example, are a key 
mechanism in Myanmar’s education system to combat marginalisation, 
and aim for the inclusion of the poorest in society. By ensuring that the 
monastic schools and teachers are supported through donations from 
society, monastic heads undermine the exploitative relationship of the 
tuitions system within the government education system to which poor 
parents are subject.
While monastic schools mostly support poor children and their 
families, the parallel ethnic systems, many of which are provided by 
EAOs, offer similar support to remote and conflict-affected children, 
whose mother tongue is not Burmese. The EAO education officials and 
ethnic parents who send their children to EAO-run schools generally feel 
MYANMAR’S EDUCATION REFORMS278
that the government should have a responsibility in supporting both the 
teachers and the infrastructure of ethnic nationality schools on the basis 
of giving ethnic people equal rights, that have been denied for many 
years under military rule. This is cemented by the fact that these schools 
often offer education in areas where the government is unable or 
unwilling to go. The government’s answer for ethnic students – the roll of 
the LC – does not reverse the process of marginalisation embedded in 
the government education system that impacts so adversely on smaller 
minority groups. In fact, rather than greater inclusion, the manner in 
which it is being developed and rolled-out seems to be sowing division 
even within the ethnic groups. So the debate on the teaching of ethnic 
languages through either a local curriculum, or by developing a full 
MTB-MLE system continues. The census points to the fact that the lack 
of MTB-MLE in Myanmar means that the country will retain long-term 
structural disadvantages for certain groups, and social justice for them 
and others who are disadvantaged is a long way off.
It is astonishing how well understood all these social justice issues 
are in policy terms. The NESP MTR underlines the systemic inequities 
that disadvantage those living in conflict-affected, remote areas:
In the period since 2014/15 the education budget increased by 
63 per cent. The three regions receiving the highest per student 
budgets are Rakhine State, Chin State, and Kayah State – all conflict 
affected areas. Rakhine State and Chin State aside from being 
conflict affected also rank with the lowest matriculation results 
nationwide. The weak correlation between higher expenditure 
and lower matriculation results is likely the result of those areas in 
conflict resulting in disrupted schooling, as well as, inexperienced 
teachers being posted to remote areas, and using Myanmar 
language instead of (better understood) local, ethnic languages. 
(MoE 2020: vii)
The MTR explicitly acknowledges that the 30 per cent of children whose 
mother tongue is not Burmese have to learn two new languages – 
Burmese and English – and are therefore at a high risk of dropping out: 
‘There are no explicit learning strategies to cater for ethnic language 
speakers across Myanmar’ (MoE 2020: ix). And the MTR also recognises 
that national data masks the disparities in education across regions, 
states and population sub-groups.
Much of the current data available to the MTR team is not disaggre-
gated by gender or factors of disadvantage such as ethnicity, religion, 
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disability, geographic location and economic status. Data analysed in the 
MTR indicates that GESI is not integrated across all nine transforma-
tional shifts of the NESP, which limits its contribution to improving 
and strengthening education opportunities for all girls and boys. While 
inclusion is a focus of one transformational shift in the NESP, the plan 
does not adequately mainstream GESI across all main sub-sectors (MoE 
2020: viii).
The NESP MTR therefore validates the findings of this book, but 
does not offer much in terms of suggestions of how the policies can be 
put into practice so as to effect a more socially just system on the ground. 
The Executive Summary of the MTR states: ‘There is a need to manage 
expectations to what might realistically be expected to be achieved 
from within and outside government. For the remaining two years of 
NESP implementation, the MTR team encourages the MoE to remain 
focused on achieving realistic and planned foundations of reform’ 
(MoE 2020: vi).
It is unclear at the time of writing if development partners have 
taken on board the results of the MTR in order to tweak their support to 
the reform process, to adjust to the Myanmar government policy texts 
(and its social justice discourse), make their programmes more workable, 
and in the long run more sustainable. Real change for academics, 
teachers, students and their parents is essential if the reforms are to 
result in a system that offers hope to the generation currently growing up 
and who will have little or no recollection of Myanmar’s military junta. 
It is essential that the reforms erase the junta’s legacy of injustice and 
therefore the political parties in charge of the reforms (and one might 
argue the supporting development partners) have a heavy responsibility 
that is also time bound.
Educating Myanmar’s youth for the future 
of the country?
When discussing education reforms the outlook also has to be forward – 
to the future that is held in trust by the adults of today for the youth, the 
adults of tomorrow. Given the reforms, it is therefore right to ask how 
the reformed system as it stands at the time of writing is expected to 
improve the life of the next generation.
It has been seen across this volume that over the last 15 years, the 
quality of education has been very low. Most urban youth found it 
impossible to get a job, simply based on the government qualifications. 
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The rise of parallel private systems focusing on IT and languages (such as 
English and Mandarin) discussed in Chapter 1 in this volume shows that 
families looked for alternative and supplementary training, especially 
in urban areas. An unpublished study by Myanmar Egress conducted in 
2007–8 uncovered that young people in Yangon needed to take courses 
in private institutions in order to get a job in the private sector. But these 
young people were mostly the fortunate ones whose families could afford 
to pay the required fees, and those who could afford it would try to get 
the required qualifications to go and study abroad, guaranteeing them 
better jobs later in life.5 These market solutions did not and cannot offer 
a way out for the wider population. Many more, either rural or poor, 
were simply stuck with the Myanmar qualifications (either matriculation 
after finishing school or their university degrees) and then unable to find 
a job commensurate to their ‘training level’. The education reforms were 
sorely needed and eagerly anticipated.
But have these reforms taken a ‘visionary’ approach with regard to 
the needs of the young people that centre on getting employment in a 
country where the economy is also changing? It is already known that 
there is a serious skills gap as education is not well aligned with the 
country’s changing labour force needs, even in light of the reforms, and 
even in light of many development partners professing an adherence 
to human capital theory where education is essentially a tool to create 
an educated labour force. The ADB6 succinctly explains the challenges 
in terms of: ‘Access – while at least 80% of youth complete primary 
education, less than half (44%) complete even lower secondary 
education. This leaves a “missing majority” with bleak prospects for entry 
into modern sector employment.’ The summary goes on to explain how 
and what students learn in schools lacks relevance. Written in 2019, 
four years into the NESP, and after the same issues were discussed as 
part of the CESR in 2015,7 the ADB document shows that Myanmar’s 
economic model, based on unskilled labour and natural resource 
exploitation, plays its part in limiting the success of the education 
reforms, especially with regard to more inclusive growth and poverty 
reduction and underpins the need for a social justice approach. The 
lack of joined-up thinking is recognised in the NESP MTR: ‘Beyond 
implementation of individual reforms, the MTR team finds that stronger 
links with industry and stronger connection to future social and economic 
development policy and plans needs to coherently underpin the next 
phase of NESP in Myanmar.’ (MoE 2020: vi). It emerges that even as 
budgetary expenditure for education rises8 and policy documents signal 
the right intentions, a missing element is the recognition of the needs of 
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the young people – who these reforms are ultimately for – and a vision of 
their possible future. As has been seen across this volume, if the practice 
does not follow the policy text, not much will change. Under these 
circumstances the question remains – what future for Myanmar’s youth?
The 2020 elections
The future will not only be determined by the education reforms. Those 
who will govern Myanmar after 2020 also hold the key to how the reforms 
and the future will pan out. The planned parliamentary elections at the 
end of 2020, the third under the 2008 Constitution and the first under 
the government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, are expected to return the 
NLD to government. This next step in Myanmar’s transition would in 
itself be a big achievement, given the country’s history of military rule. 
The Union Election Commission (UEC) compiled the list of 37 million 
eligible voters at the end of 2019.9 More then 100 parties are expected to 
contest. As a new generation is allowed to go to the polls, how are the 
education reforms feeding into the campaign?
More broadly, the reforms are part of the pre-election campaign 
that started very informally early in 2020. After five years in power, the 
NLD has engendered a lot of activity, which has not translated into much 
change on the ground. Certain sections of Myanmar’s urban society 
will be disappointed with the slow pace of change, especially in areas 
such as jobs, infrastructure and foreign investment. The NLD has not 
lived up to society’s high expectations, and there is disappointment; 
but given the lack of an alternative and the fact that there is certainly no 
appetite for a return of the military at the helm of government, the 
failings of this government are unlikely to make much of a difference at 
the polls. A survey held by People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) 
in July 2019 shows that: ‘People were more positive about the outlook 
in their immediate vicinity such as townships than in their states/regions 
or in Myanmar as a whole. While nearly half (44%) of the citizens stated 
that their townships were going in the right direction, only one third said 
the same regarding their states/regions (38%) and the country (37.3%)’ 
(PACE, 2019: 17).
Given the current political context, education and its reform is 
unlikely to dominate the election headlines; critical issues to influence 
voters are more likely to be the stalled peace process and the debate 
around the Rakhine crisis. Callahan states in her 2019 report for 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) that the elections will foster 
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division rather than reconciliation. ‘Communal, religious, and nationalist 
claims will certainly be center stage during the campaign, raising the 
possibility that tensions could boil over’ (Callahan and Myo Zaw Oo, 
2019: 2).
Not all see the peace process as a key issue. A quote from a Mandalay-
based public intellectual in the USIP report notes the lack of interest 
in the peace process amongst the Bamar majority: ‘They watch Amay 
[mother] Suu give the opening speech at every Panglong (Union Peace) 
Conference, and they think she has already made peace. It’s done for 
them. So why are the ethnic groups making trouble?’ (Callahan and 
Myo Zaw Oo, 2019: 19). Nevertheless, the peace process is a key issue for 
around 40 per cent of the population of ethnic nationality, many living 
in conflict-affected areas. The disappointment in these areas at the lack 
of progress of the peace process might lead to some electoral gains for 
ethnic parties, which could recreate an ethnic opposition, as seen during 
the USDP Government between 2011 and 2015 (Lall, 2016a). This would 
be easier than in 2015 as the multiple Kachin, Mon, Chin and Karen 
parties have mostly merged into single ethnicity options that can stand 
against the NLD and the USDP candidates. Nevertheless, as Callahan 
reminds us, much will depend on how acceptable the ethnic party 
candidates are perceived to be by the local voters. It also remains unclear 
how the EAOs – both signatory and non-signatory – will prepare for the 
elections.
Not all ethnic issues will damage the NLD. Myanmar being called 
to defend itself at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2019 will 
actually help Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as she has been seen standing up for 
her country against what are perceived as unreasonable international 
demands. The country’s support has been underlined by huge billboards 
that appeared at Yangon’s busy intersections as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
headed to The Hague to defend her country accused of genocide, 
declaring: ‘We stand with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’.10 However, in 2018 
under immense international pressure, the NLD’s Government agreed 
in principle to the repatriation of the Rohingya from Bangladesh. This 
was to start with around 2,000 refugees at the end of 2018. To date, 
none have returned through the formal process. Nevertheless, this 
agreement will pit the NLD against the Rakhine nationalists. Protests 
against repatriation have already taken place, led by Rakhine CSOs and 
monks. The Rohingya issue is likely to be used by political parties fighting 
the NLD, not only in Rakhine, but in other states and regions as well. 
In addition, the increased violence between the recently created Arakan 
Army11 and the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State has increased the state’s 
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fractious politics. The Arakan Army has seen its popularity rise in central 
and northern Rakhine State, ‘having captured the imagination of many 
Rakhine people through its pursuit of #ArakanDream2020 and the Way 
of Rakhita, which is a call for a nationwide armed revolution by the 
Rakhine people in 2020’ (Callahan and Myo Zaw Oo, 2019: 21).
Education – the ‘litmus test’ by which many in the country will 
judge the reforms in the long run – was originally expected to play a 
significant role in the pre-election discussion.12 In fact, the PACE survey 
mentioned earlier asked those who indicated Myanmar is going in 
the right direction the reasons why. A large percentage (42 per cent) 
indicated infrastructure and government services, 30 per cent said 
administration and governance and 16 per cent pointed to the economy 
and 36 per cent mentioned better education (PACE, 2019: 56). When 
PACE’s enumerators asked those who responded that things are going 
in the wrong direction the reasons why, 39 per cent said bad education 
(PACE, 2019: 57). Education is seen as a key issue. Most families have a 
link to a school or another education institution through their children, 
or as young adults through their studies and training. Ordinary families 
can directly evaluate what has changed and others, more removed from 
the sector, can also follow changes in public education carefully as it has 
become an important press item. This is why the MoE saw the MTR report 
as such an important document and why it needed to show progress 
against the NESP.
However, the COVID-19 epidemic has dampened the post-MTR 
education reforms. As of 19 April 2020, Yangon imposed a night-time 
curfew (10 pm–7 am) and a stay-at-home order on several townships – 
in the first instance, until mid June 2020.13 Shan, Karen, and Kachin 
States and Mandalay, Sagaing, Ayeyarwaddy, and Bago Regions have 
also adopted restrictions including limiting gatherings to a certain 
number of people.14 As schools and universities are closed to reduce the 
chance of contagion, and citizens have been asked to avoid unnecessary 
outings, the whole nature of the build-up to the elections is changing. 
The government has created the country’s first-ever joint civil–military 
‘Emergency Response Committee’ led by military-nominated Vice 
President U Myint Swe to enforce community quarantines and social 
distancing initiatives. The military has been using social media to show 
that it is better prepared to deal with a crisis such as COVID-19 than the 
civilian administration.15 The government on its side put together a 
COVID-19 Comprehensive Relief Plan (CCRP) and Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi is also using social media to underpin her central and visible role 
in the crisis.16 COVID-19 seems to have become a key election issue, 
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eclipsing others that might have played a larger role in the nationwide 
debate.
In light of this, the MoE has put developing NESP 2 on hold, till it 
has a clearer picture of when and how schools will reopen in the second 
half of the year.17 Development agencies have sent most staff back to their 
home countries, and many programmes have either slowed down or 
paused, as they cannot deliver the required changes remotely. COVID-19, 
despite not having hit Myanmar as hard as was initially feared,18 also 
means that the whole election campaign focus moves away from 
education, to the other basic public service of health.
The date for the polls has been set as 8 November 2020. The UEC 
has tried to reassure political parties that the pandemic will not result 
in a rescheduling. However, political parties are concerned that the 
government should first focus on controlling the spread of the virus 
and that the virus might also result in fewer voters taking part in the 
elections, and that it could affect election preparations and management. 
Political parties, therefore, have asked to be consulted in any possible 
changes to the polls.19
This ends a tumultuous five years in which both much and little has 
changed. It is a positive development that ministries such as the MoE 
are aware of the country’s challenges, and that these show up in the 
policy documents. It has to be hoped that the next administration will 
take up the challenge of translating these policies into a reality for the 
Myanmar people.
Notes
 1 It should be remembered that the NESP is not an NLD document but was conceived under the 
President Thein Sein USDP Government as a result of the CESR. The NLD took the original 
NESP and only made minor amendments before it became official Myanmar education policy 
and the backbone of the reforms.
 2 In the Myanmar context, it is unhelpful to think of this in class terms; the military, though part 
of this structure, is not necessarily middle class.
 3 Most of the issues related to in-service training are dealt with in the next section on teacher 
education.
 4 Prior to the new system, when asked, children used to be able to simply recite the lesson back 
to their parents.
 5 Wealthier families opt for private education that can lead to higher education abroad: 
‘In Yangon, the number of international schools, seen by the elite as a pathway to prestigious 
foreign universities, rose from 25 in 2012 to 43 by November 2016. Despite soaring tuition 
fees, enrolment increased by more than 75 per cent in the same period, from 6,700 to 11,800, 
with locals making up 80 per cent of the intake.’ See By Shuyin, 2017. 
 6 Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2019) ‘Support to Myanmar in Strengthening Education 
and Equipping Youth for Employment’ Project Summary Sheet. https://www.adb.org/
projects/48431-003/main.
ConClusion: Whither soCial Just iCe in MyanMar? 285
Annex 1 of this document shows that less than 20 per cent of Myanmar’s entrants to non-
agricultural wage jobs have a Bachelors degree (or higher) and 47 per cent have completed 
secondary education, some other training or diploma. ADB supporting secondary education 
and TVET reforms over 15 years including the Equipping Youth for Employment Project (EYE), 
implemented by the MoE and Ministry of Industry in collaboration with other agencies June 
2017–December 2022.   
 7 CESR presentation on skills gap. Chris A. Spohr (2015) ‘Skills for Decent Jobs and a Modern 
Myanmar: Challenges and Emerging Directions’, Discussion with the Confederation of Trade 
Unions – Myanmar (CTUM) and Solidarity Center, 13 November 2015. Presented by Chris A. 
Spohr, Principal Social Sector Specialist, ADB Myanmar Resident Mission in Naypyitaw. 
 8 Budgeted expenditure increased as a share of GDP for MoE from 1.57 per cent of GDP in 
2014–5 to 1.88 per cent of GDP. Despite this increase, actual expenditure by MoE as share of 
GDP has remained stagnant at around 1.7 per cent of GDP. […] The gap between planned and 
actual expenditure reflects growing challenges of budget execution. Beck et al. 2018.
 9 Excluding military personnel and their families as well as those in the five townships of the 
Wa special region, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/28/c_138589570.htm.
10 https://asiatimes.com/2019/12/suu-kyi-no-shoo-in-at-myanmars-2020-polls/.
11 The AA is an ethnic Rakhine armed group that has its sights set on autonomy from Myanmar 
by 2020, as laid out in its Arakan Dream 2020 mobilisation campaign. 
12 Private discussions with NLD MPs and ministry personnel in 2018 and 2019.
13 Excluding essential workers.
14 https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker- 
0#Myanmar.
15 The Tatmadaw has also announced a ceasefire until the of end August 2020 to help deal with 
COVID-19, but not including Rakhine.
16 Kyaw San Wai, Myanmar and COVID-19, 1 May 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/
myanmar-and-covid-19/.
17 Myanmar reopened high schools end of July 2020. However, schools had to close again end 
August 2020 because of a spike in COVID-19 cases. 
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